Determination of Rates and Terms 06-05-2012 - 201. 1

UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT ROYALTY JUDGES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

ORIGINAL

In the Matter of:

Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services

Docket No. 2011-1 CRB PSS/Satellite II

) Volume I

Pgs. 1 - 298

Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, June 5, 2012

The following pages constitute the proceedings held in the above-captioned matter, held at the Library of Congress, Madison Building, 101 Independence Avenue, Southeast, Washington, D.C., before Cindy L. Sebo, RMR/CRR/CSR/RPR/CCR/RSA of Capital Reporting Company, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, beginning at approximately 9:32 a.m.

	·	
1	APPEARANCES	2
2	Copyright Royalty Tribunal:	
3	CHIEF JUDGE SUZANNE M. BARNETT	
4	JUDGE WILLIAM ROBERTS JUDGE STANLEY C. WISNIEWSKI	
5		
6	On behalf of SiriusXM:	
7	R. BRUCE RICH, ESQUIRE	
8	TODD LARSON, ESQUIRE	
9	MIRANDA S. SCHILLER, ESQUIRE	
10	RANDI W. SINGER, ESQUIRE	
11	SABRINA A. PERELMAN, ESQUIRE	
12	Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP	
13	757 Fifth Avenue	
14	New York, New York 10153-0119	
15	212.310.8170	
16	bruce.rich@weil.com	
17	todd.larson@weil.com	
18	miranda.schiller@weil.com	
19	randi.singer@weil.com	
20	sabrina.perelman@weil.com	
21		
22		

		3
1	APPEARANCES (Continued):	
2	On behalf of Music Choice:	
3	PAUL M. FAKLER, ESQUIRE	
4	MATTHEW TROKENHEIM, ESQUIRE	
5	Arent Fox LLP	
6	1675 Broadway	
7	New York, New York 10019	
8	212.457.5445	
9	fakler.paul@arentfox.com	
10	trokenheim.matthew@arentfox.com	
11	- and -	
12	MARTIN F. CUNNIFF, ESQUIRE	
13	Arent Fox LLP	
14	1050 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest	
15	Washington, D.C. 20036-5339	
16	202.715.8465	
17	cunniff.martin@arentfox.com	
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		

	-
1	A P P E A R A N C E S (Continued):
2	Allean And a bonemaca,.
3	On behalf of CoundEvahange.
	On behalf of SoundExchange:
4	DAVID A. HANDZO, ESQUIRE
5	JARED O. FREEDMAN, ESQUIRE
6	GARRETT A. LEVIN, ESQUIRE
7	1099 New York Avenue, Northwest
8	Suite 900
9	Washington, D.C. 20001-4412
10	202.639.6085
11	dhandzo@jenner.com
12	jfreedman@jenner.com
13	glevin@jenner.com
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	

	•	5
1	CONTENTS	
2	OPENING STATEMENTS: PAGE:	
3	On behalf of SiriusXM 26	
4	On behalf of Music Choice 83	
5	On behalf of SoundExchange 141	
6		
7	WITNESSES:	
8	ROGER G. NOLL EXAMINATION DIRECT ON QUALIFICATIONS	
9		
10	By Mr. Rich 192 208	
11		
12		
13	SIRIUSXM TRIAL EXHIBITS: * MARKED ADMITTED	
14	1 209 209	
15		
16		
17	(* Exhibits Retained by Counsel.)	
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		

			6
	1	PROCEEDINGS	J
	2	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Good morning.	
	3	Please be seated.	
	4	Good morning. Welcome all.	
	5	This is the date and time set for	
	6	hearings in the direct case or the direct phase of	
	7	Copyright Royalty Board Docket Number 2011-1 in the	
	8	Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting	
	9	Subscription Services, or PSS, and Satellite Digital	
	10	Audio Radio Services.	
	11	I am Judge Suzanne Barnett. Seated to	
	12	my left is Judge William Roberts. Seated to my	
	13	right is Judge Stanley Wisniewski.	
	14	We preside as a three-judge panel and	
	15	shall do so throughout these proceedings.	
	16	Our court reporter this week is	
	17	Ms. Cindy Sebo.	
	18	I understand Ms. Sebo is providing	
	19	realtime reporting for counsel, and I also have	
	20	realtime hooked up here on the bench.	
	21	I might, from time to time, highlight a	
	22	portion of the record. I hope and I take notes	
1			

1	at the keyboard. I hope my note taking or
2	highlighting is not distracting to counsel.
3	Please don't draw any conclusions about
4	when I do or do not take notes or highlight the
5	transcript.
6	The hearings on the direct case will
7	proceed in accordance with the this Board's
8	earlier order: for four days this week, counting
9	today; Monday through Friday of next week, the week
10	of June 11; and for the first two days of the
11	following week, the week of the 18th.
12	Each hearing day will begin at 9:30. We
13	will break for lunch at or around noon each day. We
14	will reconvene at 1 p.m. and continue with hearings
15	until approximately 4:30.
16	I say approximately because you know as
17	well as I do that we don't want to cut off a witness
18	in midsentence.
19	As you're no doubt aware, these hearings
20	are subject to the procedural rules set forth in
21	Subchapter B, Chapter 3, Title 37 of the Code of
22	Federal Regulations

1	We are also going forward in accordance
2	with prior orders of the Copyright Royalty Panel and
3	in accordance with stipulations of the parties
4	regarding scheduling, allocation and utilization of
5	allotted time and the order of presentation of
6	witnesses.
7	Just as a reminder, which is, I'm
8	certain, not necessary given the caliber of the
9	of the parties assembled here, these hearings will
10	proceed with all of the decorum afforded a court
11	proceeding.
12	The Panel expects that you will remember
13	to speak clearly and distinctly to assure a clear
14	record and to spare the life of our trusty court
15	reporter to whom you may want to turn for production
16	of an accurate record of these proceedings.
17	The Panel further expects that you will
18	maintain the respect due all participants in these
19	± ±
10	proceedings, counsel, parties and witnesses.
20	
	proceedings, counsel, parties and witnesses.

		9
1	In the interest of full disclosure to	
2	the company assembled, all participants should know	
3	that from mid-1986 until late 1989, I was affiliated	
4	as a senior associate with the firm of Weil, Gotshal	
5	& Manges in their Houston office.	
6	I had no equity interest in the firm. I	
7	had no involvement with the intellectual property or	
8	technology lawyers of the firm. I had minimal	
9	contact with the Washington, D.C. office, although I	
10	did spend a fair amount of time in the New York	
11	office in the waning years of Eastern Airlines. You	
12	might remember them.	
13	I can conceive of no scenario that might	
14	give rise to a conflict of interest, but I think	
15	disclosure is the better part of valor.	
16	If anyone has any heartburn about my	
17	continuing to preside, speak now or forever hold	
18	your peace.	
19	Okay.	
20	We received the stipulation of all the	
21	remaining parties relating to the royalty and	
22	minimum fee payment for ephemeral recordings under	

10 17 USC Section 112. Thank you for that. We will proceed accordingly. 3 We have one preliminary motion to deal with this morning, a motion by SiriusXM relating to revision and amendment of the testimony of Dr. Roger Noll. We received the motion, the response in opposition from SoundExchange and a reply from SiriusXM. We will hear brief argument of counsel 10 on the remaining issues raised by this motion. 11 fellow jurists and I will rule on this motion before Dr. Noll testifies, which I understand will be 12 13 today. 14 We will hear opening statements today and, as I said, we anticipate beginning Dr. Noll's 15 testimony today. 16 17 The court reporter tells me you have all 18 reported in, so we don't need to have appearances 19 for the record, thank goodness. It will take us 20 half the morning to do that, I think. 21 Any other business for the day that I failed to mention, Judge Roberts?

-		11
1	JUDGE ROBERTS: No.	
2	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Judge Wisniewski?	
3	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: No.	
4	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: On the motion,	
5	I've asked my colleagues to take the laboring oars,	
6	as that was what's left is based on an order that	
7	was entered before I came onboard. And I think it's	
8	better for me just to not insert myself into	
9	something that is ongoing.	
10	So who will be making the presentation	
11	for	
12	MR. RICH: Good morning, Your Honor.	
13	Bruce Rich from Weil, Gotshal. I will make the	
14	presentation on behalf of SiriusXM.	
15	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you,	
16	Mr. Rich.	
17	MR. RICH: If I may approach	
18	Your Honors. I have redlined or bluelined and	
19	redlined copies of the proposed amended testimony.	
20	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Is that different	
21	from your filing, Mr. Rich?	
22	MR. RICH: Yes.	
ĺ		

	12
JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Did you say that's	
the same or different?	
MR. RICH: The same.	
Good morning, Your Honors. Straight	
forwardly, I think the briefing is quite	
comprehensive. On in a timely fashion, we	
submitted a proposed amended written direct	
testimony of Dr. Noll which was objected to on a	
variety of grounds.	
And Your Honors denied the motion in	
substantial part based on an interpretation of what	
was appropriate subject for amended testimony based	
on materials learned during the discovery process.	
And in accordance with that and	
certain of the proposed amended testimony, indeed,	
fell within that category, specifically and	
prominently most prominently relating to	
additional information relating to the direct	
licenses in which our clients have entered and, as	
well, a public filing relating to Pandora.	
Notwithstanding that, there were other	
aspects of the proposed amended testimony which fell	
	MR. RICH: The same. Good morning, Your Honors. Straight forwardly, I think the briefing is quite comprehensive. On in a timely fashion, we submitted a proposed amended written direct testimony of Dr. Noll which was objected to on a variety of grounds. And Your Honors denied the motion in substantial part based on an interpretation of what was appropriate subject for amended testimony based on materials learned during the discovery process. And in accordance with that and certain of the proposed amended testimony, indeed, fell within that category, specifically and prominently most prominently relating to additional information relating to the direct licenses in which our clients have entered and, as well, a public filing relating to Pandora. Notwithstanding that, there were other

- 1 within both the letter and the spirit of proposed --
- 2 of the -- of amended direct testimony; namely,
- 3 updating Dr. Noll's testimony and benchmarking to
- 4 accommodate materials that were produced in the
- 5 discovery process.
- And the order, without prejudice,
- 7 indicated that we could represent that portion of
- 8 the proposed amended testimony during the proceeding
- 9 for Your Honors' consideration. And before you is
- 10 a -- is that proposed revised amended written direct
- 11 testimony.
- 12 And what I handed up this morning is a
- 13 blueline of the proposed additions which faithfully
- 14 adhere to the standards set forth in the ruling of
- 15 Your Honors; namely, limiting any proposed amended
- 16 testimony to materials produced in discovery.
- We think it shouldn't be controversial.
- 18 It's well within the spirit and the letter of it
- 19 that, precisely, this is the contemplated scope of
- 20 amended testimony taking advantage of materials
- 21 produced by one's adversary.
- This was incorporated in the prior

- 1 proposed amended testimony by March 26th, which was
- 2 the due date. And so we are seeking to move into
- 3 evidence today the revised amended testimony, which
- 4 is identical in that portion of the prior proposed
- 5 amended testimony, which relates solely to materials
- 6 which the prior order indicated was the appropriate
- 7 subject of an amendment.
- JUDGE ROBERTS: Mr. Rich, perhaps we can
- 9 go right to the heart of your motion.
- 10 In looking over the testimony of
- 11 Professor Noll, I see, in essence, five portions
- 12 that seem to be the most substantial ones. And I
- 13 just wanted to see if you agree with me that -- that
- 14 this is the gravamen of your motion: the testimony
- 15 on Page 8; the testimony that begins on the bottom
- 16 of Page 13, goes through 14 and 15; the testimony on
- 17 the bottom -- starting on the bottom of Page 74
- 18 going to 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82 and ends on
- 19 the top of 83; then the testimony starting on the
- 20 bottom of Page 83 that goes over to Page 84; and
- 21 then, finally, the testimony that begins on Page 92,
- 22 93 and ends on the top of 94.

		15
1	Are those the five essential sections?	
2	MR. RICH: That's correct, Your Honor.	
3	JUDGE ROBERTS: Thank you.	
4	Perhaps you might be interested in going	
5	through each of those and let us know why those five	
6	portions are permissible under our rules.	
7	MR. RICH: Surely.	
8	In all or virtually all of those cases,	
9	Dr. Noll has amended his testimony to incorporate	
10	into his analysis of the marketplace and the	
11	potential benchmarks discovery which came out of the	
12	files of SoundExchange and which is largely	
13	incorporated in proposed further appendices relating	
14	to certain agreements principally involving other	
15	noninteractive active custom radio services, which	
16	he finds corroborative of the analysis which was in	
17	the original direct testimony.	
18	In each of the cases you cite,	
19	Judge Roberts, all that Dr. Noll is doing is	
20	incorporating the benefit of his examination of	
21	those agreements, certain surrounding information	
22	necessary to put those agreements in context, which	

- 1 is, for example, going to the Web sites of one or
- 2 more of these other entities; and, again, within the
- 3 structure of his direct testimony in each case,
- 4 performing the analysis and updating the analysis
- 5 consistently with his original testimony, but with
- 6 the benefit of additional marketplace agreements to
- 7 which we and Dr. Noll had no access prior to the
- 8 discovery process, which, had Dr. Noll had access to
- 9 those, publicly or otherwise, he would have
- 10 considered sooner and, again, entirely consistently
- 11 with the rules of this Tribunal, having gotten the
- 12 benefit of those within the 15-day window, rapidly
- 13 integrated those into his testimony.
- 14 With respect to -- I should add,
- 15 Judge Roberts, with respect to 83 and 84 of the
- 16 testimony, there is, in addition, a discussion of a
- 17 mobile services agreement which helps to emphasize a
- 18 very important part of Dr. Noll's testimony which
- 19 relates to how one deals with bundled services in
- 20 terms of how one thinks and goes about the
- 21 benchmarking process.
- 22 And the particular agreement which he

- 1 discusses there, which, again, came out of the
- 2 discovery process, explicates and supports his
- 3 underlying economic framework of analysis.
- 4 JUDGE ROBERTS: It would seem that the
- 5 potential objection lies with the fact that
- 6 Dr. Noll, while certainly looking at agreements that
- 7 were produced in discovery -- there's little doubt
- 8 of that -- but then he went on to do additional
- 9 research, as you just mentioned. You described it
- 10 as putting it in context, but perhaps going to the
- 11 Web site of these different services, Slacker or
- 12 turntable.fm or Tier 4 service.
- 13 And then, also, he looked into any
- 14 publications that might discuss those agreements or
- 15 might have some bearing on what he wanted to say
- 16 about them.
- 17 Isn't that additional material and
- 18 additional research that was not really the product
- 19 of discovery?
- MR. RICH: Well, it was -- it was the
- 21 fruits of the discovery, Your Honor. Had -- had
- 22 Dr. Noll had access to these materials prior to

- 1 discovery, it's reasonable to assume he would have
- 2 used those same research tools to flesh out,
- 3 contextualize and present in a coherent fashion the
- 4 implications of these agreements.
- 5 The only reason he supplemented in the
- 6 fashion you describe was with the benefit of that
- 7 discovery in order to present a coherent analysis.
- It seems, to us at least, that it would
- 9 be a bit artificial to allow the physical documents
- 10 in without being able to round the testimony in a
- 11 meaningful way, in a coherent way with a very
- 12 limited amount of supplemental information designed
- 13 simply to contextualize it.
- This is not a massive supplementation of
- 15 what's there; it's really to put it in its proper
- 16 context within the framework of an existing, you
- 17 know, comprehensive piece of testimony.
- 18 So it was -- it was literally the --
- 19 what you cite was not the fruits of discovery, but
- 20 it wasn't extraneous to it, it wasn't independent of
- 21 it, it wasn't gratuitously added; it was simply to
- 22 take what was the benefit of that discovery and put

			19
	1	it into a format and shape and context that would	19
	2	make it meaningful for Your Honors.	
	3	JUDGE ROBERTS: So you're asking for	
	4	some flexibility of the rules?	
	5	MR. RICH: A little bit.	
	6	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Thank you.	
	7	MR. RICH: Thank you.	
	8	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Who will be	
	9	responding?	
	10	MR. HANDZO: Good morning. For the	
	11	record, I'm David Handzo on behalf of SoundExchange.	
	12	And to Judge Roberts and	
	13	Judge Wisniewski, it's good to be here again.	
	14	And to Judge Barnett, welcome to our	
	15	world.	
	16	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you.	
	17	JUDGE ROBERTS: You still lead the	
	18	league, Mr. Handzo.	
	19	MR. HANDZO: I am compelled to say	
	20	Mr. Freedman, who's with me, is tied.	
	21	I think I can narrow this dispute a	
	22	little bit. There are particular portions of the	
1			

20 testimony that we do still object to, and let me 2 start on Page 14. 3 There you have a further description not from discovery, but from Internet research about Slacker. 5 It is not correct to say that that's research that couldn't have been done prior to discovery because there was information about Slacker in the original testimony. So this is all 10 something that could have been done before. 11 There was knowledge about Slacker in the 12 original testimony. They just supplemented it by doing some Internet research that could have been 13 14 done much earlier. 15 JUDGE ROBERTS: Mr. Handzo, why wouldn't 16 you want to, however, as Mr. Rich pointed out, put 17 this into context? You get these agreements in 18 discovery and, while it would be nice to just simply 19 confine your testimony solely to the agreements, it could be helpful to give a little explication on, in 21 this instance, Slacker. 22 MR. HANDZO: Well, let me just

- 1 distinguish between two different things. On 14
- 2 and 15, we've got Slacker and then we've got
- 3 turntable.
- Now, in the case of turntable, that was
- 5 an agreement that was disclosed in discovery. They
- 6 didn't know about it before. So, there, Mr. Rich's
- 7 argument is I just found out about turntable for the
- 8 first time in discovery, so I ought to be able to go
- 9 a little bit further and do some Internet research.
- 10 My point with respect to Slacker is they
- 11 didn't discover that one in discovery; they already
- 12 knew about it at the time they filed their testimony
- 13 the first time.
- So, there, there's no reason to be
- 15 giving latitude to go write things in the amended
- 16 testimony that you kind of wish you'd written in the
- 17 original testimony, but you just didn't.
- 18 JUDGE ROBERTS: Maybe they knew it, but
- 19 did they have it?
- MR. HANDZO: I'd have to go back and
- 21 look at exactly what agreement they had, but I don't
- 22 think it influences the fact that they talked about

22 Slacker in the first place and could have said whatever they wanted to say about Slacker in the original testimony. Let me go also to Page 76. 5 It's the same sort of thing here. is information that they could have -- I'm referring now, I'm sorry, to not the first paragraph about turntable, but to the second paragraph, blueline paragraph, about Last.fm. There, they did have the 10 Last.fm agreement -- a Last.fm agreement with Warner and certainly could have done whatever they needed to do with that. 12 13 This is just adding new information that they could have added in the first pace. 15 That carries over, then, as well, to Page 77 at the top. All this discussion there about 17 Last.fm includes a social networking feature and 18 chat rooms and so on; again, they discussed the last agreement between Warner and Last in the original 20 testimony. This all could have been in the original 21 testimony. 22 The same point with respect to the

- 1 bottom of 77 and the top of 78, again, with respect
- 2 to Slacker, they knew about Slacker, they could have
- 3 addressed that information in the original
- 4 testimony.
- 5 So I guess my point is I think the
- 6 Court's point is well taken, that there is an issue
- 7 here with respect to if you get discovery and you
- 8 learn of some new agreements, do you get to just
- 9 talk about those agreements or can you go further,
- 10 and is the Court going to provide that latitude.
- 11 And it seems to me that is a matter within the
- 12 Court's discretion.
- But where they already had the discovery
- 14 on Slacker, they already had the Last.fm deal,
- 15 there, I think there is a line to be drawn that --
- 16 that just going back and adding new information that
- 17 you wish you had in the first place is not
- 18 permissible.
- 19 JUDGE ROBERTS: Okay.
- 20 MR. HANDZO: If the Court has no other
- 21 questions, I think that's my presentation.
- MR. RICH: May I respond very briefly?

24 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Brief rebuttal. 1 2 MR. RICH: Mr. Handzo confuses two separate concepts, the physical ability to get on a 3 Web site and identify more current information and its relevance. At the time, the only documents available to Dr. Noll dated back to 2007, and, therefore, he was required essentially to confine his analysis to the context and circumstances for the duration of those agreements. 11 The agreements that were produced, 12 however, in discovery are more contemporaneous, and 13 it would have been neglectful on his part and certainly incomplete and, I would argue, subject to cross-examination and impeachment if he had simply 15 offered those later-in-time agreements without 17 updating for Your Honors the later evolution of 18 these services and how those agreements fit within the functionality offered by services, like Last.fm 20 and Slacker. 21 All he did and the only reason it became relevant to look and add the information to which

		•	25
	1	Mr. Handzo adverts is because we had later, more	
	2	contemporaneous agreements which made exactly that	
	3	contextualizing relevant.	
	4	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you.	
	5	MR. RICH: Thank you.	
	6	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Do you want to	
	7	confer?	
	8	We're going to confer for a few minutes.	
	9	We will return.	
1	10	(The Judges confer.)	
1	L1	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Good morning.	
1	12	Please be seated.	
1	.3	The Judges have conferred. We have	
1	. 4	concluded that we will grant the motion of SiriusXM	
1	.5	to amend the testimony of Professor Noll. And his	
1	. 6	testimony will be based upon the revised amended	
1	.7	written direct testimony that we received	
1	.8	recently	
1	9	MR. RICH: Thank you.	
2	20	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: and another	
2	21	copy this morning.	
2	2	MR. RICH: Thank you, Your Honor.	

	. 26
1	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you.
2	We will now have opening statements for
3	the directed case.
4	Mr. Rich, you again?
5	MR. RICH: Yes, thank you.
6	
7	OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF SIRIUSXM
8	
9	MR. RICH: With Your Honors' permission,
10	we have a few demonstratives we'd like to hand up.
11	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you.
12	MR. RICH: A formal good morning to you,
13	Chief Barnett, and add welcome.
14	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you.
15	MR. RICH: And Judge Roberts and
16	Judge Wisniewski, the same.
17	May it please Your Honors, this
18	proceeding, as it relates to SiriusXM, involves a
19	determination of rates that SiriusXM will pay to
20	publicly perform sound recordings during the 2013 to
21	2017 license period pursuant to statutory license
22	provisions of Section 114(f)(1) of the

27 Copyright Act. 2 This proceeding also encompasses Section 112(e), ephemeral licenses. As Her Honor indicated, the parties have submitted a stipulation as to the disposition of fees as they relate to the 112(e) license rates. Pursuant to that stipulation are to be encompassed within the rates determined for the Section 114 license and valued at 5 percent of the total 10 license. 11 And, therefore, what's before 12 Your Honors in this proceeding, formally, is the 13 determination of that encompassing rate for the sound recording performance right under Section 114. 15 This is, as you're aware, the second 16 such proceeding between these parties, the first conducted during 2006 and 2007 covering the period, 17 18 2007 through this year, 2012. That proceeding resulted in rates for the current period beginning at 6 percent of defined revenues as of 2007, rising to 8 percent of defined revenues for 2012. 22 Those rates reflected three to four

- 1 times higher rates than the effective level of prior
- 2 fees that had been negotiated between the parties.
- 3 These fees and the current fee structure
- 4 has generated some \$600 million in license fees over
- 5 the term through the date, roughly, of the direct
- 6 case filing or, actually, more technically, through
- 7 the end of the third quarter of 2011.
- And in our testimony is an estimate that
- 9 by the end of 2012, more than \$200 million in
- 10 additional fees will have been paid pursuant to this
- 11 license structure, meaning something in the
- 12 neighborhood of \$830 million in license fees will be
- 13 paid through SoundExchange to the record industry
- 14 over the course of the current license term.
- Now, for SoundExchange, the great thing
- 16 about a revenue-based license is that the record
- 17 companies really become SiriusXM's top-line partner.
- 18 They share proportionally in SiriusXM's revenue
- 19 growth irrespective of the actual drivers of that
- 20 growth.
- 21 So whether the success of SiriusXM is
- 22 driven by music programming or nonmusic programming

- 1 or improved delivery systems or upgraded receivers
- 2 or whatever, the record industry, by definition,
- 3 gets its stated share of those revenues.
- 4 Looking at the first demonstrative,
- 5 Your Honor, at the red bars, you'll see that
- 6 SoundExchange royalties under the current fee
- 7 structure have steadily grown year by year in line
- 8 with our client's own revenue growth.
- 9 Now, in practice, during this same 2007
- 10 to third quarter 2011 period, during which SiriusXM
- 11 paid continually increasing yearly fees cumulating
- 12 approximately \$600 million, the company experienced
- 13 cumulative cash flow losses during the same period
- 14 of some \$437 million.
- If you look at the blue bars heading in
- 16 the other direction on the first demonstrative, you
- 17 see the contrast between those two sets of data.
- Now, along those lines, you'll hear from
- 19 SiriusXM's chief financial officer, David Frear,
- 20 that while the company's financial performance has
- 21 improved, it's going to take years to recoup nearly
- 22 20 years of losses experienced by the company.

		30
1	As of the time of the direct case	
2	filing, those losses stood at \$5.5 billion in	
3	negative free cash flow and \$8 billion \$8 billion	
4	in net operating losses.	
5	We've not seen a proposal from	
6	SoundExchange either in this case or in the previous	
7	case offering to partner on that side of the	
8	financial ledger. Nor can SoundExchange complain	
9	that SiriusXM hasn't paid its fair share of	
10	statutory royalties.	
11	From 2007 to 2011, SoundExchange	
12	collected an estimated \$1.15 billion from all manner	
13	of statutory licenses combined, subscription and	
14	nonsubscription services, business establishments	
15	services on ephemerals, preexisting; you name it.	
16	And if you do the simple math, our client paid well	
17	over half of the entire amount of that	
18	\$1.15 billion.	
19	Viewed from a slightly different	
20	perspective, as you will have read, SiriusXM's	
21	principal competitor remains terrestrial radio.	
22	Now, because of its statutory exemption,	

31 Ovalties

- 1 radio stations pay no sound recording royalties
- 2 whatsoever. They do, however, pay music performing
- 3 rights organizations, ASCAP, BMI, royalties to
- 4 perform the musical works which are embedded in
- 5 these sound recordings.
- 6 In 2012, broadcast radio -- the
- 7 broadcast radio industry combined with reported
- 8 revenues in the \$17 billion range, give or take, are
- 9 estimated to pay about \$300 million annually in
- 10 music performing rights royalties to the music
- 11 performing rights organizations.
- 12 So compare that to the \$200 million
- 13 estimated to be paid by SiriusXM alone to
- 14 SoundExchange despite, despite, SiriusXM have
- 15 scarcely 1/5 the revenues of its terrestrial radio
- 16 competitors.
- Now, the point of these comparisons, to
- 18 being clear, is not, per se, to suggest that
- 19 payments for diverse music copyright licenses should
- 20 all be equivalent; but, rather, it's to establish
- 21 that SiriusXM, by any rational measure, is making
- 22 extraordinary payments for the use of the record

- 1 industry's intellectual property and that, at
- 2 prevailing royalty levels, the record industry is
- B benefiting handsomely by the signs that SiriusXM may
- 4 have turned the financial corner.
- 5 Remarkably, in our view, the record
- 6 industry professes that it's still being
- 7 significantly undercompensated at the prevailing
- 8 royalty levels and notwithstanding ever escalating
- 9 royalty payments made by SiriusXM.
- 10 For all of its window dressing,
- 11 SoundExchange's case really distills down to the
- 12 propositions that since SiriusXM is increasingly
- 13 financially stable, because it is no longer
- 14 hemorrhaging massive annual losses, because its
- 15 management has expressed optimism concerning its
- 16 future prospects even in the face of a fiercely
- 17 competitive marketplace, that this somehow entitles
- 18 the record industry not merely to share in whatever
- 19 future success the company may attain by continuing
- 20 to receive their current share of any increased
- 21 revenues, but, instead, to receive an ever largely,
- 22 indeed, immensely larger share of those revenues.

Now, you can scour the entire SoundExchange filing for evidence that the record industry's relative contribution to our client's business has grown since the prior license period so as to validate such a demand, but I submit you won't find it. 7 Boiled down to its essence, the record industry's position is that SiriusXM's recent success and short-term continued prospects for 10 success, by definition, entitle the record industry 11 to a larger partnership share in SiriusXM. 12 This position is most clearly evidenced 13 by the written direct testimony of one of its experts, Gregory Sidak. Now, he posits that 15 SiriusXM could afford to pay statutory license fees 16 as high as 57.8 percent of revenue, computed by 17 taking the dollar difference between SiriusXM's 18 total revenue collections and deducting all of its 19 other costs of service and awarding every remaining

1

20

So, in other words, Mr. Sidak's 21

dollar to SoundExchange.

22 testimony invites Your Honors to think of this case

- 1 not through the prism of what a reasonable fee is
- 2 under the governing standard, but, rather, in terms
- 3 of what he terms the "shut down royalty rate" --
- 4 those are his words, "shut down royalty rate" --
- 5 would be for the record industry to take every last
- 6 dollar of revenue remaining after SiriusXM covered
- 7 its other costs.
- Now, even SoundExchange must have
- 9 blushed a bit at pressing that assertion as to the
- 10 actual basis for its proposed rates. So it cut that
- 11 proposal roughly in half.
- 12 Instead, the record industry, quote,
- 13 merely seeks a rate increase beginning with a
- 14 50 percent rate hike in the first year of the new
- 15 license, bringing it to 12 percent of revenue,
- 16 increasing each year such that by 2017, SiriusXM
- 17 would be paying fully 20 percent of its revenue or
- 18 fully two-and-a-half times the current 8 percent
- 19 rate.
- Now, in actuality, Your Honors, the rate
- 21 increase sought is larger than that, given
- 22 SoundExchange's attempt to redefine the governing

- 1 revenue base under -- to which those percent of
- 2 royalty rates would be applied. I'll mention a bit
- 3 more about that later.
- 4 Now, as I discuss also in greater detail
- 5 in just a bit, the basis for SoundExchange's
- 6 proposal, as testified to by Professor Ordover, is a
- 7 dated reliance on agreements reached between the
- 8 major record companies and so-called interactive
- 9 music services.
- This is the same group of benchmark
- 11 services relied on by SoundExchange and Dr. Ordover
- 12 in the prior proceeding. These agreements, if you'd
- 13 flip to your next demonstrative, please, the second
- 14 column, implicate different users engaged in
- 15 different businesses and in need of different
- 16 rights.
- 17 Accordingly, for such agreements to
- 18 serve as potential benchmarks for the fees to be
- 19 paid by SiriusXM necessarily requires a series of
- 20 imprecise adjustments by nature even to try to get
- 21 to the point of viability.
- Now, whatever its merit five years ago,

- 1 this choice of benchmark, in light of a
- 2 significantly altered competitive landscape and the
- 3 availability now of far better benchmarks, will be
- 4 shown during this hearing to be deeply flawed in its
- 5 attempted application to SiriusXM.
- 6 Our client, in contrast, will rely on
- 7 far more probative benchmarks. There are two of
- 8 these: first, the direct licenses SiriusXM has
- 9 entered into with individual record labels which
- 10 require no extrapolations at all -- back to
- 11 Demonstrative 2, if you don't mind, the last
- 12 column -- since those licenses involve the same
- 13 buyer, the same sellers, the same service and the
- 14 same rights conveyance.
- That first ever, first ever direct
- 16 evidence of fair market value for the very rights in
- 17 issue here, indeed, including an even broad scope of
- 18 rights, demonstrates that in actual competitive
- 19 bargaining between and among record companies to
- 20 secure airplay on SiriusXM, the rate that has
- 21 emerged is between 5 and 7 percent of defined
- 22 SiriusXM revenue.

37 1 Dr. Noll's testimony establishes that the average of the 62 agreements executed as of November of '11 is 6.06 percent. The second corroborating benchmark, which Dr. Noll will testify to in detail, involves the majors' agreements with noninteractive, as 7 opposed to interactive, Internet music services. 8 These, you will learn, are head-to-head competitors with our client in the car who offer 10 user experiences and music listening options far 11 more comparable and compatible with SiriusXM's 12 offerings than do the interactive services. 13 These far more apposite agreements were readily available to SoundExchange and its experts, 15 but they avoided them like the plague, and that's for good reason. Making the basic needed 17 adjustments to these far more relevant agreements 18 yields fees in a range corroborative of the direct licenses, 6.6 to 8.3 percent of revenue. 19 20 Now, it's useful to examine the 21 respective economic consequences of the parties' 22 positions.

- 1 If you turn to the next series of
- 2 demonstratives, please.
- 3 Under our client's primary proposal,
- 4 taking an average of 6.06 percent of revenue, and
- 5 based on revenue projections used by one of their
- 6 experts, Mr. Lys, L-Y-S, and him self-relying on
- 7 revenue projections by Morgan Stanley, you would see
- 8 that SoundExchange's five-year receipts for the
- 9 period 2013 to 2017 would increase from the prior
- 10 five-year period, 2008 to 2012, by about
- 11 \$250 million to a cumulative total of just under
- 12 \$1 billion for the license term.
- 13 That's assuming a rate of 6.06 percent
- 14 were established and that those revenue targets were
- 15 actually reached.
- 16 If you turn to the next demonstrative,
- 17 the same analysis, but, this time, plugging the
- 18 current statutory rate at 8 percent and
- 19 hypothesizing that that rate were to stay in place
- 20 over the term. And what you see is that, here,
- 21 SoundExchange would receive more than half a billion
- 22 dollars more than they will have received in the

- 1 prior eight-year period.
- 2 Turning to the next demonstrative, you
- 3 see a depiction of the SoundExchange rate proposal
- 4 escalating as it does from 8 percent to 20 percent.
- 5 And you'll notice that by 2017, its impact for that
- 6 year alone would be an annual payment close to a
- 7 billion dollars one year alone on that estimate.
- 8 And if you flip to the next
- 9 demonstrative, please, you will see that the full
- 10 import of that proposal would be to generate an
- 11 estimated \$3.4 billion over the term of the next
- 12 license or about \$2.4 billion more that our own
- 13 clients' proposal at 6 percent -- and if you turn to
- 14 the next demonstrative, please -- more than
- 15 \$2 billion more than maintaining the status quo. A
- 16 \$2 billion rate increase over the next five-year
- 17 period.
- 18 Now, if you'll put in front of you the
- 19 next demonstrative please, you're all familiar with
- 20 the so-called 801(b) factors. The presentation of
- 21 our case, Your Honors, will also demonstrate that
- 22 the rates implied by the foregoing benchmarks are,

- 1 if anything, conservative; that is, they overstate
- 2 the reasonable fee called for here.
- Why is this? Because, as Your Honors
- 4 are aware, this proceeding is not focused simply on
- 5 what a willing buyer or a willing seller would have
- 6 agreed to in a workably competitive market; it,
- 7 instead, entails a determination of reasonable fees
- 8 based on an evaluation of the statutory 801(b)
- 9 factors which are set forth on this -- on this slide
- 10 for you.
- Now, as it attempted to do in the prior
- 12 proceeding, SoundExchange and its experts try to
- 13 avoid this legal reality, urging Your Honors simply
- 14 to ignore the various 801(b) criteria and assume
- 15 instead that the rate in this proceeding ought to be
- 16 determined as if the governing standard were willing
- 17 buyer/willing seller.
- Now, of course, you can't do that. When
- 19 SoundExchange appealed this Tribunal's ruling in
- 20 2007 to the D.C. Circuit, based in part on the
- 21 assertion that the Judges erred in failing simply to
- 22 adopt a purely market-based rate, the D.C. Circuit

41 held that the argument, quote, ignores relevant precedent. Quote, The agency -- meaning you-all -were under no obligation, said the Court, to choose a rate derived from a market-based approached, 5 unquote. For support for that, the Court cited to its early 1999 decision in RIAA versus Librarian of 7 Congress, where it held, quote, In no uncertain terms, the claim that 801 clearly requires the use 10 of market rates is simply wrong, unquote. 11 And just a brief reference to that earlier decision itself, which was the Librarian's 12 13 decision in that proceeding, there, the Librarian addressed the argument made by SoundExchange's 14 15 originating parent, the Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA, that the predecessor 17 CARP's responsibility in determining rates under 18 801(b) was, quote -- this is now quoting the RIAA -to determine the royalty that would be produced 20 through free market negotiations absent the compulsory license, unquote. 21 22 The Librarian -- this is the opinion

- 1 that was cited favorably in the D.C. Circuit --
- 2 squarely rejected this approach, concluding that
- 3 reasonable rates under Section 801(b) are to be
- 4 determined based on policy considerations and that,
- 5 quote, the standard for setting the royalty rate for
- 6 the performance of a sound recording under an 801(b)
- 7 analysis is not fair market value, unquote; and,
- 8 importantly here, observed that the governing policy
- 9 consideration should, quote, temper, unquote,
- 10 marketplace points of reference, temper, marketplace
- 11 points of reference.
- Now, the reason that SoundExchange runs
- 13 from this standard, I would submit, is evident.
- 14 Application of the 801(b) factors to the record
- 15 facts inexorably leads to the need to, quote, temper
- 16 the marketplace points of reference that will be
- 17 submitted before Your Honors for your consideration
- 18 and drive rates lower, rather than higher, in
- 19 relation to such benchmarks.
- Now, I want to turn for a few minutes to
- 21 an explication of our direct case. Dr. Roger Noll,
- 22 emeritus professor of economics at Stanford

- 1 University and deeply experienced in the economics
- 2 of the entertainment industry, of intellectual
- 3 property and in the valuation of music rights, will
- 4 present testimony establishing the economic basis
- 5 for our client's rate proposal.
- 6 Dr. Noll's testimony explains that the
- 7 analytic path for setting appropriate fees here is
- 8 far simpler than it was in the prior proceeding.
- 9 As of the date of filing of the direct
- 10 cases, November of last year, SiriusXM had
- 11 successfully negotiated 62 direct licenses with
- 12 record labels, the fees for which incorporate the
- 13 grant of performance rights that would otherwise be
- 14 determined by the outcome of this proceeding.
- Taken together, those agreements cover
- 16 more than 7,000 artists, 9,000 albums, and 110,000
- 17 sound recordings, or tracks, as we call them.
- These agreements reflect voluntary
- 19 decisions, voluntary decisions by numerous
- 20 individual record labels to compete for airplay on a
- 21 major platform that they recognize is promotional of
- 22 sales of their sound recordings, precisely the sort

- 1 of agreements contemplated as probative of
- 2 reasonable fees in a proceeding such as this by
- 3 statute.
- And I refer you here to the provision of
- 5 114(f)(1)(B) of the statute, which, in interest of
- 6 time, I won't read in full text.
- 7 The fees agreed to range between 5
- 8 and 7 percent of specified SiriusXM revenue and
- 9 encompass grants of rights that are actually broader
- 10 than those at issue here.
- 11 Accordingly, as I've already noted, we
- 12 have agreements that represent the same buyer
- 13 dealing with the same body of sellers for even more
- 14 expansive rights in relation to what is being
- 15 adjudicated here.
- This is a breakthrough from prior
- 17 proceedings. We no longer have to look to imperfect
- 18 surrogates for the market value of performances of
- 19 sound recordings by SiriusXM.
- There's no need, for example, to
- 21 determine the comparability of different buyers to
- 22 SiriusXM. There's no need to determine the

- 1 comparability of the rights granted, such as between
- 2 on-demand interactivity for nonstatutory licenses
- 3 versus the more circumscribed grants of rights under
- 4 this statutory license.
- 5 You avoid the need to make complicated
- 6 adjustments to account for characteristics that
- 7 distinguish these other claimed benchmarks services
- 8 from SiriusXM.
- 9 In prior proceedings, those adjustments
- 10 included so-called interactivity adjustments. In
- 11 this proceeding, as you'll hear, it would entail, in
- 12 addition, adjustments to account for different music
- 13 intensity of the respective services, as well as the
- 14 different relative contributions made in offering
- 15 their products to consumers, most notably here, the
- 16 fact that SiriusXM uniquely provides not only
- 17 content, but the platform to deliver the content, in
- 18 contradistinction to any benchmark service. It's
- 19 absolutely imperative that adjustments be made to
- 20 account for that major reality.
- Now, while SoundExchange can be expected
- 22 to attack these agreements as nonrepresentative

- 1 outliers and as reflecting fees well below fair
- 2 market value, they really suffer neither
- 3 shortcoming.
- 4 The quality and breadth of the music
- 5 catalogs directly licensed can't be seriously
- 6 disputed.
- 7 You'll hear from Mr. Gertz of an
- 8 organization called Media Reports, Inc., who was
- 9 associated with the effort to secure these licenses
- 10 and who is, himself, deeply experienced in the -- in
- 11 the business, indicating that -- if you turn to the
- 12 next two demos, please -- that these agreements
- 13 cover all genres of music from jazz to punk, from
- 14 children's music to metal, from Broadway show tunes
- 15 to hip-hop; and next demo, cover GRAMMY nominated
- 16 and other award-winning artists and works of which a
- 17 sample are set forth on your demonstrative; cover
- 18 works regularly featured on SiriusXM service; and
- 19 are with some of the most sophisticated and
- 20 important independent record labels.
- 21 As for the assertion that the royalty
- 22 levels in these agreements are below previously

- 1 prevailing levels and, therefore, must not reflect
- 2 fair market value of these rights, that's the funny
- 3 thing about actual competition; it drives prices
- 4 down to competitive levels.
- Now, this is obviously an uncomfortable
- 6 reality for our friends at SoundExchange and its
- 7 members, which have really never had to confront
- 8 competition nor deal with evidence of this caliber.
- 9 Directly contrary to SoundExchange's
- 10 supposition, Dr. Noll's testimony describes how
- 11 SoundExchange's presence in the market, the tendency
- 12 of otherwise competing record labels to band
- 13 together to license only through that collective or
- 14 only at license fees that result from a proceeding
- 15 such as this distorts the competitive process in a
- 16 way that leads to fees above competitive norms.
- Now, this fear of competition and
- 18 concern over the highly probative value that such
- 19 direct licenses would have in this proceeding led
- 20 SoundExchange to decide not simply to challenge
- 21 these direct licenses in this hearing room, but,
- 22 instead, to mount a feverish campaign within the

- 1 record industry to limit the success of these direct
- 2 licensing efforts.
- 3 As Messrs. Frear and Gertz will testify,
- 4 beginning days after the launch of the direct
- 5 license initiative, first, SoundExchange, then a
- 6 series of other record industry trade groups began
- 7 an orchestrated campaign aimed at discouraging
- 8 record labels from entering into such agreements.
- 9 This messaging is apparent from candid
- 10 communications between and among SoundExchange
- 11 employees, board members of SoundExchange and
- 12 third-party record company executives. But a sample
- 13 of these is set forth on the next demonstrative.
- 14 Because these reflect information
- 15 produced in restricted documents, I'll let
- 16 Your Honors read these privately. I'm not going to
- 17 read them in the open hearing room, but they speak
- 18 volumes as to the mindset.
- And, incidentally, the reference in the
- 20 first of these to MRI, as I mentioned, is a
- 21 shorthand for Mr. Gertz' Media Reports, Inc.
- 22 organization.

1 Now, in addition to these private communications, SoundExchange also went public with its disdain for the direct licenses. In a statement released on August 11th of 2011, which appears as Exhibit 10 to Mr. Frear's written direct testimony -- that's just days after the initial 7 mailing starting the direct licensing program --SoundExchange advised these potential licensees that it was, quote, planning to seek a substantial 10 increase in the statutory rate; in other words, we plan to seek rates well in excess of the 2012 rate 11 12 of 8 percent, closed quote. 13 The statement went on to assure the industry that, quote, it should expect to see a 15 significantly increased statutory rate and hammering 16 home the importance of not breaking ranks by signing 17 the direct licenses. 18 The statement concluded by pointedly observing, quote, Privately negotiated licenses in 19 20 the marketplace may play a very significant role in 21 the outcome, unquote, of this proceeding. 22 Now, SoundExchange continues to resist

- 1 discovery into their communications on this topic
- 2 with other industry groups for good reason. A
- 3 barrage of obviously coordinated communications on
- 4 message with SoundExchange's exhortations soon
- 5 followed. Five occurred in one 24-hour period by
- 6 five different organizations.
- 7 Their messaging included, quote, It is
- 8 in your interest to refrain from direct licensing,
- 9 unquote, from the Recording Academy; quote, We are
- 10 more powerful collectively than we are separately,
- 11 unquote, from the Future of Music Coalition.
- I offer this summary at this point,
- 13 Your Honors, to suggest that the foregoing conduct
- 14 should give Your Honors more than a bit of pause as
- 15 you consider what surely will be SoundExchange's and
- 16 its expert's efforts here and in the rebuttal phase
- 17 to denigrate and knock down the probative value of
- 18 the direct license benchmark.
- In the interest of time, I'm going to
- 20 skip, except make passing reference to the fact that
- 21 there is interesting precedent in parallel with the
- 22 evidence that we are proffering as to direct

	·	51
1	licenses here.	
2	I simply refer Your Honors to several	
3	litigations in which a company called DMX litigated	
4	in the ASCAP and BMI so-called rate courts, where	
5	the standard, similarly, is reasonable fees and	
6	used, there, similar evidence of their going into	
7	the marketplace, in that case, dealing directly with	
8	music publishing companies rather than with the	
9	collectives for the music performing rights.	
10	And two District Court opinions, one by	
11	Judge Cote in Southern District New York, another by	
12	Judge Stanton in Southern District New York,	
13	affirmed the strong probative value of that direct	
14	license evidence in formulating what was an	
15	appropriate blanket fee. And we would urge that	
16	parallel consideration here on the facts in this	
17	record will be warranted.	
18	Now, a few more words about Dr. Noll's	
19	corroborating benchmark	
20	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Before you get to	
21	that, Mr. Rich, if I can interrupt with a question.	
22	I'm not quite following the flow of your	

52 argument here with respect to this interference with 1 the direct license initiative. 3 As I understand it, your position is that the direct licenses that you're offering are, in fact, representative. 6 MR. RICH: Yes. JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: If that is so, then why do we care about this interference? The argument there would be that they are not 10 representative. 11 MR. RICH: We're certainly arguing they're representative. And you'll hear at length 12 13 from Dr. Noll and you've read from Dr. Noll why we believe they are. 15 We also fully anticipate from the other side, however, the argument that they're two few, they're too small, they're outliers, they're just a 17 18 handful, they're a small percent of the market. And what we're suggesting very strongly is that while we 20 don't think, to your point, that should affect this -- Your Honors' judgments about the adequacy of the group we have, we think it's self-evident that

- 1 there would have been significantly more such
- 2 licenses for Your Honors' consideration, but for the
- 3 activity here.
- 4 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: If we had so many
- 5 more licenses, would they be more representative?
- 6 That's the question that I'm asking.
- 7 MR. RICH: Without seeing them, it would
- 8 be very difficult -- that's a hypothetical I have
- 9 trouble responding --
- JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: So do I.
- 11 MR. RICH: But that's the
- 12 straightforward answer to your question.
- JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Thank you.
- MR. RICH: Now, while the direct
- 15 licenses constitute the best evidence of competitive
- 16 market rates for rights being priced in this
- 17 proceeding, Dr. Noll will describe another set of
- 18 agreements negotiated in the marketplace that we
- 19 submit are corroborative of the direct license
- 20 evidence and provide further support for our
- 21 client's rate proposal.
- 22 And these are agreements between the

54 major record companies and noninteractive customized Internet radio services. 3 It's important that Your Honors understand the nature of these services, as well as a second category of services, so-called interactive services, which I adverted to earlier, which is the category of services from which SoundExchange, once 7 again, has constructed its own benchmarking analysis. 10 You'll hear from a variety of our witnesses, including Dr. Rosenblatt and Mr. Meyer, 11 12 about the nature and development and competitive impact of these various services in brief. 13 14 But let me just describe the essential attributes and distinctions between these two 15 16 categories, which is very central to your 17 consideration of the competing rate proposals. 18 Noninteractive radio services, similarly to SiriusXM and to traditional radio, do not allow a 20 user to choose the music tracks that he or she hears beyond, perhaps, identifying the particular genre of

music or a decade of music.

1 In some cases, such as the popular Pandora, the user may be able to identify a favorite artist or a favorite song or indicate likes or dislikes, and the service will build a noninteractive playlist of songs reflecting that user input. But the service will not allow the user to listen to the specific referenced artist or tracks on demand, that is to say, whenever and as often as the user wants to listen to those tracks. 10 These services, other examples of which Last.fm and Slacker, are sometimes referred to as 11 12 lean back services to distinguish them from lean 13 forward interactive services, a term that captures 14 the fact that users of those services actively 15 choose the tracks that they wish to listen to. 16 As various of our witnesses will 17 describe, these lean back services, that is, the noninteractive services, are direct competitors to 1.8 19 our client in the car in a way that was not the case 20 five years ago when the record in the prior proceeding was established. 22 In the Satellite One proceedings the

- 1 terrestrial radio, the chief competition, came from
- 2 so-called lean forward playback options, CDs, MP3s
- 3 downloaded to iPods and plugged into a car's audio
- 4 jack, tracks from portable subscription services
- 5 ported to devices and plugged into car stereo.
- Now, in contrast, webcasting services,
- 7 like Pandora, Slacker, Last.fm, are all available
- 8 streamed to smartphones over 3G and 4G networks,
- 9 including in cars, where they can be connected
- 10 directly to the audio system. Pandora, for example,
- 11 is already seamlessly integrated into the dash in
- 12 systems offered by Toyota and Ford.
- Over the period of this license term,
- 14 you will hear, automobile manufacturers will be
- 15 making huge strides in so-called connected car
- 16 technology with the result that SiriusXM
- 17 increasingly will be faced with low-cost competitive
- 18 offerings of both music and nonmusic programming in
- 19 vehicles either for free or at very low and,
- 20 therefore, very highly competitive to SiriusXM
- 21 prices.
- Now, to the extent that such

- 1 noninteractive services otherwise observe
- 2 Section 114's limitations to qualify for statutory
- 3 licenses, they are, no differently than our client,
- 4 entitled to operate under such licenses, and a
- 5 number do so.
- 6 Some such services, however, also
- 7 include features that exceed what is allowed under
- 8 the 114 license, such as unlimited skipping,
- 9 preannouncement of songs, and even caching of
- 10 channels. And because of these features, the
- 11 services have negotiated voluntary licenses with the
- 12 record companies.
- 13 Let me pause. I know a lot of these
- 14 terminology, even for me, are inside baseball. You
- 15 will have ample time, I would hope and expect, with
- 16 some our witnesses if you have any specific
- 17 questions about the technology.
- 18 I'm probably the wrong person to ask,
- 19 but we have some right people you can ask on the
- 20 stand, such as Mr. Rosenblatt.
- Now, what about the interactive
- 22 services? The so-called interactive services, a

- 1 category familiar to Your Honors from the prior
- 2 proceedings, include services like Rhapsody,
- 3 Napster, Spotify, MOG, Rdio, and they offer
- 4 significantly different functionality.
- 5 Most important, they're fully on demand,
- 6 meaning a user can listen to any song he or she
- 7 wishes whenever he or she wants and as many times as
- 8 he or she wants to listen.
- 9 In this sense, they stand as a total
- 10 substitute for the need to purchase the CD or
- 11 download a track, particularly when on-demand
- 12 streaming is now available on Internet-connected
- 13 portable devices, like smartphones.
- The labels recognize this. Dr. Noll
- 15 discusses major label digital strategy documents
- 16 that recognize the high level of, quote,
- 17 cannibalization, unquote, caused by such interactive
- 18 services for the sales of albums and tracks.
- 19 SiriusXM, by contrast, is acknowledged
- 20 in other research conducted among others by the RIAA
- 21 to stimulate music purchases.
- Now, Dr. Noll will describe why the

- 1 voluntary agreements between noninteractive Internet
- 2 radio services, such as Last.fm, provide a good test
- 3 for the reasonableness of the rates of the SiriusXM
- 4 direct licenses and why these proxies serve as a far
- 5 better alternative benchmark than do the agreements
- 6 entered into by interactive services, however
- 7 adjusted.
- 8 Very simply, these noninteractive
- 9 services, while still providing the user certain
- 10 features that allow more user input than does our
- 11 client's service, are still much closer in
- 12 functionality to the noninteractive genre- and
- 13 decade-based music channels found on SiriusXM than
- 14 are the fully on-demand services offered as
- 15 benchmarks by SoundExchange.
- 16 Given, in addition, that they are now
- 17 direct competitors in the car with SiriusXM, the
- 18 agreements entered into between such services and
- 19 individual record labels are informative, we submit,
- 20 of the ratemaking process.
- 21 As Dr. Noll explains, once properly
- 22 adjusted, there should be rate parity between these

- 1 other licenses and any rate payable by SiriusXM,
- 2 less SiriusXM itself be competitively disadvantaged
- 3 in this head-to-head competition in the marketplace.
- 4 Dr. Noll's written direct testimony
- 5 describes a five-step process for applying rates
- 6 from these noninteractive agreements. And while I
- 7 give you a demonstrative that sets it forth, again,
- 8 because I'm running a bit long and because he will
- 9 be the next witness, I will spare you my
- 10 walk-through, because you're going to hear that
- 11 walk-through from the very same demonstrative in
- 12 several hours time, hopefully.
- And so I have it here for you, but we'll
- 14 leave the details of how we get there to Dr. Noll.
- Suffice it to say, as I indicated
- 16 earlier, that this process generates a bottom line,
- 17 once properly adjusted, very close to the outcome of
- 18 the direct licenses.
- I do want to say one -- I do want to
- 20 speak about one aspect of the adjustment process,
- 21 which is critical. I want to come back to the
- 22 distinction which must be accounted for in dealing

- 1 whether with an interactive service of the type that
- 2 Dr. Ordover promotes or with a noninteractive
- 3 service of the type that Dr. Noll alternatively
- 4 promotes. And that is to account, again, for the
- 5 basic difference in the package of product and
- 6 services provided by the respective enterprises.
- 7 If you're looking at a Last.fm, it's
- 8 basically providing music format programming to a
- 9 user. That user requires a device to listen to it
- 10 and an Internet device to connect to it, neither of
- 11 which is provided by Last.fm, each of which,
- 12 presumably, is the subject of a separate transaction
- 13 and purchase by the consumer.
- 14 When you subscribe to SiriusXM, you get
- 15 the platform and the content; you get their unique
- 16 distribution network; you get the receiver in the
- 17 car; you get the benefit of the satellite and
- 18 repeater network, the entire distribution system.
- And so without making an adjustment to
- 20 account for that significantly greater cost and to
- 21 apply, let's say, a benchmark rate to the full
- 22 retail price of a SiriusXM, without making a basic

- 1 adjustment to account for the fact that part of the
- 2 bundle of services is distinct and different and far
- 3 more costly to provide, then the benchmark service
- 4 would be extraordinarily inappropriate.
- 5 And Dr. Noll makes that adjustment in
- 6 ways he will describe and defend and, we assert, is
- 7 critical because, as you will also hear, Dr. Ordover
- 8 fails entirely to account for that phenomenon
- 9 working from his interactivity benchmark. And that
- 10 creates a major, major distortion, we would submit,
- 11 in the analysis.
- Now, I turn briefly to a recap of a few
- 13 points from the SoundExchange -- from the
- 14 SoundExchange case. I mention that Dr. Ordover
- 15 falls back on the interactive licenses, and at one
- 16 level, that's not surprising.
- 17 In the recognition that these licenses
- 18 have a very significant potential to displace sales
- 19 and license fees because of their on-demand nature,
- 20 the fees that the record industry has been able to
- 21 garner from these agreements are extraordinarily
- 22 high. And, also, understandably, from the

- 1 standpoint of SoundExchange, in its ruling in 2007,
- 2 this Tribunal, on the record they developed, found
- 3 that such a benchmark with adjustments was plausible
- 4 in setting a top end of the market estimate.
- 5 But as the record here will
- 6 demonstrate -- this is really critical -- a
- 7 tremendous amount has changed technologically and
- 8 competitively in the last five years. New Internet
- 9 services whose functionality is far more similar to
- 10 the music service component of our client are now
- 11 direct competitors of our client for music
- 12 listenership in the vehicles. That's what I just
- 13 discussed.
- 14 And like SiriusXM and unlike the
- 15 interactive services, these newer services are far
- 16 more likely to be promotional of record sales than
- 17 the interactive services, and not to mention, of
- 18 course, a major change, which is the direct license
- 19 evidence itself.
- 20 So we have a dramatically different
- 21 record here than you faced back in 2007.
- Now, Professor Ordover, his primary

- 1 analysis really ignores all of these realities. He
- 2 pays no heed at all to the new generation of
- 3 Internet competitors. And, in addition, while he
- 4 makes an adjustment account for the music/nonmusic
- 5 component of the respective services, which both
- 6 sides, you will see, agree is necessary, as I
- 7 indicated, he makes no adjustment whatsoever to
- 8 account for the much greater consumer value derived
- 9 from on-demand access for sound recordings, facts
- 10 which the record companies take into account when
- 11 they price these different categories of license
- 12 agreements.
- He takes the rather astonishing position
- 14 that this reality requires no adjustment whatsoever
- 15 to the percentage rate to be applied to SiriusXM's
- 16 retail rates.
- 17 Ostensibly -- and that is you can just
- 18 ingraft the rate that's charged -- the percentage of
- 19 revenue that is charged for an interactive service,
- 20 just ingraft that onto SiriusXM's own retail rates
- 21 without further adjustment, ostensibly because these
- 22 various differences between the services will all be

- 1 taken care of somehow in the different retail rates
- 2 they charge.
- 3 So, in other words, Professor Ordover's
- 4 primary modeling assumes that all matter of audio
- 5 music services will be charged the same percentage
- 6 of their retail revenue irrespective of the
- 7 different features they offer, the different
- 8 functionality they provide, or the actual or
- 9 perceived promotional or substitutional effects of
- 10 those services.
- Now, that premise is just fundamentally
- 12 incorrect. It's incorrect as a matter of basic
- 13 economics. As Professor Ordover even had to admit
- 14 in his deposition in this case, it makes no sense
- 15 that the price of an input to a finished product
- 16 would invariably represent the same percentage of
- 17 the price of the final product. We know that's not
- 18 true.
- And, as importantly, it's undermined by
- 20 the actual evidence you will have in front of you.
- 21 Agreement after agreement shows that the percentage
- 22 royalty rates paid for music vary depending on the

- 1 service type and their level of interactivity.
- 2 There's simply no reason to believe that a
- 3 noninteractive service, like SiriusXM, would pay
- 4 some 60 percent of revenue for its music channels as
- 5 might and do some interactive services.
- 6 Now, if you turn to Demonstrative
- 7 Number 13, please.
- 8 I just want to cite and preview what
- 9 Dr. Noll will be highlighting, which is, for all of
- 10 the differences between the parties and the dramatic
- 11 differences in the fee consequences, this
- 12 demonstrative is really designed to show that there
- 13 are really two major aspects of the approaches
- 14 adopted by Professor Noll on the one hand and
- 15 Professor Ordover on the other that drive the
- 16 enormous bottom line differences.
- Now, this is putting the direct license
- 18 experience for the moment to one side.
- The first row, which is labeled
- 20 Benchmark Agreement, you will see, the very choice
- 21 of benchmark service in Dr. Noll's case, custom
- 22 radio services with the stated -- and I'm not going

- 1 to read these into the record because one or more
- 2 aspects of these are also restricted -- with the
- 3 stated percentage of revenue rate versus interactive
- 4 music services itself drives, as you can see at the
- 5 very get-go, an enormous distinction. One is a more
- 6 than double nominal rate higher.
- 7 And while both Dr. Ordover and
- 8 Professor Noll, as I indicate, agree that you have
- 9 to make an adjustment from whichever benchmark
- 10 service to account for the fact that fully half --
- 11 or approximately half of our client's programming is
- 12 nonmusic, Dr. Noll performs the next necessary
- 13 adjustment, which Dr. Ordover does not, which is, as
- 14 I indicated, to account for the revenues associated
- 15 with the cost of providing the platform, not simply
- 16 the channel.
- And as Dr. Noll will describe, when you
- 18 correct for those errors, you find that even under
- 19 Dr. Ordover's approach, the rates drop back out of
- 20 the stratosphere into the realm of the plausible.
- 21 And the last demonstrative here just
- 22 does the math setting forth for Your Honors' benefit

68 and setting the stage for Dr. Noll's testimony showing the consequences of just those two different core assumptions driving the competing benchmark analysis here. 5 MR. RICH: I have about 15 more minutes. Would you like me to conclude? 7 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: We need to take a five-minute recess. I know you're near the end. I don't like to interrupt --10 MR. RICH: It's a good breaking point. 11 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: -- but the court 12 reporter needs to zap her information off. So we'll take five-minute recess. 13 14 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken 15 from 10:54 a.m. to 11:01 a.m.) 16 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Good morning, again. 17 18 Please be seated. 19 Mr. Rich, are you ready to wrap up? 20 Thank you, yes. MR. RICH: 21 I want to spend a very few minutes discussing SoundExchange's wildly optimistic

69 portrait of our client's financial prospects. I suggest that Your Honors, and urge Your Honors to view much of that evidence under a yellow flag of caution. 5 SoundExchange's counsel, previewing a series of its witnesses, I'm sure, will stand up here and describe how our client has turned the corner financially, how much more robust it is today than it was five years ago, and cite optimistic 10 statements by executives of our client about the 11 newfound health of the company and its prospects for 12 growth. 13 This may sound familiar to Your Honors. 14 Five years ago, in 2007, SoundExchange 15 put on the stand an expert by the name of Mr. Butson, who forecasted confidently that Sirius 17 and XM, the separate companies then, would have a combined 33 million subscribers by 2010. 1.8 19 In his view, this projected growth 20 justified rates as high as 23 percent of revenues by 21 the -- during the prior license term. Now, how did 22 that work out? In fact, less than two years later,

- 1 just three years ago, the now combined company was
- 2 literally hours from bankruptcy.
- 4 40 percent of the company to the one investor,
- 5 Liberty Media, that offered a rescue package. It
- 6 was a very expensive rescue package. It carried a
- 7 15 percent rate -- payback rate, diluted the stake
- 8 of the existing shareholders by 40 percent, and it
- 9 was a hit that was compounded by a drop in
- 10 SiriusXM's stock price to a nickel a share.
- 11 The company's last annual report
- 12 disclosed that \$100 invested in SiriusXM five years
- 13 earlier was worth only \$55 as of December 31, 2011;
- 14 actual subscribers in 2010, 20 million, more than a
- 15 third fewer than predicted by Butson, 3-1/2 million
- 16 of whom are on promotional trial subscriptions.
- 17 Revenue and cash flow in 2010,
- 18 42 percent and 58 percent respectively below
- 19 Mr. Butson's predictions.
- The analysts from that period fared no
- 21 better. Morgan Stanley, whose projections are
- 22 relied on this time around by SoundExchange, made

71 similar massive miscalculations. Forecasts in 2006, '7 and '8 predicted that our client would have between 25 and 35 million subscribers in 2010. And there were similar dramatic overestimations of revenue by Morgan Stanley, as more fully described in Mr. Stowell's testimony. Total new car sales, which now, as you've read, are really the drivers of our client's business, plummeted to levels not seen since the early '80s. 10 11 The company is still saddled with \$2.4 billion in debt coming due in the 2013-2015 12 13 period. The company still has a junk credit rating. 14 Despite its forecasting failures last 15 time around, SoundExchange is back once again claiming the sky is the limit on what our client can afford -- can afford 57.8 percent, ostensibly --18 based largely on Morgan Stanley projections that 19 have proven wrong time and again. 20 I submit that the lesson of the current rate period is that caution is warranted in reading these projections. As explicated by

72 Professor Stowell, experience of the past five years on its own should counsel caution in adopting SoundExchange's prognostications about SiriusXM's prospects. 5 Professor Stowell will explain that, based on various considerations, including the company's tumultuous history and recent brush with 7 bankruptcy, the ongoing uncertain global economic climate, increased dependence on the automobile industry, and an increasingly robust competitive 10 landscape which is likely to continue to gain 11 momentum throughout the next license period, 12 13 SiriusXM faces a threat of disruption that is equal to or greater than that which it faced during the 15 Satellite I proceeding. 16 Professor Stowell's testimony explains that the royalty that SiriusXM is required to pay 18 SoundExchange has a large impact on its bottom line finances and any increase to the royalty rate would 19 20 substantially increase the likelihood of such a 21 disruptive impact on the company. 22 Additional testimony from other

73

executives of the company and experts will amplify on some of these considerations. James Meyer, who is SiriusXM's president of operations and sales, will provide an overview of the business, the competitive landscape in which the company is operating, the importance of the OEM market, and the company's continuing investments and innovations in its technological infrastructure. Mr. Meyer will testify how SiriusXM has become increasingly dependent on the OEM market and how this dependence, combined with the global 12 economic conditions and numerous other challenges, 13 makes its projected financial health during the 2013 to 2017 period far from certain. 15 One such salient factor which Mr. Meyer will focus on is the increasingly robust technology

- 17 in the market today, which has fostered development
- 18 of strong competition from new Internet-based audio
- 19 content providers of the type I discussed briefly
- 20 earlier.
- 21 Mr. Meyer will describe in greater
- 22 detail the way in which these low priced, in some

74 cases, free competitors, whose cost structures diverge widely from the companies will be SiriusXM's primary challenge during the 2013 to 2017 licensing period. 5 Mr. Rosenblatt, as I mentioned, who is president of GiantSteps Media Technology and a technology industry veteran and expert in the field 7 of digital music services, will corroborate Mr. Meyer in identifying important trends in the 10 digital audio entertainment marketplace that were largely unforeseen at the time of the prior 12 proceeding, and which, together, would dramatically 13 increase the range and scope of competition facing SiriusXM in the coming license period. 15 In turn, SiriusXM's CEO, Mel Karmazin, and its chief financial officer, David Frear, will 17 testify that although encouraged by the company's 18 recent profitability and optimistic about the 19 company's prospects in the near term, SiriusXM's 20 future is far from clear. 21 Mr. Frear will point out that while the

company's financial performance has improved, it

75 will take years to recoup nearly 20 years of losses experienced by the company; as I mentioned, \$5.5 billion in negative cash flow, \$8 billion in net operating losses. 5 He'll also describe the aggressive cost cutting the company has engaged in across other areas of its operations, and notably, including its 7 other programming and its -- its marquee exclusive programming, it has dramatically reigned in the 10 costs there and views its obligations here no 11 differently, part of which was the impetus to pursue 12 the competitive licensing paradigm in the 13 marketplace for sound recording performing rights. 14 Mr. Karmazin will explain why, in light 15 all of these considerations, an increase in the royalty rate from the existing level, let alone of 17 the magnitude sought by SoundExchange, is unwarranted. 18 19 Next-to-the-last topic, where do the 20 801(b) factors fit into the mix here? 21 I'm going to preview what our witnesses 22 are going to say on some of these factors.

- I indicated analytically that even when
- 2 Your Honors are working with marketplace benchmarks,
- 3 to the extent Your Honors were to find that one or
- 4 more of the Section 801(b) factors favors SiriusXM
- 5 here, this may well lead you to temper those
- 6 marketplace points of reference when you set a
- 7 reasonable fee.
- Now, Professor Ordover concedes at a
- 9 minimum, one would need to inquire as to the
- 10 relative impact the 801(b) factors would have as
- 11 applied to benchmark services that one or another
- 12 party cites on the one hand, and SiriusXM on the
- 13 other, to assess their comparability and make any
- 14 appropriate adjustments. Yet, he hasn't attempted
- 15 to do that. He simply assumes there are no
- 16 adjustments necessary.
- 17 In contrast, Dr. Noll and
- 18 Professor Stowell do explicitly discuss the impact
- 19 of 801(b) factors on the process here.
- 20 Factor 1 is availability. Satellite I,
- 21 the Judges found a lack of persuasive evidence
- 22 favoring either side concerning the net promotional

77 or substitutional effect of SiriusXM's performances of sound recordings. 3 In this proceeding, another one of our witnesses, Steven Blatter, who is the senior vice president and general manager of music programming for SiriusXM, will provide much more detailed evidence attesting to the promotional benefits of satellite radio for artists and record companies. Mr. Blatter will describe how the direct 9 impact of airplay on SiriusXM on the sale of 10 recorded music is substantially greater than it was 11 when he testified in the previous proceeding and how 12 13 those promotional benefits are valued by recording artists, artists' managers and record companies. 15 Notably, for the first time in a CRB proceeding, he'll present data from Soundscan and 17 Mediabase, industry standard reports of sales and airplay data, demonstrating that plays on SiriusXM, 18 19 in circumstances where SiriusXM is the only 20 broadcaster featuring a particular track, often leads directly to increased purchases or downloads 22

of that track and that recording artists routinely

- 1 recognize and credit our client for that impact.
- 2 This testimony and evidence will be
- 3 supplemented by evidence out of the record
- 4 industry's own files attesting to the promotional
- 5 effects of the satellite radio versus the
- 6 substitutional effects that I mentioned of on-demand
- 7 services.
- 8 Second factor, fair return.
- 9 As I mentioned, SoundExchange premises
- 10 much of its rate proposal on predictions as to
- 11 SiriusXM's profitability in the upcoming license
- 12 term.
- As both company witnesses, including
- 14 Mr. Karmazin and Mr. Frear, and experts like
- 15 Professors Noll and Stowell will explain, that
- 16 approach ignores enormous investments on the part of
- 17 SiriusXM and its predecessor companies to get to the
- 18 point where it actually can begin to reward that
- 19 investment, not least of which is the accumulated
- 20 net operating losses of \$8 billion.
- In SoundExchange's view, the billions in
- 22 investments and losses which SiriusXM and its

79 stockholders endured for years in an effort to create a profitable enterprise should simply be ignored when it comes to rewarding the record companies. 5 This supposition, we would submit, ignores how real markets operate, ignores expectations of investors, and simply constitutes bad public policy. 9 It's also ironic. One of the listed witnesses for the other side, Charles Ciongoli, who 11 was, until very recently, apparently -- I think he's 12 now changed his position -- the chief financial officer of Universal Music Group, one of the giants in the field, acknowledged at his deposition the basic tenet that Universal Music Group should be able to, quote, recoup our investments and to earn 17 an appropriate return on invested capital, unquote. 18 We agree. No differently than a major record company is entitled to recoup its long-term 20 investments, rates should be set here so as to enable SiriusXM to do the same. 21 22 Professor Stowell demonstrates how

		80
1	adoption of SoundExchange's conception of	
2	marketplace rates jeopardizes that opportunity.	
3	Factor 3, relative contribution.	
4	I've discussed this. You'll hear from	
5	Dr. Noll further about the importance of this	
6	element applied to the adjustments necessary to the	
7	respective benchmarks.	
8	Again, SiriusXM's contribution to the	
9	service offered to consumer is far more encompassing	
10	than that of any of the benchmark services and	
11	requires recognition in terms of the the process	
12	and and backing out costs and/or other	
13	adjustments to account for that, which Dr. Ordover	
14	simply ignores.	
15	Factor 4, disruption.	
16	I think I've said enough about it in	
17	terms of of the prospects of it.	
18	And and let me end very briefly with	
19	a few words about the revenue definition that I	
20	mentioned at the outset.	
21	SoundExchange, as part of its case,	
22	proposes a radical change to the governing revenue	

- 1 definition to which any percent of revenue fee would
- 2 here be applied. The effect of it would be to
- 3 eliminate deductions for revenue that's totally
- 4 unrelated to performances under the statutory
- 5 license, including different categories of
- 6 performance, webcasting -- not under this license --
- 7 works in the public domain, like pre-1972 sound
- 8 recordings. Those would all go by the boards.
- 9 Those would all be compensable as if they were
- 10 protected under this statutory scheme and/or under
- 11 copyright law.
- 12 As importantly, the effect of that
- 13 proposed revenue definition would be to make
- 14 impossible realizing the economic benefits of any
- 15 direct licenses. Under the current statutory
- 16 definition, when SiriusXM reaches terms on a direct
- 17 license and performs music coming under the catalog
- 18 of the direct licensors, it takes a deduction so as
- 19 not to double pay with respect to those
- 20 performances.
- 21 Logically, it wouldn't pay once to the
- 22 individual label and only to pay a second time to

- 1 that label indirectly through SoundExchange, which
- 2 would then presumably distribute it again. And the
- 3 current regulations allow and definitions allow that
- 4 process. SoundExchange would cut that off
- 5 completely.
- 6 We don't think it's accidental. We
- 7 think it's part of the broader fabric of concern
- 8 over the direct licenses, and when we get to that
- 9 aspect of this case, we will urge Your Honors to
- 10 maintain the current definition in place so as,
- 11 among other reasons, not to encourage and allow
- 12 SoundExchange to frustrate the intended economic
- 13 benefits of the direct licenses.
- In conclusion, Your Honors, thank you
- 15 for your patience.
- We urge Your Honors at the end of the
- 17 proceeding to reject SoundExchange's rate case and
- 18 instead adopt the rates suggested by the direct
- 19 license evidence proposed by our client.
- Thank you very much.
- 21 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you,
- 22 Mr. Rich.

	·	83
1	Good morning.	
2	MR. FAKLER: Good morning, Your Honors.	
3		
4	OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF MUSIC CHOICE	
5		
6	MR. FAKLER: Again, good morning,	
7	Your Honors. My name is Paul Fakler. I'm with the	
8	firm of Arent Fox. I have with me my colleagues,	
9	Martin Cunniff, Matthew Trokenheim, and we're here	
10	today representing Music Choice in connection with	
11	the adjustment of rates for the preexisting	
12	subscription services, or the PSS, as we like to	
13	shorten it.	
14	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Could you spell	
15	your last name for me?	
16	MR. FAKLER: It's Fakler, F-A-K-L-E-R.	
17	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you.	
18	MR. FAKLER: So, yes, we do like to	
19	shorten it as PSS because we find that P-S-S, being	
20	PSS, would be a little distracting. So we call them	
21	PSS. And the PSS are a fundamentally unique digital	
22	music services among all the digital music services,	

- 1 and for a number of reasons, but that uniqueness has
- 2 an impact or a bearing on the rate setting.
- 3 So I'd like to start by discussing
- 4 briefly the history of the PSS and the compulsory
- 5 license.
- 6 The PSS story is a bit different than
- 7 the story of the SDARS who entered the market years
- 8 after the PSS did and, in fact, after there was
- 9 already a public performance right for sound
- 10 recordings, which was not true at the time
- 11 Music Choice entered the market.
- 12 And the PSS were three -- now they've
- 13 dwindled to two -- companies who essentially
- 14 invented the digital music service. They did this
- 15 by coming up with a commercial-free radio product
- 16 that was transmitted to consumers in their homes
- 17 through their cable and satellite television
- 18 service.
- But in order to consider the history of
- 20 the PSS and the reasons for the compulsory license,
- 21 one has to look at the legal and licensing landscape
- 22 that was in place at the time that Music Choice

8.5

- 1 launched its service.
- 2 Prior to 1972, sound recordings were not
- 3 protected by Federal copyright whatsoever. In 1972,
- 4 when Congress did extend copyright to sound
- 5 recordings, they withheld the public performance
- 6 right. All of the other exclusive rights were
- 7 granted to sound recordings, but the public
- 8 performance right was withheld.
- 9 And because of that, broadcasters and
- 10 other companies that publicly perform sound
- 11 recordings still did not have to get a license or
- 12 pay royalties to the record companies.
- 13 And it was in that context that
- 14 Music Choice developed and launched its service.
- 15 The service was developed in the late '80s, launched
- 16 by 1991, and, in fact, was being transmitted to
- 17 customers throughout the country for years before
- 18 there was, in fact, a public performance right for
- 19 sound recordings. That happened in 1995 with the
- 20 passage of the DPRA.
- 21 But when Congress did, for the first
- 22 time, create this limited digital performance right

- 1 and this new revenue stream for record companies,
- 2 they also implemented a compulsory license. And
- 3 that's the compulsory license we're here about
- 4 today.
- 5 And the legislative history of the DPRA
- 6 is very clear that one of the purposes -- one of the
- 7 purposes for instituting the compulsory license was
- 8 specifically to ensure it would remain economically
- 9 feasible for the few existing pioneers at that time,
- 10 like Music Choice, to continue already existing
- 11 operations.
- 12 And to that end, Congress chose to
- 13 implement a policy-based standard for setting the
- 14 royalty rate rather than a marketplace willing
- 15 buyer/willing seller standard, which they certainly
- 16 could've done and was in place for certain other
- 17 statutory licenses.
- 18 But they purposely chose this
- 19 policy-based factor that takes into account things
- 20 like the financial viability of the licensed
- 21 service, disruption to the industry of the licensed
- 22 service and the like.

- 1 When -- fast-forward to 1998 and the
- 2 DMCA, or the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, at
- 3 that point, with the advent of the Internet, and it
- 4 started to become clear there were likely going to
- 5 be all sorts of other wonderful digital music
- 6 services coming down the pike. The record labels
- 7 went to Congress, and they persuaded Congress to
- 8 say -- to change the rate-setting standard to a
- 9 marketplace standard of willing buyer/willing
- 10 seller.
- But at the same time, Congress chose to
- 12 grandfather the preexisting services, and allow them
- 13 to continue to have this policy-based rate instead
- 14 of moving them to a marketplace rate.
- And, again, the legislative history in
- 16 the DMCA uses almost identical wording to that in
- 17 the DPRA, saying that the reason for the
- 18 grandfathering was to prevent the disruption of the
- 19 existing operations of the PSS.
- Now, when it suits SoundExchange's
- 21 tactical purposes, they acknowledge all of this.
- 22 Five years ago, when there was at least the

- 1 beginning of a PSS proceeding, SoundExchange went to
- 2 the Register of Copyrights and requested a ruling
- 3 that the PSS designation would be strictly limited
- 4 to the three companies that were in business at the
- 5 time of the passage of the DMCA.
- And in their briefing to the Register of
- 7 Copyrights, they noted -- they said the reason for
- 8 the grandfathering was to protect the legitimate
- 9 business expectancies of the preexisting services.
- 10 And the Register agreed. She issued a decision that
- 11 did limit the applicability of PSS status to those
- 12 three companies.
- And in her decision, she noted that the
- 14 purpose of the grandfather was to protect the PSS in
- 15 recognition that, as pioneers, they had invested a
- 16 great deal of resources in developing services and
- 17 deserved to continue developing the services under a
- 18 policy-based standard that allowed for below-market
- 19 rates.
- 20 She went on to also note that
- 21 grandfathering provisions are frequently included in
- 22 statutes to ensure continuity and to award the

- 1 investment and efforts of those who were the first
- 2 to take on the struggles and risks of novel
- 3 enterprises and methods. And that description
- 4 certainly describes the PSS, the very first digital
- 5 music services back before it was hip or cool.
- Now, there is a certain amount of
- 7 precedent in 801(b) rate-setting proceedings that
- 8 you can look to for certain general principles that
- 9 should apply, and particularly that discuss the
- 10 relationship between a policy-based rate and a
- 11 market rate.
- 12 And it's clear from looking at the
- 13 appellate precedent that the 801(b) rate-setting
- 14 standard is a very different exercise than just
- 15 setting a market rate.
- 16 It requires more judgment on the part of
- 17 the Judges because you were called upon to implement
- 18 these policy factors dictated by Congress, and it
- 19 really can't be short-circuited by some sort of just
- 20 mathematical formula. The D.C. Circuit itself noted
- 21 that an 801 royalty must be set to achieve the
- 22 policy objectives and not as the result of a

- 1 rigorous mathematical derivation.
- 2 And it's also clear the appellate
- 3 decisions have held time and time again that the
- 4 policy rate under 801(b) is not a market rate.
- 5 Perhaps the most important appellate guidance that
- 6 could be of help to the Judges are the two appellate
- 7 decisions from the first PSS rate-setting
- 8 proceeding. The PSS were not only the first digital
- 9 music services, they were also the first digital
- 10 music services to have their rates set pursuant to a
- 11 proceeding.
- 12 And in that proceeding, initially, there
- 13 was a CARP convened that issued a decision, and that
- 14 decision was appealed to the Librarian of Congress
- 15 who, for the most part, overturned the CARP, and the
- 16 Librarian did his own analysis and issued a new rate
- 17 decision.
- And at that first level of appellate
- 19 review, the Librarian specifically rejected the
- 20 argument made by the RIAA at the time, that the PSS
- 21 rate had to be consistent with market rates. The
- 22 Librarian said that the PSS rate need not mirror a

- 1 freely negotiated marketplace rate and rarely does,
- 2 because it is a mechanism whereby Congress
- 3 implements policy considerations which are not
- 4 normally part of the calculus of the marketplace
- 5 rate.
- 6 So the Librarian recognized that any
- 7 notion that one can short-circuit the policy factors
- 8 by claiming that these various policies are already
- 9 baked into a marketplace rate, the Librarian
- 10 directly rejected that concept.
- 11 The Librarian's decision was appealed to
- 12 the D.C. Circuit, and on the rate portion with
- 13 respect to the methodology and the result, it was
- 14 affirmed completely.
- And, once again, the D.C. Circuit
- 16 similarly rejected this argument by the RIAA about
- 17 marketplace rates.
- 18 Holding that the RIAA's claim that the
- 19 statute clearly requires the use of market rates is
- 20 simply wrong, the PSS standard, it held, does not
- 21 use the term "market rates," nor does it require
- 22 that the term "reasonable rates" be defined as

- 1 market rates. Moreover, there is no reason to think
- 2 that the two are coterminous, for it's obvious that
- 3 a market rate may not be reasonable and vice versa.
- 4 Another general principle that can be
- 5 abstracted from these appellate decisions are that
- 6 to the extent that a market rate is considered in
- 7 setting the PSS rate, it can only be used to
- 8 determine the upper bounds of a possible reasonable
- 9 rate under the policy factors. The D.C. Circuit
- 10 specifically held that an above market rate can
- 11 never be a reasonable rate under 801(b).
- Now, that's not to say that marketplace
- 13 evidence can't be considered in setting the policy
- 14 rates. That's also very clear from the precedent.
- 15 But they have to be used as points of reference that
- 16 are weighed along with the evidence that go directly
- 17 to the policy factors in order to set a reasonable
- 18 rate. It's also clear from the precedent that not
- 19 just any marketplace evidence can be considered.
- Various precedent, including previous
- 21 decisions of the Copyright Royalty Judges, have
- 22 repeatedly held that in order for a marketplace

- 1 license agreement to be used as a benchmark, it must
- 2 be an agreement for a comparable music service.
- 3 In the Section 115 mechanical
- 4 rate-setting proceeding, the last one, the one that
- 5 didn't settle, the Judges rejected a number of
- 6 benchmarks that were offered precisely because the
- 7 benchmark -- the proposed benchmark markets were not
- 8 comparable to that of the target market for the rate
- 9 being set.
- 10 Even more importantly, five years ago in
- 11 the last SDARS proceeding, the SDARS wanted to use
- 12 Music Choice as a benchmark to set their rate.
- 13 SoundExchange objected to this strenuously and put
- 14 on significant economic evidence demonstrating that
- 15 the market for the PSS -- the Music Choice,
- 16 essentially, because it's the -- almost the only
- 17 player left in the PSS market -- but that that
- 18 marketplace was radically different in all of the
- 19 key, most important ways that you would need to try
- 20 to adjust for a comparable benchmark, the demand --
- 21 the demand characteristics, the value, the way that
- 22 users use the service, all of these things were so

- 1 radically different that it was noncomparable in any
- 2 way, could not be used as a benchmark. And
- 3 Your Honors agreed and rejected that as use for a
- 4 benchmark.
- 5 So it's clear from all of this that to
- 6 be a usable benchmark, if you're using a license
- 7 agreement for another music service, those services
- 8 have to be comparable, at least in a way that can be
- 9 adjusted for, but which is the difference between
- 10 comparable versus identical.
- 11 With those general principles in mind,
- 12 I'd like to talk a little bit about Music Choice's
- 13 case, which is consistent with this precedent.
- 14 And I would also like to talk about
- 15 SoundExchange's case, which it completely ignores
- 16 these principles and precedent and, in fact, defies
- 17 them.
- 18 For its case, Music Choice presents the
- 19 testimony -- the fact testimony of David Del Beccaro
- 20 and Damon Williams.
- 21 Mr. Del Beccaro is the president and CEO
- 22 and founder of Music Choice. It was his idea, back

- 1 when he was working for Gerald Communications, to
- 2 launch a service like Music Choice. He helped put
- 3 together the investors. I believe he worked on some
- 4 of the original technology involved in bringing it
- 5 to market, and he's managed the company ever since.
- 6 Mr. Williams is the vice president of
- 7 programming and content development for
- 8 Music Choice. He's got 30 years of broadcast
- 9 programming experience.
- Now, as Mr. Del Beccaro testifies, the
- 11 PSS, as I mentioned before, were the very first
- 12 digital music services. And they were the first to
- 13 have their rate set in a proceeding.
- 14 And Mr. Del Beccaro describes the
- 15 process through which the rate was initially set.
- 16 And that was, again, initially in a CARP, that rate
- 17 was changed by the Librarian of Congress on appeal,
- 18 and that was then upheld by the D.C. Circuit.
- 19 And because of this rigorous level of
- 20 appeal, the Librarian of Congress' decision provides
- 21 a very significant and useful roadmap for setting
- 22 the rate for the PSS. Indeed, the Librarian of

- 1 Congress, in that decision, noted that a reasonable
- 2 way for the rate to be adjusted in the future would
- 3 be to essentially just take into account changes in
- 4 circumstances that occur during the period, and that
- 5 either side could use that to argue to have the rate
- 6 lowered or raised.
- 7 In order to describe the Librarian of
- 8 Congress' decision, I think it would be helpful just
- 9 very briefly to talk about some basics in music
- 10 licensing, and particularly the difference between
- 11 the sound recording copyright and the musical work
- 12 copyright.
- 13 A sound recording, in copyright
- 14 parlance, is a -- is a classic derivative work. And
- 15 what that means is that to create a sound recording,
- 16 the recording artist takes a preexisting work, the
- 17 song, which was written by a songwriter or a
- 18 composer, and then adds some creativity to it to
- 19 create a new work based on the preexisting work.
- 20 And in the case of a sound recording, the performing
- 21 artist gives their specific rendition of the
- 22 preexisting song, and that is captured and wrapped

- 1 up, along with the song, into the sound recording.
- Musical work or composition performance
- 3 rights are administered in the United States by what
- 4 are called performing rights organizations, ASCAP,
- 5 VMI (verbatim) and SESAC, and those bodies issue
- 6 blanket license for any sort of business that wants
- 7 to publicly perform these songs, typically in the
- 8 context of also publicly performing the sound
- 9 recordings.
- The Librarian of Congress principally
- 11 relied on the PSS' PRO license as the marketplace
- 12 evidence that it used to set the PSS rate, finding
- 13 no evidence in that proceeding that the sound
- 14 recording performance right in the context of a
- 15 performance-based service would be worth any more
- 16 than the musical works right.
- Now, the Librarian of Congress
- 18 recognized that these were two different copyrights,
- 19 technically. But the Librarian also recognized they
- 20 were certainly related, and that they were really
- 21 intertwined within the product or the -- or the
- 22 recording that Music Choice and the other PSS were

- 1 using.
- The Librarian also recognized that, you
- 3 know, the exact same copyright was being licensed in
- 4 the sense of the public performance right, as
- 5 opposed to any of the other exclusive rights, and
- 6 that it was a license for the PSS, which were, at
- 7 the time, as they still are, very unique services.
- 8 So those licenses took into account
- 9 these odd things that wouldn't be able to be
- 10 adjusted for with respect to other licensed
- 11 services.
- 12 Now, all of this is still true today. I
- 13 mean, the bottom line is even SoundExchange's
- 14 witnesses agree that the PSS are completely unique,
- 15 that there are no comparable music services, there
- 16 is no marketplace evidence related to a service that
- 17 is comparable. Their witnesses say it, as well as
- 18 our -- ours do.
- 19 So the Copyright Royalty Judges are
- 20 essentially in the same position that the Librarian
- 21 was back then as far as benchmarks. It's really the
- 22 only game in town. And, of course, as it was used

- 1 and upheld on two levels of appeal, certainly it's
- 2 acceptable to use that as a benchmark.
- Now, Music Choice recognizes in some
- 4 prior proceedings, the Copyright Royalty Judges have
- 5 chosen not to use the musical works benchmarks to
- 6 set rates for other services, particularly
- 7 noninteractive webcasting and the SDARS. But, of
- 8 course, for both of those services, the Judges were
- 9 able to find a marketplace comparable, namely,
- 10 interactive webcasting, that the Judges found were
- 11 comparable and could be adjusted for and used as
- 12 benchmarks.
- 13 That is certainly not the case today.
- As I mentioned, even SoundExchange
- 15 mentioned none of these services are comparable and,
- 16 in fact, in the SDARS decision last time when the
- 17 Judges said that Music Choice could not be used
- 18 because it wasn't comparable, all of the
- 19 distinctions between the PSS, Music Choice and the
- 20 SDARS are also differences between Music Choice and
- 21 interactive webcasting or any of these other music
- 22 services and, in fact, there are even more

100 differences in some instances. So that really puts us -- that's one of the other reasons that the PSS are really in a 3 unique position, not only in the market, but before the Copyright Royalty Judges, to have their rates set. Now, Mr. Del Beccaro also discusses certain foreign markets in which the musical work and the sound recording performance rights are 10 licensed side by side. 11 And in those instances, the musical works rate is typically valued roughly the same as 13 the sound recording rate; in some instances, higher. He also discusses copyright royalty tribunals that 15 exist in Canada and the United Kingdom that set 16 rates for performance rights license in those 17 jurisdictions in the absence of industry agreements. 18 Those tribunals set these rates pursuant 19 to a marketplace willing buyer/willing seller 20 standard, and both of those tribunals have 21 repeatedly held that when the musical works right 22 and the sound recording performance rights are both

- 1 licensed for the same service, that they have an
- 2 equivalent value.
- Now, turning back to the original
- 4 Librarian of Congress' decision.
- 5 The Librarian of Congress had to use an
- 6 estimate of what the PSS PRO rates would be because
- 7 at the time, the PSS were still negotiating their
- 8 PRO licenses with ASCAP, BMI, SESAC. And the
- 9 estimate that the Librarian came up with was roughly
- 10 10 percent of revenue.
- 11 As Mr. Del Beccaro testifies, that
- 12 estimate turned out to be grossly high. In fact,
- 13 it's roughly double what the actual final rates
- 14 turned out to be for the PROs.
- 15 For this reason alone, in the original
- 16 PSS proceeding, the rate was set twice as high as it
- 17 ought to have been under the Register -- under the
- 18 Librarian's reasoning.
- But Mr. Del Beccaro also goes through
- 20 the 801(b) policy factors and talks about various
- 21 changes in circumstances that occurred since the
- 22 last rate setting that show that Music Choice can

- 1 now make an even stronger case for setting the rate
- 2 on the lower end of the range.
- 3 Turning to the first factor, maximizing
- 4 the availability of creative works to the public.
- 5 The Librarian of Congress focused
- 6 entirely on the sound recording as being the
- 7 creative work made available to the public. And
- 8 that made sense at the time, because when
- 9 Music Choice first launched, essentially what you
- 10 got in your home was a black screen with some basic
- 11 song ID information and white text on it, and you
- 12 got the music played in a commercial-free stream of
- 13 music.
- 14 That has changed substantially since
- 15 that time. You know, as a preliminary matter,
- 16 Mr. Williams describes in detail how the channels
- 17 themselves are creative works in the sense that it
- 18 requires a great deal of creativity and expertise to
- 19 select which songs get played on which channels.
- 20 Music Choice certainly devotes a lot of staff and a
- 21 lot of money towards hiring people who are very
- 22 skilled in doing this. But also, those channels,

- 1 what goes through those channels, has changed.
- 2 As I said before, it used to be,
- 3 essentially, a black screen. Now there is an
- 4 on-screen display with all sorts of graphical
- 5 content that's created by Music Choice. There's
- 6 textual content that gives facts and trivia about
- 7 the artists that are meant to sort of engage the
- 8 user and keep them more engaged with the
- 9 Music Choice service.
- 10 Oftentimes, there's promotional content
- 11 to help promote the recording artists and new
- 12 releases, things of that matter.
- 13 All of that creative content is created
- 14 by Music Choice, not by the record labels, and is
- 15 added to the service.
- 16 Now, Music Choice has also developed a
- 17 recording studio where artists come in and record
- 18 promotional interviews, but also record music that
- 19 sometimes winds up on the Music Choice channels. So
- 20 Music Choice is actually itself creating sound
- 21 recordings. Some; I'm not trying to say it's the
- 22 bulk of what gets played on Music Choice, but there

- 1 are certainly some that get played on the channels.
- 2 So there's a bunch of additional
- 3 creative content that Music Choice contributes to
- 4 the service that wasn't true at the time of the
- 5 first proceeding.
- 6 Since that original proceeding,
- 7 Music Choice has more channels of content. It went
- 8 from 31 to 46, and next year expects to go to 300.
- 9 There's more programming and content
- 10 staff. It went from 16 at the time of the first
- 11 proceeding to 43 now, and expects to be 58 by 2017.
- 12 And the amount spent by Music Choice on
- 13 programming and content creation has quadrupled
- 14 since the time of the first rate setting.
- With respect to the second factor,
- 16 affording the copyright owner a fair return for its
- 17 creative work and a copyright user fair income under
- 18 existing economic conditions.
- 19 The Librarian of Congress adopted on
- 20 that one essentially the CARP's findings, which were
- 21 that the PSS were struggling financially, their
- 22 long-term viability was far from certain, and all of

- 1 that support is setting the rate on the lower end of
- 2 the spectrum.
- Fifteen years later, DMX, one of the
- 4 original PSS, was dissolved in bankruptcy; it's out
- 5 of that market. Muzak, the only other PSS, has
- 6 chosen not to expand its business beyond the one
- 7 affiliate that it had back at the time.
- 8 And Music Choice's financial position,
- 9 as you can see in Mr. Del Beccaro's testimony and
- 10 his exhibits, is even more precarious now than it
- 11 was in 1996 through '98, when the rate was set.
- 12 As it turns out, the projections that
- 13 Music Choice gave to the CARP were unduly
- 14 optimistic. Although they have managed to expand
- 15 their subscriber base over the years quite
- 16 substantially, at the same time, their average fee
- 17 per subscriber on a monthly basis has plummeted.
- 18 And that's, of course, due to the
- 19 competitive dynamics of the cable market, where
- 20 Music Choice has to compete with audio-visual
- 21 programming and all sorts of other content for
- 22 carriage as part of the basic cable package, which

106 frankly, for better or worse, the cable companies seem to believe is more highly valued by their customers. And all of those forces have driven the rate down substantially. 5 Only recently has Music Choice managed to turn an occasional profitable year on an annual basis. Although some years have been profitable and then others it goes back into a loss, they're certainly far from recovering the cumulative losses 10 that they've endured over the years under the 11 original rate; nor are they close to providing a return on investment for their original investors. 12 13 So these facts all continue to support, and even more strongly so, setting the rate on the 15 lower end of the spectrum. 16 Now, the third factor looks to the relative roles of the PSS and the copyright owners in making the product available to the public, and 18 there are several subfactors to look at. 19 20 The first are the relative creative 21 contributions. 22 Now, frankly, this pretty much mirrors

- 1 the first factor, so to the extent that Music Choice
- 2 is adding more creative content to the service than
- 3 it did before, certainly we would understand the
- 4 record companies having the better of this factor,
- 5 but by a lesser margin. But all of the other
- 6 subfactors continue to go in favor of setting a
- 7 lower rate.
- 8 The second subfactor is the relative
- 9 technological contributions.
- 10 The Librarian focused on the various
- 11 technology that the PSS had developed to create and
- 12 launch their services, to create an entire new type
- 13 of digital music service, and noted that the record
- 14 companies were not required to make any
- 15 technological contributions to that.
- That is certainly even more true today.
- 17 Mr. Del Beccaro sets out in his testimony various
- 18 new technologies that Music Choice has had to
- 19 implement to improve its service and try to stem the
- 20 flow of the lowering and lowering user rates.
- Some examples are the on-screen displays
- 22 that I discussed before; the production studio for

- 1 recording artists' interviews and performances;
- 2 improvements to the digital playback systems; the
- 3 creation of a data center and disaster recovery
- 4 systems; improvements to the satellite uplink system
- 5 to allow for more channels to be transmitted; and
- 6 various technology required to integrate social
- 7 media platforms into the service.
- 8 And, again, with -- the record labels
- 9 still have not had to make any technological
- 10 contributions related to the PSS.
- 11 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Mr. Fakler, if I
- 12 could interrupt you just a second on that point.
- MR. FAKLER: Absolutely.
- JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Are you suggesting,
- 15 then, that the -- that the -- what you described as
- 16 the policy-based reason for setting the rate for the
- 17 PSS is a moving target in the sense that, as the PSS
- 18 adopts new technology, then that new technology also
- 19 has to be taken into account in order to preserve
- 20 their rate of return or to preserve them
- 21 economically?
- MR. FAKLER: Yes, I absolutely do think

109 1 so. And I think that if you look at even the 2 way that the Librarian suggested that one would look to changes in circumstance over the intervening years, you know, the key -- and also consistent with the legislative history, which is to -- to allow the PSS to maintain their businesses, it's a very unusual consideration given to a small group of fairly modest companies, but there it is in 10 the legislative history and in their rate. 11 So, yes, I do believe -- I don't think 12 that you just take a snapshot of the initial launch 13 technology and any new technology that's required to keep the service in business doesn't get counted. 15 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Do you distinguish between new technology required to keep the service in business and new technology that expands the 17 18 nature of that business? 19 MR. FAKLER: I don't think that there's a distinction between those two. 20 21 And I think that Mr. Del Beccaro will, you know, testify to that to some degree.

110

1 In the competitive world in which the PSS have been trying to continue to exist, it requires that they're constantly adding new value to the service to persuade the cable companies to -- to slow down that lower and lower value. They have to keep demonstrating added value to the cable companies. And so for that reason, I think those two are actually the same. 10 And with respect to the next subfactor, 11 the relative capital contribution, the Librarian of Congress essentially looked at the technological 12 13 contributions that they had already -- that he had 14 already evaluated and noted that each of those 15 required substantial capital investments to 16 implement.

- And so for that same reason, all of
- 18 these technical contributions that I just discussed,
- 19 the more recent ones, all of them required
- 20 significant capital investments by Music Choice. In
- 21 fact, for Music Choice alone, those capital
- 22 investments are far greater for Music Choice alone

- 1 than the 10 million for the entire PSS industry that
- 2 was credited at the time of the first proceeding.
- 3 The next subfactor are the relative
- 4 costs and risks borne by the services.
- 5 And here, the Librarian of Congress
- 6 found that the costs and the risks of the PSS
- 7 greatly outweighed those of the record companies,
- 8 which is not to say that -- I mean, the Librarian
- 9 recognized that record companies experience certain
- 10 costs and risks associated with their primary
- 11 business, which is the recording and distribution of
- 12 copies of sound recordings.
- 13 But the Librarian also noted that those
- 14 costs and risks have been there for many decades.
- 15 Largely, the record labels had adapted their
- 16 businesses to accommodate those costs and risks.
- 17 But, most importantly, none of those costs and risks
- 18 were affected or certainly were increased by the
- 19 PSS. To the contrary, the Librarian found that the
- 20 risks were somewhat lowered by the PSS because of
- 21 the promotional impact, the Librarian found, from
- 22 the PSS service.

- 1 This is even more true today. As set
- 2 out in Mr. Del Beccaro's and Mr. Williams'
- 3 testimony, first of all, the PSS lower the costs of
- 4 the record labels in a way they didn't before, which
- 5 is by doing these customized artist promotions that
- 6 include custom programming on the channels, they
- 7 include custom advertisements on the screen and
- 8 promotional materials. The record labels
- 9 specifically asked Music Choice for -- to do these
- 10 promotions, and Music Choice does them at no cost to
- 11 the record labels.
- So that's a cost saving, a new cost
- 13 saving that's coming from the PSS.
- And, of course, they also continue to
- 15 lower the risk to the record labels through the
- 16 promotional impact.
- 17 It's also important to note that even
- 18 during this admittedly difficult transition from
- 19 the -- for the record labels between physical
- 20 distribution models and digital, they have still
- 21 managed to turn profits, in very stark contrast to
- 22 Music Choice's performance.

113 1 Digital actually lowers several of the historical costs for the record labels substantially with respect to production and distribution. It's also important to note that last year, the overall album sales actually increased. And the long-awaited inflection point -- the record labels, themselves, anticipate that inflection point, where the increases in digital will finally make up for losses in physical, will be upon us within the next 10 year or two. 11 For the PSS, the risks are only 12 increasing. As set out in Mr. Del Beccaro's 13 testimony, you know, the revenue per subscriber 14 continues to go lower. 15 Music Choice is now a mature service, 16 unlike at the time of the first rate-setting 17 proceeding, specifically in the sense it can no 18 longer hope that increased market penetration is 19 somehow going to solve the profitability problem. 20 Music Choice has also had to develop video content to package along with its audio 22 services in order to help stem, again, this -- this

- 1 constant lowering of the per-subscriber fee.
- When it -- you know, when it adds that
- 3 video content to its channels, it has to direct
- 4 license that at much higher rates from the record
- 5 labels.
- 6 So at this point, it's very unclear
- 7 whether the video component of the residential
- 8 business will ever be profitable enough to sort of
- 9 make up for these losses on the audio side.
- 10 And, finally, the fifth subfactor is the
- 11 relative contribution to opening of new markets for
- 12 creative expression and media for their
- 13 communication.
- 14 And the Librarian of Congress found
- 15 easily, you know, just by the nature of the PSS,
- 16 they were opening these new channels, these new
- 17 media, and it did not require any contribution from
- 18 the record labels other than the sound recordings
- 19 which, of course, they weren't really providing,
- 20 Congress was providing, in a sense.
- 21 Turning finally to the fourth factor,
- 22 which is maximizing any disruptive impact on the

- 1 structure of the industries involved, the Librarian
- 2 of Congress specifically noted that setting a rate
- 3 too high ran the risk of driving one or more of the
- 4 PSS out of the business. The Librarian found this
- 5 completely unacceptable outcome under the fourth
- 6 factor.
- 7 The Librarian also contrasted this with
- 8 the effect of the rate -- the royalty stream from
- 9 the PSS on the record companies, noting that even if
- 10 the rate was set at the extremely high 41.5 percent
- 11 rate that the RIAA was asking for in the proceeding,
- 12 it wouldn't have any material impact on the revenues
- 13 of the record labels.
- 14 That's certainly just as true, if not
- 15 more so, today. We've seen the loss of DMX. We've
- 16 seen Music Choice's poor financial performance
- 17 certainly indicates that the rate was set too high
- 18 in the first place. At the same time, PSS royalties
- 19 are nowhere near a primary or even tertiary revenue
- 20 stream for the record labels.
- 21 In fact, if the labels were to get the
- 22 45 percent rate that they're asking for in this

- 1 proceeding, that increase would amount to roughly a
- 2 fraction of a hundredth of a percent of the gross
- 3 revenues of the record labels.
- 4 So this is just a meaningless event, no
- 5 matter where the rate gets set for the record
- 6 labels.
- 7 So, in summary, based on the actual PRO
- 8 rate, which was initially set twice as high as it
- 9 should have been, and the various changes in
- 10 circumstance related to the policy factors,
- 11 Music Choice is requesting a rate of 2.6 percent of
- 12 revenue.
- Now, this rate proposal is further
- 14 supported by the expert testimony of Music Choice's
- 15 economist, Dr. Gregory Crawford. Dr. Crawford is
- 16 currently a professor of economics at the University
- 17 of Warwick in England. He was previously the chief
- 18 economist for the FCC. He's researched and
- 19 published extensively on economic matters relating
- 20 to the cable industry which, of course, is very
- 21 helpful, since that's the industry the PSS are in.
- 22 And he presents two main areas of

- 1 analysis: In the first area, he uses the
- 2 widely-accepted Nash Noncooperative Bargaining Model
- 3 to demonstrate the suitability of using the musical
- 4 works performance license as a benchmark for the
- 5 sound recording performance license specifically for
- 6 the PSS.
- 7 He also uses the Nash model to
- 8 demonstrate that, in a hypothetical marketplace
- 9 negotiation, the sound recording license rate would
- 10 be lower than the musical works performance license,
- 11 and therefore, the PRO license should set the upper
- 12 bound of potential ranges of marketplace outcomes.
- In the second area, he analyzes
- 14 Music Choice's financial performance, particularly
- 15 in light of the second and fourth policy factors.
- 16 He also uses the capital asset pricing model to
- 17 determine Music Choice's reasonably expected rate of
- 18 return on capital.
- And he does all of this to estimate what
- 20 the surplus should be for Music Choice's residential
- 21 music service available to be split between
- 22 Music Choice and the record company.

118 1 Dr. Crawford estimates that surplus to be 3.05 percent of revenue and concludes, therefore, that a reasonable rate for the PSS would range from 3 .61 to 2.43 percent of revenue, which is essentially just saying SoundExchange should get somewhere between 20 percent and 80 percent of the entire surplus. 8 And as you can see, the Music Choice rate proposal is at the high end of Dr. Crawford's 10 range. Now, before I talk about SoundExchange's 11 12 rate case, I just want to talk briefly about the other terms in the CFR that relate to the PSS 14 license. 15 Mr. Del Beccaro has testified that the PSS and SoundExchange have been operating under 17 these regs for many years now without any particular issues that either side has ever discussed with the 19 other. 20 There's, frankly, no reason to change them at this late date. SoundExchange is asking to 22 make various changes to the regulations. They try

- 1 to couch them as mere stylistic and just trying to
- 2 conform them to the SDARS regulations, but if you
- 3 look through the red lines -- and, unfortunately,
- 4 you do have to hunt through all the red lines to see
- 5 all of the changes they're requesting to make --
- 6 many of them, in fact, take away substantive
- 7 protections for the PSS and other benefits to the
- 8 PSS that are in the existing regs.
- And, notably, when they get to one of
- 10 the provisions; namely, the fee shifting threshold
- 11 for audits, suddenly they don't want to conform the
- 12 PSS regs to the SDARS. Why? Because the PSS regs
- 13 are better for them than the SDARS' regs.
- 14 So they're really not trying to conform
- 15 these things in any way. In any event, they haven't
- 16 provided in their direct case any justifications --
- 17 any substantive justifications for changing any of
- 18 these regulations that the parties have been using
- 19 for many years.
- 20 And also, notably, there are many
- 21 compulsory licenses in the Copyright Act, there are
- 22 many sets of implementing regulations in the CFR.

- 1 They're not all identical. They don't necessarily
- 2 have to be identical. And Music Choice submits that
- 3 they shouldn't be changed in this case.
- 4 Now, turning to SoundExchange's rate
- 5 case, as noted before, there is precedent on how a
- 6 rate should be set for the PSS. There is precedent
- 7 about these general principles for 801(b) rate
- 8 setting.
- 9 SoundExchange ignores all of them. In
- 10 fact, in its written case, it almost entirely
- 11 ignores the PSS. You really have to hunt through
- 12 their testimony to find any reference to us. In any
- 13 event, there is certainly no fact witness testimony;
- 14 there isn't a shred of fact witness testimony that
- 15 supports their rate proposal.
- In fact, the only fact witness that even
- 17 mentions the PSS rate is Steven Bryan of Warner
- 18 Music Group.
- 19 What does Mr. Bryan say? He gives no
- 20 testimony on what the rate should be. He says
- 21 nothing relating to the policy factors related to
- 22 the PSS. In fact, he only gives one paragraph of

- 1 testimony about the PSS rate, and in that paragraph,
- 2 he says only two things.
- 3 First, he admits that the PSS is
- 4 completely unique among digital music services and
- 5 admits there are no marketplace agreements that are
- 6 in any way similar.
- 7 The second thing he says is
- 8 hypothetically, Warner Music Group would not
- 9 voluntarily agree to license the PSS at a rate as
- 10 low as 7.5 percent because they're able to get these
- 11 higher rates in these other admittedly noncomparable
- 12 areas.
- Well, neither of these things support
- 14 the specific rate that SoundExchange is proposing.
- 15 And, in fact, the first admission about how
- 16 noncomparable the PSS is actually shows why their
- 17 expert witness' opinion is completely useless to
- 18 setting the rate in this proceeding.
- 19 That turns to their economist for the
- 20 PSS, Dr. George Ford.
- 21 And I think Dr. Ford's testimony can
- 22 only be described as, you know, a rate in search of

- 1 a methodology.
- 2 He ignores the precedent entirely.
- 3 Dr. Ford, like Mr. Bryan, admits that the PSS market
- 4 is completely unique. He admits that there were no
- 5 marketplace comparables to use in a traditional
- 6 benchmarking analysis.
- 7 That admission alone should doom his
- 8 decision, because all he does is then proceed to
- 9 rely on a series of admittedly noncomparable
- 10 benchmark services.
- 11 Apparently, in Dr. Ford's view, it's
- 12 okay to use noncomparable benchmarks as long as you
- 13 use a lot of them, and that was essentially his
- 14 approach.
- He took the analysis actually done by
- 16 Dr. Ordover, SoundExchange's other economist in this
- 17 case -- and there was a range of percentage of
- 18 revenue rates that ran from 43 percent to 70 percent
- 19 in certain digital music service markets -- and he
- 20 assumed that that range constituted the entire range
- 21 of existing direct licensed digital music service
- 22 rates. And based on that assumption, he then

- 1 reasoned because SoundExchange's 45 percent rate was
- 2 at the low end of that range, it was, per se,
- 3 reasonable.
- 4 Now, there are a lot of problems with
- 5 that methodology. One question that immediately
- 6 comes up is if Dr. Ford was going to rely on
- 7 Dr. Ordover's staff and his analysis for his
- 8 opinion, why not just have Dr. Ordover give the
- 9 opinion on what that analysis and work meant for the
- 10 PSS?
- 11 The other question which, in their
- 12 deposition testimony, Dr. Ford acknowledged that he
- 13 never spoke to Dr. Ordover, although he spoke to
- 14 Dr. Ordover's staff. And Dr. Ordover did not even
- 15 know who Dr. Ford was, and certainly didn't know he
- 16 was talking to his staff or using any of his
- 17 analysis.
- 18 So why was Dr. Ford and -- firewalled
- 19 off from Dr. Ordover? Well, the answer to both of
- 20 these questions, I think, are the same. It was
- 21 Dr. Ordover who SoundExchange put before the Judges
- 22 five years ago in rebuttal in the SDARS case to

- 1 explain all of the reasons why Music Choice was so
- 2 unique and so different from the SDARS that it
- 3 couldn't even be used as a benchmark.
- 4 Dr. Ordover understands that you can't
- 5 use a noncomparable digital music service as a
- 6 benchmark. That was his very testimony that the
- 7 Judges accepted and agreed with. So he would be the
- 8 last person able to sit here with a straight face
- 9 and use this sort of methodology that relies
- 10 entirely on noncomparable benchmarks.
- But there are other problems. Even if
- 12 it were somehow valid to use these noncomparable
- 13 benchmarks, the fundamental assumption, as I said,
- 14 was this range of rates was the total range of rates
- 15 out there, that there was no digital music service
- 16 directly licensed who was paying at a rate less than
- 17 43 percent.
- The fact is, that's completely false.
- 19 There are dozens of digital music service agreements
- 20 that pay at a rate substantially lower than
- 21 43 percent. Apparently, Dr. Ford didn't know that;
- 22 apparently, he didn't ask. But, in any event, that

- 1 completely undermines his critical assumption.
- 2 There's another fundamental problem with
- 3 his methodology as well, in that he relies on the
- 4 nominal percentage of revenue rate in these various
- 5 noncomparable digital music service agreements. And
- 6 as the Judges know from SoundExchange's case, all of
- 7 these agreements have multiple ways that you can
- 8 figure out what the actual royalty rate is, and
- 9 which one of those metrics gets used depends in
- 10 large part on the performance of the music service.
- 11 The fact is, none of these digital music
- 12 services pay on the nominal percentage of revenue
- 13 rate. So all of these noncomparable services that
- 14 Dr. Ford used, he used a revenue -- he used a rate
- 15 that nobody actually pays on.
- So for all of those reasons, each one, I
- 17 believe, independently nullifies any utility of his
- 18 decision. They're all still there.
- He then turns to the policy factors very
- 20 briefly, but he only does so to essentially argue
- 21 that all of the policy factors are already baked
- 22 into these noncomparable digital music service

- 1 agreements. And, of course, that is completely at
- 2 odds with the Librarian of Congress' decision, the
- 3 other 801(b) D.C. Circuit decisions, and
- 4 specifically, the Librarian of Congress, who said,
- 5 on this very point, that market rates do not
- 6 typically already include these policy factors.
- 7 And that's common sense and consistent
- 8 with the legislative history, because why would
- 9 Congress choose these four policy factors instead of
- 10 a market rate when they could have chosen a market
- 11 rate? Why did they grandfather the PSS with these
- 12 policy rates when they went to an actual market
- 13 rate? All of that is meaningless if you believe
- 14 that a market rate already takes into account the
- 15 four -- the 801(b) policy factors.
- Avoiding the policy factors by assuming
- 17 that they're all necessarily satisfied by market
- 18 rates, it contravenes Congress' very intentional
- 19 decision to set the policy standards this way, and
- 20 it's totally in conflict with the precedent.
- 21 Now, Dr. Ford even goes on in the fourth
- 22 factor to claim that a rate that puts Music Choice

- 1 out of business is still consistent with the fourth
- 2 policy factor. Well, that's, again, completely
- 3 inconsistent with the precedent here and, of course,
- 4 the legislative history and the very purpose for
- 5 using the policy factor.
- 6 So, in conclusion, the Copyright Royalty
- 7 Judges, with respect to the PSS rate, anyway, are
- 8 presented with two historically contrasting
- 9 methodologies.
- One, Music Choice looks to the prior
- 11 precedent, prior rate setting, even for the PSS,
- 12 uses the same methodology, uses the same benchmark,
- 13 and then adjusts for changes in circumstance, which
- 14 is exactly what was suggested by the Librarian of
- 15 Congress in that decision.
- SoundExchange, on the other hand,
- 17 completely ignores all of these general principles
- 18 and precedent as if they never happened.
- 19 SoundExchange proposes benchmarks from admittedly
- 20 noncomparable services, using rates that are not
- 21 actually paid in the marketplace by any of those
- 22 services.

		128
1	Their entire proposal is based on the	
2	false assumption that no direct license music	
3	service pays less than 43 percent, and then claims	
4	that it need not bother submitting any evidence on	
5	the 801(b) factors because, contrary to precedent,	
6	those factors are already baked into these	
7	noncomparable performance licenses.	
8	The result is a request on	
9	SoundExchange's part for a sixfold increase in the	
10	rate Music Choice will pay.	
11	If Congressional intent and precedent	
12	are to mean anything in this proceeding, the choice	
13	between Music Choice's rate proposal and	
14	SoundExchange's rate proposal is no choice at all.	
15	Thank you very much.	
16	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you,	
17	Mr. Fakler.	
18	Your timing is impeccable. We will take	
19	our noon recess and reconvene at 1:00.	
20	(Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m.,	
21	a luncheon recess was taken.)	
22		

1	A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N	129
2	(1:03 p.m.)	
3	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Good afternoon.	
4	Please be seated.	
5	MR. RICH: Your Honor, before Mr. Handzo	
6	begins, I was hoping I could raise an important	
7	evidentiary housekeeping matter that may have some	
8	bearing on his opening.	
9	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: You may.	
10	MR. RICH: Thank you.	
11	By agreement of the parties, we	
12	exchanged last evening demonstratives as a courtesy,	
13	and also by agreement, we have been exchanging	
14	proposed exhibits proposed to be introduced by	
15	the adversary on cross-examination.	
16	And we have, as of noon today, received	
17	now three such sets of designations from our friends	
18	at Jenner & Block. And what we found was, in the	
19	demonstratives last night, there is a reliance on	
20	postclose of direct case and outside of discovery	
21	financial records in the case of the demonstratives'	
22	public filings, but nonetheless, deeply into 2012	

- 1 relating to, no surprise, our client.
- 2 And in the proffers of exhibits done in
- 3 good faith, as per the agreement, there is, in
- 4 effect, an effort to de facto update, through
- 5 cross-examination exhibits, the entire financial
- 6 record of this case through the direct case, meaning
- 7 documents that are well outside of the end date of
- 8 November '11, our direct case, well outside of
- 9 anything produced in discovery. That record closed
- 10 in March; they're just brand-new documents.
- Now, as Your Honors are aware, when we
- 12 attempted to update, for example, to freshen the
- 13 record through Messrs. Gertz and Dr. Noll on direct
- 14 licenses, we were met with a fierce opposition,
- 15 mostly sustained by Your Honors, about the fact that
- 16 that's not the role of the direct case.
- You're bound by your case and -- unless
- 18 it's in the discovery record and so forth. And we
- 19 have, therefore, abided by that.
- 20 And so what we have is really a de facto
- 21 effort here, as we see it, in the making of a
- 22 one-sided update of the case; that is, updating in

- 1 the quise of cross-examination exhibits documents
- 2 that never would have properly made it into, for
- 3 example, the list document, their key financial
- 4 expert, had they done -- had they proposed to amend
- 5 Dr. Lys with the May 2012 slide deck that's in
- 6 Mr. Handzo's opening, we would have taken their
- 7 briefing on the Gertz and Noll motion, flipped it
- 8 around, used their words and said, sorry, it doesn't
- 9 work.
- 10 It's -- it's an update of information
- 11 well beyond the close date. Their arguments, which
- 12 you read, were we have to have some closure in the
- 13 direct case.
- So what we're facing is this imbalance,
- 15 potentially, where we are preparing our direct
- 16 witnesses, going on the stand beginning today, based
- 17 on a record frozen as to the direct written cases.
- 18 We are not proposing to examine Mr. Frear, for
- 19 example, tomorrow on financial developments post his
- 20 written direct testimony. It had been our
- 21 understanding that would be inappropriate under the
- 22 governing strictures.

132 A great example of the imbalance is that 1 when Professor Noll suggested in our original proposed amended testimony to make reference to a 2012 Pandora 10-K, as Your Honors will recall, that was objected to. And that was rejected and, therefore, stricken and no longer appears in the 7 revised amended -- one of the very exhibits they're proposing to cross-examine Dr. Noll with and introduce in evidence is that same document. 10 So it seems to me, unless I'm missing something, that we ought to have at least an 12 equitable understanding about everybody can update 13 within whatever parameters, in which case, we can 14 affirmatively address the circumstances that would 15 come in collaterally through cross, or nobody can do that until the rebuttal case. But certainly, it 16 17 shouldn't come through the side door. Technically speaking, if you know the 18 19 rules, as you do of your own Court here, 20 cross-examination is, by definition, limited to the 21 subject of the direct examination. By definition, our witnesses did not address post-November '11

- 1 financial developments, and to be met now with
- 2 cross-examination where we could not affirmatively
- 3 have used those, in what appears to be a systematic
- 4 effort to sort of end run the understandings we
- 5 thought we had, in fact, the parameters advocated by
- 6 our adversary, seems to us inappropriate.
- 7 And I didn't want to interrupt
- 8 Mr. Handzo's opening where it's there, but I think
- 9 if we could get some guidance from Your Honor, it
- 10 would be -- Your Honors, it would be very helpful.
- 11 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Mr. Handzo, do you
- 12 want to respond?
- MR. HANDZO: Sure.
- The objections to the written testimony
- 15 were based on a specific regulation --
- JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Actually, gentlemen,
- 17 you should be at the podium for these things.
- MR. RICH: That's fine.
- MR. HANDZO: That's fine.
- I have a bad habit, by the way, of
- 21 ignoring those microphones. I was in Court in a
- 22 trial last month and thought I was off the mic when

134 conferring with one of my colleagues, and the judge let us know that we were on the mic. 3 In any event --JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Those microphones 5 actually are off unless you press them down. MR. HANDZO: Thank you. 6 In any event, the objection to the written testimony was based on the specific regulation which addresses that, 351.4. It doesn't address the situation that Mr. Rich is now talking 10 about, which is what happens when a witness gets on 12 the witness stand and there are things about which 13 you wish to cross-examine that witness that may relate to more recent events. 15 That's not something that is barred by the regulation, nor is it unfair, because almost by 17 definition, what you're doing is you're 18 cross-examining the witness about something the witness has knowledge of. You're cross-examining 20 the witness about the witness' own statements, for 21 example. 22 In this case, talking about the -- the

- 1 various SiriusXM documents or statements that
- 2 various folks made, they're their own statements.
- 3 So it seems a little bizarre not to be able to
- 4 cross-examine them about their own statements,
- 5 whenever made. And I'm aware of no rule of this
- 6 Court that would forbid it.
- Now, I will say I think this issue has
- 8 come up before, and I recall it coming up in the
- 9 first SDARS case, where we had the same sorts of
- 10 issues about financial information being updated
- 11 after the close of discovery, in fact, around the
- 12 time the hearings began.
- 13 My recollection is that the Court
- 14 generally was -- tended to be permissive of updating
- 15 that information; as long as there wasn't any unfair
- 16 sandbagging by doing it, updating with information
- 17 that the other party had no basis to know.
- 18 But in this, there's certainly, again,
- 19 no unfair sandbagging. These are their own
- 20 documents and their own statements.
- 21 And, again, to cross-examine a
- 22 witness -- to not be able to cross-examine a witness

3

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

22

136 about the witness' own statements is just not something that these regulations contemplate. And I will also say I think Mr. Rich, with all due respect, is incorrect when he says it would necessarily be beyond the scope of the direct. The scope of direct is defined by the subject matter of it, and as long as the cross-examination relates to the subject matter of it, it is within the scope of the cross-examination. That's all I have, but I'm happy to respond to questions from the Court, if you wish. CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: No, thank you. Brief statement in rebuttal, Mr. Rich. MR. RICH: Very simply, Your Honors, I've never viewed these proceedings as a game of "gotcha." If there is interest, as there should

standpoint, an up-to-date record, we have no dispute

about that. The question is, what is the orderly

be, in having a complete record and, from our

way to present that information?

If, as a matter of practice and as

- 1 advocated by SoundExchange in repeated filings
- 2 indicating that you need a period of closure for the
- 3 direct case, or else it will be a constantly
- 4 updating exercise -- that's their characterization
- 5 in response to our efforts to update information
- 6 viewed as highly relevant by our client -- then,
- 7 surely, that has to work both ways.
- 8 And the device of saying, well, Dr. Noll
- 9 can't affirmatively use a Pandora 10-K because
- 10 that's an amend -- an impermissible amendment, but I
- 11 can turn around and use that 10-K -- which, by
- 12 definition, is not part of his direct testimony --
- 13 to impeach him or otherwise cross-examine him and,
- 14 moreover, introduce that very same document in
- 15 evidence on cross-examination, creates a complete
- 16 imbalance in the creation of an orderly record.
- To be clear, we are not looking to avert
- 18 developing a complete record here. We're looking to
- 19 do it in some logical way and also to have some
- 20 understandings in terms of rules of the road in
- 21 terms of what are the proper boundaries for us,
- 22 then, to bring our witnesses current during their

- 1 direct examinations and, in turn, SoundExchange's
- 2 witnesses current, I assume, during those.
- We're all for that, but the idea of
- 4 doing it through the side door seems inappropriate.
- I mean, truly, I think one way to
- 6 conceptualize this, which is not far from real, is
- 7 that SoundExchange clearly understood that these
- 8 documents they wanted to use could never have come
- 9 in through the direct technique of an amendment
- 10 through one of their witnesses for the very reasons
- 11 that Mr. Handzo cites.
- 12 Can it possibly be that they can
- 13 completely end run that and avoid that by the device
- 14 of saying, oh, in a general sense, this falls within
- 15 the subject matter, meaning the financial health of
- 16 the company, and, therefore, we can take the very
- 17 same documents outside of the time period, never the
- 18 subject of testimony by any of our clients, and use
- 19 them -- not only use them as general probing and
- 20 impeaching documents on cross, but independently,
- 21 then, to get them admitted into evidence?
- We would urge Your Honors that that

139 approach will be piecemeal, will be one-sided, will be imbalanced and, at the end day, won't create a full and fair record here. JUDGE ROBERTS: Mr. Rich, isn't the better approach here, if you do have an objection to the specific use of a document, to raise it at that time on the grounds that it's outside the scope of the direct? MR. RICH: We're fully prepared to do 10 that, and if that the Panel's preference, that's 11 certainly fine with us. However, we -- we felt uncomfortable, candidly, having Mr. Handzo proceed 12 13 with what may be a centerpiece of his opening with 14 such a document without stating at least our 15 position very forcefully felt on the subject. 16 If, as a matter of procedure, Your Honors decide that's how you want to proceed, 17 18 obviously, we will -- we will address it on that 19 basis. 20 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Can we confer? 21 (The Judges confer.) 22 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you for your

		140
1	patience.	110
2	Please be seated.	
3	Counsel, I will state that painfully	
4	obvious opening statements are statements of what	
5	the parties anticipate the evidence will show.	
6	Mr. Handzo can proffer anything he wants	
7	during his opening statement. It doesn't make it	
8	evidence. And at the time that he presents	
9	something or moves that something be admitted into	
10	evidence or offers something into evidence, if	
11	there's an objection at that time, we can deal with	
12	it at that time.	
13	I do ask, Mr. Rich, that to the extent	
14	you have an objection to it being offered during the	
15	opening statement, you make that now or make your	
16	record now, which you have done, rather than	
17	interrupting the opening statement.	
18	MR. RICH: Understood, Your Honor.	
19	Thank you very much.	
20	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Um-hum.	
21	Mr. Handzo.	
22	MR. HANDZO: Thank you.	

		141
1	OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF SOUNDEXCHANGE	141
2		
3	MR. HANDZO: As Mr. Rich anticipated, we	
4	do have some demonstratives as well.	
5	And before I begin, I should introduce	
6	my colleagues, Garrett Levin and Ann Wagner back	
7	there.	
8	My colleagues, Michael DeSanctis and	
9	Jared Freedman. Were here this morning, but they	
10	apparently didn't feel the need to listen to me. So	
11	they've left. And Mr. Moskowitz is also part of the	
12	team, got a hall pass, apparently, for today.	
13	But you will see all of them in due	
14	course.	
15	I'm going to respond to SiriusXM and	
16	Music Choice in the order that Mr. Rich and	
17	Mr. Fakler appeared, so I'll start with SiriusXM.	
18	SoundExchange submits that the	
19	appropriate marketplace benchmarks suggest rates in	
20	the range of 20 to 30 percent of revenue for	
21	SiriusXM. That is consistent with other digital	
22	music services.	

142 1 For most digital music services, royalty rates cluster around 50 to 65 percent of revenue. Ring tones, downloads, interactive streaming, all 3 the marketplace benchmarks are at that level or higher. Now, making allowance for the fact that SiriusXM broadcasts nonmusic content as well as music content, royalty rates in the range of 20 to 30 percent of -- of revenues -- in other words, 10 about half of the royalty for an all-music service -- seem appropriate based on the belief 12 which all the experts seem to accept, that nonmusic 13 content is about half the value of the service or half the value of the content for consumers. 15 So a royalty rate that is half of what SoundExchange, record companies and artists obtain for other digital services seems appropriate. 17 18 SoundExchange does propose, however, that this Court set the rates below that range at 20 the outset, rising to the bottom of that range by the end of the rate period. 21 22 And specifically, SoundExchange proposes

143 that the rates begin at 12 percent of revenue in 2013 and rise to 20 percent in 2017. 3 Mr. Rich, this morning, seemed to suggest that somehow, the record companies and the artists just want a handout here, just want to put a hand into SiriusXM's pocket now that it's making 7 money. No. 8 What's happening here is those are the appropriate marketplace rates, as we will 10 demonstrate in this case. What SoundExchange is 11 asking for is -- is a marketplace rate, not a 12 handout. 13 Now, broadly, I think there are two issues that are framed for us in this proceeding by 14 this Court's prior decision in the SDARS I case. 15 16 The first question is, what rate would a willing buyer pay a willing seller for the right to 17 18 publicly perform sound recordings on a satellite radio service? And once we've determined what that 19 20 rate is, is there any reason then to adjust it to account for the factors set forth in 801(b)? 22 That is how this Court approached the

- 1 analysis in the SDARS I case, and we propose to
- 2 follow it here.
- Now, I'm going to take those issues in
- 4 reverse, first, as to whether there will be any need
- 5 to adjust a marketplace rate.
- In SDARS I, this Court concluded that
- 7 the first three statutory factors would likely be
- 8 satisfied by any rate that was a marketplace rate, a
- 9 rate that a willing buyer would pay a willing
- 10 seller. Just by operation of the markets, one would
- 11 expect that price would comply with the statutory
- 12 mandate to reward risk, to encourage the creation of
- 13 new music and so on.
- 14 No evidence will be offered in this case
- 15 that will give you any reason to deviate from that
- 16 ruling. Both sides in this case still offer some
- 17 evidence about their creative technological and
- 18 financial contributions and the risks, but nothing
- 19 in kind any different than what was offered in SDARS
- 20 I. And, indeed, I believe there's mercifully less
- 21 of it than last time around.
- 22 So that conclusion that the first three

- 1 factors are satisfied by a marketplace rate I think
- 2 should apply in this case as well. And Dr. Ordover
- 3 will testify on behalf of SoundExchange that in his
- 4 opinion, marketplace rates will satisfy those
- 5 factors.
- In SDARS I, however, the Court did, I
- 7 think, deviate from a marketplace rate based on the
- 8 fourth factor, disruption. Two-thirds of the Court
- 9 at least will recall that in that case, the Court
- 10 found that 13 percent of revenues was the upper
- 11 bound of a reasonable marketplace rate.
- 12 The Court did not find -- did not
- 13 determine what a lower bound was, except to say that
- 14 it would have to be higher than the musical works
- 15 rate. And the Court also found that a marketplace
- 16 rate closer to the higher end of the scale, rather
- 17 than lower, was most strongly indicated by the
- 18 evidence.
- 19 Nevertheless, the Court set the rate at
- 20 6 percent of revenue at the beginning, going up to
- 21 8 percent at the end of the term. And the reason
- 22 for cutting it back from that 13 percent, as

- 1 expressed in the Court's decision, was that a higher
- 2 rate might be disruptive in two ways: First,
- 3 SiriusXM still had a number of satellites that it
- 4 needed to launch to replace its existing satellites.
- 5 That's a very expensive proposition.
- 6 SiriusXM didn't, at that point -- wasn't
- 7 clear that they had the money to do it, and so the
- 8 Court was concerned that a higher rate might prevent
- 9 SiriusXM from going forward with those satellite
- 10 launches. And, of course for a satellite service,
- 11 no satellites, no service. So the Court believed
- 12 that that would be disruptive.
- 13 The second reason the Court found there
- 14 might be disruption from a larger rate increase was
- 15 that SiriusXM had not achieved positive EBITDA at
- 16 that point, and the Court felt that unduly delaying
- 17 that would also be disruptive.
- The Court adjusted downward accordingly,
- 19 but the evidence in this case, I think, will show
- 20 that there is no need for any adjustment of a
- 21 marketplace rate under Section 801 other than,
- 22 perhaps, to increase that rate over time rather than

- 1 imposing it all at once.
- 2 The evidence is overwhelming that the
- B rates requested by SoundExchange will not be
- 4 disruptive, because SiriusXM is in a very, very
- 5 different place than it was five years ago.
- On the numbers, in a third quarter 2011
- 7 earnings call, Mr. Frear, who is the CFO of
- 8 SiriusXM, said that fixed expenses since 2008 have
- 9 declined by 31 percent, while revenue has increased
- 10 by 25 percent. And you can imagine what a
- 11 difference that makes, but we can display it
- 12 graphically.
- It's the first tab in the binder that
- 14 you have. And this is from a stockholder
- 15 presentation by SiriusXM in 2012.
- And you can see their representation of
- 17 the growth in the number of subscribers that they
- 18 have, continuing out through the end of this year.
- 19 Obviously, when you have growth in
- 20 subscribers, you have growth in revenue. And that's
- 21 the next chart, again, from the same presentation.
- 22 Again, this is a SiriusXM presentation, and it shows

- 1 their multiyear revenue growth going up to very
- 2 lofty levels by the end of this year and, obviously,
- 3 dramatically increasing over 2008.
- When you've got increasing revenue and
- 5 decreasing costs, your EBITDA obviously also
- 6 improves. And this is a slide from the same
- 7 presentation showing how the EBITDA has improved.
- 8 In fact, it was negative in 2008, it turned positive
- 9 in 2009, and has continued to grow at healthy levels
- 10 since then.
- 11 And then, lastly, when we litigated
- 12 SDARS I, there was a great deal of testimony about
- 13 free cash flow and the importance of free cash flow
- 14 to SiriusXM's business. Free cash flow is just the
- 15 money they have available to use as they choose to
- 16 pay down debts, to make acquisitions. Whatever they
- 17 need to do, that's the money they have to do it.
- 18 And as you'll see from Tab 4, the free
- 19 cash flow has been growing very dramatically, again,
- 20 from a negative in 2008 to a very healthy positive
- 21 anticipated at the end of 2012.
- 22 And I think it's useful to keep in mind

- 1 that all of this is happening during a time when the
- 2 country has gone through the worst recession that
- 3 we've had since the Great Depression. It is quite
- 4 remarkable that SiriusXM experienced that
- 5 improvement during this period of time, but they
- 6 obviously did.
- Now, why did that happen? Well, there's
- 8 a couple of things.
- 9 First of all, Sirius and XM, which were
- 10 separate companies at the time we litigated SDARS I,
- 11 merged shortly after that. The merger was
- 12 completed, I believe, in 2008. And as part of that
- 13 merger, SiriusXM has been able to reduce costs
- 14 fairly dramatically.
- I think Mr. Frear, in his written
- 16 testimony submitted in this case, testifies that
- 17 costs -- variable costs, not including content, were
- 18 reduced by more than 500 million since 2008.
- 19 Another reason for the improvement is
- 20 scale. SiriusXM is a business that has very high
- 21 up-front costs of starting the business. You've to
- 22 launch the satellites, you've got to build the

- 1 repeaters and so on. So you've got very high
- 2 capital costs at the beginning, but then those costs
- 3 don't increase very much as you add new subscribers
- 4 because you don't have to launch more satellites to
- 5 have more subscribers.
- 6 So the larger the business grows and the
- 7 more revenue they have, the costs don't increase at
- 8 the same rate. So their profitability dramatically
- 9 improves and so they hit the turning point where,
- 10 all of a sudden, you're making a lot of money.
- 11 And if you look at Tab 5 -- again, this
- 12 is from the same presentation -- this is SiriusXM's
- 13 discussion of how their leverage is improving.
- In addition to all of that, SiriusXM
- 15 imposed what, in effect, was a price increase. I
- 16 believe it was 2008 or 2009 -- I'm now forgetting
- 17 the exact date, but SiriusXM imposed on its
- 18 subscribers a music royalty fee. In other words,
- 19 when the rates went up as a result of this Court,
- 20 SiriusXM tacked onto its subscription price an
- 21 additional fee of \$1.98 for consumers who received
- 22 music as part of their package, which is pretty much

- 1 all of their consumers.
- 2 And through that, it was able to recoup
- 3 most, if not all, of the price increase. They
- 4 reduced that music royalty fee to \$1.40 in
- 5 December 2010 because that was required to comply
- 6 with the FCC's regulations.
- 7 What happened was, when Sirius and XM
- 8 merged, the FCC did not allow them to do a price
- 9 increase, generally speaking. It did allow them to
- 10 impose this fee under certain circumstances, so they
- 11 did. They had to cut it back a little bit to comply
- 12 with the FCC.
- The key point here is they were able to
- 14 respond to a rate increase by, in effect, increasing
- 15 their prices to their subscribers. And the
- 16 testimony at the time -- the statements at the time
- 17 were doing that did not increase their churn.
- 18 In other words, increasing that price
- 19 did not, as far as they could tell, really cost them
- 20 any subscribers. People didn't say, nope, you
- 21 increase the price, now I'm going to leave. So they
- 22 were able to recover most of those costs.

- 1 Now, this is how Mel Karmazin, who is
- 2 the CEO of SiriusXM, summed it up in an earnings
- 3 call in the third quarter of 2011. Quote, Our
- 4 400 million free cash flow quidance represents a
- 5 staggering 90 percent increase over 2010. Just a
- 6 few short years ago, in 2008, the combined negative
- 7 free cash flow of SiriusXM exceeded 550 million. To
- 8 put it mildly, we've come a long way, and it gets
- 9 better. Our 2012 guidance calls for free cash flow
- 10 to increase 75 percent next year, versus 2011, to
- 11 approximately 700 million, driven by improved
- 12 operating results and lower capital expenditures.
- Mr. Karmazin goes on to say, quote,
- 14 Let's put this in perspective. In 2012, we plan to
- 15 grow our cash generation to nearly \$2 million every
- 16 day. That's including weekends and holidays. Truly
- 17 an astounding statistic, which obviously will
- 18 represent the best free cash flow in the history of
- 19 the company.
- 20 Mr. Karmazin said that at the end of
- 21 2011, but those rosy prognostications continue.
- 22 More recently, he has said -- and this, again, is a

- 1 quote -- Our strategy is working, our execution is
- 2 strong and we have a fantastic organization capable
- 3 of meeting our goals. We have started this year
- 4 with great results, and I believe it's an exciting
- 5 time to be a shareholder of our company. Based on
- 6 everything we know today, we are confident that 2012
- 7 will be a great year for us, and 2013 will be even
- 8 better.
- 9 To the extent that Mr. Rich has
- 10 suggested in his opening that these are all just
- 11 kind of SoundExchange experts' pie-in-the-sky
- 12 projections, these are the words of SiriusXM as to
- 13 what they anticipate and how they're doing.
- 14 The improvement is going to continue
- 15 beyond 2013, and it's going to continue because,
- 16 again, you continue to improve the scale. As you
- 17 get more subscribers, costs don't increase at the
- 18 same level; profits increase.
- And Mr. Frear has said, and we've quoted
- 20 it in Mr. Lys' testimony, that fixed costs are going
- 21 to remain stable as -- in the future, as their
- 22 revenues grow.

- In addition, Mr. Frear has said that
- 2 they expect cost decreases, in fact, because, for
- 3 example, they're going to get more efficient about
- 4 how they create these receivers, they're going to
- 5 have better ways to do it. They'll get some more
- 6 synergies from combining the XM network and the
- 7 Sirius network, which hasn't fully happened yet.
- 8 And, finally, they have, yet again,
- 9 increased their subscription price from 12.95 to
- 10 14.95 for the basic package with no increase in
- 11 churn, according to Mr. Karmazin.
- 12 So the results are substantial revenue
- 13 growth projected by the analysts, and that's the
- 14 next tab, Tab 6. Tab 6 shows the actuals up until
- 15 2010 and then the projection forward by the
- 16 analysts. And this document appears in the
- 17 testimony of Mr. Lys.
- As you can see, there is anticipated by
- 19 the analysts very, very healthy growth.
- 20 Based on that, we asked Mr. Lys in his
- 21 testimony to project out the impact of the rate
- 22 increase that SoundExchange is requesting in this

- 1 case. And his projections can be depicted -- are
- 2 depicted graphically in the next two tabs.
- 3 Tab 7 shows the projected EBITDA for
- 4 SiriusXM, assuming SoundExchange's rate is accepted.
- 5 And the next tab, Tab 8, shows the same
- 6 thing, except free cash flow instead of EBITDA.
- 7 I think it is entirely clear from these
- 8 documents that if the Court accepts SoundExchange's
- 9 rate proposal, SiriusXM will remain a very, very
- 10 financially healthy company.
- Now, SiriusXM, in its filings with this
- 12 Court, has attempted to argue that no, the future is
- 13 really not that great and there are risks a-plenty
- 14 out there and there will be tremendous disruption if
- 15 you increase the rates.
- 16 I think if you look at the arguments
- 17 they make, they simply do not withstand scrutiny and
- 18 they're not really supported by the evidence.
- 19 First and most general, SiriusXM, I
- 20 think in Mr. Karmazin's testimony, says, well, you
- 21 know, there's always a danger that the economy will
- 22 turn south again, and so that's a risk.

156 But, here's what Mr. Frear had to say in 1 March of 2011. Quote, the great news is that we seem to grow regardless of the environment. 3 grew through the recession. The total subscribers 5 dropped a little bit one year, but that was entirely related to auto sales. If you look underneath the covers, self-paid subscribers has grown consistently, including through the depths of the recession. 10 So, Number 1, I think we all hope there's not going to be any economic downturn; but, 11 12 Number 2, SiriusXM seems to deal with it quite well. 13 The next aspect of disruption that SiriusXM claims is that they will face increasing 15 competition from -- primarily from Internet services 16 like Pandora, which will become increasingly available in the car. 17 18 But, again, I quote Mr. Karmazin from a third quarter 2010 earnings call. Quote, Our 19 20 incredible operational and financial performance 21 over the past several quarters is clearly a 22 reflection of our competitive advantages, which

- 1 include nearly complete coverage of the continental
- 2 United States. Not many companies can deliver
- 3 content as ubiquitously as we can and, certainly, no
- 4 audio content provider out there today or at any
- 5 time in the future will be able to match that -- I'm
- 6 sorry.
- 7 I should have said any time in the near
- 8 future to quote Mr. Karmazin accurately.
- 9 He then goes on to say, Not only do
- 10 those competitive advantages help explain our recent
- 11 performance, but I also want to point out that these
- 12 factors are not going to go away as we look forward.
- 13 In fact, some of these competitive advantages will
- 14 continue to improve and further differentiate our
- 15 business from existing competitors and any potential
- 16 competitors on the horizon.
- So while SiriusXM in this Court says woe
- 18 is us; we're going to be facing increased
- 19 competition in the future in their public
- 20 statements, they assure everyone that they think
- 21 they're the ones with competitive advantage and it's
- 22 only going to get better.

158 Another of the risks that SiriusXM 1 claims is that it is linked to the OEM markets, that is, its future is, to some degree, tied to the auto industry and their ability to get satellite receivers in the cars. And they paint that as a potential problem for the future. In fact, it's exactly the opposite. If you look at Tab 9, again, from a SiriusXM presentation, this is what they're projecting in 10 terms of the number of cars on the road that have 11 factory installed SiriusXM receivers. 12 I think it's important to keep in mind 13 this is their market. This is who they can sell to, people who have those receivers in the car. 15 it's going to go up from below 20 million in 2009 to close to 100 million by the end of this rate period. 17 So they're going to have 100 million 18 cars on the road that they can sell to. It is a 19 tremendous advantage for them, and they know it. 20 SiriusXM also talks about the risks 21 related to having a satellite system, but it was their intention to replace both systems with all of

- 1 the replacements they needed by the first quarter of
- 2 2012. The launch of that last satellite, I believe,
- 3 was delayed, but it's fully paid for. It's not
- 4 something they need to reserve capital for; they've
- 5 already done that.
- All of their satellites, according to
- 7 them, will last through 2020, and they won't start
- 8 having to invest for the next one until 2016.
- 9 In addition to that, in October of 2010,
- 10 SiriusXM launched an in-orbit spare. So if anything
- 11 happens to either a Sirius or an XM satellite, they
- 12 have a spare up there ready to go. So the risks
- 13 from -- related to having a satellite business are
- 14 minimal, and the costs are pretty much already taken
- 15 care of.
- Maybe the thing that Sirius seems to
- 17 talk about most is debt. They say, gee, we've got
- 18 billions of dollars in debt, and that's a big
- 19 problem. Well, actually, no, it's not.
- The first thing to know is, actually,
- 21 their leverage ratio has been improving
- 22 dramatically. And I think if you look at the next

- 1 tab, Tab 10 -- again, this is a SiriusXM
- 2 presentation -- you'll see how their leverage ratios
- 3 are improving.
- 4 And the evidence will also show that
- 5 when any of this debt comes due, SiriusXM expects to
- 6 be able to refinance it at a lower cost, which will,
- 7 yet again, improve their financial performance.
- 8 Here's what Mr. Karmazin said in a third
- 9 quarter 2011 earnings call. Quote, Remember that
- 10 over the next few years, we will have the
- 11 opportunity to refinance some of our expensive
- 12 legacy debt at lower rates, nor does SiriusXM expect
- 13 to have any problem refinancing.
- Mr. Frear, in a fourth quarter 2010
- 15 earnings call, said this: Quote, You know, I think
- 16 I just want to reemphasize the point that Mel made
- 17 in there that we believe we'll be -- very
- 18 comfortably cover our 2013 and 2015 maturities out
- 19 of the cash flow of the business.
- So they expect to just be able to take
- 21 care of this out of their cash flow. And the truth
- 22 is that SiriusXM does not want to pay off its debt.

- 1 Mr. Rich talked about their debt being sort of junk
- 2 status. Well, the reality is Mr. Karmazin has said
- 3 we don't want to pay off our debt. We could be an
- 4 investment grade company. We could just pay it off,
- 5 but we don't want to.
- 6 And this is a quote from a
- 7 September 2011 presentation by Mr. Karmazin: Quote,
- 8 We can grow our business in, many, many ways, but we
- 9 don't see any real advantage of us being an
- 10 investment grade company. I mean, we know we can
- 11 easily. If you run out the numbers, you can see how
- 12 we could be debt free if, in fact, that was our
- 13 interest.
- I don't see any reason for this company
- 15 to be an investment grade company. I don't know
- 16 what advantages that has for us.
- 17 So while they talk about the dangers and
- 18 the burdens of this debt, the reality is, as
- 19 Mr. Karmazin says, they could pay it off; they just
- 20 have decided not to.
- The reality is that when you hear all of
- 22 the evidence in the case, the conclusion is going to

- 1 be that the biggest issue that SiriusXM faces is
- 2 really what to do with all the money they're making
- 3 at this point. And that sounds like lawyer
- 4 hyperbole, but it's not. That is something that
- 5 Mr. Karmazin actually said recently on a cable TV
- 6 show called Mad Money, and we actually have the
- 7 audio of that one.
- 8 (Audio played from Mad Money.)
- 9 MR. HANDZO: A billion, 2 or a billion,
- 10 3 cash on the books and they don't know what to do
- 11 with it. Go buy back some stock -- which is fine,
- 12 they're entitled, but they really can't sing the
- 13 blues about how a rate increase is going to be
- 14 disruptive.
- And the last thing I should say on the
- 16 point of disruption, and then I'll move on, is that
- 17 there's nothing that SiriusXM has offered by way of
- 18 evidence of disruption that meets this Court's
- 19 definition of what would be disruptive under the
- 20 fourth 801 factor.
- 21 This Court, in SDARS I, said that
- 22 disruption is something that directly produces an

- 1 adverse impact that is substantial, immediate and
- 2 irreversible in the short run, because there's
- 3 insufficient time for either the SDARS or the
- 4 copyright owners to adequately adopt to the changed
- 5 circumstances.
- Nothing that we're talking about here is
- 7 substantial, immediate and irreversible in the short
- 8 run; far from it.
- 9 As I understand the Court's holding,
- 10 evidence that at some point in the future, there
- 11 could be an economic downturn, evidence that at some
- 12 point in the future, there could be competition,
- 13 that is -- and -- and because of that, you'd like to
- 14 maintain a bigger pot of cash than you might
- 15 otherwise have, that's simply not evidence of
- 16 disruption under this statute. And, certainly,
- 17 nothing that SiriusXM offers here meets that
- 18 standard.
- The only substantial impact -- the only
- 20 thing that could constitute disruption would be a
- 21 substantial impact from the rates itself, not from
- 22 some extraneous change, like a change in the economy

- 1 or technology. And the only impact I think you
- 2 could have from the rates themselves would be
- 3 imposing a very substantial increase in the rates
- 4 all at once. And that is why SoundExchange's rate
- 5 proposal scales up over time, rather than asking for
- 6 an immediate increase to the endpoint that we have
- 7 of 20 percent of revenue.
- 8 So we would submit, considering all of
- 9 that, the only real issue in this case becomes what
- 10 do the marketplace benchmarks tell you about what
- 11 the willing buyer/willing seller rate will be. I do
- 12 understand that under the statute, you would then
- 13 have to compare that against the 801 factors and
- 14 determine whether any change is necessary, but I
- 15 submit that the evidence will show you that it is
- 16 not.
- Now, in terms of the marketplace
- 18 benchmarks, SoundExchange has submitted analysis by
- 19 Dr. Ordover and, as we have in the past, Dr. Ordover
- 20 starts with a benchmark analysis. The Court used,
- 21 in the SDARS I case, interactive streaming as the
- 22 benchmark, and Dr. Ordover will testify here that

- 1 that is still the correct benchmark.
- In SDARS I, the Court found that the
- 3 interactive subscription market is a benchmark with
- 4 characteristics reasonably comparable to the
- 5 noninteractive SDARS. Nothing has changed in that
- 6 regard. It was an appropriate benchmark in SDARS I;
- 7 it remains the appropriate SDARS -- appropriate
- 8 benchmark today.
- 9 In SDARS I, the way the Court used that
- 10 benchmark was it determined from Dr. Ordover's
- 11 testimony that the royalty rate in the interactive
- 12 market, the benchmark market, was about \$7.50 a
- 13 month.
- 14 The Court then adjusted that rate to
- 15 account for the salient difference between the
- 16 benchmark market, interactive services and the SDARS
- 17 services; and the salient difference is the absence
- 18 of interactivity in the satellite services.
- 19 So it adjusted that royalty rate
- 20 downward to come up with an implied royalty for the
- 21 noninteractive satellite services of \$1.40 per
- 22 subscriber per month, and it then translated that

- 1 into a percentage of revenue by dividing that number
- 2 into the average monthly price of a subscription,
- 3 which was then \$11.25. That yielded the percentage
- 4 of revenue rate of 13 percent.
- Now, Dr. Ordover in this case will give
- 6 you a number of different ways to analyze this
- 7 interactive benchmark, but one of the ways he does
- 8 it is really basically the way the Court did it in
- 9 this SDARS I decision, following the same
- 10 methodology.
- 11 The average royalty rate today for
- 12 interactive service is about \$5.95. Now, to get
- 13 the -- to adjust that for the absence of
- 14 interactivity, Dr. Ordover did the same thing
- 15 basically that Dr. Pelcovitz did in the recent
- 16 Webcasting III case. He started by taking the
- 17 average retail price of an interactive streaming
- 18 service and he compared it to the average retail
- 19 price of a noninteractive service.
- 20 And the difference in those retail
- 21 prices between an interactive and a noninteractive
- 22 service basically reflects the value that consumers

- 1 attribute to interactivity. And, since the royalty
- 2 that a service is willing to pay record companies
- 3 for music content is a function of the retail price
- 4 that consumers are willing to pay, the royalties in
- 5 the two markets relate to one another.
- I guess, in my layman's terms, the more
- 7 consumers will pay for the music, the higher the
- 8 royalty the service will pay for the music.
- 9 So the ratio of the interactive royalty
- 10 to the noninteractive service royalty is expected to
- 11 be the same as the ratio of the consumer
- 12 subscription price for an interactive service
- 13 compared to the subscription price of a
- 14 noninteractive service.
- 15 And I can't follow this stuff without
- 16 looking at a piece of paper and seeing the numbers,
- 17 so we have one. It's Tab 11.
- So this is how the -- those numbers
- 19 work. The average monthly subscription price for an
- 20 interactive service is 9.99. That's what the
- 21 consumers pay. The average monthly subscription
- 22 price for a noninteractive service, that is, the

- 1 streaming service, is 4.86. Dividing the
- 2 interactive consumer price into the noninteractive
- 3 consumer price gives you a ratio of .4865, or
- 4 48 percent.
- 5 So that's your interactivity adjustment,
- 6 based on the differing value that consumers place on
- 7 an interactive service versus a noninteractive
- 8 service.
- 9 And then we complete the steps that the
- 10 Court followed in SDARS I. As I said before, the
- 11 average royalty rate for an interactive service is
- 12 \$5.95. So if we apply that 48 -- .4865 ratio to the
- 13 interactive service royalty, we get an implied
- 14 royalty rate for a noninteractive service of \$2.89.
- 15 And that, as a percentage of SiriusXM's subscription
- 16 price, is about 22 percent.
- Now, as I said, Dr. Ordover had several
- 18 different approaches to analyze this benchmark.
- 19 What I think he will say about the approach that I
- 20 just described is that it assumes that the only
- 21 significant difference between the interactive
- 22 benchmark market and the satellite radio market is

- 1 interactivity.
- 2 There may be other differences that
- 3 drive the consumer value for those two different
- 4 services, and so another way to do this is to
- 5 compare the consumer subscription price for an
- 6 interactive service to the consumer subscription
- 7 price for satellite radio.
- 8 And the belief of economists there is
- 9 that those different prices will reflect the
- 10 different value that consumers place on the service
- 11 and, therefore, will drive the royalty that the
- 12 services are willing to pay.
- 13 So Dr. Ordover looked at the ratio of
- 14 what consumers will pay for a satellite service
- 15 versus what consumers pay for an interactive
- 16 streaming service, and he applied that ratio to the
- 17 royalty that interactive services pay for sound
- 18 recordings in order to derive a royalty for the
- 19 satellite service.
- Basically, he's sort of doing the same
- 21 thing that I described earlier except, instead of
- 22 comparing the rates for streaming services, he's

- 1 comparing the rates of an interactive streaming
- 2 service to satellite radio.
- Now, there is one complication here, and
- 4 the complication here is that when you look at the
- 5 price that consumers will pay for satellite radio,
- 6 you have to take into account the fact that part of
- 7 what they're paying for is nonmusic content, not
- 8 music content. And so he needed to adjust for that.
- 9 And in this case, he had data that he didn't have in
- 10 SDARS I.
- 11 Since the time of SDARS I, SiriusXM has
- 12 offered a mostly music package at 9.99 that didn't
- 13 have the most nonmusic content, and it offered a
- 14 nonmusic content package also priced at 9.99.
- And Dr. Ordover concludes that the fact
- 16 that those two packages are priced the same suggests
- 17 that the marginal consumer views the nonmusic
- 18 content as having the same value as the music
- 19 content.
- 20 As it turns out, this really isn't an
- 21 issue all that much in dispute, because in
- 22 Dr. Noll's written testimony, he also says that the

- 1 music content and the nonmusic content appear to
- 2 have roughly the same value.
- 3 So based on that, Dr. Ordover opines
- 4 that a hypothetical music only satellite service
- 5 would retail at about half the price of the current
- 6 service. And, again, we've got the math laid out in
- 7 Tab 12.
- 8 And this looks a little more imposing,
- 9 so I'm not going to try and walk through it all.
- 10 The -- the math is here, but the bottom line is
- 11 you're doing the same sort of ratio between the
- 12 prices and then using that ratio to determine -- to
- 13 determine the satellite radio subscription -- I'm
- 14 sorry -- royalty on the theory that it would bear
- 15 the same relationship to the interactive royalty as
- 16 the consumer prices do.
- 17 The result of all of that is that
- 18 Dr. Ordover concludes that marketplace rates would
- 19 range from low 20 percent of revenue to upper
- 20 20 percent of revenue.
- Now, needless to say, Dr. Noll has a
- 22 different approach on behalf of SiriusXM. And as

- 1 you heard from Mr. Rich this morning, he principally
- 2 relies on these direct licenses that SiriusXM
- 3 negotiated with certain independent record labels.
- 4 The first thing to know about those
- 5 licenses is that collectively, they represent
- 6 something like 2 percent of the market, plus or
- 7 minus. And when you realize that there are, you
- 8 know, 60 plus indies that signed these direct
- 9 licenses, and together they represent 2 percent or
- 10 so of the market, what that's telling you is that
- 11 each one of these is a very, very small fish.
- 12 And at the end of the day, I think the
- 13 evidence is going to show you that an indie with a
- 14 .03 percent market share is not going to negotiate
- 15 the same deal that Sony or Universal, with a 20 or
- 16 30 or 35 percent market share, would negotiate.
- 17 The second thing to know is that when --
- 18 Mr. Rich earlier today showed you a chart where he
- 19 compared the various benefits of different types of
- 20 benchmarks, and in one of them was is it a rate from
- 21 a competitive market. Well, the reality is that
- 22 these direct licenses are not really negotiated in a

173 competitive market; they are negotiated in a heavily 1 regulated setting. 3 As I think Dr. Noll will admit, when these licenses were negotiated, there's a statutory license that's kind of overhanging the negotiations. So, for example, labels don't have any 6 ability to just refuse to license. They don't have any ability to say no, I don't like the price, I'm just not going to do it. Their only choices are 10 license at the rate that's offered or come to this 11 Court and ask to set a rate. But they can't say no, which distinguishes this whole scenario from what 12 13 would happen in an actual market setting. 14 And that, in turn, means that what drives the negotiated rate with these direct 16 licenses is not what the parties think would happen 17 in a marketplace. What drives the negotiated rate 18 in this setting is what do the parties think this Court is going to establish as the statutory rate. 19 20 That's going to be the -- the thing that they think about when they're deciding what rate to

22

agree to.

174 1 Now, because all of the indies who signed these deals are very small players, none of them have ever participated in proceedings before this court, and they are very ill-equipped to make that judgment about what rates may come out of this proceeding. 7 In fact, in the negotiating documents, I 8 think you will see, these indies were told by MRI, which was representing SiriusXM, that, you know, the 10 rate currently is 7.5 percent, will go up to 8 percent, don't think it's going to go up above 11 12 that or, if it does, it's going to go up very 13 little, maybe by .5. 14 So when these indies are negotiating, they're being told that here's the rate, it's not 15 likely to change or it will change very little. 16 17 They don't have any experience with this Court. 18 They don't know how the rates are set. They're 19 going to accept that, and that's basically the 20 negotiation. It's not a marketplace negotiation. 21 The other thing to keep in mind about 22 these licenses is that with -- they were negotiated

- 1 with the statutory rates sort of as a ceiling, but
- 2 then what SiriusXM did through MRI is it offered
- 3 some inducements that are not part of the statutory
- 4 license.
- 5 For example, you will see that SiriusXM,
- 6 again, through MRI, in its talking points for
- 7 negotiations emphasized to these labels that they
- 8 would be paid 100 percent of the royalty. As the
- 9 Court knows, under the statutory standard, labels
- 10 get 50 percent, and SoundExchange distributes
- 11 45 percent directly to the featured artists and
- 12 5 percent to the nonfeatured artists. So the label
- 13 only directly gets 50 percent, rather than
- 14 100 percent.
- 15 So what SiriusXM is doing is it's going
- 16 to these labels and saying, in contrast to the
- 17 statute, we'll give you 100 percent. That matters
- 18 to these labels, because if you are a label that has
- 19 made advances to an artist and you're entitled to
- 20 recoup your advance from the royalties, getting
- 21 100 percent of the royalties obviously allows to you
- 22 recoup a heck of a lot faster than you would if you

- 1 were only getting 50 percent. And you'll see
- 2 evidence that that was something that motivated at
- 3 least some of these indies. Some of the indies were
- 4 offered advances, which SoundExchange can't do.
- 5 So there are various inducements that
- 6 simply are not part of the statutory scheme that may
- 7 have caused these indies to accept what they
- 8 perceived as a very small haircut off what they were
- 9 being told was the statutory rate.
- I think the fourth thing to consider
- 11 here with respect to these direct licenses is that
- 12 if only 2 percent of the market took the deals,
- 13 98 percent either turned it down or SiriusXM knew it
- 14 was futile to even offer. And we would submit that
- 15 a rate that 90 percent -- 98 percent of the market
- 16 won't accept is not a marketplace rate.
- Now, I think what Dr. Noll will say, and
- 18 we'll hear soon enough, is that 98 percent of the
- 19 market declined these offers because they preferred
- 20 to act collusively through SoundExchange.
- But to what end? Because acting through
- 22 SoundExchange just means that these record companies

- 1 would have to come to this Court to set a rate. And
- 2 if this Court is going to set a marketplace rate
- 3 anyway, why would they turn down a marketplace rate
- 4 that's being offered voluntarily by SiriusXM?
- 5 Dr. Noll has an answer. Dr. Noll says
- 6 that the record companies that declined these direct
- 7 licenses did so because they expect this Court to
- 8 set an above market rate.
- 9 Dr. Noll says that the whole regulatory
- 10 process is rigged in the record companies' favor,
- 11 that the record companies, that SoundExchange have
- 12 informational and political advantages in this
- 13 regulatory system, which would lead them to want to
- 14 come to this Court because they confidentially
- 15 expect a higher than market rate from this Court.
- Now, I have to say I'm all in favor of
- 17 judges who want to be biased in my favor, but this
- 18 is the fifth time I've been in this Court. And if
- 19 the Court has been biased in my favor in the past, I
- 20 didn't see it. I don't believe that this system is
- 21 biased in anybody's favor. It is an equal, level
- 22 playing field. Everybody plays by the same rules.

178 1 And the reality is that Dr. Noll's theory really kind of falls apart, unless you accept his premise. Because unless you accept his premise that the record companies think they will do better than a marketplace rate here, they would have had no reason for 98 percent of them to refuse these direct licenses. Dr. Noll's fallback is a benchmark based on agreements with a single webcaster, Last.fm. 10 Even if the statutory webcasting rate represented a 11 useful benchmark -- and it does not -- Dr. Noll 12 ignores the rates that SiriusXM itself negotiated 13 for its noninteractive Internet streaming; he 14 ignores the rates set by this Court; and, just as importantly, he ignores the impact of per-play rates 15 on the webcasting market. 16 17 As this Court knows, when it has set rates for webcasters in the past, it has set them as 18 a per-play rate and the rates negotiated between 19 20 SoundExchange and SiriusXM for its webcasting, 21 likewise, on a per-play basis. 22 Now, in the Last.fm deal that Dr. Noll

- 1 relies on, the rates are stated as a greater of a
- 2 percentage of revenue, a per-play rate or a
- 3 per-subscriber rate. And Dr. Noll concludes from, I
- 4 think, one monthly statement by Last.fm to Universal
- 5 that based on the number of plays in that statement,
- 6 he can ignore the per-play rates in this deal and
- 7 just conclude that he only needs to look at the
- 8 percentage of revenue rates.
- 9 But what he doesn't consider is what
- 10 rate SiriusXM would, in fact, pay under the Last.fm
- 11 deal if it was operating under that deal. In other
- 12 words, SiriusXM might use music a lot more
- 13 intensively than Last.fm does. It might have a lot
- 14 more plays if we were ever in a position to figure
- 15 out how many plays it has.
- You just can't tell how that deal would
- 17 apply to SiriusXM unless you know the number of
- 18 plays, and Dr. Noll has made no effort to figure
- 19 that out.
- Now, finally, I should point out that
- 21 Dr. Noll applies the rate that he derives from all
- 22 of this to SiriusXM's revenues after he nets out

- 1 both the revenue from nonmusic content -- that he
- 2 attributes to nonmusic content and what he claims is
- 3 the value of the SiriusXM network, satellites and so
- 4 on.
- 5 In that regard, it seems as though
- 6 Dr. Noll is essentially repackaging testimony that
- 7 was offered by Dr. Woodbury on behalf of SiriusXM in
- 8 SDARS I. Dr. Woodbury essentially made the same
- 9 arguments and offered the same kinds of calculations
- 10 that Dr. Noll is doing here.
- Dr. Woodbury referred to that as his
- 12 functionality adjustment, and the Court specifically
- 13 rejected it. They referred to Dr. Woodbury's -- the
- 14 Court referred to Dr. Woodbury's theory as the
- 15 unsubstantiated theory that any such other inputs
- 16 could produce the same level of revenue, absent any
- 17 music to broadcast.
- In other words, the network doesn't have
- 19 any value, except as a vehicle to -- to broadcast
- 20 the content. And so you cannot simply say the
- 21 network has an independent value from the content.
- 22 It doesn't. It has no value independent of the

181 content. And you have to assess all of it together, which Dr. Ordover does; Dr. Noll does not. 3 SoundExchange proposes for SiriusXM that the rates begin at 12 percent of revenue in 2013, increase to 20 percent at the end of the rate term. 5 And we would submit that the evidence supports that. No accommodation is needed for the 801(b) factors other than ramping up over the rate term, which is what SoundExchange proposes. 10 I do want to spend a few minutes talking 11 about Music Choice. 12 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Actually, before you 13 get there, Mr. Handzo, if I can interrupt you for a 14 second. 15 MR. HANDZO: Sure. 16 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: You had mentioned the 17 music royalty fee or surcharge of \$1.98. 18 Was that encompassed within the revenue definition that applied under SDARS I? 2.0 MR. HANDZO: I'm hesitating. I believe the answer is yes. I'm not 100 percent confident. 21 22 I will do what you have seen me do often

182 in these proceedings in the past; I'll look back to my colleagues -- the answer is yes. 3 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: So, in effect, you've got some portion of -- of that surcharge effectively to the extent that it was reflected in additional revenue --MR. HANDZO: Yes. JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: -- and that continued to be the case on the -- when it was reduced to 10 1.40? 11 MR. HANDZO: I think it should be, yes. 12 I mean, that rate increase went in fairly recently. 13 I should say, though, as you know from our case, SoundExchange has some issues with -- with the revenue base against which the royalty rate 15 is -- is assessed. And since you raised the 17 subject, let me --JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: That's the point I 1.8 19 was getting to, just to see what that -- if you 20 could highlight that for us. 21 MR. HANDZO: Sure. 22 When the Court set the rates in SDARS I,

- 1 it determined that the royalty that the Court found
- 2 was established by the upper bounds of the market --
- 3 well, I should back up.
- When the Court set the rate, it
- 5 determined what the market rate would be, and then
- 6 it divided that into the per-subscriber fees that
- 7 SiriusXM was charging to derive its percentage of
- 8 revenue.
- 9 And I think we -- we submitted the
- 10 testimony of Jonathan Bender, who has analyzed the
- 11 payments that SiriusXM has made. And it turns out
- 12 that the percentage of revenue that SiriusXM
- 13 actually pays against is far below the number that
- 14 the Court used to determine the percentage of
- 15 revenue.
- Now, it seems to me you can sort of
- 17 address that two ways. Obviously, ultimately, the
- 18 royalty that gets paid is a function of the
- 19 percentage of revenue versus what amount of revenue
- 20 are we levying it against.
- 21 And the -- the real point here is that
- 22 when -- if the Court was establishing a percentage

- 1 of revenue assuming that it was going to be paid
- 2 against a certain revenue base and then it turns out
- 3 it wasn't paid against that revenue base, it was
- 4 paid against something substantially less, we submit
- 5 that a change needs to be made. And we have
- 6 submitted regulations which we think would make that
- 7 change. The other way to do it would simply be to
- 8 adjust the percentage of revenue accordingly.
- 9 Judge Wisniewski, if that addresses your
- 10 question, I was going to go back to Music Choice.
- JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Yes, it does. Thank
- 12 you.
- MR. HANDZO: As the Court knows, there
- 14 are only two PSS services, and only Music Choice is
- 15 participating in this proceeding. The current rate
- 16 is 7.5 percent of revenues. SoundExchange is
- 17 proposing a royalty that starts at 15 percent and
- 18 ends at 45 percent, while Music Choice has proposed
- 19 a rate of 2.6 percent.
- One thing I think both parties actually
- 21 do kind of agree on is that services like
- 22 Music Choice offering a noninteractive audio

- 1 programming delivered through cable TV is fairly
- 2 unique in the digital space. And this Court has
- 3 recognized in the past, SoundExchange has recognized
- 4 that in the past.
- 5 And that certainly does make setting a
- 6 rate a little bit challenging. But what Dr. Ford
- 7 has done is he looked at the prevailing market rates
- 8 for numerous types of digital services. Mr. Fakler
- 9 says, oh, he -- you know, he was too high, there are
- 10 some lower than he's saying. But I can tell you
- 11 there are none that are as low as the rate that is
- 12 now being charged to Music Choice. And that's the
- 13 fundamental point.
- It is hard to find something that you
- 15 can point to as this is the service that is
- 16 comparable, and here's the benchmark; however, what
- 17 you can do is you can look at everything that's out
- 18 there, and what you can see is that Music Choice has
- 19 got a royalty rate that is way lower, way lower than
- 20 anything else you see in the market. And there's
- 21 just no reason for it to be an outlier in that way.
- 22 As Dr. Ford will explain, one of the

- 1 virtues of a percentage of revenue rate is that it
- 2 adjusts in accordance with the revenue that the
- 3 service is using.
- 4 So if Music Choice isn't earning a high
- 5 revenue, since it's paying on a percentage of
- 6 revenue basis, the royalty goes down accordingly.
- 7 So although Music Choice talks about how
- 8 we can't charge all that much for our service, the
- 9 reality is that if you impose a percentage of
- 10 revenue fee, it's going to, in effect, self-adjust.
- 11 The evidence that I think Dr. Ford will
- 12 present will make it clear that under anything you
- 13 might use as a benchmark, any digital service,
- 14 7.5 percent is just way too low. There's just
- 15 nothing like it out there.
- And so then the fallback for
- 17 Music Choice appears to be, well, okay, but we need
- 18 to adjust down to account for the 801 factors. And
- 19 I think that Music Choice just greatly overstates
- 20 the impact of those factors.
- 21 As I sat through Mr. Fakler's opening
- 22 today, it kind of sounded to me -- and I apologize

187 if I'm mischaracterizing, but it sounded to me like he was effectively saying that the statute was intended to make the record companies and the artists the quarantors of Music Choice's economic survival. I don't believe that's what the statute 7 was intended to do. The statute does not require that PSS services remain in business forever no matter what it costs the recording industry to do it. 10 11 Indeed, Mr. Fakler appears to go 12 further, and he appears to say, even if we choose to 13 invest in new technologies, if we have costs, then the recording industry has to underwrite those. 15 that is surely not the point of the 801(b) factors. 16 The reality is that if Music Choice 17 struggles financially -- and SoundExchange does not 18 concede that at all -- the royalty that it pays is not the cause, and the copyright owners are not 20 required to simply do whatever needs to be done to help Music Choice surmount any economic hurdles that

22

it may face.

188 Apart from arguing the disruption and 1 801(b) factors, Music Choice relies on the musical works benchmark, I don't think I really need to say 3 much more than other -- than that -- about that, other than it has been rejected by this Court on numerous occasions. Accordingly, we would ask the Court to adopt the SoundExchange proposal for Music Choice. 9 And I just want to close by coming back 10 to SiriusXM for a moment. 11 When Mr. Rich started off at the very beginning of this morning, he said that SiriusXM 12 13 pays the record companies and the artists a lot of 14 money. And he just stressed that at the outset, here's the tens of millions, hundreds of millions of 15 dollars that we pay the record companies, and we'll 16 17 pay them even more in the future.

- But the reality is SiriusXM makes a lot
- 19 of money, so much so that as you heard Mr. Karmazin
- 20 say a little earlier, they don't even know exactly
- 21 what to do with it all.
- 22 Sirius can afford to pay for the content

- 1 that it broadcasts. In fact, Mr. Karmazin has
- 2 bragged about it.
- 3 And this is my last Mel Karmazin quote
- 4 for the moment. In April of 2012, he said, And,
- 5 again, we're a very profitable, successful company.
- 6 If we want a performer, we can afford to pay more
- 7 than anybody else can because we're making more,
- 8 unquote.
- 9 Well, SiriusXM now comes into this Court
- 10 and sings a very different tune about its ability to
- 11 pay for performers. But they can pay.
- 12 And if SiriusXM winds up with a billion
- 13 dollars or more of free cash at the end of this
- 14 year, at least half of that, if not more, is due to
- 15 the sound recordings that they are broadcasting.
- As a very profitable, successful
- 17 company, SiriusXM should be able to pay a fair
- 18 market rate for the music content that has made it a
- 19 very profitable, successful company.
- The surveys that SiriusXM does of its
- 21 subscribers show that the thing they value most
- 22 about this service is the music. It is the music

190 that drives their profitability. And the music is entitled not out of some sense of fundamental fairness or just because the money is there, but the music is entitled to get a fair market rate. That's what we're asking for. That's what we think our evidence supports. Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Thank you. 9 Do you want to take a recess? 10 It will be about 10 minutes so the court reporter can take care of her business as well. 11 12 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken 13 from 2:18 p.m. to 2:29 p.m.) 14 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Please be seated. 15 MR. HANDZO: If I may, I just have a housekeeping matter before we call the first 17 witness. 18 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. 19 MR. HANDZO: One of the SoundExchange 20 witnesses, Thomas Lys, we learned a day or two ago was recently admitted to the hospital, and, in fact, 22 may not get out of the hospital before the end of

191 this trial; that is, the direct phase of the case. I don't know that to be the case yet. 3 And the background is some weeks ago he had a fall from a horse, he broke his leg. But then, apparently, there have been complications, 5 possible bone infections, so on, so they're talking about doing skin grafts and all sorts of things. I'm not asking the Court to do anything about this now, because we just don't know how this 10 is all going to play out, but we have told counsel for the Services, and I did want to just at least 11 put it on everybody's radar screen because it may --12 13 it may be something that we'll need to ask for an accommodation about later. 15 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. Thank you very much. 17 MR. HANDZO: Thank you. 18 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Mr. Rich, you may call your first witness. 20 MR. RICH: Your Honors, we call Professor Roger Noll as our first witness. 22 WHEREUPON,

		192
1	ROGER G. NOLL	
2	called as a witness, and having been first duly	
3	sworn, was examined and testified as follows:	
4		
5	EXAMINATIONS ON QUALIFICATIONS	
6		
7	BY MR. RICH:	
8	Q. Good afternoon.	
9	A. Good afternoon.	
10	Q. Would you please state your name for the	
11	record?	
12	A. Roger G. Noll.	
13	Q. Dr. Noll, what is your occupation?	
14	A. I am a professor emeritus, which means	
15	retired, at Stanford University in the Department of	
16	Economics.	
17	I also still run my research program in	
18	the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.	
19	Q. Would you tell the Court briefly what	
20	what the Institute for Economic Policy is involved	
21	in and what your role is?	
22	A. The Stanford Institute for Economic	

- 1 Policy Research is basically a university-wide
- 2 research institution that involves all of the
- 3 economists across campus, regardless of where
- 4 they're located, and the program inside of it that I
- 5 run is called the program and regulatory policy.
- 6 I'm also on the -- the steering committee, the
- 7 executive committee of the Institute.
- 8 Q. Would you please provide the Court with
- 9 your educational background? And I know that much
- 10 of this is in your CV, and we'll be selective in
- 11 coursing through it, or else we will devote most of
- 12 the afternoon here doing that.
- 13 A. I have an undergraduate in mathematics
- 14 from the California Institute of Technology, and I
- 15 have an M.A. and Ph.D. in economics from Harvard
- 16 University.
- 17 Q. Now, according to your vitae, you've
- 18 taught economics for more than 40 years; is that
- 19 correct?
- 20 A. It's approaching 50. I first started
- 21 teaching in '64, '65.
- 22 Q. Am I correct from the vitae that

- 1 principally, those teaching engagements were first
- 2 at Cal Tech and, since 1984, at Stanford?
- 3 A. Yes. I've been visiting professor at
- 4 various places, but the two principal academic
- 5 appointments I've had were Cal Tech and Stanford.
- 6 Q. And would you please describe the
- 7 principal areas of your research concentration as an
- 8 economist?
- 9 A. Yes. The field that economists call
- 10 that I work in, the name the economists use is
- 11 industrial organization. The actual topical area of
- 12 my own research is antitrust regulation and
- 13 technology policy, R&D and technological progress.
- 14 Q. And have you written in each of those
- 15 fields?
- 16 A. Yes, I have.
- 17 Q. And, overall, how many books have you
- 18 authored or coauthored in your career?
- 19 A. Fourteen.
- Q. What's the number of publications more
- 21 generally in terms of scholarly books and journals
- 22 that you've authored or coauthored?

		195
1	A. It's over 300.	
2	Q. And focusing in the area of intellectual	
3	property, have you published in that field as well?	
4	A. Yes, I have.	
5	Q. And if you turn to Page we're going	
6	to offer your your testimony in evidence shortly,	
7	but as part of the credentialing process, if you	
8	would turn to Page 2 in the proposed testimony in	
9	front of you, your revised amended testimony, you	
10	make reference in the second full paragraph on	
11	Page 2 to certain publications, including The	
12	Digital Dilemma.	
13	Do you see that?	
14	A. Yes.	
15	Q. Could you briefly describe the subject	
16	areas of those publications?	
17	A. Yes. The Digital Dilemma was a book	
18	that was put together by a group of us for the	
19	National Academies on the impact of digital	
20	technology on many industries: entertainment,	
21	software. We wrote a report about the policy	
22	implications of these changes and how how	

- 1 intellectual property law, in particular, would have
- 2 to adjust to new digital technology.
- 3 Q. And another publication you reference in
- 4 that paragraph is Bridging the Digital Divide.
- 5 Do you see that?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. Can you describe that briefly?
- 8 A. That was prepared -- that was by a group
- 9 of us. Actually, I led a team that consisted at
- 10 that time of some of my students to examine the
- 11 issue of the diffusion of digital technology in
- 12 society among consumers in California.
- 13 And we -- our concern there was whether
- 14 the growing disparity in access to digital
- 15 technology by educational and income groups was
- 16 creating some sort of a problem and, if so, were
- 17 there any policies that could be -- that could deal
- 18 with that problem.
- 19 Q. Next in the list is, quote, ISDN and the
- 20 Small User. Can you describe that briefly?
- 21 A. ISDN was the first digital network
- 22 technology that was introduced by telephone

- 1 companies about 20 years ago. And this was an
- 2 article written with, again, a former -- a student
- 3 of mine at the time who is now at MIT, on what the
- 4 potential market impact of digital networks, ISDN,
- 5 was going to be.
- 6 Q. Next in the list of publications that
- 7 you indicate bear directly on the analysis you
- 8 provide this Court is the Economics of Information,
- 9 A User's Guide.
- 10 What is that?
- 11 A. That was a paper that I wrote for the
- 12 Aspen Institute at a conference that involved mostly
- 13 people from industry, where I basically explain the
- 14 economics of information in terms of what the cost
- 15 functions are, what the revenue functions are and,
- 16 in particular, I dealt with the issue of piracy of
- 17 information, what -- what a reasonable economic
- 18 definition of piracy really was and how the changes
- 19 in technology would affect the extent to which
- 20 piracy would occur.
- Q. A couple more.
- 22 You next cite The Economics of Scholarly

		198
1	Publications and the Information Superhighway.	
2	A. Yes.	
3	Q. Can you describe that work?	
4	A. That was what would the availability of	
5	digital technology capable of basically producing	
6	what we now have, things like ebooks, having	
7	publications be distributed over the Internet and	
8	over digital networks, how would that affect	
9	scholarly publications and the viability of	
10	scholarly journals, and the use of scholarly	
11	journals as a way to vet the qualities of academics	
12	for promotion and tenure.	
13	Q. Finally in that list, Intellectual	
14	Property Antitrust in the New Economy.	
15	Can you describe that, please?	
16	A. Yes.	
17	That was a paper that I wrote for a	
18	conference put on by the American Antitrust	
19	Institute on the at the time, the there was an	
20	issue of whether the innovations in information	
21	technology were essentially making traditional ways	
22	of thinking about antitrust policy irrelevant. And	

- 1 this is an article that says no, that's not true,
- 2 it's just more difficult, but it's still the same
- 3 principles applied.
- 4 Q. Has your research and/or writing
- 5 included work on the regulatory process as a
- 6 mechanism for setting prices?
- 7 A. Yes, it has.
- Q. Can you describe a little bit your work
- 9 in that area?
- 10 A. Actually, probably the single biggest
- 11 part of my work has been at the intersection of
- 12 economics law and politics, that it's a little bit
- 13 bigger than just regulation, it's administrative
- 14 law. That is to say, how the existence of
- 15 administrative processes affects the performance of
- 16 the economy.
- 17 That's probably my single most important
- 18 area of research. And I've been doing that for my
- 19 entire career.
- 20 My first book was called Reforming
- 21 Regulation, and it dealt with that issue. The book
- 22 I'm going to write next year with two of my former

- 1 students will deal with that issue.
- 2 Q. I take it that -- as we'll get to a bit
- 3 later, a portion of your written direct testimony
- 4 takes some of that learning on your part and applies
- 5 it to certain principles that you would derive in
- 6 this current setting; is that correct?
- 7 A. That's correct.
- 8 Q. And just to round out the record a bit,
- 9 what subjects have you taught over your career that
- 10 bear on topics we're going to be discussing today?
- 11 A. I have taught, in addition to sort of
- 12 the core courses that all economists teach,
- 13 microtheory and econometrics and things like that,
- 14 my main teaching has been in the field of industrial
- 15 organization. I -- my -- my -- almost every year
- 16 until I retired, I taught both the undergraduate and
- 17 graduate courses in antitrust and regulation, plus I
- 18 taught an undergraduate course in essentially public
- 19 policy analysis, benefit cost analysis.
- Q. And I take it, again from your vitae,
- 21 that you've acted as either an independent expert or
- 22 an advisor to both committees of Congress and a

-		201
1	variety of Government agencies; is that correct?	
2	A. Yes, I have.	
3	Q. Can you just enumerate several of those?	
4	A. Well, I have I have was involved	
5	with the Department of Justice in the creation of	
6	USA-ATT. I was involved with the Federal	
7	Communications Commission in the deregulation of	
8	cable television that occurred in 1980.	
9	I have I have I still participate,	
10	I'm currently involved with a process at the Federal	
11	Trade Commission.	
12	I submitted an amicus submission to the	
13	Federal Communications Commission just a few months	
14	ago on blackouts of telecasts of sports events.	
15	Q. I counted four Presidential task forces	
16	or committees on which you've served; does that	
17	sound right?	
18	A. Yes.	
19	Q. And could you	
20	JUDGE ROBERTS: Let me just interrupt a	
21	second, Mr. Rich.	
22	Professor Noll, I took a little bit of	

		202
1	interest in your your paper to the FCC about the	
2	sports blackout today.	
3	THE WITNESS: Did you read it?	
4	JUDGE ROBERTS: No. Unfortunately, I	
5	didn't I didn't secure a copy of it, but I'm	
6	wondering how you came out on that.	
7	THE WITNESS: That it's time for the	
8	Federal Communications Commission to withdraw from	
9	the fray, that there's no need for the Federal	
10	Communications Commission to regulate blackouts and	
11	to create a cover, basically.	
12	The only sport that it actually matters	
13	is the National Football League. The rest of the	
14	sports negotiated their way out of it, and so I just	
15	think the FCC should withdraw from the fray.	
16	JUDGE ROBERTS: I only raise it because	
17	should the FCC repeal that rule, that would trigger	
18	a proceeding before us.	
19	THE WITNESS: Really?	
20	Well, I'll see you again.	
21	JUDGE ROBERTS: Thank you.	
22		

- 1 BY MR. RICH:
- 2 Q. Just completing this credentialing
- 3 phase, could you briefly describe for the Court the
- 4 work you've done for the World Bank?
- 5 A. Yes.
- I have, on a number of occasions, been a
- 7 member of a World Bank mission to some developing
- 8 country to provide technical assistance on the --
- 9 essentially the privatization of the
- 10 telecommunications industry; the entire thing, not
- 11 just telephones, but including digital technology
- 12 and the kinds of regulatory institutions and the
- 13 kinds of competition policy one has to have in place
- 14 in order for that privatization process to work.
- 15 And I've been probably to a dozen countries over the
- 16 past 25 years in that capacity.
- 17 Q. It's made for interesting dinner
- 18 conversation with me, I know that.
- 19 A. That's right.
- Q. Am I correct that your written direct
- 21 testimony lists numerous instances in which you
- 22 provided expert testimony in cases dealing with,

- 1 among others, intellectual property issues and,
- 2 specifically, in many cases, involving the licensing
- 3 of broadcast or digital transmission rights?
- A. Yeah. I'm not sure I'd use the word
- 5 "numerous," but it's a list, maybe 20 things on it.
- 6 Q. Several?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. And I take it you were a rebuttal
- 9 witness in the prior SDARS proceeding, correct?
- 10 A. That's correct.
- 11 Q. Representing jointly the then separate
- 12 Sirius and XM entities?
- A. Well, not representing, but appearing on
- 14 behalf.
- Q. Appearing on behalf of them?
- 16 A. Yeah.
- 17 Q. And a recent trial appearance in Federal
- 18 Court in New York, I take it, was in a case styled
- 19 MobiTV versus ASCAP; is that correct?
- 20 A. That's correct.
- 21 Q. And that was a rate-setting proceeding
- 22 under the auspices of the United States consent

205 decree in regulating ASCAP to some degree; is that correct? 3 Α. That's correct. Ο. And what was the nature of your testimony there? My testimony was about how to set 6 Α. appropriate rates in the context, of course, of ASCAP, which is an antitrust setting, as opposed to this, but it was what is the appropriate way to 10 develop benchmarks for rates, for performance -- the 11 performance part, not the -- not the recording part, 12 but the musical works part. 13 Ο. And to what degree did the District Court in its eventual opinion in that case follow some or all of the advice you provided? 15 They basically adopted everything that I 16 17 had proposed. 18 Q. And am I correct that in recent weeks, the Second Circuit has affirmed that decision? 19 20 Α. Yes. 21 MR. RICH: At this point, Your Honors, I'd like to offer Professor Noll as an expert in the

206 economics of industrial organization, including the economics of antitrust regulation and intellectual property. JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Before you do that, Mr. Rich, I want to give Professor Noll a chance, in the interest of full accuracy, to correct the answer that he gave to a question that you asked him. MR. RICH: Please. 8 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: You had asked him 9 whether he had been the author or coauthor of some 11 14 books or monographs and, actually, in your -- in 12 your vitae, you list yourself as author or coauthor 13 of seven, and instead, as the editor or coeditor of the other seven. 15 THE WITNESS: The books I'm editor of 16 I'm also a coauthor of. I have at least one and 17 usually several chapters in those books. JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Chapters? 18 19 THE WITNESS: Yes. 20 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: I recall that vividly, because I'm almost your age. 21 22 THE WITNESS: No, you're not.

		207
1	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: In terms of history	
2	in the profession and, in fact, I used the '74 book,	
3	Government and Sports	
4	THE WITNESS: The sports business? I	
5	wrote three chapters.	
6	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: In a class I taught	
7	the economics of team sports back in in '74.	
8	THE WITNESS: You have very good taste.	
9	JUDGE ROBERTS: Mr. Rich, could you	
10	repeat that again?	
11	MR. RICH: The proffer is, as an expert	
12	in the economics of industrial organization,	
13	including the economics of antitrust regulation and	
14	intellectual property.	
15	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Mr. Handzo.	
16	MR. HANDZO: No objection, Your Honor.	
17	MR. RICH: Thank you.	
18	MR. FAKLER: No objections.	
19	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Professor Noll is	
20	so qualified.	
21	MR. RICH: Thank you.	
22		

208 1 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. RICH: 3 Now, you have in front of you what has Ο. been designated as your revised -- revised amended written direct testimony in this case. That's that rather large binder. Do you have that, sir? Α. Yes, I do. Q. Okay. And do you recognize that as reflecting your work? 11 Yes, I do. This is --Α. 12 Q. And --13 -- this belongs to me. Like, obviously, I haven't read the whole thing, but looking at it, 15 it looks like exactly what I did. 16 Can you verify that the declaration 17 appearing at the end of that testimony bears your signature? 18 19 Yes, that's my signature. Α. 20 Q. And are the attached tables and appendices those that you rely on and reference in 22 this written testimony?

209 Well, that's -- it's supposed to be all 1 Α. the things I relied upon, yes. 3 Ο. Yes. Α. Yes. MR. RICH: Your Honors, at this point, and consistent with this morning's colloquy, we would offer this document in evidence as SiriusXM Trial Exhibit 1. 9 MR. HANDZO: No objection, Your Honor. 10 MR. FAKLER: No objection, Your Honor. 11 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. Exhibit 1 12 is admitted. 13 (SiriusXM Trial Exhibit Number 1 was 14 marked and admitted into evidence.) 15 MR. HANDZO: Your Honor, if I may, this is the point in time when usually the opposing party then asks for certain of the information to be 17 treated as restricted. And I do have such a motion 18 to make with respect to some of the information in 20 Dr. Noll's report. 21 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. 22 MR. HANDZO: Specifically starting at

210 Page 77. 1 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: I'm going to ask 3 you to speak up. MR. HANDZO: Starting at Page 77, there are highlighted portions of the text which we would ask to be treated as restricted. JUDGE ROBERTS: On what grounds, Mr. Handzo? 9 MR. HANDZO: Your Honor, the -- this refers to the Slacker deal. 11 JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. 12 MR. HANDZO: Which I believe is currently in effect with Universal, and we have -we ask for deals that are currently in effect to be treated as restricted, because they are information 16 that is known to one record company but not to the 17 other record companies, and for having all of the record companies knowing what the deals of their 18 competitors are is obviously competitively sensitive 20 information. 21 JUDGE ROBERTS: All right. 22 MR. RICH: We have no objection.

		211
1	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: The text and the	
2	footnote?	
3	MR. HANDZO: Yes, Your Honor.	
4	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Consider that	
5	restricted.	
6	Okay, go ahead.	
7	MR. HANDZO: Then on Page 78, we would	
8	ask that the last paragraph of 78, carrying over to	
9	79, be treated as restricted.	
10	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: And just the top	
11	line on 79?	
12	MR. HANDZO: Well, no, I'm sorry. On	
13	79, I would also ask for the rest of the highlighted	
14	information to be treated as restricted.	
15	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay.	
16	Mr. Rich?	
17	MR. RICH: No objection.	
18	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay.	
19	JUDGE ROBERTS: The same reasoning,	
20	Mr. Handzo?	
21	MR. HANDZO: Yes, that's correct.	
22	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. That will	:

212 be treated as restricted. MR. HANDZO: Then on Page 81, I would ask for the highlighted information be restricted on the same basis. 5 MR. RICH: No objection. CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: The highlighted material on Page 81 is then restricted. 8 MR. HANDZO: Thank you. 9 Moving ahead to Page 89, we would ask that the -- in the first paragraph the highlighted information be restricted, so there's just 11 12 essentially one line there. 13 MR. RICH: What about the table? 14 MR. HANDZO: We are not asking that the table be restricted. 16 MR. RICH: No objection. 17 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: And that's on the same basis, Mr. Handzo? 18 19 MR. HANDZO: Correct. 20 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. What about 21 the two bits on the bottom of Page 89? 22 MR. HANDZO: We are not asking that that

		213
1	be treated as restricted.	
2	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay.	
3	MR. HANDZO: Page 90, we are not asking	
4	that the table be treated as restricted; however, we	
5	are asking that the couple of lines in the first	
6	full paragraph below that be treated as restricted,	
7	again, on the same theory.	
8	MR. RICH: No objection.	
9	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: On the same basis,	
10	that will be considered restricted.	
11	MR. HANDZO: Then, unfortunately, I also	
12	need to address the exhibits.	
13	Starting with Exhibit H, we ask that be	
14	treated as restricted in its entirety.	
15	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: What's your basis?	
16	MR. HANDZO: Again, the same the same	
17	basis as before, Your Honor.	
18	MR. RICH: One moment, please,	
19	Your Honor.	
20	(Pause.)	
21	MR. RICH: We have no objection.	
22	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Exhibit or,	

214 excuse me, it's entitled Appendix H, I believe. Appendix H is then considered restricted in its 3 entirety. MR. HANDZO: Then turning to Appendix I, 5 there are two documents here separated by a blue sheet of paper. We are not asking that the first document be treated as restricted. We are, however, asking that the second document be treated restricted, again, on the same theory. 10 MR. RICH: Perhaps for the record, Mr. Handzo, you ought to identify it so there's no 12 lack of clarity. 13 MR. HANDZO: Yes. I'll use the Bates number. The first page of it is SX02 00127848. 15 16 MR. RICH: Again, we have no objection. 17 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: It's entitled 18 Amendment Number 1 of Interactive Radio and Music 19 Services Agreement. 20 MR. HANDZO: Correct. 21 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Those Bates page 22 numbers ending with -7855. That document will be

215 considered restricted. MR. HANDZO: Turning, then, to Exhibit J, we would ask that the entire document be 3 treated as restricted. Again, the same -- the same basis. 5 6 MR. RICH: I believe there may be several documents here. 8 MR. HANDZO: The motion applies to all of them. 10 MR. RICH: We have no objection. 11 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Appendix J is 12 considered restricted in its entirety. 13 MR. HANDZO: Appendix K, we would ask that that document be treated as restricted in its entirety. And, again, there are two documents as 15 part of this exhibit. We ask that treatment for 16 17 both. 18 JUDGE ROBERTS: Are they amendments to 19 the agreement, Mr. Handzo? 20 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: It's entitled --21 MR. HANDZO: I believe it is, yes. 22 JUDGE ROBERTS: Okay.

		216
1	MR. RICH: No objection.	
2	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Appendix K is	
3	restricted.	
4	MR. HANDZO: I don't know if the Court	
5	will permit me to do this wholesale, but I will tell	
6	you that we will make the same motion on the same	
7	basis for Appendix Appendices M, N, O, P, Q, R,	
8	and S.	
9	JUDGE ROBERTS: All active agreements?	
10	MR. HANDZO: Correct.	
11	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Did you say P, N,	
12	M?	
13	MR. HANDZO: M, N, O, P, Q.	
14	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Q, R, S.	
15	MR. HANDZO: R and S.	
16	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay.	
17	MR. HANDZO: I am advised that I did not	
18	move with respect to Appendix L. If that's correct,	
19	I need to fix that.	
20	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: You did not.	
21	MR. HANDZO: Then I would make that	
22	motion with respect to Appendix L. Again, the same	

217 basis. 1 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: So, Mr. Rich, L through S inclusive? 3 4 MR. RICH: Just checking, Your Honor. I'll be right with you. 6 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Mr. Handzo, there are also some numbered tabs at the back after Appendix S. Are they part of S? 9 MR. RICH: They are not. 10 MR. HANDZO: I believe they are not; Cricket. 11 12 MR. RICH: We have no objection to L 13 through S. 14 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: L through S will 15 be deemed restricted. 16 MR. HANDZO: Lastly, the Tab 2 behind 17 the appendices, we would ask that Table 2.1c, 2.2a, 2.2b, 2.2c, 2.2d, and 2.2 -- I'm sorry, 2.3 be 18 19 treated as restricted. 20 MR. RICH: No objections. 21 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: That's on the same 22 basis, Mr. Handzo?

			218
	1	MR. HANDZO: Yes, that's correct.	
	2	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Those will be	
	3	restricted	
	4	MR. HANDZO: Thank you.	
	5	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: on the same	
	6	basis.	
	7	Mr. Rich.	
	8	BY MR. RICH:	
	9	Q. All right. Resuming, Dr. Noll. Thank	
	10	you for your patience.	
	11	A. Um-hum.	
	12	Q. Please describe for this Court the	
	13	nature of your assignment in this proceeding.	
	14	A. My assignment was to determine the	
	15	appropriate methods and carry them out for	
	16	determining a reasonable rate for SDARS as called	
	17	for by this proceeding.	
	18	Q. At the end in the culmination of your	
	19	analysis, did you, in fact, reach a conclusion as to	
	20	an appropriate rate or range of reasonable rates?	
Ì	21	A. Yes, I did.	
	22	Q. Jumping quickly to the bottom line, what	

219 was that conclusion? The bottom line of the conclusion is that the best -- the best benchmarks for the direct licenses, which range from 5 to 7 percent, and that 5 the secondary benchmark of the least customized, noninteractive Internet-based services that are available over mobile technology are the second best, and they come out with numbers in the same range as the direct licenses. 10 Have you prepared several demonstratives Q. 11 to facilitate our colloquy this afternoon? 12 Α. Yes, I have. 13 MR. RICH: With the Court's permission, I'd like to distribute those. 15 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: You may. 16 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Perhaps this is a good time to remind counsel that items that are not 17 put into the record will be available to be picked 18 19 up up here later, as usual. 20 MR. RICH: Very good. 21 BY MR. RICH: 22 Q. Why don't we start, Dr. Noll, with a

- 1 description of the methodology or the conceptual
- 2 approach you took to going about your assignment?
- 3 Can you describe that, please?
- A. Sure. I'm -- I -- basically, it's the
- 5 same two-pronged procedure that's been done before.
- 6 First of all, consider the 801(b)(1) factors, and
- 7 secondly, consider willing buyer/willing seller
- 8 benchmarks to determine what kinds of rates would be
- 9 like -- or satisfy the reasonableness test that are
- 10 appropriate here.
- 11 Q. And did you, as part of your
- 12 investigation, give consideration to both prongs of
- 13 this analysis; namely, the bearing that the various
- 14 801(b)(1) factors have on rate setting as well as
- 15 consideration of potential willing buyer/willing
- 16 seller benchmarks?
- 17 A. Yes. I considered both, except I did
- 18 not do disruption. I did the first three 801(b)(1)
- 19 factors.
- Q. I take it the disruption analysis was
- 21 done by, to your knowledge, another expert for --
- 22 A. Yeah, it was done by Dr. Stowell.

- 1 Q. Yes.
- 2 And could you describe, as you conceive
- 3 of it, the proper interrelationship -- you as an
- 4 economist, not as a lawyer -- between considered --
- 5 this Court's consideration of the 801(b)(1) factors
- 6 and its consideration of one or more market
- 7 benchmarks? How do they interrelate?
- 8 A. Well, they're -- they're distinct and
- 9 separate. I mean, in principle, you could end up
- 10 with a circumstance in which they get the same
- 11 answer, but there's no reason to believe that in
- 12 principle that would actually happen given the
- 13 facts, because what I understand the 801(b) -- the
- 14 801(b)(1) factors to do is to say there are certain
- 15 policy or societal considerations that you should
- 16 take into account, and maybe or maybe not a market
- 17 would take them into account. You have to be sure,
- 18 if you're going to use a market benchmark, that
- 19 these factors are, indeed, taken into account.
- Q. I take it from that answer and from your
- 21 written direct testimony that you do not agree with
- 22 the supposition that most of these factors are

- 1 simply implicitly, quote, baked into, to use
- 2 Mr. Handzo's opening phrase, a market analysis; is
- 3 that correct?
- A. No, I don't think they're automatically
- 5 baked in, no.
- 6 Q. Could you be more specific in terms of
- 7 ticking through one at a time what you've listed as
- 8 A, B, C, D here -- or A, B, C; you didn't look at
- 9 disruption -- how you conceive of, conceptualize
- 10 those factors, and preview for the Court how you
- 11 believe those have application to the analysis here?
- 12 A. I'll do them in sequence. The
- 13 availability has two dimensions to it. The first is
- 14 providing incentives to produce creative product,
- 15 and the second is delivering that product to
- 16 consumers on a nationwide basis.
- 17 The way that fits into this particular
- 18 case, of course, is in the first instance, there's
- 19 some crucial factor here about inducement of more
- 20 creative product; and, secondly, is there an
- 21 availability issue for delivering music content to
- 22 consumers that is unique to satellite radio?

223 And the answer to the latter is that --1 is the nature of the coverage of satellite radio compared to all the competing alternatives. to say, there are areas in the country that have no over-the-air radio and that have no wireless service. So that if the issue is the delivery of 7 musical content through some communications technology, to dashboard of a car, in those areas, satellite radio is the only one. 10 So that is the -- the part of the 11 satellite radio availability that has to be taken 12 into account in 801(b) factors. 14 If -- if, for some reason, satellite 15 radio were no longer available, then, indeed, it would be the case that musical content of the kind 17 of variety and -- that is available over satellite 18 radio or over the Internet through various noninteractive services would simply not be 20 available to those people. 21 And the FCC's own work indicates that --22 that on the order of 40 percent of the service area

- 1 of the U.S., containing roughly 2 percent of the
- 2 population, does not have wireless carriers.
- 3 It's a little bit harder to figure out
- 4 who doesn't get access to over-the-air radio, so I
- 5 focus there. You can actually get that information
- 6 from a really complicated Web site at the FCC, which
- 7 I spent some time with, and produce a number of
- 8 examples of -- of locations in the U.S. where they
- 9 also don't have radio.
- 10 Q. Meaning terrestrial radio?
- 11 A. Terrestrial radio. Yes.
- 12 Q. So that's one branch of availability,
- 13 yes?
- 14 A. That's a branch of availability.
- 15 Q. And there's a second element -- aspect
- 16 of that?
- 17 A. The second element of it has to do with
- 18 inducement effect, which is what is the -- what is
- 19 the contribution of -- to the inducement of more
- 20 creative product. And here, someone simply looks at
- 21 what fraction of the total revenue of the record
- 22 industry is accounted for by SiriusXM, and it's 2 or

- 1 3 percent.
- 2 So even if it were to totally disappear,
- 3 which isn't what is at issue here, we're talking
- 4 about a fairly small difference in the -- in the
- 5 generation of revenue for the record industry.
- 6 Q. Did your written direct testimony give
- 7 consideration to the relative promotional and
- 8 substitutional effects of one or more potential
- 9 benchmarks that you examined?
- 10 A. Yes, it did.
- 11 Q. And does that have any bearing, in your
- 12 estimation, on the availability prong?
- 13 A. The promotional and substitution effect
- 14 is -- is -- is an input to availability in the sense
- 15 that if people learn about music from a particular
- 16 way of delivering it to them, and then they take
- 17 actions to acquire more of it, to buy other music
- 18 products other than the one of the particular way
- 19 they got it, that is a -- what we, as economists,
- 20 would call a pecuniary externality to the record
- 21 industry.
- That is to say, not only do they get

- 1 whatever revenue they would derive from that
- 2 particular way of delivering the music, they get
- 3 additional revenue because the customer would, say,
- 4 buy it from a digital download site or buy a CD, or
- 5 subscribe to a more expensive in-demand service and
- 6 specifically request that particular recording.
- 7 So there is an inducement of additional
- 8 use of music, consumption of music, if there is, in
- 9 fact, a promotional effect.
- If there's a substitution effect, then
- 11 it's exactly the opposite, that delivering music
- 12 over a particular channel means there's less demand
- 13 for music over other channels. And, in particular,
- 14 obviously, digital downloads and CDs can both be
- 15 used to put music on an iPad [verbatim], and if you
- 16 buy one, you're unlikely to buy the other. As time
- 17 has progressed, digital downloads have substituted
- 18 for CDs as a way to put music on your iPod.
- 19 Q. Have you given consideration, as part of
- 20 your work on this testimony, to the promotional
- 21 versus substitutional effects of satellite radio?
- 22 A. Yes, I have.

		227
1	Q. Have you drawn any conclusions?	
2	A. Yes. There's as a couple of pieces	
3	of evidence, I have not done I have relied upon	
4	the testimony of others, in parts, from their own	
5	experience with SiriusXM, and then I have read the	
6	documents themselves.	
7	There is no reliable economics research	
8	in published journals on this issue. What there is	
9	is studies that the company the record companies	
10	have done and their trade associations have done,	
11	and they reach the conclusion that, indeed,	
12	consumers of SiriusXM are more likely to buy music	
13	in other forms than they would have been had they	
14	not subscribed to SiriusXM.	
15	So that would be a promotional effect.	
16	Q. And, conversely, have you given	
17	consideration to the promotional or substitutional	
18	effects of one of the benchmarks used by	
19	Dr. Ordover, which is the interactive service	
20	benchmark?	
21	A. Yes.	
22	Again, there is there's no published	

- 1 academic research on this issue and, indeed, there's
- 2 not enough data available for me to undertake such a
- 3 research project. What you have to rely upon is
- 4 what happens out in the industry and what people in
- 5 the industry have done, and there have been several
- 6 internal studies performed, again, by trade
- 7 associations and record companies, addressing this
- 8 issue. They basically are ambiguous in their
- 9 conclusions.
- 10 Some think there's a substitution
- 11 effect, some think there isn't.
- 12 On balance, it seems to be the case that
- 13 issue is unresolved, but there's no -- there's no
- 14 question that you wouldn't say it's a promotional
- 15 effect, like satellite radio or terrestrial radio.
- 16 It's either nothing or it's a substitution effect.
- 17 Q. Your testimony also references the
- 18 accompanying testimony offered by our client of
- 19 Mr. Blatter, who heads up the music programming --
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. -- section, and you comment a bit about
- 22 your reactions to that in relation to the promotion

229 substitution issue. Can you summarize that? 3 Accepting what he says is true, that's an illustration of the more general point, which is that record companies put forth enormous effort to get their records played on both terrestrial and satellite radio, and they wouldn't do that if it weren't for the fact they believed it's promotional. So all that information is consistent with that -- that view that -- that it -- it does --10 11 and it's especially true for the less mainstream 12 genres of -- of sound recordings. 13 As time has progressed, terrestrial radio has become less and less diverse in the kind 14 of recorded music that's played on radio stations. 15 We're now to the point there's only a handful of 17 classical music stations left in the United States. 18 There's almost no jazz stations left in the 19 United States. It's very hard to find folk music, 20 and certainly ethnic music, other than Latin, is 21 almost impossible to find on the radio. 22 As radio has become less and less

- 1 diverse, more and more radio stations are simply
- 2 outlets of very large national chains that all have
- 3 the same playlists.
- As that has happened, then outlet -- an
- 5 outlet like SiriusXM or some of the noninteractive
- 6 Internet services have become the only way to gain
- 7 access to recordings in these other genres. And in
- 8 those areas in particular, the promotional value is
- 9 especially great. Because if you're a jazz fan, you
- 10 really have very few options except subscribe, you
- 11 know, to either one of the Internet services and
- 12 SiriusXM, and then that's the only way you're going
- 13 to learn about music in that genre, new releases and
- 14 things like that.
- 15 Q. Turning to Element B of the 801(b)
- 16 formulation, fair return --
- 17 JUDGE ROBERTS: One moment, Mr. Rich.
- Just a question for you, Professor Noll.
- 19 Given the promotional versus
- 20 substitutional effect, which you seem to indicate
- 21 leans in favor of promotional, rather than -- so the
- 22 positive side of getting music out, rather than the

231 negative side of leasing sales through substitution, how would you propose that this could be quantified in a royalty rate analysis? THE WITNESS: I have made no attempt to When we get later to the way I have done these things, there are some that I don't think are -- are possible to quantify at this point because of the absence of any research. 9 What I'm saying is, this -- my 10 expectation of processes like this is you don't come to a point estimate of what's the only conceivable 11 12 reasonable rate. What's going to happen in this 13 process, I think, the most likely outcome is there's 14 a range of possibilities, and the question is where 15 do you pick in them? 16 And I don't -- I can't give you a magic bullet on the issue of promotion versus 17 substitutability, because there isn't enough 18 19 quantitative information out there for me to give 20 you a point estimate. It wouldn't be honest for me 21 to do it. 22 So I'm just saying if you come to the

- 1 end and there's a range, this is a factor that says
- 2 go to the bottom of the range or go lower in the
- 3 range than you otherwise might be inclined to do.
- 4 JUDGE ROBERTS: Okay. Thank you.
- 5 BY MR. RICH:
- 6 Q. Could you address the second of these
- 7 factors in terms of its bearing on your analysis,
- 8 fair return?
- 9 A. The fair return one is -- refers to the
- 10 fact that a company must continue to earn the
- 11 competitive return on its investments or it will be
- 12 unable to continue to make those investments over
- 13 time.
- 14 That means one must check, at least on a
- 15 forward-going basis, if the company is not only
- 16 going to be able to pay its operating costs, but
- 17 it's able to recover the depreciation or
- 18 amortization of its capital investments, including
- 19 R&D, and in addition to that, earn a competitive
- 20 return on capital.
- The idea that we should evaluate the
- 22 long-term viability of SiriusXM on the basis purely

- 1 of its ability to have cash -- positive cash flow
- 2 and to cover its operating costs is completely
- 3 false.
- It's -- it -- there's, you know,
- 5 2 percent turnover every month of SiriusXM
- 6 customers. The biggest single capital cost they
- 7 have is getting new customers, paying for part of
- 8 the radio in a car, paying the automobile company a
- 9 commission in order to sign people up for SiriusXM.
- Given the 2 percent per month
- 11 cancellation rate, turnover rate of SiriusXM, within
- 12 a couple of years, they're basically gone if they
- 13 have no incentive to make these additional
- 14 investments. So you have -- you have to take that
- 15 into account on a forward-going basis in order to
- 16 determine whether the company is -- is viable.
- 17 And I get into this later when I get to
- 18 the next -- the next item, but it's important to
- 19 note that the calculations I have done have not done
- 20 this, because I was -- I took the most conservative
- 21 possible approach, which is to ignore the
- 22 competitive return on investment in doing my own

234 calculations, but that, I believe, is an economic problematic move, and I think they should be added back in. Q. Thank you. 5 Relative contribution, how did you assess this factor? 7 To me, the way relative contribution makes sense is you simply think about what is satellite radio? It's fundamentally three different 10 inputs: It's music content -- or I should say sound 11 recording content, because there's a -- one of the anomalies is that I said 55 percent of the content 12 13 is sound recordings, and Professor Ordover said 14 50 percent. That's because I counted comedy and he 15 didn't. So we have the juxtaposition here of 16 experts. 17 But the sound recording component is, say, approximately half; the nonsound recording 19 component is roughly half; and then there's another 20 component, which is the physical infrastructure. 21 To key off of something that was said in 22 the opening remarks, each of those three probably

- 1 has no value standing alone, right, in the sense --
- 2 so you really -- in order for SiriusXM to survive,
- 3 it really has to offer all that, and --
- 4 Q. In your testimony you refer to it as a
- 5 bundle of services?
- 6 A. It's a bundle of services, it's a
- 7 distribution system, a bunch of nonmusic content and
- 8 a bunch of music content, all of which are
- 9 essential. And you pull the plug on any one of
- 10 them, and the whole thing collapses.
- And relative contribution, in my opinion
- 12 as an economist, refers to trying to figure out how
- 13 do you figure out what the contribution is, given
- 14 that all three are essential, that the service
- 15 couldn't survive without any of them. So that means
- 16 not only do you take into account the nonmusic
- 17 content, it also means you take into account the
- 18 costs of the distribution system, because the
- 19 entities that it's competing with are not bundled.
- 20 They do not -- they do not include the distribution
- 21 system. It's provided separately in an unbundled
- 22 way.

236

So you're after what is an appropriate 1 way to unbundle the various components of this for the purpose of figuring out what the price of each -- implicit price of each ought to be. 5 Ο. Do real companies operating in real markets recognize, in a sense, that distinction? 7 Namely, that where one entity is operating in a somewhat bundled basis, that -- that -- that the input cost of -- the price of the input has to 10 adjust to reflect that fact and, if so, have you 11 investigated that -- and you're turning ahead of me 12 to the next demonstrative. Could you explain the 13 purpose of the next demonstrative? 14 Α. First of all, let me answer the question more broadly, then I'll get to this. 15 16 0. Yes.

- A. More broadly, of course -- I mean, in
- 18 the real world, it's really rare to have a
- 19 percentage of revenue as how much you pay for an
- 20 input.
- 21 You don't pay a percentage of the price
- 22 of the automobile when you go buy new tires. You

- 1 don't pay a percentage of the price of the
- 2 automobile when you go fill up the gas tank. The
- 3 price of gas per gallon is the same, no matter what
- 4 car you're driving, whether it costs 20,000 or
- 5 200,000.
- 6 So right off the bat, in most of the
- 7 circumstances we're observing -- again, this was
- 8 discussed somewhat in the opening remarks -- the
- 9 price that is charged people is a sort of
- 10 per-unit-of-use price, which would be the optimal
- 11 thing to do except for the tiny problem that SXM
- 12 doesn't measure its audience, so you don't actually
- 13 know how many users there are to multiply a price
- 14 per user by.
- And we're using -- we shouldn't lose
- 16 fact -- sight of the fact that we're -- we have a
- 17 percentage of revenue number out there simply as a
- 18 second best, because the other thing isn't feasible.
- 19 And if we had a price per user, and we knew how to
- 20 measure it for SiriusXM, then -- then all this issue
- 21 about do they increase the amount of capital costs
- 22 or not, do they do R&D to enhance the service or

- 1 not, would be irrelevant. They still pay .0017, or
- 2 whatever it is, for price per use.
- 3 So that's the keep your eye on the ball,
- 4 that we would really like to do something that's
- 5 exactly the same as buying nuts and bolts to make an
- 6 automobile, that it doesn't matter whether you're
- 7 buying a Chevrolet or a Cadillac, it's still so much
- 8 for a nut and bolt.
- 9 Then the second part of the story, of
- 10 course, is, which is shown in the next exhibit, and
- 11 which --
- 12 MR. HANDZO: I'm sorry. I apologize for
- 13 interrupting.
- 14 If Dr. Noll is now going to talk about
- 15 this next demonstrative, I just would note that one
- 16 of the bars is restricted information. I don't have
- 17 a problem with it being demonstrative, since that
- 18 won't come into evidence. I just ask that we
- 19 somehow talk about it without mentioning the number.
- 20 THE WITNESS: I had already anticipated
- 21 that. I will not name names. And as much as it
- 22 pains me, I won't state numbers. My natural

- 1 inclination is to talk about numbers.
- 2 BY MR. RICH:
- 3 Q. Let me just amend that further by saying
- 4 to the extent convenient, and not compromising your
- 5 testimony, if you ever reach a point where you feel
- 6 you would like to have the unexpurgated version, we
- 7 would make a motion to the Court to, on a limited
- 8 basis, restrict the courtroom to people entitled,
- 9 but to the extent you can do a workaround, I think
- 10 everybody would appreciate it.
- 11 A. The issue here is simply demonstrating a
- 12 core fact, which is that the -- the -- one of
- 13 the factoids that appeared in the -- in the opening
- 14 arguments was the statement that everybody basically
- 15 pays the same royalties, and that's just not true.
- 16 And this is a good illustration of it.
- If you're a mobile telephone company
- 18 that, among many data services that you deliver, one
- 19 of them happens to be interactive Internet music
- 20 service, you pay a much, much, much lower royalty, a
- 21 tiny fraction compared to the royalty that's paid by
- 22 the companies that all they do is provide

- 1 interactive music downloads. The royalty rate for
- 2 the interactive music downloads is much, much
- 3 higher.
- 4 Now, why is that so? Because a mobile
- 5 telephone company is bundling a whole bunch of other
- 6 stuff, including the distribution system, in with
- 7 interactive music service. So you're paying for
- 8 text messaging and e-mail and searching the Internet
- 9 and all a whole bunch of stuff, plus the telephone
- 10 and the -- and the wireless delivery system. And
- 11 so, obviously, the -- the royalty rate is going to
- 12 be much lower for a mobile phone company's
- 13 interactive music service than it's going to be for
- 14 Spotify or Rhapsody.
- JUDGE ROBERTS: Professor Noel, how many
- 16 mobile phone companies are we talking about here
- 17 that you looked at?
- 18 THE WITNESS: Well, I can only look at
- 19 the ones for which there's been data produced.
- JUDGE ROBERTS: There's one.
- 21 THE WITNESS: This is the only one
- 22 that's been produced. I know from other contexts

- 1 that other mobile phone companies have other kinds
- 2 of entertainment services, and I know that the point
- 3 I'm making is true, because this was exactly the
- 4 same point that arose in the ASCAP case involving
- 5 MobiTV, which was, you know, Verizon and AT&T and
- 6 Sprint and T-Mobile are all offering data services
- 7 of -- that differ from each other, that bundle
- 8 things in different ways, and it's the same basic
- 9 issue, how do we -- how do we tease out the musical
- 10 composition rights out of this huge bundle of
- 11 services.
- JUDGE ROBERTS: Okay.
- 13 BY MR. RICH:
- 14 Q. Turning, at a conceptual level,
- 15 Dr. Noll, to the second branch of --
- JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Actually, if I could
- 17 follow up on that.
- 18 So I take it your conclusion is that --
- 19 that the way we tease it out, at least
- 20 intellectually, is by distinguishing between the two
- 21 groups here on the basis that one appears to have
- 22 greater use of that particular input than the other?

242 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure I understand. 1 Meaning more variety of uses? 2 3 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: I'm just talking about the particular input here, the music input. 5 THE WITNESS: The music input. I think the best way to go at the music input is to try to 7 figure out directly from those people who are just providing specialized service what the value of the music is and apply it to the bundled service. 10 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: I understand. But I'm trying to understand where you -- how you 11 12 arrived at your conclusion that one appeared to be 13 worth much more than the other. It seems that you're -- you're basing that on the use of the music 15 input. 16 THE WITNESS: No, actually, the different royalty rates that you see on that picture 18 come up with the same number, because the low number 19 multiplied by the monthly price and the high number 20 multiplied by a much lower monthly price come out to basically the same royalty for interactive service, 22 all right?

243 1 So it's not that somebody's getting it 2 cheaper, it's that if you -- it's that, you know, a 3 competitive benchmark for a telephone company is, in fact, the completely dedicated, single purpose, 5 interactive service, and that pays a very high royalty rate multiplied by a relatively low monthly 7 price. If you then apply that to the telephone 8 9 company --10 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: If I could just stop 11 you right there for a second. 12 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 13 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Does that then coincide with the position that you took a little bit earlier, which is essentially to say, on their 15 face, these comparisons don't mean much? 16 17 THE WITNESS: They don't mean a thing 18 until you do what I just did, and you -- you say, 19 okay, let's multiply the rate by the actual monthly 20 price and see what the actual magnitude of the 21 royalty is. And, in this case, the magnitude of the royalty is basically the same.

244 1 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: BY MR. RICH: 3 Just if you'll stay with this 0. demonstrative to tease the point out to make sure I understand it, and hopefully, the Court fully understands it. On the right-hand bar, there's a reference to -- I think we can disclose this part of it -- interactive services typically charging the range of 50 to 60 percent to entity of the retail 10 revenue base of entities like Rhapsody, Napster, 12 et cetera, correct? 13 Α. That's correct. And what this is designed to 14 15 demonstrate, I take it, is that when those similar services are offered by a bundled mobile service, whose name we will not identify for the moment, and 18 who offers a plenitude of services that you would not expect to see, and in this case, accordingly, 20 don't see, the equivalent 50 to 60 percent rate applied against the full retail base of that other service; is that correct?

245 That's exactly right, because the --1 Α. what's happening is the royalty rate has been adjusted downward to take into account a relative 3 contribution factor. That is to say, that one of these providers is providing the distribution system and the other one isn't. But mathematically, that 10 percent 7 against a larger X percent against a larger retail base, as you pointed out, could yield the same 10 result, yes? 11 Α. It should. 12 That was a hypothetical 10 percent? Q. 13 Α. Yes. 14 Ο. Let's turn to the second of the broad 15 concepts you explored. We just spent a few minutes on 801(b). 16 17 In your first demonstrative, you indicate also the need to consider appropriate 18 approaches to the willing buyer/willing seller 19 benchmarks; is that correct? 20 21 That's correct. Α. 22 If you turn to your next demonstrative, Q.

- 1 please, would you tell us how you approached that
- 2 matter conceptually?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 These are the criteria that I used to --
- 5 the first -- the first column is the criterias that
- 6 I used; the second column refers to the SXM direct
- 7 licenses; and the third column refers -- refers to
- 8 the interactive Internet music services.
- 9 The -- the point is, I start off --
- 10 there's a number of candidates out there for what
- 11 might be benchmarks, and so the first thing to do is
- 12 to determine which ones are the closest, according
- 13 to these criteria, to the rates at issue here.
- And to go briefly through it, it's the
- 15 market rate you're observing is competitive.
- 16 Q. You spend a fair amount of time
- 17 discussing that in your written direct testimony.
- 18 Can you encapsulate that testimony?
- 19 A. Yes. Basically -- the basic story here
- 20 is the market structure here is the market structure
- 21 between the buyers and the sellers of the
- 22 performance rights for sound recordings.

- 1 Q. So identify those parties, please.
- 2 A. And on -- on the supply side consists of
- 3 all the record companies, which is an industry that
- 4 is relatively concentrated, but it's not so
- 5 concentrated I would call it a monopoly, and
- 6 economists would generally not call it a monopoly.
- 7 So about 90 percent of the distribution
- 8 takes place with the four major labels, and the
- 9 biggest one is Universal, which is in the 30s. So
- 10 that is a moderately concentrated industry, but it's
- 11 not one that I'm going to complain about. I'm just
- 12 going to accept that as a reasonable standard for
- 13 competitive market.
- On the demand side for these performance
- 15 rights are all the people who want to buy, for
- 16 whatever reason, from the record companies sound
- 17 recordings. And there's a whole bunch of people who
- 18 want to buy them, you know, there's -- this is all
- 19 at the wholesale level, including people who retail
- 20 CDs, including people who sell digital downloads,
- 21 people who sell interactive services, people who
- 22 sell noninteractive services.

- 1 And that is the appropriate way to think
- 2 about that market interaction, and here, SiriusXM is
- 3 a tiny fraction of the demand side. And, indeed,
- 4 the demand side, in general, is essentially
- 5 atomistic. There's nobody out there who has
- 6 anything remotely resembling the market share of
- 7 Universal on the supply side, so I conclude that the
- 8 demand side of the market is workably competitive as
- 9 well.
- 10 So that if we actually observe market
- 11 transactions here, that they will be the result of a
- 12 competitive process. There may be other things
- 13 affecting them, but they will be the result of a
- 14 competitive process.
- 15 O. What did you conclude as to how and in
- 16 what circumstances individual record labels would
- 17 compete over the licensing of sound recording
- 18 performing rights?
- 19 A. There's -- the reason that they will
- 20 compete for the -- to sell their rights to SiriusXM
- 21 is -- is to get play time, and play time is valuable
- 22 to them in two ways: First of all, for any given

- 1 royalty rate, the more times your stuff is played,
- 2 the higher the royalty you're paid.
- Secondly, the more play time you get,
- 4 the more records you sell through other channels
- 5 because of the promotional effect.
- 6 And that -- this is called an economics
- 7 demand diversion. There's a number of articles that
- 8 I cite that have talked about demand diversion in
- 9 not only this market, but other markets of
- 10 entertainment intellectual property rights. And
- 11 it's that phenomenon, the fact that a given label
- 12 wants to be played more for these two reasons that
- 13 induces people to be willing to compete to get on
- 14 SiriusXM.
- 15 Q. Could you use a different terminology
- 16 than demand diversion to -- to convey the concept
- 17 here in terms of as applied to a service like
- 18 SiriusXM?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 What's happening is that a particular
- 21 label is trying to get SiriusXM to substitute for
- 22 songs played -- that are released by other labels in

- 1 favor of songs released by it, that it wants -- it
- 2 wants to get more of its songs played at the expense
- 3 of its competitors, not because it wants to harm its
- 4 competitors, that's not what it's trying to do, but
- 5 it wants to sell more of its own records, and it
- 6 wants to get more royalty income.
- 7 And it's that desire to cause a
- 8 substitution effect on the demand side in its favor
- 9 that is the engine of competition for these rights.
- 10 And this phenomenon is -- it doesn't have to be a
- 11 perfectly competitive market. These are obviously
- 12 differentiated products. There are certain unique
- 13 artists.
- 14 You know, it's unlikely this argument is
- 15 going to have much cut -- it's going to cut much ice
- 16 if the story is Adele or somebody like that, the
- 17 current best selling artist. But at the level of
- 18 filling up all the channels on SiriusXM 24/7,
- 19 there's a lot of play, there's a lot of room for
- 20 maneuvering as to which songs get on the playlist.
- 21 And that was what they're competing for, especially
- 22 in these genres that have no other playtime outlets,

- 1 this is the holy game for them.
- Q. So under the column, qualities of a good
- 3 benchmark, you've been discussing the criteria of a
- 4 workably competitive market.
- 5 Am I correct, then, in trying to
- 6 identify a suitable benchmark meeting that
- 7 criterion, you would be looking for a transaction or
- 8 transactions that reflect and incorporate the
- 9 incentive of individual record companies to compete
- 10 for increased plays of their sound recordings?
- 11 A. Yes, that's right. And that -- that's
- 12 precisely right. That's exactly the phenomenon one
- 13 would observe in the context of a SiriusXM.
- Q. And let me just ask you this: In a
- 15 setting in which transactions between buyers of --
- 16 or licensees of sound recording performing rights
- 17 occurs, not with individual record companies, but
- 18 with the collective SoundExchange, does that meet
- 19 this criterion?
- 20 A. No, because SoundExchange as an entity
- 21 is -- is indifferent between distribution of plays
- 22 among its members. It's only interested in total

- 1 plays times the royalty rate, which means maximizing
- 2 the income to the membership of SoundExchange has
- 3 nothing to do with this -- this competition among
- 4 plays. It simply has to do with getting the highest
- 5 royalty rate possible, because the plays are going
- 6 to be basically constant.
- 7 And so what -- what they're -- they're
- 8 solely interested in the royalty rate. They -- they
- 9 derive no benefit from a competitive interaction
- 10 among their members to engage in price cutting.
- 11 Q. Now, applying the various criteria, the
- 12 various qualities of a good benchmark against the
- 13 evidence available to you, did you arrive at a best
- 14 available benchmark?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 O. What was that?
- 17 A. The direct licenses, because they
- 18 satisfy all these criteria (indicating) that -- that
- 19 I list as the -- as the basis for the best
- 20 benchmark.
- JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: If I could interrupt
- 22 for just one second.

253 1 Did I mishear you? When you were talking about workably competitive market, did you posit that as a feature of -- of the comparable benchmark that we ought to be looking for? 5 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I mean, obviously, nothing is perfect, right, but, yes, and I'm accepting the structure, the market structure of the recording industry as it is. JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Right. That's what -- I'm curious, because now you listed these 11 five, and you've got same buyer here, rather than 12 the -- the fraction of the demand side of the market 13 that -- that you said established a competitively 14 workable market. 15 THE WITNESS: By same buyer, I'm talking 16 about the interaction between the record companies 17 and the buyer, and SiriusXM signed the direct licenses, and SiriusXM is the buyer from 19 SoundExchange. 20 So the -- the --21 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: I understand what 22 that means.

254 1 THE WITNESS: That's a separate, independent issue, all right, whether it's the same buyer. JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Separate and 5 independent from what? 6 THE WITNESS: The issue of whether the 7 market is competitive is separable from the issue of -- you could have the result that it wasn't a competitive market, but you would still undertake 10 the test, as it the same buyer. It would be even 11 more important if you had concluded that the 12 argument wasn't -- the market wasn't competitive, 13 then it would be essential that it be the same 14 buyer. JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: If we have the same 15 16 buyer, is it a workably competitive market anymore? 17 THE WITNESS: The same buyer is the 18 person engaged in the transaction. This isn't a 19 statement about the market, it's a statement about 20 the buyer. The market contains many buyers, and the 21 license we're interested in here, the buyer is the 22 same in both cases.

255 1 I thought you were JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: looking for a benchmark, and the benchmark is based on a market, not on a single buyer. THE WITNESS: The benchmark is based on a single buyer if the market contains -- if the -you are right to say that if there were other buyers who otherwise satisfied all the conditions, they would be relevant, too. I agree with that point. But I'm just using the characteristics of willing buyer/willing seller that are what people 11 have used in the past about how to find a license in 12 a product-differentiated market that's -- it's imperfectly competitive, what is the best possible 13 14 example? 15 And if we found -- usually you think 16 about it more on the seller's side than on the buyer's side, but in this particular case, there's 17 no differentiating factor between the entity that's 18 the buyer in this proceeding and the entity that's 20 the buyer of the direct license. They're buying exactly the same thing for exactly the same purpose. 22 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: So when you're

256 talking about this benchmark comparison, you're limiting it to the context of the direct license category that you've offered; is that correct? 4 THE WITNESS: In principle, there could be other things that one would use, yes. SiriusXM, in principle, could be in other businesses, all 6 right, that -- for which it was buying other licenses instead of this one, in which case it wouldn't work, right? If I were -- I wouldn't 10 satisfy the same buyer criteria. 11 Suppose that Sirius and XM hadn't merged 12 and XM had bought some direct licenses but Sirius 13 hadn't. Then they wouldn't be the same buyer. 14 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: That's correct. 15 THE WITNESS: All right. Now, you could 16 arque that the XM licenses ought to be used for 17 Sirius, but it takes one more step to say that the 18 product differentiation in the industry is such that 19 those distinctions don't make any difference. 20 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Well, I quess so, but 21 it looks like you're essentially limiting that -that workably competitive market. But I'll let 22

257 Mr. Rich continue. MR. RICH: Thank you. I don't want to 3 cut you off. JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: No, that's fine. 5 JUDGE ROBERTS: Mr. Rich, are you going to look any more at this chart, because I had a question. 8 MR. RICH: We're going to stay with it for a while, but why don't you go ahead? 10 JUDGE ROBERTS: Since this is a 11 description of characteristics, if you look at the 12 same sellers, you have given a checkmark for the 13 SiriusXM direct licenses and a full checkmark for the SoundExchange interactive agreements. 15 But that isn't really -- they don't both 16 fully deserve a checkmark, do they? In other words, 17 doesn't the SiriusXM deserve a checkmark that is only 2 percent of the size of the checkmark that SoundExchange gets? 19 20 THE WITNESS: I think the issue of the 21 representativeness of the group of people who have 22 signed direct licenses is a valid issue to examine,

- 1 and I will -- I do -- will and do examine it.
- 2 I agree with you, and that's exactly the
- 3 same answer as I gave to Sirius. Suppose there were
- 4 25 satellite radio companies and -- and two of them
- 5 had signed direct licenses, we would be in the same
- 6 issue, which is, shall -- you know, to what extent
- 7 can we make a valid statement that the two satellite
- 8 radio companies that signed licenses are
- 9 representative of the 23 that didn't?
- 10 I agree that that is an issue that has
- 11 to be addressed.
- 12 JUDGE ROBERTS: Okay. So you would say
- 13 that the checkmark that you have there should be a
- 14 tiny checkmark?
- THE WITNESS: No, I don't think so. I
- 16 mean, the issue is -- the way I was conceptualizing
- 17 it is, are the buyers and the sellers -- on both
- 18 sides, the buyers and the sellers, basically people
- 19 in the same business doing the same thing? That's
- 20 what I was thinking about.
- 21 And the reality, of course, is that
- 22 there's only one satellite radio company, so the

259 question of the same buyer is very narrow on the buyer's side, whereas it's much broader in the record label company. And there is a burden, I think, upon me and others here to demonstrate that that check is valid, all right? This is a summary of what I've done, and I believe that check is 7 completely valid. JUDGE ROBERTS: Okay. BY MR. RICH: 10 Q. Why don't we turn to that, which is -which is that if you could summarize your written 12 testimony as to what makes -- first of all, how many 13 licenses did you -- how many direct licenses did you identify as of November of 2011? 15 Yes, as of November 30th --16 Ο. 29th. 17 -- or whatever, I believe it was 62. Α. 18 Q. And what was the royalty range in those 19 licenses? 20 Α. Five to seven. 21 Q. And did you average those? 22 Α. They -- the average is around six.

- 1 about the middle.
- Q. Around six. And just before we get to
- 3 the representative issue, what is your understanding
- 4 of the scope of rights that was granted across these
- 5 licenses to SiriusXM?
- 6 A. It's actually somewhat broader, because
- 7 it gives SiriusXM some additional rights with regard
- 8 to its PC-based service and other things it might do
- 9 with satellite service.
- 10 Q. Did you attempt to make any adjustment .
- 11 for that added value?
- 12 A. No, I didn't make any attempt to adjust
- 13 for that because I don't have any quantitative basis
- 14 to make that adjustment. I don't think there's
- 15 anything out there that would give me insight into
- 16 how much these were worth.
- 17 Q. In what direction would that skew, if
- 18 any, your analysis, failing to do that?
- 19 A. Because these are broader rights,
- 20 they're worth more.
- 21 Q. Now, if you would summarize your
- 22 testimony as to the analysis you gave and the

- 1 conclusion you reached as to what makes these 62
- 2 licenses representative for purposes of your
- 3 benchmarking here where, after all, it is the role
- 4 of the Court to establish a fee industrywide
- 5 effectively.
- 6 A. Basically, the issue is as a
- 7 collectivity, do these licenses offer rights to
- 8 scope of sound recordings that is comparable to the
- 9 scope of sound recordings one would get from the
- 10 people who are not licensed. And, in particular,
- 11 the issue here is going to be how can we compare the
- 12 62 licenses that account for 2 percent of the market
- 13 with a major, which EMI is the smallest major, and
- 14 it's about 10 percent of the market.
- So the question is, is this scope of
- 16 types of music, types of artists, age distribution
- 17 of recordings among -- the industry tends to break
- 18 recordings into three categories. There's --
- 19 there's the hits; there's the other relatively
- 20 recent releases; and there's something called
- 21 catalog, which is the things they keep making a
- 22 couple of years after they've been released.

262 1 And roughly -- there's roughly equally -- all three are roughly equally important to the record industry. So the issue is, do we have the right distribution by age, by type of music, by popularity of artists that would cover that full range, and that's the way I approached it. 0. And what conclusions did you reach? Α. Well, the -- the conclusion that I 10 reached by examining the repertoire offered by each of these labels and sort of summing them up was that, collectively, they did compete across the 12 13 board with the major distribution companies in all of these various categories. 15 Mr. Handzo, in his opening, intimated Q. that -- that a major simply would never have agreed 17 to a royalty at or around this rate. Have you considered that? 18 19 Α. Yes, I have. 20 What's your conclusion? 0. 21 I -- it seems to me that the principal 22 reason for the majors not to negotiate is because,

- 1 again, they're the principal beneficiaries of
- 2 banding together in SoundExchange. For sure,
- 3 they're not going to get a worse outcome than the
- 4 rates that could be negotiated with SiriusXM, and
- 5 they may get a better outcome.
- 6 This is sort of playing a lottery, if
- 7 you will, where the worst possible outcome is the
- 8 direct licenses. So, from my perspective, there's
- 9 no good incentive for the label.
- I can also say, however, that I did the
- 11 calculation in my report about the -- the
- 12 incremental plays that even the largest major, UMG,
- 13 would -- would be required to have in order to make
- 14 a half of a percentage point cut in the rate
- 15 profitable for them, and it's like a play every few
- 16 hours. It's not a big deal.
- 17 So they do have an incentive to compete
- 18 with other majors and try to take away plays from
- 19 other majors, but the four majors definitely have --
- 20 have decided they would prefer a regulated
- 21 environment which is supposed to come up with what
- 22 is a reasonable rate, which they believe the worst

264 possible outcome is probably what they could get if they negotiated directly. 3 They've chosen to go the SoundExchange route. 5 Ο. Let me unpack that a little bit. You said -- you made reference to half a 7 percent difference. Can you explain what the numbers were and how you got there that get you to that half a 10 percent difference? 11 Yes. The issue was -- was I was comparing why would you accept a 7 percent rate 12 13 rather than an 8 percent rate? And you have to take off from the 8 percent rate the costs of operating 1.5 the SoundExchange system, which is about a half of a 16 percentage point. 17 So that leaves the -- the net rate from SoundExchange as around 7-1/2. So the question is, 18 would I take a cut from 7-1/2 to 7, what would have

to be true to cause me to want to take that cut?

a 6.48 percent increase in plays, and then if you

And just on the royalty payment alone, it would take

20

- 1 add to that promotional effects, you know, it would
- 2 be -- you would be better off taking a lower rate.
- 3 Q. Now, by definition, SiriusXM, you
- 4 indicated that an inducement for a label to sign a
- 5 direct license is -- is to increase its plays,
- 6 correct?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. So that even at a nominally lower
- 9 effective royalty rate, more plays can generate more
- 10 royalty income, correct?
- 11 A. That's correct.
- 12 Q. All right.
- Now, by definition, though, SiriusXM
- 14 couldn't increase -- couldn't do that for every
- 15 label, is that correct, given the finite amount of
- 16 plays available?
- A. Well, it wouldn't -- it is -- it's not
- 18 the right way to put it. The answer to your
- 19 question is no, that's not quite right.
- The -- one thing SiriusXM could do, if
- 21 we were in a world in which we had royalties based
- 22 on use, is respond to a lower price by having more

- 1 music.
- 2 And the way it would work out here is if
- 3 having more music induces more people to subscribe
- 4 to SiriusXM, then the lower royalty encourages them
- 5 to have more plays for everybody.
- But that is a tiny effect compared to
- 7 the effect any single label would be likely to
- 8 receive if it had a somewhat lower royalty rate.
- 9 So the basic argument is true. The
- 10 incentive for the industry as a collectivity to cut
- 11 its price is really small compared to the incentive
- 12 for any label, even a major label like Universal, to
- 13 cut its price.
- Q. In that latter connection, beginning at
- 15 Page 49 of your testimony, you talk about the
- 16 response of various record industry organizations to
- 17 the direct licensing initiative, correct?
- 18 A. I do, yes.
- 19 Q. Could you summarize the purport of that
- 20 testimony, please?
- 21 A. Well, the -- the -- the basic story is
- 22 the -- all of the trade associations in the record

- 1 industry, whether it's artists or record labels,
- 2 issued public statements, as well engaged in private
- 3 activity to try to convince independent labels not
- 4 to sign these licenses.
- 5 It is not true that these -- that the
- 6 independent -- these poor independent labels were
- 7 operating in a vacuum and didn't know up from down.
- 8 They were getting information from their trade
- 9 associations. There's a trade association of
- 10 independent labels. There's SoundExchange itself.
- 11 There's associations of artists who are on
- 12 independent labels. There's associations of
- 13 executives who work for independent labels.
- 14 All of these organizations were putting
- 15 out information, but, in addition to that, exhorting
- 16 their members not to sign the licenses.
- 17 And the goal of this was explicit. It
- 18 was the fear on the part of these organizations that
- 19 if competition were allowed to happen for direct
- 20 licenses, it would cause the rate to be lower,
- 21 because this proceeding would come up with a lower
- 22 rate. That was the fear.

268

And so this was an explicit attempt to 1 make certain, to try very hard to make certain there would be no such information available in this proceeding to indicate what a competitive rate might look like. Ο. And if you turn to the last paragraph on Page 54, carrying over to Page 55 of your testimony, please. Let me just made read a passage into the record and ask you to expand on it. 10 This is beginning with the second sentence, and the carryover paragraph on 54. 12 13 Whereas many record companies, including 14 the four majors, are unwilling to enter meaningful 15 negotiations for direct licenses, these statements show -- meaning the statements you have recounted 17 from the industry organizations that you just testified to -- that the source of this reluctance 18 is the expectation that letting SoundExchange lead a 20 collective effort to set a single statutory rate for

the entire industry will produce more royalty income

for all, because SoundExchange will not respond to

- 1 the competitive incentive facing each record company
- 2 to compete on the basis of price in order to receive
- 3 more plays.
- 4 What I want you to comment on is the
- 5 concluding sentence, which is, This phenomenon is
- 6 precisely why the direct licenses between SiriusXM
- 7 and 62 record companies are the most appropriate
- 8 benchmark for this proceeding.
- 9 Can you just explain that connection?
- 10 A. Yes. It's the obverse of the reason
- 11 they tried to suppress it, which is that the point
- 12 here is not just that they didn't want some
- 13 independents to get some more plays for a lower
- 14 rate. It was the -- the looking-forward aspect of
- 15 it into this proceeding that it would lead to a
- 16 lower rate.
- 17 They didn't want -- they know that the
- 18 job of the Copyright Royalty Judges is to try to
- 19 find something like a market rate, maybe with some
- 20 discounts for 801(b) factors. Everybody knows that.
- 21 And they want that -- as little of that information
- 22 to be available as possible. It helps them if there

270 is no direct information about what a competitive market would look like, because then you have to get into all these crazy exercises that economists do of trying to take an apple and figure out what its price will be if it were really a banana. And that process is inherently full of lots of uncertainty and ends up with being in ranges 7 of reasonableness that are sometimes a factor of two different. This is real, honest to goodness 10 competition that is happening to -- among companies 11 to get more plays, and that is the most direct evidence we can come up with of what a competitive 12 benchmark for the rate at issue here would be. 13 14 Q. During my opening, Judge Wisniewski 15 asked me -- this is my paraphrase, may be unreasonable -- if we were not sort of being 17 inconsistent by saying that we find 62 licenses representative, but still comment on this effort to 18 19 dissuade by the industry. 20 Did you hear that? 21 Α. Yeah. 22 Q. Can you comment on your own reaction to

- 1 that, please?
- 2 A. Yeah. I think it's -- it's exactly
- 3 right. The more that the number of licensees could
- 4 be limited, the more of an issue there is about
- 5 their representativeness. And, indeed, that
- 6 notice -- the issue also about how many of these
- 7 licenses are, I can't talk about some of them,
- 8 right?
- 9 The idea is to restrict information.
- 10 It's -- you don't want that information out, and the
- 11 less of it there is, the more you can get into these
- 12 other exercises that do not yield anything remotely
- 13 resembling what a competitive market rate would be.
- 14 Q. If you turn back to Page 54 of your
- 15 testimony, please, at the top of that page, the
- 16 first full sentence reads, All of these
- 17 statements -- again, reflecting the public
- 18 statements of the various organizations you
- 19 recounted a few pages earlier -- reflect the
- 20 expectation that royalties for SDARS sound recording
- 21 performing rights will be higher if the industry
- 22 relies on regulation, rather than individual market

- 1 transactions, and allows SoundExchange to present
- 2 the united front in the rate-setting process.
- 3 Then in the succeeding paragraph, you
- 4 say, These expectations are congruent with decades
- 5 of scholarship on regulation, which concludes that
- 6 the informational and political advantages of
- 7 regulated firms cause the expected outcome of price
- 8 regulation to be prices that exceed the competitive
- 9 level and so forth.
- 10 Yes?
- Is that the area you said you've done a
- 12 fair amount of scholarship in?
- 13 A. Yes.
- Q. And now, Mr. Handzo, in his opening,
- 15 characterized it as we say it's a rigged process.
- 16 Can you straighten out the record on that?
- 17 A. I don't think the judges are biased, and
- 18 I don't think the process is rigged. What I'm
- 19 saying is the information that's available to
- 20 determine the result is relevant to what the outcome
- 21 is going to be, and each -- each side wants to make
- 22 strategic use of information, to present the

- 1 information that's favorable to it and try to fight
- 2 the introduction of the information that's not
- 3 favorable to it. That's what good lawyers do on
- 4 both sides.
- 5 And the whole issue about the direct
- 6 licenses is to prevent an important source of
- 7 information from, first of all, coming into
- 8 existence; and then, secondly, being presented to
- 9 the -- to the -- to the Judges as something to take
- 10 into account in setting rates, with the full
- 11 expectation that the more of this information is
- 12 presented to them, the more likely they are to come
- 13 up with a rate that sort of looks like the direct
- 14 licenses.
- That's the whole -- that's exactly what
- 16 I meant by writing that, is that -- that the
- 17 outcomes of these processes depend on the
- 18 information that's given to them, and the
- 19 information -- if the information is restricted and
- 20 limited and biased, then that will have an effect
- 21 and that -- in its direction favored by the person
- 22 limiting it on the outcome.

	. 274
1	MR. RICH: It might make sense to take a
2	short break.
3	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: You've got the
4	nod. We will take about a five-minute break so our
5	court reporter can do her job.
6	(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken
7	from 3:55 p.m. to 4:04 p.m.)
8	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Good afternoon.
9	Please be seated.
10	Before you resume, Mr. Rich, may I
11	presume that we will take up with Dr. Noll again in
12	the morning?
13	MR. RICH: Yes.
14	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay.
15	MR. RICH: And we plan to work till
16	about 4:30, Your Honor?
17	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: We will go until
18	4:30, yeah.
19	MR. RICH: All right.
20	CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Go ahead.
21	BY MR. RICH:
22	Q. Dr. Noll, if you turn to Page 45 of your

- 1 written direct testimony, there begins a section
- 2 addressing the topic of Market Concentration?
- 3 A. Yes.
- Q. Can you describe what you're doing in
- 5 that section, please?
- 6 A. Yes, I'm -- I'm examining this question
- 7 of the degree of competition on both sides of the
- 8 market.
- 9 Q. And focusing on the buyer's side, we've
- 10 talked about the seller's side?
- 11 A. It also -- yeah, the main thrust of this
- 12 is to deal with the issue, because SoundExchange has
- 13 characterized SiriusXM as having monopoly power in
- 14 the satellite radio marketplace, and it's dealing
- 15 with that issue.
- Q. And do you reach a contrary conclusion?
- 17 A. I -- I reach two conclusions: the first
- 18 is that statement is -- is incorrect, they don't
- 19 have monopoly power; and, secondly, even if they
- 20 did, it would be irrelevant.
- 21 Because the market of concern here is
- 22 the market for the rights, and they're one of many

- 1 competitors in the market for the rights, regardless
- 2 of whether they have monopoly power in some
- 3 downstream market.
- 4 Q. Now, another assertion that we heard
- 5 during openings from my worthy adversary was the
- 6 direct licenses assertedly have not taken place in a
- 7 competitive market, but rather, have been tainted
- 8 somehow by the overhang of regulation.
- 9 Is that a concept you considered and
- 10 addressed in your testimony?
- 11 A. Yes, it is.
- 12 Q. Can you speak to that?
- 13 A. It's true of literally all the rights
- 14 markets, that there's to some degree in effect of
- 15 the existence of regulation of some of the prices on
- 16 the prices for everything, whether they're regulated
- 17 or not.
- The -- the -- we have -- in a product
- 19 differentiated industry, you have people who offer
- 20 different products, and they differ in terms of
- 21 their technical attributes, one from the other. But
- 22 the -- the interactive service people compete with

- 1 the most customized of the noninteractive service
- 2 people, and the most customized of the
- 3 noninteractive services compete with the least
- 4 customized, and the least customized compete with
- 5 SiriusXM, and SiriusXM competes with over-the-air
- 6 broadcasters.
- 7 The -- so the -- the price, every
- 8 time a particular price changes, if the Copyright
- 9 Royalty Judges decide to change the price of a
- 10 statutory service, it's going to change all the
- 11 other prices everywhere in the whole system. And
- 12 that's the classic characterization --
- 13 characteristic of a product differentiated market.
- So you never -- you can't be completely
- 15 pure. There's never going to be anything in which
- 16 there's no consequence -- effective regulation.
- 17 Having said that, outside the context of
- 18 SDARS and PSS, these things are all supposed to be
- 19 the competitive price, all right? There is supposed
- 20 to be a reasonable rate using a standard of a
- 21 workably competitive market, willing buyer/willing
- 22 seller. That's what all these other things are

- 1 supposed to be.
- 2 So if you get the other prices right,
- 3 then what's the problem, right? It's not -- there
- 4 isn't some perverse horror show arising from getting
- 5 that other price right. It's that something that
- 6 competes with you has a competitive marketplace, and
- 7 in order for you to compete effectively, you better
- 8 have a competitive price, too.
- 9 That's not a distortion unless you
- 10 believe that there is a fundamental distortion in
- 11 the rate process that is coming out of this process,
- 12 that the Copyright Royalty Judges aren't doing their
- 13 job.
- 14 Q. I'd like to turn to the alternative
- 15 benchmark other than the direct licenses that you
- 16 identified as corroborative of the rates suggested
- 17 by the direct licenses.
- And from your testimony, I take it that
- 19 in order for you to explore and ultimately identify
- 20 potentially suitable other benchmarks, it was
- 21 necessary for you to assess the competitive
- 22 landscape in which SiriusXM operates?

- 1 A. Yes. You -- that's the object you gave
- 2 is to find their closest competitors.
- 3 Q. And what did your analysis of that
- 4 competitive landscape reveal?
- 5 A. It revealed that what we would
- 6 conceptualize as their closest competitors don't
- 7 exist, which would be either another satellite
- 8 service or an Internet service that can be delivered
- 9 to the dashboards of automobiles that is completely
- 10 noninteractive, that is to say, has zero
- 11 customization, that sort of looks like SiriusXM.
- 12 There's no such service.
- The closest that comes to it is in this
- 14 spectrum of customized services. The things that
- 15 fall into the category noninteractive, the ones that
- 16 have the least customization are the ones that look
- 17 the most like satellite radio.
- So you have to have the characteristic
- 19 that you are a non -- a noninteractive service; you
- 20 have to have the characteristic that you have as
- 21 little customization as anybody in that business
- 22 does; you have to have, obviously, licenses that are

- 1 available for me to study that have been produced in
- 2 discovery.
- And you add up all those, you come to
- 4 the nearest possible substitutes for satellite
- 5 radio. Because satellite radio is primarily in the
- 6 dashboard, you want these other services that can be
- 7 made available in the dashboard.
- Q. What is the relevance of the section of
- 9 your testimony where you talk about the changes that
- 10 have been occurring in the competitive landscape in
- 11 the last three, four, five years?
- 12 A. Well, as someone who was sitting here
- 13 five years ago, I had no clue that all this stuff
- 14 was coming down the pike. I didn't know what was
- 15 going to happen. And I -- I would hazard to say no
- 16 one else did either.
- 17 That the -- the explosion made possible
- 18 by 3G telecommunications systems in
- 19 Internet-delivered services, both audio and video,
- 20 is dramatic. And -- and it -- and in particular,
- 21 the idea of customization is fantastic, right? It
- 22 was out there, but it wasn't an important driving

- 1 factor in mobile music delivery.
- 2 And so this is all brand-new and was --
- 3 it was unanticipated. It wasn't even discussed,
- 4 really, in the previous proceeding, and here we have
- 5 it today where there's more people listening to
- 6 music over their mobile phones through the dashboard
- 7 than there are subscribing to SiriusXM. And that's
- 8 a dramatic change, a complete change in the
- 9 competitive landscape.
- 10 Q. And looking at the various competitors
- 11 across that landscape, did you identify one or more
- 12 categories that -- you said none were perfect.
- Did you identify one or more categories
- 14 and specific players in that landscape who came
- 15 closest in your estimation to the overall
- 16 functionality of SiriusXM in respect of its music
- 17 offerings?
- 18 A. Well, there are a number that come
- 19 close, but the only ones for which I have licenses
- 20 to work with is Last.fm. All right. I don't
- 21 have -- Last.fm is the least customized of the
- 22 services. It -- it offers a subscription service

- 1 that is a -- has the least amount of customization.
- 2 It doesn't involve caching and things like that. So
- 3 I identified Last.fm.
- 4 I -- I did not consider services that
- 5 operate under the Webcaster Settlement Agreement
- 6 because I was informed that I -- I actually started
- 7 off trying to use those and was informed that I
- 8 couldn't because they couldn't be used as precedent
- 9 in this proceeding.
- I actually thought about some things
- 11 involving SoundExchange and SXM and SoundExchange
- 12 involving the National Association of Broadcasters.
- 13 That had a similar problem, in particular, the
- 14 problem that it was with SoundExchange, not the
- 15 labels.
- So among the things that satisfy the
- 17 characteristics, it was direct licenses between a
- 18 service provider and labels, and it had minimal
- 19 customization, all that I had to work with was
- 20 Last.fm.
- 21 Q. Do you know whether by the terms of the
- 22 SiriusXM Webcaster Agreement, the parties agreed

- 1 whether that would have any precedential force in a
- 2 proceeding like this?
- A. I don't, but I assumed I was allowed to
- 4 use it, but -- that it's okay to use it. If it's
- 5 not okay to use it, I've wasted a lot of time.
- 6 Q. We'll clarify that as the proceeding
- 7 progresses.
- I'd like you to comment, if you would,
- 9 on another one of your demonstratives, which is
- 10 labeled Royalty Rate Variation Across Services and
- 11 Tiers, midway through the book.
- 12 A. Yes.
- Q. What is this demonstrating in connection
- 14 with your examination of the marketplace?
- A. Well, this is an illustration of how the
- 16 nature of the service affects the royalty rate. All
- 17 right. I use the rate numbers -- even though I'm
- 18 fully aware and I take into account in my -- in my
- 19 report that the typical license says you will pay
- 20 the most of one or two or three or four, sometimes,
- 21 items, because I've actually calculated what the
- 22 implied percentage rate would be from the ones that

- 1 are not percentage rates, and they're basically all
- 2 pretty similar.
- 3 So it's useful, because we're doing a
- 4 percentage rate here, I think, to focus on the
- 5 percentage rate. And what this says is that the
- 6 degree of customer control of the content is
- 7 important in determining what the royalty rate is.
- 8 Again, it's simply not true that all
- 9 services pay the same royalty rate as a fraction of
- 10 their revenues even when I confine myself to the
- 11 services that have no distribution component of
- 12 their price.
- The rate in the marketplace does depend
- 14 upon the degree of customization or interactivity,
- 15 the degree of customer control. And it does depend
- 16 on it like a factor of two. So it is simply wrong
- 17 to say everybody pays the same royalty rate.
- 18 Q. All right. So getting to the pià ce de
- 19 rÃOsistance at 4:10 in the afternoon when everybody
- 20 is at their highest energy level, if you would turn
- 21 to the next demonstrative and use that, please, for
- 22 what I'm going to make as an open-ended proposal,

- 1 which is that you walk the Court through or
- 2 summarize the five steps you engaged in to isolate
- 3 out, identify, and then make appropriate adjustments
- 4 to the most suitable benchmark other than direct
- 5 licenses, and using this as a -- as a tool, if you
- 6 don't mind.
- 7 A. Yeah. This is the five-step procedure.
- 8 And the first one was, as I said before, identify
- 9 the closest substitutes. And the one I picked was
- 10 Last.fm from among those for which I had rates that
- 11 I was allowed to use.
- I mean, I identified other close
- 13 substitutes, like Pandora, as another one, but I
- 14 can't use that rate because it's a WSA rate.
- 15 Q. So to be clear, barring -- barring
- 16 technical bars, for example, parties saying no party
- 17 shall use this, it's conceivable that you would have
- 18 had multiple additional corroborating benchmarks in
- 19 your view?
- 20 A. Oh, yes. There were other things that,
- 21 in principle, you could use, but they're not --
- 22 they're not fair game because they don't have

- 1 precedential value.
- 2 Q. In your testimony, you characterized
- 3 those as sort of loading the deck in favor of
- 4 SoundExchange.
- 5 What did you mean by that?
- 6 A. Well, what -- what I meant was that --
- 7 that SoundExchange is in a beautiful position. It
- 8 can -- for -- for the rates in which the parties
- 9 have to consent to a rate being precedential,
- 10 they're in the position of being able to limit the
- 11 licenses that you look at to the ones that are most
- 12 favorable to them.
- 13 So that -- that's an illustration of the
- 14 point I was making before. When you restrict the
- 15 information available in the process, it'll cause an
- 16 effect on the reasonableness of the outcome.
- 17 Q. Thank you.
- 18 So why don't you now return to walking
- 19 through the five steps?
- 20 A. Okay.
- 21 So the -- Step 1, identify the closest
- 22 substitutes -- I should add that -- that, you know,

- 1 Pandora is, in fact, the poster child here, but I
- 2 can't use the rate. Because Pandora is by far the
- 3 most important Internet music site. It's -- it's --
- 4 it has a much larger -- all by itself, it accounts
- 5 for about 60 percent of all Internet music delivery.
- 6 So it's really the big elephant in the room, but I
- 7 can't use it.
- 8 The -- the -- then the second -- the
- 9 second pie is to find market negotiated rates
- 10 pertaining to the closest substitutes, and that's
- 11 the last -- the Last.fm, which negotiated rates with
- 12 each -- I used the four major distribution companies
- 13 that -- the most recent rates that Last.fm has
- 14 negotiated with the four companies, and I get that
- 15 range of outcomes, which I will not repeat.
- Q. While you have -- while you ultimately
- 17 isolated out one buyer, you examined a series of
- 18 agreements across, what, four majors with that
- 19 buyer?
- 20 A. Four major -- all four majors with that
- 21 particular buyer, yeah.
- Q. Okay. Go ahead.

288

Α. Then the next step is what is the 1 implicit market price for the music channels, and there's a whole bunch of ways to go at that, all right? The most obvious is, you know, the --5 the number at the bottom, \$3, that turns out to be what most of the -- of the -- that's the subscription price of the most important of the noninteractive, not -- least customized Internet 10 mobile services. I use all those words because 11 they're all important. \$3 is what Pandora charges. 12 And --13 0. Just so -- so we're totally clear as to what the object of Step 3 is, would you please just 15 state that one more time? 16 The object is to find a market price for 17 the music content on SiriusXM. And this -- this 18 is -- what I'm looking for is the -- a comparable 19 system that is disaggregated and unbundled where

it's just the music that's being sold.

20

21

(866) 448 - DEPO www.CapitalReportingCompany.com © 2012

and these other systems that I'm -- that are in this

When we talk about Last.fm and Pandora

- 1 \$3 price, we're talking about something that is
- 2 qualitatively better -- it has higher bit rates, so
- 3 the quality of sound is actually a little better
- 4 than the quality of the sound over SiriusXM -- we're
- 5 talking about availability on the dashboard through
- 6 downloads over the Internet. That's -- and -- and
- 7 have -- it's the subscription service that has the
- 8 least degree of customization, no caching, no
- 9 ability to do on-demand, no infinite skips, you
- 10 know -- it's limitations on the degree of customer
- 11 control that make it the closest thing I can find to
- 12 SiriusXM.
- So that's how I get \$3, because that's
- 14 what most of them charge.
- Now, there's some other ways to get a
- 16 price as well. There's a survey by
- 17 Professor Hauser --
- 18 Q. Who will testify before this Court.
- 19 A. -- who will be testifying, and he comes
- 20 up with a number that's a little higher than that.
- Q. What did he ask? What did he
- 22 investigate?

- 1 A. What he investigated was how much would
- 2 they have to cut the price of SiriusXM if they took
- 3 away all the music, that kind of a question.
- 4 And it's -- and I will let him explain
- 5 how you do it. Because it turns out that's very
- 6 hard to do. That's why he has to be a separate
- 7 expert. It took him months to be able to develop
- 8 and execute a survey that would ask that question.
- 9 Q. And what was his conclusion?
- 10 A. His conclusion was basically it's pretty
- 11 close, like \$3.13 or \$3.10. He actually came up
- 12 with a lower number than \$3, but he did the same
- 13 thing that Janusz Ordover did; he didn't count the
- 14 comedy channels.
- 15 Q. You added those in?
- 16 A. I had to add the comedy channels back
- 17 in.
- 18 Q. And was there a third technique you
- 19 used?
- 20 A. And the third technique I used, which
- 21 comes up with the \$3.45, was to do it on -- on the
- 22 cost basis, which is to look at the books of

- 1 SiriusXM and separate -- and subtract from their
- 2 revenues the costs associated with the delivery
- 3 system.
- 4 And in doing that -- I'll go back to
- 5 what I said before -- I did not include a
- 6 competitive return on investment, because in a
- 7 previous decision, the Copyright Royalty Judges had
- 8 said we're not going to include that.
- 9 I think it should be included in this
- 10 case because of the rapid turnover that exists for
- 11 SiriusXM customers and the fact that the company
- 12 would be half as big two years from now if it didn't
- 13 make reinvestments in radios.
- But none -- nonetheless, I didn't do
- 15 that, all right, I didn't give them a competitive
- 16 return on their radios.
- 17 And once you make that subtraction, you
- 18 come up with \$3.45.
- So I -- my conclusion is that the -- all
- 20 roads lead to Rome, that all the ways that I
- 21 approached this problem led to a price in the range
- 22 of \$3 to \$3.50 per month as the market price for the

292 music content on SiriusXM. I add this is an overestimate, because these alternatives I have all have a problem where 3 I've been conservative. I've made assumptions that benefit SoundExchange with regard to the fact that the quality is somewhat better on these services, you know, with regard to the fact that -- that I'm not including competitive return on the radios, that kind of thing. 10 So these are upper bounds, actually. I think that --11 12 Q. You described some of those conservative 13 assumptions in your testimony, correct? 14 Α. Yeah. 15 And then the fourth -- the fourth one is to do again what was done before, is to multiply the 17 percentages in Line 2 by the -- the -- the prices in 18 Line 3 and get a monthly royalty, all right, that --19 and -- and depending on which combination of 20 percentages and monthly prices you use, you get a monthly royalty of between 75 cents and 95 cents. 22 Q. That's the math of multiplying the

- 1 results of 2 by 3, correct?
- 2 A. That's right. I'm doing exactly the
- $3\,$ same thing as that was shown in the --
- 4 characterizing Ordover's calculations.
- 5 And then the last one is the same as he
- 6 did. You divide that by the average revenue per
- 7 unit per customer, which is \$11.38. So you -- you
- 8 look at the range 75 cents to 95 cents, divide it by
- 9 11.38, you get the percentage of revenue.
- 10 O. And what does the last demonstrative
- 11 depict? Does that show the various permutations of
- 12 the analysis?
- 13 A. That's another way to do the same thing,
- 14 another way to do exactly the same thing. This
- 15 breaks down the \$3 to \$3.45.
- 16 Q. I think you've covered it in a series of
- 17 answers, but to put it in one place, in one wrap-up
- 18 answer, did you consider using Internet --
- 19 interactive Internet services in place of or in
- 20 addition to using the noninteractive services to do
- 21 this benchmark?
- 22 A. Yeah, I did.

- 1 Q. Why did you reject that?
- 2 A. Well, it gets -- it gets you to the same
- 3 place once you make the adjustment for interactive
- 4 versus noninteractive, all right. Just take the
- 5 interactive, multiply it by half, and you're to the
- 6 noninteractive, which is the numbers I used.
- 7 So the market is telling us that the
- 8 price of interactive is roughly -- is double the
- 9 price of the noninteractive.
- So, you know, if you just think about --
- 11 this is really simple. If you want to start with
- 12 interactive, you cut it in half because you're going
- 13 to something that is noninteractive; you cut it in
- 14 half again because half of the content is not music;
- 15 and then you cut it in half again because the
- 16 distribution system accounts for half of the costs.
- 17 And when you take the royalty rates paid
- 18 for interactive service and then you do these
- 19 adjustments to them, you end up again in the same
- 20 range, this 6 to 8 percent range.
- Q. Now, just to be clear, you indicated
- 22 that you didn't do any disruption analysis.

295

Is it correct, therefore, that this 1 resulting range of rates does not account for any 3 potential disruption factor were the Court to determine there was some potential for disruption? Α. Well, I -- I would say more than that. If you used the higher end, it would be disruptive because it wouldn't provide a competitive return on the radios. And -- and, therefore, it would cause SiriusXM to stop buying radios and stop having 10 new -- having radios in new cars. 11 Your testimony indicates that it's 12 important in undertaking this type of analysis that at the end of the day, SiriusXM, in terms of fair 13 market value appraisal at least, not pay a rate 15 that's effectively higher than those of the people 16 who are competing with it in the dashboard of the 17 car; is that correct? 18 Α. That's right. 19 And why is it your view that's a correct Ο. 20 outcome? 21 Well, the reason for it is there's no reason -- the regulatory process just shouldn't 22

296 stack the deck in favor of one competitor over another. It shouldn't be the case that five years from now, everybody's listening to music on Pandora over the dashboard because the rate set for SiriusXM put SiriusXM out of business. Likewise, we shouldn't set a rate for 6 7 SiriusXM that puts Pandora out of business. 8 You could do something in this rate proceeding to put either one out of business, and we shouldn't do that. 10 11 MR. RICH: Subject to any questions 12 Your Honors have, that concludes my direct 13 examination. 14 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Okay. Thank you. 15 Questions, Judge Roberts? 16 JUDGE ROBERTS: No. 17 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Judge Wisniewski? 18 JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Tomorrow. 19 CHIEF JUDGE BARNETT: Well, I'm, once again, impressed with the impeccability of your 20 timing. It's time now for us to break for the day. 22 We will be in recess until 9:30 in the

			297
1	morning.	Back here same bat time, same bat station.	
2		MR. RICH: Thank you.	
3		(Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the	
4		hearing was adjourned to reconvene on	
5		Wednesday, June 6, 2012, at 9:30 a.m.)	
6			
7		* * * *	
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			

		298
1	CERTIFICATE OF CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER	
2	I, CINDY L. SEBO, the Certified Court Reporter,	
3	do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony.	
4	appears in the foregoing hearing is the testimony of	
5	said witness which was taken by me in stenotypy and	
6	thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under my	
7	direction; that said hearing is a true record of the	
8	testimony given by said witness; that I am neither	
9	counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the	
10	parties to the action in which this hearing was taken;	
11	and, further, that I am not a relative or employee of	
12	any counsel or attorney employed by the parties hereto,	
13	nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome	
14	of this action.	
15		
16		
17	Con COLUMNIA (Cal)	
18	Cindy L. Sebo, RMR, CRR, RPR, CSR,	
19	CRR, RSA, Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia	
20		
21		
22	My commission expires: April 14, 2015	

		, I	
\$		114 27:8,14 57:8	
\$1 38:12	0	114(f)(1 26:22	2
\$1.15 30:12,18	00127848 214:15	114(f)(1)(B 44:5	2 36:11 156:12 162:9 172:6,9
\$1.40 151:4 165:21	0017 238:1	114's 57:2	176:12 195:8,11
\$1.98 150:21	03 172:14	115 93:3	217:16 224:1,22
181:17			233:5,10 257:18
\$100 70:12	11.05.147.14	11th 49:4	261:12 292:17 293:1
\$11.25 166:3	1 1:8 5:14 7:14 76:20 156:10	12 34:15 143:1 171:7 181:4	
\$11.38 293:7	209:8,11,13	171.7 181.4 12.95 154:9	2.1c 217:17
\$17 31:8	214:18 286:21		2.2 217:18
\$2 39:15,16 152:15	1.40 182:10	12:03 128:20	2.2a 217:17
	1/5 31:15	13 14:16 66:7 145:10,22 166:4	2.2b 217:18
\$2.4 39:12 71:12	1:00 128:19	14 14:16 20:2 21:1	2.2c 217:18
\$2.89 168:14	1:03 129:2	206:11 298:22	2.2d 217:18
\$200 28:9 31:12	10 49:5 101:10	14.95 154:10	2.3 217:18
\$250 38:11	111:1 160:1	141 5:5	2.43 118:4
\$3 288:6,11	190:10 245:7,12	15 14:16 21:2 68:5	2.6 116:11 184:19
289:1,13 290:12 291:22 293:15	261:14	70:7 184:17	2:18 190:13
\$3.10 290:11	10:54 68:15	15-day 16:12	2:29 190:13
\$3.13 290:11	100 158:16,17 175:8,14,17,21	16 104:10	20 29:22 34:17
\$3.4 39:11	181:21	1675 3:6	39:4 70:14 75:1
\$3.45 290:21	10019 3:7	17 10:1	118:6 141:20
291:18 293:15	101 1:17	18th 7:11	142:8 143:2 158:15 164:7
\$3.50 291:22	10153-0119 2:14	192 5:9	171:19,20
\$300 31:9	1050 3:14	1972 85:2,3	172:15 181:5
\$437 29:14	1099 4:7	·	197:1 204:5
\$5.5 30:2 75:3	10-K 132:4	1980 201:8	20,000 237:4
\$5.95 166:12	137:9,11	1984 194:2	200,000 237:5
168:12	11 7:10 37:3 130:8	1989 9:3	20001-4412 4:9
\$55 70:13	132:22 167:17	1991 85:16	20036-5339 3:15
\$600 28:4 29:12	11.38 293:9	1995 85:19	2006 27:17 71:1
\$7.50 165:12	11:01 68:15	1996 105:11	2007 24:7
\$8 30:3 75:3 78:20	110,000 43:16	1998 87:1	27:17,18,20 29:9 30:11 40:20
\$830 28:12	112 10:1	1999 41:7	63:1,21 69:14
φ υυυ Δ0.1Δ	112(e 27:3,6		2008 38:10 147:8
	(,		

	1 ag		
148:3,8,20 149:12,18 150:16 152:6 2009 148:9 150:16 158:15 2010 69:18 70:14,17 71:3 151:5 152:5 154:15 156:19 159:9 160:14 2011 28:7 29:10 30:11 49:4 70:13 147:6 152:3,10,21 156:2 160:9 161:7 259:14	208 5:9 209 5:14 212.310.8170 2:15 212.457.5445 3:8 22 168:16 23 69:20 258:9 24/7 250:18 24-hour 50:5 25 71:3 147:10 203:16 258:4 26 5:3 26th 14:1 298 1:8	4 4 17:12 80:15 148:18 4.86 168:1 4:04 274:7 4:10 284:19 4:27 297:3 4:30 7:15 274:16,18 40 70:4,8 193:18 223:22 400 152:4 41.5 115:10	55 234:12 268:7 550 152:7 57.8 33:16 71:17 58 70:18 104:11 6 6 27:20 39:13 145:20 154:14 294:20 297:5 6.06 37:3 38:4,13 6.48 264:22 6.6 37:19 60 66:4 172:8 244:10,20 287:5
2011-1 1:5 6:7 2012 1:12 27:18,21 28:9 31:6 38:10 49:11 129:22 131:5 132:4 147:15 148:21 152:9,14 153:6 159:2 189:4 297:5 2013 26:20 38:9 73:13 74:3 143:2 153:7,15 160:18 181:4	29th 259:16 3 3 7:21 80:3 162:10 225:1 288:14 292:18 293:1 3.05 118:2 3:55 274:7 30 95:8 141:20 142:9 172:16 300 104:8 195:1	42 70:18 43 104:11 122:18 124:17,21 128:3 45 115:22 123:1 175:11 184:18 274:22 46 104:8 48 168:4,12 4865 168:3,12 49 266:15 4G 56:8	61 118:4 62 37:2 43:11 259:17 261:1,12 269:7 270:17 64 193:21 65 142:2 193:21 7 7 36:21 44:8 71:2 155:3 219:4 264:12,19 7,000 43:16
2013-2015 71:12 2015 160:18 298:22 2016 159:8 2017 26:21 34:16 38:9 39:5 73:14 74:3 104:11 143:2 202.639.6085 4:10 202.715.8465 3:16 2020 159:7	30s 247:9 30th 259:15 31 70:13 104:8 147:9 3-1/2 70:15 33 69:18 35 71:3 172:16 351.4 134:9 37 7:21 3G 56:8 280:18	5 5 1:12 27:9 36:21 44:7 150:11 174:13 175:12 219:4 50 34:14 142:2 175:10,13 176:1 193:20 234:14 244:10,20 500 149:18 54 268:7,12 271:14	7.5 121:10 174:10 184:16 186:14 70 122:18 700 152:11 7-1/2 264:18,19 74 14:17 207:2,7 75 14:18 152:10 292:21 293:8 757 2:13 76 14:18 22:4 77 14:18 22:16

		360.	
23:1 210:1,4 78 14:18 23:1	84 14:20 16:15 89 212:9,21	286:10 290:7 above-captioned	8:1,3 12:14 186:2
211:7,8		1:15	according 154:11 159:6 193:17
7855 214:22	9 9 158:8	absence 100:17	246:12
79 14:18		165:17 166:13 231:8	accordingly 10:2
211:9,11,13	9,000 43:16	absent 41:20	35:17 44:11
8	9.99 167:20 170:12,14	180:16	146:18 184:8
8 14:15 27:21	9:30 7:12 296:22	absolutely 45:19	186:6 188:7 244:19
34:18 38:18 39:4	297:5	108:13,22	
49:12 71:2 145:21 155:5	9:32 1:21	abstracted 92:5	account 45:6,12,20 61:4,20 62:1,8
174:11	90 152:5 176:15	academic 194:4	64:4,8,10
264:13,14	213:3 247:7	228:1	67:10,14 80:13
294:20	900 4:8	academics 198:11	86:19 96:3 98:8 108:19 126:14
8.3 37:19	92 14:21	Academies 195:19	143:21 165:15
80 14:18 118:6	93 14:22	Academy 50:9	170:6 186:18
801 41:9 89:21	94 14:22	accept 142:12	221:16,17,19
146:21 162:20	95 292:21 293:8	174:19 176:7,16	223:13 233:15 235:16,17 245:3
164:13 186:18	98 105:11	178:2,3 247:12 264:12	261:12 273:10
801(b 39:20 40:8,14 41:18	176:13,15,18		283:18 295:2
42:3,6,14 75:20	178:6	acceptable 99:2	accounted 60:22
76:4,10,19		accepted 124:7 155:4	224:22
89:7,13 90:4	A	accepting 229:3	accounts 287:4
92:11 101:20 120:7 126:3,15	a.m 1:21 68:15 297:5	253:7	294:16
128:5 143:21	abided 130:19	accepts 155:8	accumulated 78:19
181:8 187:15		access 16:7,8	accuracy 206:6
188:2 221:13 223:13 230:15	ability 24:3 158:4 173:7,8 189:10	17:22 64:9	•
245:16 269:20	233:1 289:9	196:14 224:4	accurate 8:16
801(b)(1	able 18:10 21:8	230:7	accurately 157:8
220:6,14,18	55:2 62:20 79:16	accidental 82:6	achieve 89:21
221:5,14	98:9 99:9 121:10	accommodate 13:4 111:16	achieved 146:15
80s 71:10 85:15	124:8 135:3,22 149:13		acknowledge 87:21
81 14:18 212:2,7	151:2,13,22	accommodation 181:7 191:14	
82 14:18	157:5 160:6,20	accompanying	acknowledged 58:19 79:14
83 5:4 14:19,20	189:17 232:16,17	228:18	123:12
16:15	494.10,17	accordance 7:7	

	<u>_</u>	<u></u>	
acquire 225:17	290:11 292:10	275:2	admit 65:13 173:3
acquisitions	actuals 154:14	adds 96:18 114:2	admits 121:3,5
148:16	adapted 111:15	Adele 250:16	122:3,4
across 75:6 193:3	add 16:14 24:22	adequacy 52:21	admitted 5:13
260:4 262:12	26:13 150:3	adequately 163:4	138:21 140:9
281:11 283:10 287:18	265:1 280:3	adhere 13:14	190:21
	286:22 290:16		209:12,14
act 27:1 87:2 119:21 176:20	292:2	adjourned 297:4	admittedly 112:18 121:11 122:9
	added 18:21 22:14	adjudicated 44:15	127:19
acted 200:21	103:15 110:6 234:2 260:11	adjust 93:20	adopt 40:22 82:18
acting 176:21	290:15	143:20 144:5	163:4 188:8
action 298:10,14	adding 22:13	166:13 170:8 184:8 186:18	adopted 66:14
actions 225:17	23:16 107:2	196:2 236:10	104:19 205:16
active 15:15 216:9	110:3	260:12	adopting 72:2
actively 55:14	addition 16:16	adjusted 59:7,22	• 0
activity 53:3 267:3	45:12 49:1 59:16	60:17 94:9 96:2	adoption 80:1
_	64:3 150:14	98:10 99:11	adopts 108:18
actual 28:19 34:10 36:18 47:3	154:1 159:9	146:18	advance 175:20
65:8,20 70:14	200:11 232:19 267:15 293:20	165:14,19 245:3	advances 175:19
101:13 116:7		adjustment 60:20	176:4
125:8 126:12	additional 12:18 16:6 17:8,17,18	61:19 62:1,5 64:4,7,14,21	advantage 13:20
173:13 194:11	28:10 72:22	67:9,13 83:11	157:21 158:19
243:19,20	104:2 150:21	146:20 168:5	161:9
actuality 34:20	182:5 226:3,7	180:12	advantages 156:22
actually 28:6	233:13 260:7	260:10,14 294:3	157:10,13 161:16 177:12
38:15 44:9 78:18	285:18	adjustments 35:20	272:6
103:20 110:9 113:1,5 121:16	additions 13:13	37:17	advent 87:3
122:15 125:15	address 8:21	45:6,9,10,12,19 63:3 76:14,16	
127:21 133:16	132:14,22	80:6,13 285:3	adversary 13:21 129:15 133:6
134:5 159:19,20	134:10 139:18 183:17 213:12	294:19	276:5
162:5,6 181:12	232:6	adjusts 127:13	adverse 163:1
183:13 184:20 196:9 199:10	addressed 23:3	186:2	adverted 54:6
202:12 206:11	41:14 258:11	administered 97:3	
221:12 224:5	276:10	administrative	advertisements 112:7
237:12 241:16	addresses 134:9	199:13,15	
242:16 248:10	184:9	admission 121:15	adverts 25:1
260:6 282:6,10 283:21 289:3	addressing 228:7	122:7	advice 205:15
۷۵۵.۵ ۱ ک.۵۵۰.۵			advised 49:8

	٠ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ ـ	,	
216:17	123:22 147:5	all-music 142:10	239:3
advisor 200:22	152:6 190:20	allocation 8:4	amended 11:19
advocated 133:5	191:3 197:1 201:14 280:13	allotted 8:5	12:7,12,15,22
137:1	agreed 40:6 44:7	allow 18:9 54:19	13:2,8,10,15,20 14:1,3,5 15:9
affect 52:20	88:10 94:3 124:7	55:6 59:10	21:15 25:16
197:19 198:8	262:16 282:22	82:3,11 87:12	132:3,7 195:9
affected 111:18	agreement	108:5 109:7 151:8,9	208:4
affecting 248:13	16:17,22 21:5,21	allowance 142:6	amendment 10:5
affects 199:15	22:10,19 65:21 66:20 93:1,2		14:7 137:10 138:9 214:18
283:16	94:7 129:11,13	allowed 57:7 88:18 267:19 283:3	
affiliate 105:7	130:3 214:19	285:11	amendments 215:18
affiliated 9:3	215:19 282:5,22	allows 175:21	America 41:16
affirmatively	agreements	272:1	America 41.10 American 198:18
132:14 133:2	15:14,21,22 16:6	alone 31:13 39:6,7	
137:9	17:6,14 18:4 20:17,19 23:8,9	75:16 101:15	amicus 201:12
affirmed 51:13 91:14 205:19	24:10,11,16,18	110:21,22 122:7 235:1 264:21	among 36:19 48:10 58:20
	25:2 35:7,12,17		82:11 83:22
afford 33:15 71:17 188:22 189:6	37:2,6,13,17	already 21:11 23:13,14 44:11	121:4 196:12
afforded 8:10	43:15,18 44:1,12 45:22 46:12,22	56:11 84:9 86:10	204:1 239:18
affording 104:16	48:8 53:18,22	91:8 110:13,14	251:22 252:3,10 261:17 270:10
	59:1,5,18 60:6	125:21 126:6,14	282:16 285:10
afternoon 129:3 192:8,9 193:12	62:21 64:12 100:17 121:5	128:6 159:5,14 238:20	amortization
219:11 274:8	124:19 125:5,7	altered 36:2	232:18
284:19	126:1 178:9	alternative 59:5	amount 9:10 18:12
against 164:13	216:9 257:14	278:14	30:17 63:7 89:6
182:15	287:18	alternatively 61:3	104:12 116:1 183:19 237:21
183:13,20 184:2,3,4 244:21	ahead 211:6 212:9 236:11 257:9	alternatives 223:3	246:16 265:15
245:8 252:12	274:20 287:22	292:3	272:12 282:1
age 206:21 261:16	aimed 48:7	am 6:11 19:19	ample 57:15
262:5	Airlines 9:11	192:14 193:22	amplify 73:1
agencies 201:1	airplay 36:20	203:20 205:18 216:17 251:5	analysis 15:10,16
agency 41:2	43:20 77:10,18	298:8,11	16:4 17:3 18:7
aggressive 75:5	album 113:5	ambiguous 228:8	24:9 38:17 42:7
ago 35:22 55:20	albums 43:16	amend 25:15	54:9 62:11 64:1 68:4 90:16 117:1
69:9,14 70:1	58:18	131:4 137:10	122:6,15
87:22 93:10			-

r			
123:7,9,17 144:1	200:17 205:8	appears 49:4	42:2 67:19 78:16
164:18,20 197:7	206:2 207:13	132:6 133:3	122:14 139:1,5
200:19 218:19	anybody 190.7	154:16 186:17	168:19 171:22
220:13,20	anybody 189:7 279:21	187:11,12	220:2 233:21
222:2,11 231:3	2/9:21	241:21 298:4	
232:7 260:18,22	anybody's 177:21		approached 41:4
279:3 293:12	anymore 254:16	appellate 89:13	143:22 246:1
294:22 295:12	Ť	90:2,5,6,18 92:5	262:7 291:21
	anyone 9:16	appendices 15:13	approaches 66:13
analysts 70:20	anything 40:1	208:21 216:7	168:18 245:19
154:13,16,19	128:12 130:9	217:17	
analytic 43:7	140:6 159:10	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	approaching 193:20
analytically 76:1	185:20 186:12	Appendix 214:1,2,4	
	191:8 248:6		appropriate 12:12
analyze 166:6	260:15 271:12	215:11,13	14:6 43:7 51:15
168:18	277:15	216:2,7,18,22	76:14 79:17
analyzed 183:10		217:8	141:19
-	anyway 127:7	apple 270:4	142:11,17 143:9
analyzes 117:13	177:3	applicability	165:6,7 205:7,9
and/or 80:12	apart 178:2 188:1	88:11	218:15,20
81:10 199:4	a-plenty 155:13		220:10 236:1
Ann 141:6		application 36:5	245:18 248:1
	apologize 186:22	42:14 222:11	269:7 285:3
annual 32:14 39:6	238:12	applied 35:2 64:15	approximately
70:11 106:6	apparent 48:9	76:11 80:6 81:2	1:20 7:15,16
annually 31:9	apparently 79:11	169:16 181:19	29:12 67:11
anomalies 234:12	122:11	199:3 244:21	152:11 234:18
		249:17	
answer 53:12	124:21,22		April 189:4 298:22
123:19 177:5	141:10,12 191:5	applies 179:21	area 117:1,13
181:21 182:2	appeal 95:17,20	200:4 215:8	194:11 195:2
206:6 221:11,20	99:1	apply 61:21 89:9	199:9,18 223:22
223:1 236:14	annoaled 40.10	145:2 168:12	272:11
258:3 265:18	appealed 40:19	179:17 242:9	
293:18	90:14 91:11	243:8	areas 75:7 116:22
	appear 171:1		121:12 194:7
answers 293:17	appearance	applying 60:5	195:16 223:4,9
anticipate 10:15	204:17	252:11	230:8
52:15 113:7		appointments	aren't 278:12
140:5 153:13	appearances 10:18	194:5	
anticipated 141:3	appeared 141:17	apposite 37:13	Arent 3:5,13 83:8
148:21 154:18	239:13 242:12	^ ^	argue 24:14 96:5
1		appraisal 295:14	125:20 155:12
238:20	appearing	appreciate 239:10	256:16
antitrust 194:12	204:13,15		
198:14,18,22	208:17	approach 11:17	arguing 52:11
	<u> </u>		

			,
188:1	assert 62:6	astonishing 64:13	72:9 233:8
argument 10:9	assertedly 276:6	astounding 152:17	236:22 237:2 238:6
21:7 41:1,14	assertion 34:9	AT&T 241:5	
52:1,9,16 90:20 91:16 250:14	40:21 46:21	atomistic 248:5	automobiles 279:9
254:12 266:9	276:4	attached 208:20	availability 36:3 76:20 102:4
arguments 131:11	assess 76:13 181:1	attack 45:22	198:4 222:13,21
155:16 180:9	234:6 278:21	attain 32:19	223:12
239:14	assessed 182:16		224:12,14
arising 278:4	asset 117:16	attempt 34:22 231:4 260:10,12	225:12,14 289:5
arose 241:4	assignment	268:1	available 24:7
arrive 252:13	218:13,14 220:2	attempted 36:5	37:14 56:7 58:12 102:7 106:18
arrived 242:12	assistance 203:8	40:11 76:14	117:21 148:15
article 197:2 199:1	associate 9:4	130:12 155:12	156:17 219:7,18
articles 249:7	associated 46:9	attesting 77:7 78:4	223:15,17,20
artificial 18:9	67:14 111:10	attorney 298:12	228:2 252:13,14 265:16 268:3
	291:2	attribute 167:1	269:22 272:19
artist 55:3,7 96:16,21 112:5	association 41:16 267:9 282:12	attributes 54:15	280:1,7 286:15
175:19 250:17		180:2 276:21	Avenue 1:17 2:13
artists 43:16 46:16	associations 227:10 228:7	audience 237:12	3:14 4:7
77:8,14,22	266:22	audio 1:7 6:10	average 37:2 38:4
103:7,11,17	267:9,11,12	56:3,10 65:4	105:16
108:1 142:16	assume 18:1 40:14	73:18 74:10	166:2,11,17,18 167:19,21
143:5 175:11,12 187:4 188:13	138:2	113:21 114:9 157:4 162:7,8	168:11
250:13 261:16	assumed 122:20	184:22 280:19	259:21,22 293:6
262:6 267:1,11	283:3	audio-visual	avert 137:17
ASCAP 31:3 51:4	assumes 65:4	105:20	averted 70:3
97:4 101:8	76:15 168:20	audits 119:11	avoid 40:13 45:5
204:19 205:1,8 241:4	assuming 38:13 126:16 155:4	August 49:4	138:13
aspect 60:20 82:9	184:1	auspices 204:22	avoided 37:15
156:13 224:15	assumption	author 206:10,12	Avoiding 126:16
269:14	122:22 124:13	authored	award 88:22
aspects 12:22	125:1 128:2	194:18,22	awarding 33:19
66:13 67:2	assumptions 68:3	auto 156:6 158:3	award-winning
Aspen 197:12	292:4,13	automatically	46:16
assembled 8:9 9:2	assure 8:13 49:13	222:4	aware 7:19 27:15
	157:20	automobile 56:14	40:4 130:11
h			

		<u> </u>	
135:5 283:18	213:2,9,15,22	228:8 233:12	73:10 87:4
away 119:6 157:12	214:17,21	239:14 242:21	156:16
263:18 290:3	215:11,20	243:22 246:19	229:14,22 230:6
203.10 270.3	216:2,11,14,16,2	252:6 258:18	becomes 164:9
B	0 217:2,6,14,21	261:6 284:1	
background 191:3	218:2,5 219:15	290:10	begin 7:12 78:18 141:5 143:1
193:9	274:3,8,14,17,20	basics 96:9	141:5 143:1 181:4
	296:14,17,19	basing 242:14	
backing 80:12	barrage 50:3	_	beginning 1:20 10:15 27:19
bad 79:8 133:20	barred 134:15	basis 34:10 35:5 43:4 105:17	10:15 27:19 34:13 48:4 88:1
baked 91:9 125:21	barring 285:15	106:7 135:17	131:16 145:20
128:6 222:1,5	J	139:19 178:21	151:10 145:20
balance 228:12	bars 29:5,15	186:6 212:4,18	266:14 268:11
	238:16 285:16	213:9,15,17	
ball 238:3	base 35:1 105:15	215:5 216:7	begins 14:15,21 129:6 275:1
banana 270:5	182:15 184:2,3	217:1,22 218:6	
band 47:12	244:11,21 245:9	222:16	behalf 2:6 3:2 4:3
banding 263:2	baseball 57:14	232:15,22	5:3,4,5 11:14
	based 11:6	233:15 236:8	19:11 26:7 83:4
Bank 203:4,7	12:11,12 25:16	239:8 241:21	141:1 145:3
bankruptcy 70:2	38:5 40:8,20	252:19 260:13	171:22 180:7 204:14,15
72:8 105:4	42:4 71:18 72:6	269:2 290:22	-
bar 244:7	96:19 116:7	bat 237:6 297:1	behind 217:16
bargaining 36:19	122:22 128:1	Bates 214:14,21	belief 142:11
117:2	131:16 133:15	bear 171:14 197:7	169:8
	134:8 142:11	200:10	believe 52:14 66:2
Barnett 2:3 6:2,11	145:7 153:5	İ	95:3 106:2
11:2,4,15 19:8,14,16 24:1	154:20 168:6	bearing 17:15 84:2	109:11 125:17
25:4,6,11,20	171:3 178:8	129:8 220:13	126:13 144:20
26:1,11,13,14	179:5 255:2,4 265:21	225:11 232:7	149:12 150:16
68:7,11,16 82:21		bears 208:17	153:4 159:2
83:14,17 128:16	basic 37:16	beautiful 286:7	160:17 177:20
129:3,9 133:11	61:5,22 65:12	became 24:21	181:20 187:6
136:12	79:15 102:10	į.	210:12 214:1
139:20,22	105:22 154:10	Beccaro 94:19,21	215:6,21 217:10
140:20	241:8 246:19	95:10,14 100:7	221:11 222:11
190:8,14,18	266:9,21	101:11,19	234:1 259:6,17
191:15,18	basically 61:8	107:17 109:21	263:22 278:10
207:15,19	166:8,15,22	118:15	believed 146:11
209:11,21 210:2	169:20 174:19	Beccaro's 105:9	229:8
211:1,4,10,15,18	193:1 197:13	112:2 113:12	belongs 208:13
,22 212:6,17,20	198:5 202:11	become 28:17	below-market
	205:16 220:4		MIMI INCL

	1 46	, ,	
88:18	246:11 278:20	30:2,3,12,18	262:13
bench 6:20	285:18	31:8 38:12,21	boards 81:8
benchmark 35:10	Bender 183:10	39:7,11,12,15,16	Board's 7:7
36:1 37:4 45:18	beneficiaries	71:12 75:3 78:20 162:9 189:12	bodies 97:5
50:18 51:19 59:5	263:1		· ·
61:21 62:3,9	benefit 15:20	billions 78:21	body 44:13
63:3 66:20,21	16:6,12 18:6,22	159:18	Boiled 33:7
67:9 68:3 76:11	61:17 67:22	binder 147:13	bolt 238:8
80:10	200:19 252:9	208:6	bolts 238:5
93:1,7,12,20 94:2,4,6 99:2	292:5	bit 18:9 19:5,22	
117:4 122:10	benefiting 32:3	21:9 34:9 35:2,5	bone 191:6
124:3,6 127:12	benefits 77:7,13	50:14 60:8 84:6	book 195:17
164:20,22	81:14 82:13	94:12 151:11 156:5 185:6	199:20,21 207:2
165:1,3,6,8,10,1	119:7 172:19	199:8,12 200:2,8	283:11
2,16 166:7	best 53:15 152:18	201:22 224:3	books 162:10
168:18,22	219:3,8 237:18	228:21 243:15	194:17,21 206:11,15,17
178:8,11 185:16 186:13 188:3	242:6 250:17	264:5 289:2	290:22
219:5 221:18	252:13,19	bits 212:21	
227:20 243:3	255:13	bizarre 135:3	borne 111:4
251:3,6	better 9:15 11:8	black 102:10	bother 128:4
252:12,14,20	36:3 59:5 70:21	103:3	bottom
253:4 255:2,4	106:1 107:4 119:13 139:5	blackout 202:2	14:15,17,20 23:1
256:1 269:8	152:9 153:8		60:16 66:16
270:13 278:15 285:4 293:21	154:5 157:22	blackouts 201:14	72:18 98:13 142:20 171:10
	178:4 263:5	202:10	212:21 218:22
benchmarking 13:3 16:21 54:8	265:2 278:7	blanket 51:15 97:6	219:2 232:2
122:6 261:3	289:2,3 292:6	Blatter 77:4,9	288:6
benchmarks 15:11	beyond 54:21	228:19	bought 256:12
35:18 36:3,7	105:6 131:11	Block 129:18	bound 117:12
39:22 42:19 45:7	136:5 153:15	blue 29:15 214:5	130:17
59:15 76:2 80:7	biased	blueline 13:13	145:11,13
93:6 98:21	177:17,19,21	22:8	boundaries 137:21
99:5,12 122:12	272:17 273:20	bluelined 11:18	bounds 92:8 183:2
124:10,13	bigger 163:14		292:10
127:19 141:19 142:4 164:10,18	199:13	blues 162:13	bragged 189:2
172:20 205:10	biggest 162:1	blushed 34:9	
219:3 220:8,16	199:10 233:6	BMI 31:3 51:4	branch 224:12,14 241:15
221:7 225:9	247:9	101:8	
227:18 245:20	billion	board 6:7 48:11	brand-new 130:10

breadth 46:4 break 7:13 261:17	broader 44:9 82:7 259:2 260:6,19	160:19 161:8 187:9 190:11	110:4,6 116:20
break 7:13 261:17	, i	187.9 190.11	1.60.5 105 1
break 7:13 261:17		107.7170.11	162:5 185:1
DIEAK 7.13 201.17	broadly 143:13	207:4 258:19	201:8
	236:15,17	279:21 296:5,7,9	caching 57:9 282:2
274:2,4 296:21	Broadway 3:6	businesses 35:15	289:8
Dicaming 47.10	46:14	109:7 111:16	Cadillac 238:7
68:10	broke 191:4	256:6	
DIEARS 293.13		Butson 69:16	Cal 194:2,5
breakthrough	Bruce 2:7 11:13	70:15	calculated 283:21
44:16	bruce.rich@weil.c	Butson's 70:19	calculation 263:11
Bridging 196:4	om 2:16	buy 162:11 225:17	calculations 180:9
brief 10:9 24:1	brush 72:7	226:4,16 227:12	233:19 234:1
i i	Bryan 120:17,19	236:22	293:4
68:14 136:13	122:3	247:15,18	calculus 91:4
190:12 274:6	build 55:4 149:22	buyer 36:13 40:5	caliber 8:8 47:8
byiofing 12.5 00.6	Building 1:16	44:12 143:17	California 193:14
1 131:7		144:9	196:12
briefly 23:22	bulk 103:22	253:11,15,17,18	
62:12 73:19	bullet 231:17	254:3,10,14,16,1	campaign 47:22 48:7
1	bunch 104:2	7,20,21	
118:12 125:20	235:7,8 240:5,9	255:3,5,19,20 256:10,13 259:1	campus 193:3
192:19 195:15	247:17 288:3	287:17,19,21	Canada 100:15
196:7,20 203:3 246:14	bundle 62:2	buyer/willing	cancellation
	235:5,6 241:7,10	40:17 86:15 87:9	233:11
	bundled 16:19	100:19 164:11	candid 48:9
bringing 34:15	235:19 236:8	220:7,15 245:19	candidates 246:10
95:4	242:9 244:16	255:10 277:21	candidly 139:12
	bundling 240:5	buyers 44:21	· I
245:14	burden 259:3	246:21 251:15	cannibalization 58:17
broadcast 31:6,7	burdens 161:18	254:20 255:6	
95:8 180:17,19		258:17,18	capable 153:2
204:3	business 10:21 30:14 33:4 46:11	buyer's 255:17	198:5
broadcaster 77:20	71:9 73:4 88:4,9	259:2 275:9	capacity 203:16
broadcasters 85:9	97:6 105:6	buying 238:5,7	capital 1:19 79:17
277:6 282:12	109:14,17,18	255:20 256:7	110:11,15,20,21
broadcasting	111:11 114:8	295:9	117:16,18 150:2
189:15	115:4 127:1		152:12 159:4
broadcasts 142:7	148:14	C	232:18,20 233:6 237:21
189:1	149:20,21 150:6	cable 84:17	
	157:15 159:13	105:19,22 106:1	captured 96:22

		1	
captures 55:13	119:16	256:3 279:15	139:11 157:3
car 37:9 55:19	120:3,5,10	cause 187:19	163:16 185:5
56:5,15 59:17	122:17 123:22	250:7 264:20	229:20
61:17 71:7	125:6 129:20,21	267:20 272:7	CERTIFICATE
156:17 158:14	130:6,8,16,17,22	286:15 295:8	298:1
223:9 233:8	131:13	i	
237:4 295:17	132:13,16	caused 58:17	Certified 298:1,2
	134:22 135:9	176:7	certify 298:3
care 52:8 65:1	137:3 143:10,15	caution 69:4 71:21	cetera 244:12
159:15 160:21 190:11	144:1,14,16	72:2	
	145:2,9 146:19	CD 58:10 226:4	CFO 147:7
career 194:18	149:16 155:1	CDs 56:2	CFR 118:13
199:19 200:9	161:22 164:9,21	i	119:22
CARP 90:13,15	166:5,16 170:9	226:14,18 247:20	chains 230:2
95:16 105:13	182:9,14 191:1,2	·	challenge 47:20
CARP's 41:17	204:18 205:14	ceiling 175:1	74:3
104:20	208:5 222:18 223:16 228:12	center 108:3	
	241:4 243:21	centerpiece 139:13	challenges 73:12
carriage 105:22	241.4 243.21	central 54:16	challenging 185:6
carried 70:6	256:8 291:10		chance 206:5
carriers 224:2	296:2	cents 292:21 293:8	change 63:18
carries 22:15	cases 15:8,18	CEO 74:15 94:21	80:22 87:8
carry 218:15	43:10 55:1 74:1	152:2	118:20 163:22
_	131:17 203:22	certain 8:8 12:15	164:14 174:16
carrying 211:8	204:2 254:22	15:14,21 59:9	184:5,7 277:9,10
268:7	cash 29:13 30:3	73:14 86:16	281:8
carryover 268:12	70:17 75:3	89:6,8 100:8	changed 63:7
cars 56:9	148:13,14,19	104:22 111:9	79:12 95:17
158:5,10,18	152:4,7,9,15,18	122:19 151:10	102:14 103:1
295:10	155:6 160:19,21	172:3 184:2	120:3 163:4
car's 56:3	162:10 163:14	195:11 200:5	165:5
	189:13 233:1	209:17 221:14	changes 96:3
case 6:6 7:6 16:3	catalog 81:17	250:12 268:2	101:21 109:4
21:4 26:3 28:6	261:21	certainly 17:6	116:9 118:22
30:1,6,7 32:11 33:22 39:21		22:11 24:14	119:5 127:13
42:21 51:7 55:19	catalogs 46:5	52:11 86:15 89:4	195:22 197:18
62:14 65:14	categories 54:16	97:20 99:1,13	277:8 280:9
66:21 80:21	64:11 81:5	102:20 104:1	changing 119:17
82:9,17	261:18 262:14	106:9 107:3,16	, ,
94:13,15,18	281:12,13	111:18	channel 67:16
96:20 99:13	category 12:16	115:14,17	226:12
102:1 118:12	54:5,7 58:1	120:13 123:15 132:16 135:18	channels 57:10
		152.10 155.18	59:13 66:4

102:16,19,22	checking 217:4	,20,22	circumscribed
103:1,19 104:1,7	checkmark	104:3,7,12	45:3
108:5 112:6	257:12,13,16,17,	105:13,20 106:5	circumstance
114:3,16 226:13	18 258:13,14	107:1,18	109:4 116:10
249:4 250:18	· ·	110:20,21,22	127:13 221:10
288:2 290:14,16	Chevrolet 238:7	112:9,10	
Chapter 7:21	chief 2:3 6:2	113:15,20	circumstances
	11:2,4,15	116:11 117:22	24:9 77:19 96:4
chapters 206:17,18 207:5	19:8,16 24:1	118:8 120:2	101:21 132:14 151:10 163:5
,	25:4,6,11,20	124:1 126:22	237:7 248:16
characteristic	26:1,11,13,14	127:10	
277:13	29:19 56:1	128:10,12,14	cite 15:18 18:19
279:18,20	68:7,11,16 74:16	141:16 181:11	66:8 69:9 197:22
characteristics	79:12 82:21	184:10,14,18,22	249:8
45:6 93:21 165:4	83:14,17 116:17	185:12,18	cited 41:6 42:1
255:9 257:11	128:16 129:3,9	186:4,7,17,19	cites 76:12 138:11
282:17	133:11 136:12	187:16,21	
characterization	139:20,22	188:2,8	claim 41:9 91:18
137:4 277:12	140:20	choices 173:9	126:22
	190:8,14,18	Choice's 94:12	claimed 45:7
characterized	191:15,18	105:8 112:22	claiming 71:16
272:15 275:13	207:15,19	115:16 116:14	91:8
286:2	209:11,21 210:2	117:14,17,20	
characterizing	211:1,4,10,15,18 ,22 212:6,17,20	128:13 187:4	claims 128:3
293:4	213:2,9,15,22	choose 41:3 54:20	156:14 158:2
charge 65:2 186:8	213.2,9,13,22	55:15 126:9	180:2
289:14	215:11,20	148:15 187:12	clarify 283:6
charged 64:18,19	216:2,11,14,16,2		clarity 214:12
65:5 185:12	0 217:2,6,14,21	chose 86:12,18	class 207:6
237:9	218:2,5 219:15	87:11	
	274:3,8,14,17,20	chosen 99:5 105:6	classic 96:14
charges 288:11	296:14,17,19	126:10 264:3	277:12
charging 183:7	, , ,	churn 151:17	classical 229:17
244:9	child 287:1	154:11	clear 8:13 31:18
Charles 79:10	children's 46:14		74:20 86:6 87:4
	choice 3:2 5:4 36:1	Cindy 1:18 6:17	89:12 90:2
chart 147:21	66:20 83:4,10	298:2,18	92:14,18 94:5
172:18 257:6	84:11,22 85:14	Ciongoli 79:10	137:17 146:7
chat 22:18	86:10 93:12,15	Circuit 40:20,22	157:17 140.7
cheaper 243:2	94:18,22 95:2,8	42:1 89:20	285:15 288:13
î	97:22	91:12,15 92:9	294:21
check 232:14	99:3,17,19,20	95:18 126:3	
259:5,6	101:22 102:9,20	205:19	clearly 8:13 33:12
	103:5,9,14,16,19	200.77	41:9 91:19 138:7

	T		
156:21	coherent 18:3,7,11	160:18	177:6,10,11
client 30:16 36:6	coincide 243:14	coming 71:12	178:4 187:3
37:9 55:19 57:3		74:14 81:17	188:13,16 197:1
63:10,11 69:7,10	collapses 235:10	84:15 87:6	210:17,18 227:9
71:2,16 78:1	collaterally 132:15	112:13 135:8	228:7 229:5
82:19 130:1	colleagues 11:5	188:9 273:7	236:5 239:22
137:6 228:18	83:8 134:1	278:11 280:14	240:16 241:1
	141:6,8 182:2		247:3,16
clients 12:19 39:13	1	comment 228:21	251:9,17 253:16
138:18	collected 30:12	269:4 270:18,22	258:4,8 262:13
client's 29:8 33:3	collections 33:18	283:8	268:13 269:7
38:3 43:5 53:21	collective 47:13	commercial-free	270:10
59:11 67:11 69:1	251:18 268:20	84:15 102:12	287:12,14
71:8		commission	company 1:19 9:2
climate 72:9	collectively 50:10	201:7,11,13	29:12,22 32:19
	172:5 262:12	202:8,10 233:9	48:12 51:3 69:11
close 39:6 60:17	collectives 51:9	298:22	70:1,4 71:11,13
106:11 131:11	l		72:21 73:1,5
135:11 158:16	collectivity 261:7	committee 193:6,7	75:2,6 78:13
188:9 281:19	266:10	committees 200:22	79:19 95:5
285:12 290:11	colloquy 209:6	201:16	117:22 138:16
closed 49:12 130:9	219:11	common 126:7	152:19 153:5
closer 59:11	collusively 176:20		155:10
145:16	Columbia 1:20	communication	161:4,10,14,15
	298:19	114:13	189:5,17,19
closest 246:12		communications	210:16 227:9
279:2,6,13	column 35:14	48:10 49:2	232:10,15
281:15 285:9	36:12 246:5,6,7	50:1,3 95:1	233:8,16 239:17
286:21 287:10	251:2	201:7,13	240:5 243:3,9
289:11	combination	202:8,10 223:8	258:22 259:3
closure 131:12	292:19	companies 28:17	269:1 291:11
137:2	combined 30:13	35:8 36:19 51:8	company's 29:20
clue 280:13	31:7 69:18 70:1	54:1 57:12 64:10	70:11 72:7 73:7
cluster 142:2	73:11 152:6	69:17 74:2	74:17,19,22
	combining 154:6	77:8,14 78:17	240:12
Coalition 50:11		79:4 84:13	comparability
coauthor	comedy 234:14	85:10,12 86:1	44:21 45:1 76:13
206:10,12,16	290:14,16	88:4,12 106:1	
coauthored	comes 79:3 123:6	107:4,14 109:9	comparable 37:11
194:18,22	160:5 189:9	110:4,7 111:7,9	93:2,8,20
	279:13 289:19	115:9 142:16	94:8,10 98:15,17
Code 7:21	290:21	143:4 149:10	99:9,11,15,18
coeditor 206:13	comfortably	157:2 167:2	165:4 185:16
	20,,,,,,,	176:22	253:3 261:8
L			

	1 46	T	
288:18	36:2,18 40:6	completely 82:5	231:11 285:17
comparables	47:4,15,16 53:15	91:14 94:15	conceive 9:13
122:5	54:12 56:17,20	98:14 115:5	221:2 222:9
•	72:10 73:5 75:12	121:4,17 122:4	
compare 31:12	105:19 110:1	124:18 125:1	concentrated
164:13 169:5	156:22	126:1 127:2,17	247:4,5,10
261:11	157:10,13,21	138:13 233:2	concentration
compared 166:18	172:21 173:1	243:4 259:7	194:7 275:2
167:13 172:19	232:11,19	277:14 279:9	concept 91:10
223:3 239:21	233:22 243:3	completing 203:2	249:16 276:9
266:6,11	246:15 247:13	, j	
comparing 169:22	248:8,12,14	complicated 45:5	conception 80:1
170:1 264:12	250:11 251:4	224:6	concepts 24:3
	252:9 253:2	complication	245:15
comparison 256:1	254:7,9,12,16	170:3,4	conceptual 220:1
comparisons	255:13 256:22	complications	241:14
31:17 243:16	268:4 269:1	191:5	
compatible 37:11	270:1,12 271:13	j	conceptualize
1	272:8 276:7	comply 144:11	138:6 222:9
compelled 19:19	277:19,21	151:5,11	279:6
compensable 81:9	278:6,8,21 279:4	component 63:10	conceptualizing
compete 43:20	280:10 281:9	64:5 114:7	258:16
105:20	291:6,15 292:8	234:17,19,20	conceptually
248:17,20	295:7	284:11	246:2
249:13 251:9	competitively 60:2	components 236:2	
262:12 263:17	63:8 210:19	composer 96:18	concern 47:18 82:7 196:13
269:2 276:22	253:13	r	82:7 196:13 275:21
277:3,4 278:7	competitor 30:21	composition 97:2	
competes 277:5	296:1	241:10	concerned 146:8
278:6	competitors 31:16	compounded 70:9	concerning 32:15
	37:9 55:18 59:17	comprehensive	76:22
competing 47:12	63:11 64:3 74:1	12:6 18:17	conclude 68:6
54:17 68:3 223:3	157:15,16		179:7 248:7,15
235:19 250:21	210:19 250:3,4	compromising	
295:16	276:1 279:2,6	239:4	concluded 25:14
competition	281:10	compulsory 41:21	49:18 144:6
47:3,8,17 56:1		84:4,20 86:2,3,7	254:11
60:3 73:18 74:13	complain 30:8	119:21	concludes 118:2
156:15 157:19	247:11	computed 33:16	170:15 171:18
163:12 203:13	complete 136:18	concede 187:18	179:3 272:5
250:9 252:3	137:15,18 157:1		296:12
267:19 270:10	168:9 281:8	concedes 76:8	concluding 42:2
275:7	completed 149:12	conceivable	269:5
competitive 32:17			
_			

conclusion 82:14	95:17,20 96:1,8	92:6,13,19	226:8
127:6 144:22	97:10,17 101:4,5	213:10 214:2	
161:22 218:19	102:5 104:19	215:1,12 220:17	contact 9:9
219:1,2 227:11	110:12 111:5	221:4 262:18	containing 224:1
241:18 242:12	114:14,20 115:2	276:9	contains 254:20
261:1 262:9,20	126:2,4,9,18		255:5
275:16 290:9,10	127:15 200:22	considering 164:8	
291:19	Congressional	consisted 196:9	contemplate 136:2
conclusions 7:3	128:11	consistent 90:21	contemplated
227:1 228:9		94:13 109:6	13:19 44:1
262:8 275:17	congruent 272:4	126:7 127:1	contemporaneous
conditions 73:12	connect 61:10	141:21 209:6	24:12 25:2
104:18 255:7	connected 56:9,15	229:9	content 45:17
	Connecticut 3:14	consistently	61:15 73:19 95:7
conduct 50:13		16:5,10 156:8	103:5,6,10,13
conducted 27:17	connection 83:10	consists 247:2	104:3,7,9,13
58:20	266:14 269:9		105:21 107:2
confer 25:7,8,10	283:13	constant 114:1 252:6	113:21 114:3
139:20,21	consent 204:22		142:7,8,13,14
conference 197:12	286:9	constantly 110:3	149:17 157:3,4
198:18	consequence	137:3	167:3
	277:16	constitute 1:14	170:7,8,13,14,18
conferred 25:13	consequences	53:15 163:20	,19 171:1
conferring 134:1	37:21 66:11 68:2	constituted 122:20	180:1,2,20,21 181:1 188:22
confident 153:6	conservative 40:1	constitutes 79:7	189:18 222:21
181:21	233:20 292:4,12		223:8,16
confidentially	•	constructed 54:8	234:10,11,12
177:14	consider 50:15	consumer 61:13	235:7,8,17 284:6
confidently 69:16	84:19 176:10 179:9 211:4	64:8 80:9 167:11	288:17 292:1
_	220:6,7 245:18	168:2,3	294:14
confine 20:19 24:8	282:4 293:18	169:3,5,6 170:17	context 15:22
284:10		171:16	17:10 18:16 19:1
conflict 9:14	consideration 13:9	consumers 45:15	20:17 24:9 85:13
126:20	42:9,17 51:16 53:2 54:17 109:8	84:16 142:14	97:8,14 205:7
conform	220:12,15	150:21 151:1	251:13 256:2
119:2,11,14	221:5,6 225:7	166:22	277:17
confront 47:7	226:19 227:17	167:4,7,21 168:6	contexts 240:22
		169:10,14,15	
confuses 24:2	considerations	170:5 196:12	contextualize 18:3,13
Congress 1:16	42:4 72:6 73:2 75:15 91:3	222:16,22 227:12	Ī
41:8 85:4,21	221:15		contextualizing
86:12 87:7,11		consumption	25:3
89:18 90:14 91:2	considered 16:10		

continental 157:1 45:14 106:21 corner 32:4 69:8 159:14 continually 29:11 107:9,15 108:10 correct 15:2 20:6 187:10,13 continue 7:14 144:18 67:18 165:1 187:10,13 72:11 86:10 67:18 165:1 232:16 233:2 87:13 88:17 control 284:6,15 289:11 203:20 264:14 291:2 106:13 107:6 10:2 112:14 controversial 204:9,10,19,20 Cote 51:11 153:14,15,16 convened 90:13 211:21 212:19 214:20 couch 119:1 232:10,12 257:1 convenient 239:4 222:3 conversation 203:18 244:12,13,22 counsel 5:17 6:19 continued 3:1 4:1 33:9 148:9 182:8 conversely 227:16 256:3,14 266:17 292:13 298:9,12 continuing 9:17 conveyance 36:14 266:17 292:13 293:1 count 290:13 32:19 73:7 147:18 cool 89:5 corroborating counted 109:14 contradistinction coordinated 50:3 corroborating counting 7:8
continue 7:14 110:13,18 67:18 165:1 232:16 233:2 72:11 86:10 23:13 88:17 235:18 237:4,2 235:18 237:4,2 87:13 88:17 289:11 200:6,7 201:1 264:14 291:2 106:13 107:6 289:11 200:6,7 201:1 264:14 291:2 294:16 203:20 294:16 152:21 13:17 205:2,3,18 206:6 211:21 212:19 214:20 coterminous 92:2 232:10,12 257:1 convenient 239:4 216:10,18 218:1 could've 86:16 continued 3:1 4:1 203:18 244:12,13,22 counsel 5:17 6:19 33:9 148:9 182:8 conversation 203:18 245:20,21 251:5 69:5 72:2 140:3 continues 49:22 113:14 convey 249:16 265:6,10,11,15 298:9,12 continuing 9:17 32:19 73:7 298:9,12 count 290:13 147:18 convince 267:3 295:1,17,19 counted 109:14 continuity 88:22 coordinated 50:3 corroborate 74:8 counting 7:8
continue 7:14 110:13,18 67:18 165:1 232:16 233:2 72:11 86:10 27:13 88:17 235:18 237:4,2 235:18 237:4 235:18
144:18
87:13 88:17 106:13 107:6 110:2 112:14 152:21 153:14,15,16 157:14 232:10,12 257:1 continued 3:1 4:1 33:9 148:9 182:8 continues 49:22 113:14 continuing 9:17 32:19 73:7 147:18 control 284:6,15 289:11 203:20 204:9,10,19,20 205:2,3,18 206:6 211:21 212:19 214:20 222:3 245:20,21 251:5 256:3,14 205:2,3,18 206:6 211:21 212:19 214:20 222:3 245:20,21 251:5 256:3,14 205:6,10,11,15 266:17 292:13 293:1
87:13 88:17 106:13 107:6 110:2 112:14 152:21 153:14,15,16 157:14 232:10,12 257:1 continued 3:1 4:1 33:9 148:9 182:8 continues 49:22 113:14 continuing 9:17 32:19 73:7 147:18 contradistinction 87:13 88:17 289:11 203:20 204:9,10,19,20 205:2,3,18 206:6 211:21 212:19 214:20 201:16 205:2,3,18 206:6 211:21 212:19 214:20 201:16 201:16 201:11 203:20 Cote 51:11 coterminous 92:2 201:10,18 218:1 222:3 244:12,13,22 245:20,21 251:5 256:3,14 265:6,10,11,15 298:9,12 201:15 234:14 201:15 234:14 201:15 234:14 201:15 234:14 201:15 234:14 201:15 234:14 202:20 204:9,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 205:2,3,18 206:6 211:21 212:19 214:20 201:10,18 218:1 202:3 204:12,13,22 203:18 203:18 204:12,13,22 204:12,13,22 204:12,13,22 204:12,13,22 204:12,13,22 204:12,13,22 204:19,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 204:9,10,19,20 204:16 Coterminous 92:2 204:16 201:10 219:17 205:2,3,18 206:6 211:21 212:19 214:20 204:19,10,19,20 204:19,10,19,20 204:19,10,19,20 204:19,10,19,20 204:19,10,19,20 205:2,3,18 206:6 211:21 212:19 214:20 204:10,18 218:1 203:20 204:9,10,19,20 204:19,10,19,20 205:2,3,18 206:6 211:21 212:19 214:20 204:10,18 218:1 203:18 224:20,21 251:5 256:3,14 205:6,10,11,15 298:19 10:9 69:5 72:2 140:3 191:10 219:17 298:9,12 201:15 234:14 201:15 234:14 201:15 234:14
106:13 107:6 110:2 112:14 152:21 153:14,15,16 157:14 232:10,12 257:1 continued 3:1 4:1 33:9 148:9 182:8 continues 49:22 113:14 continuing 9:17 32:19 73:7 147:18 contradistinction
152:21
153:14,15,16 157:14 232:10,12 257:1 convenient 239:4 211:21 212:19 214:20 couch 119:1 could've 86:16 222:3 244:12,13,22 245:20,21 251:5 conversely 227:16 conversely 227:16 convey 249:16 convey 249:16 convey 249:16 convey ance 36:14 convey 249:16 convey ance 36:14 convince 267:3 convince 267:3 conversely 227:18 continuity 88:22 contradistinction coordinated 50:3 corroborating countinuity 7:28:19 10:9 counted 109:14 counted 109:14 counted 109:14 counting 7:8 counting 7:8 counting 7:8 counting 7:8 counting 7:8 counted 109:14 counting 7:8 counting 7:8 counting 7:8 counted 109:14 counting 7:8 co
convenient 239:4 convenient 239:4 convenient 239:4 convenient 239:4 convenient 239:4 convenient 239:4 conversation 203:18 conversely 227:16 continues 49:22 113:14 convey 249:16 convey 249:16 convey 249:16 convey 249:16 convey 249:16 convey 249:16 convenient 239:4 convenient 239:4 convey 249:16 convey 249:17
157:14 232:10,12 257:1 convenient 239:4 214:20 216:10,18 218:1 222:3 conversation 203:18 244:12,13,22 245:20,21 251:5 256:3,14 295:1,17,19 continuity 88:22 contradistinction convenient 239:4 conversely 227:16 222:3 conversely 227:16 222:3 conversely 227:16 244:12,13,22 245:20,21 251:5 69:5 72:2 140:3 191:10 219:17 298:9,12 conversely 227:18 conversely 227:18 conversely 227:18 conversely 227:18 266:17 292:13 293:1 293:1 293:1 293:1 count 290:13 counted 109:14 counted 109:14 counting 7:8 countin
232:10,12 257:1 convenient 239:4 216:10,18 218:1 could've 86:16 continued 3:1 4:1 33:9 148:9 182:8 203:18 244:12,13,22 counsel 5:17 6:19 continues 49:22 conversely 227:16 256:3,14 191:10 219:17 191:10 219:17 continuing 9:17 conveyance 36:14 265:6,10,11,15 298:9,12 continuity 88:22 continuity 88:22 corroborate 74:8 counted 109:14 contradistinction coordinated 50:3 corroborating counting 7:8
continued 3:1 4:1 203:18 244:12,13,22 counsel 3:17 6:19 continues 49:22 conversely 227:16 256:3,14 191:10 219:17 continuing 9:17 conveyance 36:14 266:17 292:13 293:1 32:19 73:7 convince 267:3 295:1,17,19 counted 109:14 continuity 88:22 coordinated 50:3 corroborating counting 7:8
203:18
continues 49:22 conversely 227:16 245:20,21 251:5 69:5 72:2 140:3 113:14 convey 249:16 265:6,10,11,15 191:10 219:17 continuing 9:17 conveyance 36:14 293:1 count 290:13 32:19 73:7 convince 267:3 295:1,17,19 counted 109:14 continuity 88:22 coordinated 50:3 corroborating counting 7:8
continues 49:22 256:3,14 113:14 256:3,14 continuing 9:17 266:17 292:13 32:19 73:7 293:1 147:18 295:1,17,19 continuity 88:22 coordinated 50:3 contradistinction coordinated 50:3
113:14 convey 249:16 265:6,10,11,15 298:9,12 continuing 9:17 32:19 73:7 147:18 continuity 88:22 contradistinction convey 249:16 265:6,10,11,15 266:17 292:13 293:1 count 290:13 count description counted 109:14 201:15 234:14 counting 7:8
continuing 9:17 32:19 73:7 293:1 count 290:13 147:18 295:1,17,19 counted 109:14 continuity 88:22 coordinated 50:3 corroborate 74:8 201:15 234:14 counting 7:8 counting 7:8
32:19 73:7 147:18 continuity 88:22 contradistinction convince 267:3 coordinated 50:3 convince 267:3 convince
147:18
continuity 88:22 contradistinction coordinated 50:3 corroborating counting 7:8
contradistinction coordinated 50:3 corroborating counting 7:8
45:18 copies 11:19 37:4 51:19 countries 203:15
75.10
contrary 47:9 country 85:17
111:19 128:5 copy 25:21 202:5 corroborative 149:2 203:8
275:16 copyright 1:1 2:2 15:16 37:18 223:4
contrast 29:17 6:7 8:2 27:1 53:19 278:16 couple 149:8
36:6 56:6 58:19 31:19 81:11 cost 61:20 67:15 197:21 213:5
76:17 112:21 85:3,4 87:2 74:1 75:5 227:2 233:12
175:16 92:21 112:10,12 261:22
96:11,12,13 151:19 154:2 course 28:14 40:1
contrasted 115:7 98:3,19 99:4 160:6 197:14 course 28:14 40:1
contrasting 127:8 100:5,14 200:19 233:6 105:18 98:22 99:
104.16.17 236.9.290.22 103:18.112:14
contravenes 114:19 116:20
127.6 163.4
contributes 104:3 187:19 269:18 costs 33:19 34:7 141:14 140:10
75:10 80:12
80.3 8 110.11 201.7 111:4,6,10,14,16 222.16 250.17
114.11.17
224·19 234·5 7 Copyrights 88.2,7 148:5 courses 200:12,17
235:11,13 245:4
core 68:3 200:12 150:2,7 151:22 200:16 8:10 1.
contributions 239:12 153:17,20 court 6:16 8:10,14

		T	
10:17 23:10,20	160:18 202:11	Cricket 217:11	38:18 71:20
41:3,6 51:10	233:2 262:6	criteria 40:14	81:15 82:3,10
68:11 132:19		1	137:22 138:2
133:21 135:6,13	coverage 157:1	246:4,13 251:3	171:5 184:15
136:11 142:19	223:2	252:11,18	200:6 250:17
143:22 144:6	covered 34:6	256:10	
145:6,8,9,12,15,	293:16	criterias 246:5	currently 116:16 174:10 201:10
19	covering 27:17	criterion 251:7,19	
146:8,11,13,16,1	covers 156:7	critical 60:21 62:7	210:13,14
8 150:19		63:6 125:1	custom 15:15
155:8,12 157:17	Crawford 116:15		66:21 112:6,7
162:21 164:20	118:1	cross 132:15	customer 226:3
165:2,9,14 166:8	Crawford's 118:9	138:20	284:6,15 289:10
168:10	crazy 270:3	cross-examination	293:7
173:11,19	· ·	24:15 129:15	customers 85:17
174:4,17 175:9	CRB 1:5 77:15	130:5 131:1	106:3 233:6,7
177:1,2,7,14,15,	create 79:2 85:22	132:20 133:2	291:11
18,19 178:14,17	96:15,19	136:7,9 137:15	
180:12,14	107:11,12 139:2	cross-examine	customization
182:22	154:4 202:11	132:8 134:13	279:11,16,21
183:1,4,14,22	created 103:5,13	135:4,21,22	280:21 282:1,19
184:13 185:2	ŕ	137:13	284:14 289:8
188:5,7 189:9	creates 62:10		customized 54:1
190:10 191:8	137:15	cross-examining	112:5 219:5
192:19 193:8	creating 103:20	134:18,19	277:1,2,4 279:14
197:8 203:3	196:16	CRR 298:18	281:21 288:9
204:18 205:14	creation 104:13	crucial 222:19	cut 7:17 34:10
216:4 218:12	108:3 137:16	CSR 298:18	82:4 151:11
222:10 239:7	144:12 201:5		250:15 257:3
244:5 261:4	creative	culmination	263:14
274:5 285:1	102:4,7,17	218:18	264:19,20
289:18 295:3	102:4,7,17	cumulating 29:11	266:10,13 290:2
298:1,2	106:20 107:2	cumulative 29:13	294:12,13,15
courtesy 8:22	114:12 144:17	38:11 106:9	cutting 75:6
129:12	222:14,20		145:22 252:10
courtroom 239:8	224:20	Cunniff 3:12 83:9	
courts 51:4		cunniff.martin@a	CV 193:10
	creativity 96:18	rentfox.com	
Court's 23:6,12	102:18	3:17	D
143:15 146:1	credentialing	curious 253:10	D.C 1:2,11,17 3:15
162:18 163:9	195:7 203:2		4:9 9:9 40:20,22
219:13 221:5	credit 71:13 78:1	current 24:4 27:19	42:1 89:20
cover 43:15		28:3,14 29:6	91:12,15 92:9
46:13,15,17	credited 111:2	32:20 34:18	95:18 126:3
. , - ,		I	

Damon 94:20	275:14	declaration 208:16	118:15
danger 155:21	deals 16:19 174:2	declined 147:9	delayed 159:3
dangers 161:17	176:12 210:14,18	176:19 177:6	delaying 146:16
dash 56:11	1	decorum 8:10	deliver 45:17
dashboard 223:9	dealt 197:16 199:21	decreases 154:2	157:2 239:18
280:6,7 281:6	debt 71:12	decreasing 148:5	delivered 185:1
289:5 295:16 296:4	159:17,18	decree 205:1	279:8
dashboards 279:9	160:5,12,22	dedicated 243:4	delivering 222:15,21
data 29:17	161:1,3,12,18	deducting 33:18	225:16 226:2,11
77:16,18 108:3	debts 148:16	deduction 81:18	delivery 29:1
170:9 228:2	decade 54:22	deductions 81:3	223:7 240:10
239:18 240:19 241:6	decade-based 59:13	deemed 217:15	281:1 287:5 291:2
date 6:5 14:2 28:5	decades 111:14	deeply 36:4 43:1	demand 33:5 55:8
43:9 118:21	272:4	46:10 129:22	58:5 93:20,21
130:7 131:11	December 70:13	defend 62:6	226:12 247:14
150:17	151:5	defies 94:16	248:3,4,8
dated 24:7 35:7	decide 47:20	defined 27:20,21	249:7,8,16 250:8 253:12
David 4:4 19:11	139:17 277:9	36:21 91:22 136:6	demo 46:15
29:19 74:16 94:19	decided 161:20	definitely 263:19	demonstrate 39:21
day 7:12,13 10:21	263:20	definition 29:2	63:6 117:3,8
139:2 152:16	deciding 173:21	33:10 80:19	143:10 244:15
172:12 190:20	decision	81:1,13,16 82:10	259:4
295:13 296:21	41:7,12,13 88:10,13	132:20,21	demonstrates
days 7:8,10 48:4	90:13,14,17	134:17 137:12 162:19 181:19	36:18 79:22
49:6	91:11 95:20	197:18 265:3,13	demonstrating 77:18 93:14
de 130:4,20 284:18	96:1,8 99:16 101:4 122:8	definitions 82:3	110:6 239:11
deal 10:3 23:14	125:18 126:2,19	degree 109:22	283:13
47:8 88:16 102:18 140:11	127:15 143:15	158:3 205:1,13	demonstrative
148:12 156:12	146:1 166:9	275:7 276:14	29:4,16 35:13
172:15 178:22	205:19 291:7	284:6,14,15	36:11 38:16
179:6,11,16	decisions 43:19	289:8,10	39:2,9,14,19 46:17 48:13
196:17 200:1 210:10 263:16	90:3,7 92:5,21 126:3	Del 94:19,21 95:10,14 100:7	60:7,11 66:6,12
275:12	deck 131:5 286:3	101:11,19 105:9	67:21 236:12,13
dealing 44:13 51:7	296:1	107:17 109:21	238:15,17 244:4 245:17,22
60:22 203:22		112:2 113:12	243.17,22
	(866) 448	- DEPO	

	Pag		
284:21 293:10	derives 179:21	6:8 26:19 27:13	differ 241:7
demonstratives	DeSanctis 141:8	40:7	276:20
26:10 38:2 129:12,19,21 141:4 219:10 283:9	describe 18:6 53:17 54:14 55:17 58:22 62:6	determine 41:19 44:21,22 92:8 117:17 145:13 164:14	difference 33:17 61:5 94:9 96:10 147:11 165:15,17
demos 46:12 denied 12:10 denigrate 50:17 Department	67:17 69:7 73:21 75:5 77:9 96:7 194:6 195:15 196:7,20 198:3,15 199:8 203:3 218:12	171:12,13 183:14 218:14 220:8 233:16 246:12 272:20 295:4	166:20 168:21 225:4 256:19 264:7,10 differences 64:22 66:10,11,16
192:15 201:5 depend 273:17 284:13,15 dependence 72:9 73:11	220:3 221:2 275:4 described 17:9 71:6 108:15 121:22 168:20	determined 27:8 40:16 42:4 43:14 143:19 165:10 183:1,5 determining 41:17	99:20 100:1 169:2 different 11:20 12:2 17:11 21:1 30:19 35:14,15
dependent 73:10 depending 65:22 292:19	169:21 292:12 describes 47:10 60:5 89:4 95:14 102:16	218:16 284:7 develop 113:20 205:10 290:7	44:21 45:12,14 50:6 58:4 62:2 63:20 64:11 65:1,7 68:2 81:5
depends 125:9 depict 293:11	description 20:3 89:3 220:1	developed 63:2 85:14,15 103:16 107:11	84:6 89:14 93:18 94:1 97:18 124:2 144:19 147:5
depicted 155:1,2 depiction 39:3	257:11 deserve 257:16,17 deserved 88:17	developing 88:16,17 137:18 203:7	166:6 168:18 169:3,9,10 171:22 172:19
deposition 65:14 79:14 123:12 depreciation	designated 208:4 designation 88:3	development 54:12 73:17 95:7	189:10 234:9 241:8 242:17 249:15 270:9
232:17 Depression 149:3	designations 129:17	developments 131:19 133:1 deviate 144:15	276:20 differentiate 157:14
depths 156:8 deregulation 201:7	designed 18:12 66:12 244:14 desire 250:7	145:7 device 61:9,10 137:8 138:13	differentiated 250:12 276:19 277:13
derivation 90:1 derivative 96:14	despite 31:14 71:14 detail 35:4 37:5	devices 56:5 58:13 devote 193:11	differentiating 255:18
derive 169:18 183:7 200:5 226:1 252:9 derived 41:4 64:8	73:22 102:16 detailed 77:6 details 60:14	devotes 102:20 dhandzo@jenner. com 4:11	differentiation 256:18 differently 57:3 75:11 79:18
GEATTER 11.7 UT.0	determination 1:6	dictated 89:18	/3.11 /7.10

1	1 48		
differing 168:6	82:8,13,18 114:3	disclosed 21:5	displays 107:21
difficult 53:8	119:16 122:21	70:12	disposition 27:5
112:18 199:2	128:2 129:20	disclosure 9:1,15	dispute 19:21
diffusion 196:11	130:6,8,13,16	discounts 269:20	136:19 170:21
digital 1:7 6:9	131:13,15,17,20 132:21 136:5,6	discouraging 48:7	disputed 46:6
58:15 74:8,10	137:3,12 138:1,9		•
83:21,22 84:14	139:8 172:2,8,22	discover 21:11	disruption 72:13
85:22 87:2,5	173:15 176:11	discovery 12:13	80:15 86:21
89:4 90:8,9	177:6 178:6	13:5,16 15:11	87:18 145:8
95:12 107:13	191:1 200:3	16:8	146:14 155:14 156:13
108:2 112:20	203:20 208:1,5	17:2,7,19,21	162:16,18,22
113:1,8 121:4	219:3,9 221:21	18:1,7,19,22	163:16,20 188:1
122:19,21	225:6 246:6,17	20:4,8,18	220:18,20 222:9
124:5,15,19	252:17 253:17	21:5,8,11	294:22 295:3,4
125:5,11,22	255:20 256:2,12	23:7,13 24:12	•
141:21 142:1,17	257:13,22 258:5	50:1 129:20	disruptive 72:21 114:22
185:2,8 186:13	259:13 263:8	130:9,18 135:11 280:2	
195:12,17,19	265:5 266:17		146:2,12,17 147:4 162:14,19
196:2,4,11,14,21	267:19 268:15	discretion 23:12	295:6
197:4 198:5,8	269:6 270:1,11	discuss 17:14 35:4	
203:11 204:3	273:5,13 275:1 276:6 278:15,17	76:18 89:9	dissolved 105:4
226:4,14,17 247:20	282:17 285:4	discussed 22:18	dissuade 270:19
Dilemma	296:12	63:13 73:19 80:4	distills 32:11
195:12,17	directed 26:3	107:22 110:18	distinct 62:2 221:8
diluted 70:7	direction 29:16	118:18 237:8 281:3	distinction 60:22
dimensions 222:13	260:17 273:21		67:5 109:20
	298:7	discusses 17:1 58:15 100:7,14	236:6
dinner 203:17	directly 46:5 47:9	-	distinctions 54:15
direct 5:8 6:6 7:6	51:7 56:10 77:21	discussing 68:22	99:19 256:19
12:7,18 13:2,10	91:10 92:16	84:3 200:10 246:17 251:3	distinctly 8:13
15:17 16:3 25:17	124:16 162:22		distinguish 21:1
28:5 30:1 33:13	175:11,13 197:7	discussion 16:16	45:7 55:12
36:8,15 37:18 42:21 43:9,11	242:7 264:2	22:16 150:13	109:15
47:19,21 48:1,4	disadvantaged	disdain 49:3	
49:3,5,7,17	60:2	dislikes 55:4	distinguishes 173:12
50:8,18,22 51:13	disaggregated	disparity 196:14	distinguishing
52:2,4 53:14,19	288:19	displace 62:18	241:20
55:18 59:4,17	disappear 225:2	- I	
60:4,18 63:11,18	disaster 108:3	display 103:4 147:11	distortion 62:10 278:9,10
66:17 77:9	disclose 244:8	147.11	£10.7,1U
81:15,16,18	uisciose 244.8		

	rag	C Z I	
distorts 47:15	documents 18:9	downward 146:18	192:13 209:20
distracting 7:2	24:6 48:15 58:15	165:20 245:3	218:9 219:22
83:20	130:7,10 131:1	dozen 203:15	220:22 227:19
	135:1,20		238:14 241:15
distribute 82:2	138:8,17,20	dozens 124:19	274:11,22
219:14	155:8 174:7	DPRA 85:20 86:5	dramatic 66:10
distributed 198:7	214:5 215:7,15	87:17	71:4 280:20
distributes 175:10	227:6	Dr 10:6,12,15 12:8	281:8
distribution	dollar 33:17,20	13:3 15:9,19	dramatically
61:16,18 111:11	34:6	16:7,8,18	63:20 74:12 75:9
112:20 113:3	dollars 38:22 39:7	17:6,22 24:7	148:3,19 149:14
235:7,18,20	159:18 188:16	35:11 37:1,5	150:8 159:22
240:6 245:5	189:13	42:21 43:6 47:10	
247:7 251:21		51:18 52:13	draw 7:3
261:16 262:5,13	domain 81:7	53:17 54:11	drawn 23:15 227:1
284:11 287:12	done 20:7,10,14	58:14,22 59:21	dressing 32:10
294:16	22:11 86:16	60:4,14 61:2,3	· ·
	122:15 130:2	62:5,7,14	drive 42:18 66:15
District 1:20	131:4 140:16	66:9,21	169:3,11
51:10,11,12 205:13 298:19	159:5 185:7	67:7,12,13,17,19	driven 28:22 106:3
	187:20 203:4	68:1 76:17	152:11
diverge 74:2	220:5,21,22	80:5,13 116:15	drivers 28:19 71:8
diverse 31:19	227:3,10 228:5	118:1,9	drives 47:3 67:4
229:14 230:1	231:5 233:19	121:20,21	
diversion	259:6 272:11	122:3,11,16	173:15,17 190:1
249:7,8,16	292:16	123:6,7,8,12,13,	driving 68:3 115:3
	doom 122:7	14,15,18,19,21	237:4 280:22
divide 196:4	door 132:17 138:4	124:4,21 125:14	drop 67:19 70:9
293:6,8		126:21 130:13	dropped 156:5
divided 183:6	double 67:6 81:19	131:5 132:8	^ ^
dividing 166:1	101:13 294:8	137:8 145:2 164:19,22	due 8:18 14:2
168:1	doubt 7:19 17:7	164:19,22	71:12 105:18
	download 58:11	166:5,14,15	136:4 141:13
DMCA 87:2,16	226:4	168:17 169:13	160:5 189:14
88:5	downloaded 56:3	170:15,22	duly 192:2
DMX 51:3 105:3		170.13,22	duration 24:10
115:15	downloads 77:21	173:3 176:17	
Docket 1:5 6:7	142:3 226:14,17	177:5,9	during 12:13 13:8
document 131:3	240:1,2 247:20	178:1,8,11,22	26:20 27:17
132:9 137:14	289:6	179:3,18,21	29:9,10,13 36:4 69:21 72:14
139:6,14 154:16	downstream 276:3	180:6,7,8,10,11,	73:13 74:3 96:4
209:7 214:7,8,22	downturn 156:11	13,14 181:2	112:18 137:22
209:7 214:7,8,22	163:11	185:6,22 186:11	138:2 140:7,14
413.3,14	103.11		130.2 140.7,14

	1 45		
149:1,5 270:14	43:1 65:13	227:18 265:1	encapsulate
276:5	116:16 192:16	efficient 154:3	246:18
dwindled 84:13	193:15,18	effort 46:9 79:1	encompass 44:9
dynamics 105:19	197:8,14,22 199:12 206:1,2	130:4,21 133:4	encompassed 27:7
	207:7,12,13	179:18 229:5	181:18
E	227:7 249:6	268:20 270:18	encompasses 27:2
earlier 7:8 20:14	economist	efforts 48:2 50:16	encompassing
41:12 54:6 60:16	116:15,18	89:1 137:5	27:13 80:9
70:13 73:20	121:19 122:16	eight-year 39:1	encourage 82:11
169:21 172:18	194:8 221:4	either 30:6 56:19	144:12
188:20 243:15 271:19	235:12	76:22 96:5	
	economists 169:8	118:18 159:11	encouraged 74:17
early 41:7 71:10	193:3 194:9,10	163:3 176:13	encourages 266:4
earn 79:16	200:12 225:19	200:21 228:16	endpoint 164:6
232:10,19	247:6 270:3	230:11 279:7	endured 79:1
earning 186:4	economy 155:21	280:16 296:9	106:10
earnings 147:7	163:22 198:14	element 80:6	energy 284:20
152:2 156:19	199:16	224:15,17	engage 103:7
160:9,15	editor 206:13,15	230:15	252:10
easily 114:15	educational 193:9	elephant 287:6	·
161:11	196:15	eliminate 81:3	engaged 35:14 75:6 103:8
Eastern 9:11	effect 77:1 81:2,12	else 137:3 185:20	254:18 267:2
EBITDA 146:15	115:8 130:4	189:7 193:11	285:2
148:5,7 155:3,6	150:15 151:14	280:16	engagements
ebooks 198:6	182:3 186:10	e-mail 240:8	194:1
	210:13,14 224:18 225:13	embedded 31:4	engine 250:9
econometrics 200:13	226:9,10 227:15	emerged 36:21	Ü
	228:11,15,16		England 116:17
economic 17:3 37:21 43:4 72:8	230:20 249:5	emeritus 42:22	enhance 237:22
73:12 81:14	250:8 266:6,7	192:14	enormous 66:16
82:12 93:14	273:20 276:14	EMI 261:13	67:5 78:16 229:5
104:18 116:19	286:16	emphasize 16:17	ensure 86:8 88:22
156:11 163:11	effective 28:1	emphasized 175:7	entail 45:11
187:4,21	265:9 277:16	employed	entails 40:7
192:18,20,22	effectively 182:4	298:9,12	
197:17 234:1	187:2 261:5	employee 298:11	enter 268:14
economically 86:8	278:7 295:15		entered 11:7 12:19
108:21	effects 65:9 78:5,6	employees 48:11	36:9 59:6,18
economics 42:22	225:8 226:21	enable 79:21	84:7,11

	rag		
entering 48:8	equal 72:13	30:14	63:19 65:20 69:3
enterprise 79:2	177:21	estimate 28:8 39:7	76:21 77:7
enterprises 61:6	equally 262:2	63:4 101:6,9,12	78:2,3 82:19 92:13,16,19
89:3	equitable 132:12	117:19	93:14 97:12,13
entertainment	equity 9:6	231:11,20	98:16 128:4
43:2 74:10		estimated 30:12	132:9 137:15
195:20 241:2	equivalent 31:20	31:9,13 39:11	138:21
249:10	101:2 244:20	estimates 118:1	140:5,8,10
entire 30:17 33:1	erred 40:21	estimation 225:12	144:14,17
61:18 107:12	errors 67:18	281:15	145:18 146:19
111:1 118:6	escalating 32:8		147:2 155:18
122:20 128:1	39:4	et 244:12	160:4 161:22
130:5 199:19	especially 229:11	ethnic 229:20	162:18
203:10 215:3	230:9 250:21	evaluate 232:21	163:10,11,15 164:15 172:13
268:21	ESQUIRE	evaluated 110:14	176:2 181:6
entirely 16:10 62:8 102:6 120:10	2:7,8,9,10,11	evaluation 40:8	186:11 190:6
102.0 120.10	3:3,4,12 4:4,5,6	evening 129:12	195:6 209:7,14 227:3 238:18
155:7 156:5	essence 14:11 33:7	event 116:4 119:15	252:13 270:12
entirety 213:14	essential 15:1	120:13 124:22	evidenced 33:12
214:3 215:12,15	54:14 235:9,14	134:3,7	
entities 16:2	254:13	events 134:14	evident 42:13
204:12 235:19	essentially 24:8	201:14	evidentiary 129:7
244:11	84:13 93:16 96:3	eventual 205:14	evolution 24:17
entitle 33:10	98:20 102:9 103:3 104:20	everybody 132:12	exact 98:3 150:17
entitled 57:4 79:19	110:12 118:4	177:22	exactly 21:21 25:2
162:12 175:19	122:13 125:20	239:10,14 266:5	127:14 158:7
190:2,4 214:1,17	180:6,8 198:21	269:20	188:20 208:15
215:20 239:8	200:18 203:9	284:17,19	226:11 238:5
entitles 32:17	212:12 243:15	everybody's	241:3 245:1
entity 236:7	248:4 256:21	191:12 296:3	251:12 255:21
244:10 251:20	establish 31:20	everyone 157:20	258:2 271:2
255:18,19	173:19 261:4	everything 153:6	273:15 293:2,14
enumerate 201:3	established 38:14	185:17 205:16	examination 5:8
	55:21 183:2	276:16	15:20 132:21 208:1 283:14
environment 156:3 263:21	253:13	everywhere	296:13
	establishes 37:1	277:11	
ephemeral 9:22	establishing 43:4	evidence 14:3 33:2	examinations 138:1 192:5
27:3	183:22	36:16 47:8 50:22	
ephemerals 30:15	establishments	51:6,14 53:15,20	examine 37:20
	establishments		131:18 196:10

		<u> </u>	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
257:22 258:1	137:4	272:7	explicated 71:22
examined 192:3	exercises 270:3	expects 8:12,17	explicates 17:2
225:9 287:17	271:12	104:8,11 160:5	explication 20:20
examining 262:10	exhibit 49:5	expenditures	42:21
275:6	209:8,11,13	152:12	explicit 267:17
example 16:1	213:13,22 215:3,16 238:10	expense 250:2	268:1
44:20 56:10 130:12 131:3,19	exhibits 5:13,17	expenses 147:8	explicitly 76:18
132:1 134:21	105:10 129:14	expensive 70:6	explore 278:19
154:3 173:6	130:2,5 131:1	146:5 160:11	explored 245:15
175:5 255:14	132:7 213:12	226:5	explosion 280:17
285:16	exhortations 50:4	experience 66:18 72:1 95:9 111:9	expressed 32:15
examples 55:10 107:21 224:8	exhorting 267:15	174:17 227:5	146:1
exceed 57:7 272:8	exist 100:15 110:2	experienced	expression 114:12
exceeded 152:7	279:7	29:12,22 43:1	extend 85:4
except 50:20	existence 199:14 273:8 276:15	46:10 75:2 149:4	extensively 116:19
145:13 155:6		experiences 37:10	extent 56:22 76:3
169:21 180:19	existing 18:16 70:8	expert 69:15 74:7	92:6 107:1
220:17 230:10	75:16 86:9,10	116:14 121:17	140:13 153:9
237:11	87:19 104:18	131:4 200:21	182:5 197:19
	119:8 122:21	203:22 205:22	239:4,9 258:6
excess 49:11	146:4 157:15	207:11 220:21	externality 225:20
exchanged 129:12	exists 291:10	290:7	extraneous 18:20
exchanging	expand 105:6,14	expertise 102:18	163:22
129:13	268:10	experts 33:14	
exciting 153:4	expands 109:17	37:14 38:6 40:12	extraordinarily
exclusive 75:8	expands 109:17 expansive 44:14	73:1 78:14	62:4,21
85:6 98:5	2	142:12 153:11	extraordinary
excuse 214:1	expect 49:14 57:15 144:11 154:2	234:16	31:22
execute 290:8	160:12,20	expert's 50:16	extrapolations 36:10
executed 37:2	177:7,15 244:19	expires 298:22	
	expectancies 88:9	explain 72:5 75:14	extremely 115:10
execution 153:1	expectation 8:20	78:15 124:1	eye 238:3
executive 193:7	231:10 268:19	157:10 185:22 197:13 236:12	F
executives 48:12	271:20 273:11	264:8 269:9	fabric 82:7
69:10 73:1 267:13	expectations 79:7	290:4	face 32:16 124:8
	272:4	explains 43:6	156:14 187:22
exemption 30:22	expected 45:21	59:21 72:16	243:16
exercise 89:14	117:17 167:10		

rage 25				
faced 56:17 63:21	162:20 222:19	185:1 225:4	favorable 273:1,3	
72:14	232:1 234:6	fairness 190:3	286:12	
faces 72:13 162:1	245:4 255:18		favorably 42:1	
	270:8 281:1	faith 130:3	•	
facilitate 219:11	284:16 295:3	faithfully 13:13	favored 273:21	
facing 74:13	factors 39:20 40:9	Fakler 3:3	favoring 76:22	
131:14 157:18	42:14 75:20,22	83:2,6,7,16,18	favorite 55:2,3	
269:1	76:4,10,19 89:18	108:11,13,22	favors 76:4	
fact 17:5 21:22	91:7 92:9,17	109:19 128:17		
45:16 50:20 52:5	101:20 116:10	141:17 185:8	FCC 116:18	
55:14 62:1 67:10	117:15 120:21	187:11 207:18	151:8,12	
69:22 84:8	125:19,21	209:10	202:1,15,17	
85:16,18	126:6,9,15,16	F-A-K-L-E-R	224:6	
94:16,19	128:5,6 143:21	83:16	FCC's 151:6	
99:16,22 101:12	144:7 145:1,5	fakler.paul@aren	223:21	
110:21 115:21	157:12 164:13	tfox.com 3:9	fear 47:17	
119:6	181:8 186:18,20		267:18,22	
120:10,13,14,16,	187:15 188:2	Fakler's 186:21	feasible 86:9	
22 121:15	220:6,14,19 221:5,14,19,22	fall 191:4 279:15	237:18	
124:18 125:11 130:15 133:5	221:3,14,19,22	fallback 178:8		
135:11 142:6	232:7 269:20	186:16	feature 22:17	
148:8 154:2		falls 62:15 138:14	253:3	
157:13 158:7	factory 158:11	178:2	featured 46:18	
161:12 170:6,15	facts 42:15 51:16		175:11	
174:7 179:10	64:9 103:6	false 124:18 128:2	features 57:7,10	
189:1 190:21	106:13 221:13	233:3	59:10 65:7	
207:2 218:19	failed 10:22	familiar 39:19	featuring 77:20	
226:9 229:8	failing 40:21	58:1 69:13	Federal 7:22 85:3	
232:10 236:10	260:18	fan 230:9	201:6,10,13	
237:16 239:12		fantastic 153:2	201:6,10,13	
243:4 249:11	fails 62:8	280:21	·	
287:1 291:11	failures 71:14		fee 9:22 28:3 29:6	
292:5,7	fair 9:10 30:9	fared 70:20	34:1 40:2 51:15	
facto 130:4,20	36:16 42:7 46:1	fashion 12:6	66:11 76:7 81:1	
factoids 239:13	47:2 78:8	18:3,6	105:16 114:1 119:10	
	104:16,17 139:3	faster 175:22	150:18,21	
factor 73:15 76:20	189:17 190:4	fast-forward 87:1	150.16,21	
78:8 80:3,15 86:19 102:3	230:16 232:8,9		186:10 261:4	
104:15 106:16	246:16 272:12	favor 107:6		
107:1,4 114:21	285:22 295:13	177:10,16,17,19,	feel 141:10 239:5	
115:6 126:22	fairly 109:9	21 230:21	fees 27:6	
127:2,5 145:8	149:14 182:12	250:1,8 286:3 296:1	28:2,3,4,10,12	
		470.1	29:11 33:15	

	0	,	
35:18 37:18 40:7	114:10,21 154:8	113:16 115:18	flawed 36:4
43:7,12 44:2,7	179:20 198:13	117:1 121:3,15	flesh 18:2
46:1 47:14.16	finances 72:19	135:9 143:16	flexibility 19:4
51:5 62:19,20	financial 29:19,20	144:4,7,22 146:2	· ·
183:6	30:8 32:4 69:1	147:13 149:9	flip 35:13 39:8
fell 12:16,22	73:13 74:16,22	155:19 159:1,20 172:4 190:16	flipped 131:7
fellow 10:11	79:12 86:20	191:19,21 192:2	flow 29:13 30:3
felt 139:11,15	105:8 115:16	193:20 194:1	51:22 70:17 75:3
146:16	117:14 129:21	196:21 199:20	107:20
feverish 47:22	130:5 131:3,19	212:10 213:5	148:13,14,19
	133:1 135:10	214:6,14	152:4,7,9,18
fewer 70:15	138:15 144:18	220:6,18	155:6 160:19,21
field 74:7 79:14	156:20 160:7	222:13,18	233:1
177:22 194:9	financially 32:13	236:14 245:17	focus 73:16 224:5
195:3 200:14	69:8 104:21	246:5,11 248:22	284:4
fields 194:15	155:10 187:17	259:12 271:16	focused 40:4 102:5
fierce 130:14	298:13	273:7 275:17 285:8	107:10
	finding 97:12		focusing 195:2
fiercely 32:16	findings 104:20	fish 172:11	275:9
Fifteen 105:3	finds 15:16	fit 24:18 75:20	folk 229:19
fifth 2:13 114:10	fine 133:18,19	fits 222:17	
177:18	139:11 162:11	five 14:11 15:1,5	folks 135:2
fight 273:1	257:4	35:22 50:5,6	Football 202:13
figure 125:8	finished 65:15	55:20 63:8	footnote 211:2
179:14,18 224:3		69:9,14 70:12	forbid 135:6
235:12,13 242:7	finite 265:15	72:1 87:22 93:10	force 283:1
270:4	firewalled 123:18	123:22 147:5	
figuring 236:3	firm 9:4,6,8 83:8	253:11 259:20	forcefully 139:15
filed 21:12	firms 272:7	280:11,13 285:2 286:19 296:2	forces 106:3
files 15:12 78:4	first 7:10 21:8,13	five-minute	201:15
	22:1,7,14 23:17	68:8,13 274:4	Ford 56:12 121:20
filing 11:21 12:20	27:16 29:4,16	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	122:3
28:6 30:2 33:2 43:9	34:14 36:8,15	five-step 60:5	123:6,12,15,18
	48:5,20 66:19	285:7	124:21 125:14
filings 129:22	77:15 85:21	five-year 38:8,10	126:21 185:6,22 186:11
137:1 155:11	89:1,4	39:16	
fill 237:2	90:7,8,9,18	fix 216:19	Ford's 121:21
filling 250:18	95:11,12 102:3,9 104:5,10,14	fixed 147:8 153:20	122:11
final 65:17 101:13	106:20 107:1	flag 69:4	forecasted 69:16
finally 14:21 113:8	111:2 112:3		forecasting 71:14

	1 48		
Forecasts 71:1	fraction 116:2	61:21 139:3	251:1 285:22
foregoing 39:22	224:21 239:21	195:10 206:6	garner 62:21
50:13 298:4	248:3 253:12 284:9	213:6 244:21 257:13 262:6	Garrett 4:6 141:6
foreign 100:8	framed 143:14	270:6 271:16	gas 237:2,3
forever 9:17 187:9	framework 17:3	273:10	gee 159:17
forgetting 150:16	18:16	fully 34:17,18	general 77:5 89:8
formal 26:12	frankly 106:1,22	52:15 58:5 59:14 67:10 71:6 139:9	92:4 94:11 120:7
formally 27:12	118:20	154:7 159:3	127:17
format 19:1 61:8	fray 202:9,15	244:5 257:16	138:14,19 155:19 229:4
former 197:2	Frear 29:19 48:3	283:18	248:4
199:22	74:16,21 78:14	function 167:3	generally 135:14
forms 227:13	131:18 147:7 149:15 153:19	183:18	151:9 194:21
formula 89:20	154:1 156:1	functionality 24:19 58:4 59:12	247:6
formulating 51:14	160:14	63:9 65:8 180:12	generate 39:10
formulation	Frear's 49:5	281:16	265:9
230:16	free 30:3 41:20	functions 197:15	generated 28:4
forth 7:20 13:14	56:19 74:1	fundamental	generates 60:16
40:9 46:17 48:13	148:13,14,18	124:13 125:2	generation 64:2
60:7 67:22 130:18 143:21	152:4,7,9,18 155:6 161:12	185:13 190:2	152:15 225:5
229:5 272:9	189:13	278:10	genre 54:21 59:12 230:13
forward 8:1 55:13	Freedman 4:5	fundamentally 65:11 83:21	
56:2 146:9	19:20 141:9	234:9	genres 46:13 229:12 230:7
154:15 157:12	freely 91:1	funny 47:2	250:22
forward-going	frequently 88:21	futile 176:14	gentlemen 133:16
232:15 233:15	freshen 130:12	future 32:16,19	George 121:20
forwardly 12:5	Friday 7:9	50:11 74:20 96:2	Gerald 95:1
fostered 73:17	friends 47:6	153:21 155:12	Gertz 46:7 48:3,21
founder 94:22	129:17	157:5,8,19	130:13 131:7
Fourteen 194:19	front 39:18 65:20	158:3,6 163:10,12	get-go 67:5
fourth 114:21	195:9 208:3	188:17	gets 29:3 103:22
115:5 117:15	272:2		116:5 125:9
126:21 127:1 145:8 160:14	frozen 131:17	G	134:11 152:8
162:20 176:10	fruits 17:21 18:19	gain 72:11 230:6	175:13 183:18
292:15	frustrate 82:12	gallon 237:3	257:19 294:2
Fox 3:5,13 83:8	full 9:1 39:9 44:6	game 98:22 136:15	getting 175:20 176:1 182:19
			1/0.1 104.17

12 18 3:5,12 7 32:3
18 3:5,12 7 32:3
3:5,12 7 32:3
32:3
32:3
21:20
2 25:1
,19
:11
•••
22
:9
,20 21
21
22 12
2,20,21
4,18,19
11,16
13,20
3,19,21 13,15,1
٠,١٧,١
6,22
38:12
2:14
31:6
:2
:7
1:12
0:15
5:19
1:7

		1	
154:7 230:4	188:19 276:4	high 33:16 58:16	hit 70:9 150:9
happens 134:11	hearing 7:12 36:4	62:22 69:20	hits 261:19
159:11 228:4	47:21 48:17	101:12,16 115:3,10,17	hold 9:17
239:19	297:4 298:4,7,10	116:8 118:9	holding 91:18
happy 136:10	hearings 6:6	149:20 150:1	163:9
hard 185:14	7:6,14,19 8:9	185:9 186:4	holidays 152:16
229:19 268:2	135:12	242:19 243:5	holy 251:1
290:6	hears 54:20	higher 28:1 42:18	•
harder 224:3	heart 14:9	67:6 100:13	home 49:16 102:10
harm 250:3	heartburn 9:16	114:4 121:11	
Harvard 193:15	heavily 173:1	142:5 145:14,16 146:1,8 167:7	homes 84:16
Hauser 289:17	heck 175:22	177:15 240:3	honest 231:20
haven't 119:15	heed 64:2	249:2 271:21	270:9
208:14	held 1:15,16	289:2,20	Honor 11:12 15:2
having 16:11	41:1,8 90:3	295:6,15	17:21 25:22 27:4 29:5 129:5 133:9
107:4 136:18	91:20 92:10,22	highest 252:4	140:18 207:16
139:12 158:21	100:21	284:20	209:9,10,15
159:8,13 170:18	he'll 75:5 77:16	highlight 6:21 7:4	210:9 211:3
192:2 198:6 210:17 265:22	help 90:6 103:11	182:20	213:17,19 217:4
266:3 275:13	113:22 157:10	highlighted 210:5	274:16
277:17 295:9,10	187:21	211:13 212:3,6,10	Honors 11:18
hazard 280:15	helped 95:2	highlighting 7:2	12:4,10 13:9,15 19:2 24:17
heading 29:15	helpful 20:20 96:8	66:9	26:9,17 27:12
heads 228:19	116:21 133:10	highly 47:18 56:20	33:22 34:20
	helps 16:17 269:22	106:2 137:6	39:21 40:3,13
head-to-head 37:8 60:3	hemorrhaging	hike 34:14	42:17 48:16
	32:14		50:13,14 51:2 52:21 53:2 54:3
health 69:11 73:13 138:15	hereby 298:3	hip 89:5	58:1 67:22
	here's 156:1 160:8	hip-hop 46:15	69:2,3,13 76:2,3
healthy 148:9,20 154:19 155:10	174:15 185:16	hiring 102:21	82:9,14,16
1	188:15	historical 113:2	83:2,7 94:3 130:11,15 132:4
hear 10:9,14 29:18 45:11 46:7 52:12	hereto 298:12	historically 127:8	130:11,15 132:4
54:10 56:14	he's 79:11 95:5,8	history 72:7	138:22 139:17
60:10 62:7 80:4	116:18	84:4,19 86:5	191:20 205:21
161:21 176:18	169:20,22	87:15 109:6,10	209:5 296:12
270:20	185:10	126:8 127:4	hooked 6:20
heard 172:1	hesitating 181:20	152:18 207:1	hope 6:22 7:1
	_		

		·	
57:15 113:18	280:21	103:21 132:10	138:20
156:10	identical 14:4	135:5 136:10	impeachment
hopefully 60:12	87:16 94:10	141:15 144:3	24:15
244:5	120:1,2	150:16 151:21	impeccability
hoping 129:6	identified 278:16	157:5 171:9,13	296:20
horizon 157:16	282:3 285:12	173:8 177:16 181:20,21 187:1	impeccable 128:18
	identify 24:4 55:2	191:8 193:6	-
horror 278:4	214:11 244:17	199:22 201:10	imperative 45:19
horse 191:4	247:1 251:6	202:5 204:4	imperfect 44:17
hospital 190:21,22	259:14 278:19	206:15,16,21	imperfectly
hours 60:12 70:2	281:11,13	210:2 211:12	255:13
263:16	285:3,8 286:21	217:18 220:4	impermissible
housekeeping	identifying 54:21	231:9,22 238:12	137:10
129:7 190:16	74:9	241:3 242:1,3,11 247:11	impetus 75:11
Houston 9:5	ignore 40:14 179:6	253:6,10,15	•
	233:21	255:9 272:18	implement 86:13 89:17 107:19
huge 56:15 241:10	ignored 79:3	275:6 283:17	110:16
hundreds 188:15	ignores 41:1 64:1	284:22	
hundredth 116:2	78:16 79:6 80:14	288:18,22 292:7	implemented 86:2
hunt 119:4 120:11	94:15 120:9,11	293:2 296:19	implementing
hurdles 187:21	122:2 127:17	imagine 147:10	119:22
	178:12,14,15	imbalance 131:14	implements 91:3
hyperbole 162:4	ignoring 133:21	132:1 137:16	implicate 35:14
hypothesizing	II 1:5	imbalanced 139:2	implications 18:4
38:19		immediate 163:1,7	195:22
hypothetical 53:8	III 166:16	164:6	implicit 236:4
117:8 171:4	I'll 35:2 48:15		288:2
245:12	141:17 162:16	immediately 123:5	implicitly 222:1
hypothetically	182:1 202:20 214:13 217:5	immensely 32:22	· · ·
121:8	222:12 236:15	impact 39:5 54:13	implied 39:22 165:20 168:13
	256:22 291:4	72:18,21	283:22
<u> </u>	ill-equipped 174:4	76:10,18 77:10	
ice 250:15	1	78:1 84:2 111:21	import 39:10
I'd 21:20 84:3	illustration 229:4	112:16 114:22 115:12 154:21	importance 49:16
94:12 204:4	239:16 283:15 286:13	163:1,19,21	73:6 80:5 148:13
205:22 219:14		164:1 178:15	important 16:18
278:14 283:8	I'm 8:7 19:11	186:20 195:19	46:20 54:3 58:5
ID 102:11	22:6,7 48:16 50:19 51:22 53:6	197:4	74:9 90:5 93:19
idea 94:22 138:3	57:18 60:8 66:22	impeach 137:13	112:17 113:4
232:21 271:9	69:6 75:21 83:7	^	129:6 158:12 199:17 233:18
<u> </u>	57.0 75.21 05.7	impeaching	177.1/ 433.10

254:11 262:2	incentives 222:14	38:9 39:16 49:10	46:20 172:3
273:6 280:22	incidentally 48:19	72:19,20 74:13	180:21,22
284:7 287:3	•	75:15 116:1	200:21 254:2,5
288:8,11 295:12	inclination 239:1	128:9 146:14,22	267:3,6,10,12,13
importantly 42:8	inclined 232:3	150:3,7,15	independently
65:19 81:12	include 57:7 58:2	151:3,9,14,17,21	125:17 138:20
93:10 111:17	112:6,7 126:6	152:5,10	independents
178:15	157:1 235:20	153:17,18	269:13
impose 151:10	291:5,8	154:10,22	
186:9	included 45:10	155:15 162:13 164:3,6 181:5	indicate 55:3 67:8 197:7 230:20
imposed 150:15,17	50:7 88:21 199:5	182:12 237:21	245:18 268:4
·	291:9	264:22 265:5,14	
imposing 147:1	includes 22:17	•	indicated 13:7
164:3 171:8		increased 32:20	14:6 27:4 60:15
impossible 81:14	including 36:17	49:15 72:9 77:21	64:7 67:14 76:1
229:21	54:11 56:9 72:6	111:18 113:5,18 147:9 154:9	145:17 265:4 294:21
imprecise 35:20	75:7 78:13 81:5 92:20 149:17	157:18 251:10	
impressed 296:20	152:16 156:8		indicates 115:17
_	195:11 203:11	increases 113:8	223:21 295:11
improve 107:19	206:1 207:13	increasing 29:11	indicating 46:11
153:16 157:14	232:18 240:6	34:16 113:12	137:2 252:18
160:7	247:19,20	148:3,4	indie 172:13
improved 29:1,21	268:13 292:8	151:14,18	indies 172:8
74:22 148:7	inclusive 217:3	156:14	174:1,8,14
152:11		increasingly 32:12	174:1,8,14
improvement	income 104:17	56:17 72:10	·
149:5,19 153:14	196:15 250:6	73:10,16 156:16	indifferent 251:21
improvements	252:2 265:10 268:21	incredible 156:20	indirectly 82:1
108:2,4		incremental	individual 36:9
improves 148:6	incomplete 24:14	263:12	43:20 59:19
150:9	inconsistent 127:3	indeed 12:15	81:22 248:16
	270:17	32:22 36:17	251:9,17 271:22
improving 150:13 159:21 160:3	incorporate 15:9	95:22 144:20	inducement
	43:12 251:8	187:11 221:19	222:19
inappropriate	incorporated	223:15 227:11	224:18,19 226:7
62:4 131:21	13:22 15:13	228:1 248:3	265:4
133:6 138:4	ļ	271:5	inducements
Inc 46:8 48:21	incorporating 15:20	in-demand 226:5	175:3 176:5
incentive 233:13			induces 249:13
251:9 263:9,17	incorrect 65:12	Independence	266:3
266:10,11 269:1	136:4 275:18	1:17	200.5
200.10,11 209.1	increase 34:13,21	independent 18:20	industrial 194:11

53:16 re 35:8 54:5
54:5
7:21,22
9:6 61:1
3:15,17
6:5 67:3
1 142:3
1,16
2,17,21
2,20
,11,13,21
5,17
71:15
227:19
,7,13
243:5
46:8
257:14
293:19
,8,12,18
rity
62:9
5:18
167:1
69:1
:1,6,14
:8,19
161:13
06:6
115:4
252:8
298:13
g 50:21
ice
28:6
0:4,13

	. 2 %	e 33	
21:9 37:7 54:2	invariably 65:16	iPod 226:18	issues 10:10
59:1 61:10 63:8	invented 84:14	iPods 56:3	118:18 135:10
64:3 87:3 156:15	invest 159:8	ironic 79:9	143:14 144:3
178:13 198:7	187:13		182:14 204:1
223:18 230:6,11		irrelevant 198:22	item 233:18
239:19 240:8	invested 70:12	238:1 275:20	items 219:17
246:8 279:8	79:17 88:15	irrespective 28:19	283:21
287:3,5 288:9 289:6 293:18,19	investigate 289:22	65:6	- "
•	investigated	irreversible	it'll 286:15
Internet-based	236:11 290:1	163:2,7	it's 11:7 13:18
73:18 219:6		ĺ	18:1,15 19:13
Internet-	investigation 220:12	ISDN 196:19,21 197:4	22:5 29:21 31:20
connected 58:12			32:6 37:20 45:18
Internet-delivered	investment 78:19	isn't 17:17 120:14	52:22 54:3 61:7
280:19	89:1 106:12	139:4 170:20	65:12,19 68:10
	161:4,10,15	186:4 225:3	79:9 82:6,7
interpretation 12:11	233:22 291:6	228:11 231:18	83:16 89:12 90:2
	investments 73:7	237:18 245:6	92:2,18 93:16
interrelate 221:7	78:16,22	254:18 257:15	94:5 98:21 99:1 101:13 103:21
interrelationship	79:16,20	278:4	101:13 103:21
221:3	110:15,20,22	isolate 285:2	112:17 113:3
interrupt 51:21	232:11,12,18	isolated 287:17	114:6 122:11
68:9 108:12	233:14	issue 23:6 36:17	126:20 130:18
133:7 181:13	investor 70:4	44:10 97:5 135:7	131:10 133:8
201:20 252:21	investors 79:7	162:1 164:9	139:7 143:6
interrupting	95:3 106:12	170:21 196:11	147:13 148:22
140:17 238:13	invites 33:22	197:16 198:20	153:4,15 157:21
		199:21 200:1	158:7,12,15
intersection	involve 36:12	222:21 223:7	159:3,19 162:4
199:11	282:2	225:3 227:8	167:17
intertwined 97:21	involved 95:4	228:1,8,13 229:1	174:11,12,15,20
intervening 109:5	115:1 192:20	231:17 237:20	175:15 186:5,10
interviews 103:18	197:12	239:11 241:9	193:20 195:1
108:1	201:4,6,10	246:13 254:2,6,7	199:2,12,13
	involvement 9:7	257:20,22	202:7 203:17
intimated 262:15	involves 26:18	258:6,10,16	204:5 209:1
introduce 132:9	37:5 193:2	260:3 261:6,11	214:1,17 215:20 220:4 224:3,22
137:14 141:5		262:4 264:11	226:11
introduced 129:14	involving 15:14	270:13 271:4,6 273:5 275:12,15	228:14,16
196:22	204:2 241:4	ŕ	229:8,11,19
introduction	282:11,12	issued 88:10	232:17 233:4,18
273:2	iPad 226:15	90:13,16 267:2	234:9,10
£ 1 J . L			

		l'	
235:6,19,21	jointly 204:11	216:2,9,11,14,16	Justice 201:5
236:18 238:7	Jonathan 183:10	,20	justifications
240:13 241:8		217:2,6,14,21	119:16,17
243:1,2 246:14	journals 194:21	218:2,5	•
247:4,10 249:11	198:10,11 227:8	219:15,16	justified 69:20
250:4,7,14,15	judge 2:3,4	230:17 232:4	juxtaposition
251:22 254:2,19	6:2,11,12,13	240:15,20	234:15
255:12 259:2,22	10:22	241:12,16	
260:6 261:14	11:1,2,3,4,15,20	242:3,10	K
263:15,16	12:1 14:8	243:10,13 244:1	Karmazin 74:15
265:17 267:1	15:3,19 16:15	252:21 253:9,21	75:14 78:14
269:10 271:2,10	17:4	254:4,15	152:1,13,20
272:15 275:14	19:3,6,8,12,13,1	255:1,22	154:11 156:18
276:13 277:10	4,16,17 20:15	256:14,20	157:8 160:8
278:3,5 283:4	21:18 23:19 24:1	257:4,5,10	161:2,7,19 162:5
284:3,8	25:4,6,11,20	258:12 259:8	188:19 189:1,3
285:14,17	26:1,11,14,15,16	270:14	•
287:3,6 288:20	51:11,12,20 52:7	274:3,8,14,17,20	Karmazin's
289:7,10	53:4,10,13	296:14,15,16,17,	155:20
290:4,10 295:11	68:7,11,16 82:21	18,19	key 93:19 109:5
296:21	83:14,17	judges 1:1	131:3 151:13
I've 11:5 44:11	108:11,14	25:10,13 40:21	234:21
80:4,16 136:15	109:15 128:16	76:21 89:17 90:6	keyboard 7:1
177:18 194:3,5	129:3,9	92:21 93:5 98:19	•
199:18 203:15	133:11,16	99:4,8,10,17	kinds 180:9
259:6 283:5,21	134:1,4 136:12	100:5 123:21	203:12,13 220:8
259:6 283:5,21 292:4	139:4,20,22	100:5 123:21 124:7 125:6	241:1
	139:4,20,22 140:20	124:7 125:6	-
292:4	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16	1	241:1 Kingdom 100:15
292:4 	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18
292:4 	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13
292:4 	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19
292:4 	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18 191:15,18	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9 277:9 278:12 291:7	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19 knock 50:17
292:4 	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18 191:15,18 201:20	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9 277:9 278:12	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19 knock 50:17 knowledge 20:11
J jack 56:4 James 73:2 Janusz 290:13 Jared 4:5 141:9	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18 191:15,18 201:20 202:4,16,21	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9 277:9 278:12 291:7 judgment 89:16 174:5	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19 knock 50:17
J jack 56:4 James 73:2 Janusz 290:13 Jared 4:5 141:9 jazz 46:13 229:18	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18 191:15,18 201:20 202:4,16,21 206:4,9,18,20	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9 277:9 278:12 291:7 judgment 89:16 174:5 judgments 52:21	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19 knock 50:17 knowledge 20:11
J jack 56:4 James 73:2 Janusz 290:13 Jared 4:5 141:9 jazz 46:13 229:18 230:9	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18 191:15,18 201:20 202:4,16,21 206:4,9,18,20 207:1,6,9,15,19	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9 277:9 278:12 291:7 judgment 89:16 174:5	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19 knock 50:17 knowledge 20:11 134:19 220:21
J jack 56:4 James 73:2 Janusz 290:13 Jared 4:5 141:9 jazz 46:13 229:18	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18 191:15,18 201:20 202:4,16,21 206:4,9,18,20 207:1,6,9,15,19 209:11,21	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9 277:9 278:12 291:7 judgment 89:16 174:5 judgments 52:21	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19 knock 50:17 knowledge 20:11 134:19 220:21 known 210:16
J jack 56:4 James 73:2 Janusz 290:13 Jared 4:5 141:9 jazz 46:13 229:18 230:9	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18 191:15,18 201:20 202:4,16,21 206:4,9,18,20 207:1,6,9,15,19 209:11,21 210:2,7,11,21	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9 277:9 278:12 291:7 judgment 89:16 174:5 judgments 52:21 Jumping 218:22	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19 knock 50:17 knowledge 20:11 134:19 220:21 known 210:16
J jack 56:4 James 73:2 Janusz 290:13 Jared 4:5 141:9 jazz 46:13 229:18 230:9 Jenner 129:18 jeopardizes 80:2	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18 191:15,18 201:20 202:4,16,21 206:4,9,18,20 207:1,6,9,15,19 209:11,21 210:2,7,11,21 211:1,4,10,15,18	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9 277:9 278:12 291:7 judgment 89:16 174:5 judgments 52:21 Jumping 218:22 June 1:12 7:10 297:5	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19 knock 50:17 knowledge 20:11 134:19 220:21 known 210:16 L label 58:15 81:22
J jack 56:4 James 73:2 Janusz 290:13 Jared 4:5 141:9 jazz 46:13 229:18 230:9 Jenner 129:18 jeopardizes 80:2 jfreedman@jenne	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18 191:15,18 201:20 202:4,16,21 206:4,9,18,20 207:1,6,9,15,19 209:11,21 210:2,7,11,21 211:1,4,10,15,18 ,19,22	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9 277:9 278:12 291:7 judgment 89:16 174:5 judgments 52:21 Jumping 218:22 June 1:12 7:10 297:5 junk 71:13 161:1	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19 knock 50:17 knowledge 20:11 134:19 220:21 known 210:16 L label 58:15 81:22 82:1 175:12,18
J jack 56:4 James 73:2 Janusz 290:13 Jared 4:5 141:9 jazz 46:13 229:18 230:9 Jenner 129:18 jeopardizes 80:2 jfreedman@jenne r.com 4:12	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18 191:15,18 201:20 202:4,16,21 206:4,9,18,20 207:1,6,9,15,19 209:11,21 210:2,7,11,21 211:1,4,10,15,18 ,19,22 212:6,17,20	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9 277:9 278:12 291:7 judgment 89:16 174:5 judgments 52:21 Jumping 218:22 June 1:12 7:10 297:5 junk 71:13 161:1 jurisdictions	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19 knock 50:17 knowledge 20:11 134:19 220:21 known 210:16 L label 58:15 81:22 82:1 175:12,18 249:11,21 259:3
J jack 56:4 James 73:2 Janusz 290:13 Jared 4:5 141:9 jazz 46:13 229:18 230:9 Jenner 129:18 jeopardizes 80:2 jfreedman@jenne r.com 4:12 job 269:18 274:5	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18 191:15,18 201:20 202:4,16,21 206:4,9,18,20 207:1,6,9,15,19 209:11,21 210:2,7,11,21 211:1,4,10,15,18 ,19,22 212:6,17,20 213:2,9,15,22	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9 277:9 278:12 291:7 judgment 89:16 174:5 judgments 52:21 Jumping 218:22 June 1:12 7:10 297:5 junk 71:13 161:1	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19 knock 50:17 knowledge 20:11 134:19 220:21 known 210:16 L label 58:15 81:22 82:1 175:12,18 249:11,21 259:3 263:9 265:4,15
J jack 56:4 James 73:2 Janusz 290:13 Jared 4:5 141:9 jazz 46:13 229:18 230:9 Jenner 129:18 jeopardizes 80:2 jfreedman@jenne r.com 4:12	139:4,20,22 140:20 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 190:8,14,18 191:15,18 201:20 202:4,16,21 206:4,9,18,20 207:1,6,9,15,19 209:11,21 210:2,7,11,21 211:1,4,10,15,18 ,19,22 212:6,17,20	124:7 125:6 127:7 139:21 177:17 269:18 272:17 273:9 277:9 278:12 291:7 judgment 89:16 174:5 judgments 52:21 Jumping 218:22 June 1:12 7:10 297:5 junk 71:13 161:1 jurisdictions	241:1 Kingdom 100:15 knew 21:12,18 23:2 176:13 237:19 knock 50:17 knowledge 20:11 134:19 220:21 known 210:16 L label 58:15 81:22 82:1 175:12,18 249:11,21 259:3

labeled 66:19	93:4,11 99:16	launches 146:10	leg 191:4
283:10	101:22 113:4	law 81:11 196:1	legacy 160:12
labels 36:9	124:8 129:12,19 133:22 144:21	199:12,14	legal 40:13 84:21
43:12,20 46:20	159:2,7 162:15	lawyer 162:3	legislative 86:5
47:12 48:8 58:14	189:3 211:8	221:4	87:15 109:6,10
59:19 87:6 103:14 108:8	268:6 280:11	lawyers 9:8 273:3	126:8 127:4
111:15	287:11 293:5,10	layman's 167:6	legitimate 88:8
112:4,8,11,15,19	Last.fm 22:9,10,17		Ű
113:2,6 114:5,18	23:14 24:19	lead 19:17 76:5	length 52:12
115:13,20,21	55:11 56:7 59:2	177:13 268:19	less 60:2 69:22
116:3,6 172:3	61:7,11 178:9,22	269:15 291:20	124:16 128:3
173:6	179:4,10,13	leads 42:15 47:16	144:20 184:4
175:7,9,16,18	281:20,21	77:21	226:12
247:8 248:16	282:3,20 285:10	league 19:18	229:11,14,22 271:11
249:22 262:11	287:11,13	202:13	
267:1,3,6,10,12, 13 282:15,18	288:21	lean 55:12,17 56:2	lesser 107:5
	lastly 148:11	leans 230:21	lesson 71:20
laboring 11:5	217:16	learn 23:8 37:8	let's 61:21 152:14
lack 76:21 214:12	late 9:3 85:15	225:15 230:13	243:19 245:14
laid 171:6	118:21		letter 13:1,18
landscape 36:2	later 24:17 25:1	learned 12:13 190:20	letting 268:19
72:11 73:5 84:21	35:3 69:22 105:3		_
278:22 279:4	191:14 200:3	learning 200:4	level 28:1 58:16
280:10	219:19 231:5	leasing 231:1	62:16 66:1 75:16 90:18 95:19
281:9,11,14	233:17	least 18:8 78:19	142:4 153:18
large 72:18 125:10	later-in-time	87:22 94:8	177:21 180:16
208:6 230:2	24:16	132:11 139:14	241:14 247:19
largely 15:12	Latin 229:20	145:9 176:3	250:17 272:9
32:21 71:18	latitude 21:15	189:14 191:11	284:20
74:11 111:15	23:10	206:16 219:5	levels 32:2,8 46:22
larger 32:22 33:11	latter 223:1	232:14 241:19 277:3,4 279:16	47:1,4 71:9 99:1
34:21 146:14	266:14	281:21 282:1	148:2,9
150:6 245:8	launch 48:4 95:2	288:9 289:8	leverage 150:13
287:4	107:12 109:12	295:14	159:21 160:2
largest 263:12	146:4 149:22	leave 60:14 151:21	Levin 4:6 141:6
LARSON 2:8	150:4 159:2	leaves 264:17	
last 8:21 22:18,19	launched		levying 183:20
34:5 36:11 43:10	85:1,14,15 102:9	led 47:19 196:9	Liberty 70:5
63:8 67:21 70:11	159:10	291:21	Librarian
71:14 83:15		ledger 30:8	41:7,13,22

	1 48		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
90:14,16,19,22	261:10	life 8:14	listenership 63:12
91:6,9	licensees 49:8	light 36:1 75:14	listening 37:10
95:17,20,22 96:7	251:16 271:3	117:15	281:5 296:3
97:10,17,19			
98:2,20	licenses 12:19 27:3	likelihood 72:20	lists 203:21
101:4,5,9 102:5	30:13 31:19	likely 63:16 72:11	literally 18:18
104:19 107:10	36:8,12 37:19	87:4 144:7	70:2 276:13
109:3 110:11	43:11 45:2 46:9	174:16 227:12	litigated 51:3
111:5,8,13,19,21	47:19,21	231:13 266:7	148:11 149:10
114:14 115:1,4,7	49:3,17,19 51:1	273:12	
126:2,4 127:14	52:4 53:2,5,15	likewise 178:21	litigations 51:3
Librarian's 41:12	57:3,4,11 59:4	296:6	little 17:7 19:5,22
91:11 101:18	60:1,18 62:15,17		20:20 21:9 83:20
	81:15 82:8,13	limit 48:1 71:16	94:12 135:3
Library 1:16	86:17 98:8 101:8	88:11 286:10	151:11 156:5
license 26:21	119:21 128:7	limitations 57:2	171:8 174:13,16
27:6,9,10	130:14	289:10	185:6 188:20
28:4,11,12,14,16	172:2,5,9,22	limited 18:12	199:8,12 201:22
33:4,15 34:15	173:4,16 174:22	85:22 88:3	224:3 243:14
38:12 39:12	176:11 177:7	132:20 239:7	264:5 269:21
41:21 45:4	178:7 219:4,9	271:4 273:20	279:21 289:3,20
47:13,14 48:5	246:7 252:17		LLP 2:12 3:5,13
50:18 51:14 52:2	253:18	limiting 13:15	·
53:19 56:13 57:8	256:8,12,16	256:2,21 273:22	loading 286:3
62:19 63:18	257:13,22 258:5,8	line 23:15 29:7	located 193:4
64:11 66:17	259:13,19 260:5	60:16 66:16	locations 224:8
69:21 72:12	261:2,7,12 263:8	72:18 98:13	
74:14 78:11	267:4,16,20	171:10 211:11	lofty 148:2
81:5,6,17 82:19 84:5,20 85:11	268:15 269:6	212:12 218:22	logical 137:19
86:2,3,7 93:1	270:17 271:7	219:2 292:17,18	Logically 81:21
94:6 97:6,11	273:6,14 276:6	lines 29:18 119:3,4	long 60:8 122:12
98:6 100:16	278:15,17	213:5	135:15 136:7
114:4	279:22 281:19	linked 158:2	152:8
117:4,5,9,10,11	282:17 285:5	list 131:3 196:19	long-awaited
118:14 121:9	286:11	197:6 198:13	113:6
128:2 173:5,7,10	licensing 48:2 49:7	204:5 206:12	
175:4 254:21	50:8 74:3 75:12	252:19	longer 32:13 44:17
255:11,20 256:2	84:21 96:10	į.	113:18 132:6
265:5 283:19	204:2 248:17	listed 79:9 222:7	223:15
licensed 46:5	266:17	253:10	long-term 79:19
86:20,21 98:3,10	licensors 81:18	listen 55:7,9,15	104:22 232:22
100:10 101:1		58:6,8 61:9	looking-forward
122:21 124:16	lies 17:5	141:10	269:14

-	1 ag	C 57	
lose 237:15	lowers 113:1	105:14 106:5 112:21	189:18 190:4 197:4
loss 106:8 115:15	lunch 7:13		221:6,16,18
losses 29:13,22	luncheon 128:21	management	222:2 246:15,20
30:2,4 32:14	Lys 38:6 131:5	32:15	247:13
75:1,4 78:20,22	153:20	manager 77:5	248:2,6,8,10
106:9 113:9	154:17,20	managers 77:14	249:9 250:11
114:9	190:20	mandate 144:12	251:4
lot 57:13	L-Y-S 38:6		253:2,7,12,14
102:20,21	2 2 3 3 0 . 0	maneuvering	254:7,9,12,16,19
122:13 123:4	M	250:20	,20 255:3,5,12
150:10 175:22	$\frac{1}{M.A}$ 193:15	Manges 2:12 9:5	256:22
179:12,13		manner 30:12	261:12,14
188:13,18	Mad 162:6,8	manufacturers	269:19 270:2
250:19 283:5	Madison 1:16	56:14	271:13,22 275:2,8,21,22
lots 270:7	magic 231:16	March 14:1	276:1,3,7
lottery 263:6	magnitude 75:17	130:10 156:2	277:13,21 287:9
low 56:19 73:22	243:20,21		288:2,16 291:22
121:10 123:2	'	margin 107:5	294:7 295:14
171:19 185:11	mailing 49:7	marginal 170:17	market-based
186:14 242:18	main 116:22	marked 5:13	40:22 41:4
243:6	200:14 275:11	209:14	
low-cost 56:17	mainstream	market 36:16 40:6	marketplace 15:10 16:6 32:17
lower 42:18 102:2	229:11	41:10,20 42:7	42:10,16 49:20
105:1 106:15	maintain 8:18	44:18 46:2	51:7 53:18 60:3
107:7 110:5	82:10 109:7	47:2,11 52:18	74:10 75:13
112:3,15 113:14	163:14	53:16 63:4	76:2,6 80:2
117:10 124:20	maintaining 39:15	73:6,10,17	86:14 87:9,14
145:13,17		84:7,11 89:11,15	91:1,4,9,17
152:12 160:6,12	major 35:8 43:21 45:20 54:1 58:15	90:4,21 91:19,21	92:12,19,22
185:10,19 232:2	62:10 63:18	92:1,3,6,10	93:18 97:11
239:20 240:12	66:13 79:18	93:8,15,17 95:5	98:16 99:9
242:20	247:8 261:13	100:4 105:5,19	100:19 117:8,12
265:2,8,22	262:13,16	113:18 122:3	121:5 122:5
266:4,8	263:12 266:12	126:5,10,12,14,1	127:21 141:19
267:20,21	287:12,20	7 158:13	142:4 143:9,11
269:13,16		165:3,12,16 168:22	144:5,8
290:12	majors 37:6 262:22	172:6,10,14,16,2	145:1,4,7,11,15
lowered 96:6	263:18,19	1 173:1,13	146:21 164:10,17
111:20	268:14	176:12,15,19	171:18 173:17
lowering 107:20	287:18,20	177:8,15 178:16	174:20 176:16
114:1	,	183:2,5 185:7,20	177:2,3 178:5
	managed 95:5		177.2,5 170.5

	rag	C 00	
275:14 278:6 283:14 284:13	maturities 160:18	253:22	merged 149:11 151:8 256:11
markets 79:6 93:7	maximizing 102:3 114:22 252:1	meant 103:7 123:9 273:16 286:6	merger 149:11,13
100:8 114:11	may 8:15 11:17	measure 31:21	merit 35:22
122:19 144:10 158:2 167:5	23:22 26:17 32:3,19 49:20	237:12,20	message 50:4
236:6 249:9 276:14	55:2 69:13 76:5	mechanical 93:3 mechanism 91:2	messaging 48:9 50:7 240:8
marquee 75:8	92:3 129:7,9 131:5 134:13	199:6	Messrs 48:3
Martin 3:12 83:9	139:13 169:2 174:5 176:6	media 46:8 48:21 70:5 74:6 108:7	130:13
massive 18:14	187:22	114:12,17	met 130:14 133:1
32:14 71:1	190:15,22	Mediabase 77:17	metal 46:14
match 157:5 material 17:17	191:12,13,18 209:15 215:6	meet 251:18	methodologies 127:9
115:12 212:7	219:15 248:12 263:5 270:15	meeting 153:3	methodology
materials 12:13 13:4,16,20 14:5 17:22 112:8	203:5 270:15 274:10 maybe 21:18 159:16 174:13	251:6 meets 162:18 163:17	91:13 122:1 123:5 124:9 125:3 127:12 166:10 220:1
math 30:16 67:22 171:6,10 292:22 mathematical	204:5 221:16 269:19	Mel 74:15 152:1 160:16 189:3 member 203:7	methods 89:3 218:15
89:20 90:1	mean 98:13 111:8		metrics 125:9
mathematically 245:7	128:12 138:5 161:10 182:12 221:9 236:17	members 47:7 48:11 251:22 252:10 267:16	Meyer 54:11 73:2,9,15,21 74:9
mathematics	243:16,17 253:5 258:16 285:12	membership 252:2 mention 10:22	mic 133:22 134:2
	286:5	35:2 62:14 63:17	Michael 141:8
matter 1:5,15 23:11 65:4,12 102:15 103:12 116:5 129:7	meaning 28:11 41:2 58:6 130:6 138:15 224:10 242:2 268:16	mentioned 17:9 48:20 74:5 75:2 78:6,9 80:20	microphones 133:21 134:4 microtheory
136:6,8,22 138:15 139:16	meaningful 18:11	95:11 99:14,15 181:16	200:13
187:9 190:16	19:2 268:14	mentioning 238:19	mid-1986 9:3
237:3 238:6 246:2	meaningless 116:4 126:13	mentions 120:17	middle 260:1
		mercifully 144:20	midsentence 7:18
matters 116:19 175:17 202:12	means 96:15 173:14 176:22	mere 119:1	midway 283:11
Matthew 3:4 83:9	192:14 226:12	merely 32:18	mildly 152:8
mature 113:15	232:14 235:15,17 252:1	34:13	Millennium 87:2
			million 28:4,9,12

	1 48		
150:18,22 151:4	namely 13:2,15	172:3,22	night 129:19
167:3,7,8	99:9 119:10	173:1,4,15,17	nobody 125:15
170:8,12,18	220:13 236:7	174:22	132:15 248:5
171:1,4 179:12	Napster 58:3	178:12,19	
180:17	244:11	202:14 263:4	nod 274:4
181:11,17		264:2	Noel 240:15
184:10,14,18,22	narrow 19:21	287:9,11,14	Noll 5:8 10:6,12
185:12,18	259:1	negotiating 101:7	12:8 14:11
186:4,7,17,19	Nash 117:2,7	174:7,14	15:9,19 16:7,8
187:4,16,21	national 195:19	· ·	17:6,22 24:7
188:2,8	202:13 230:2	negotiation 117:9	25:15 37:5 42:21
189:18,22	282:12	174:20	52:13 53:17
190:1,4 214:18		negotiations 41:20	58:14,22 59:21
222:21	nationwide 222:16	173:5 175:7	60:14 61:3 62:5
225:15,17	natural 238:22	268:15	66:9,14
226:2,8,11,13,15	nature 35:20	neighborhood	67:8,12,17 76:17
,18 227:12	54:4,12 62:19	28:12	78:15 80:5
228:19	109:18 114:15		130:13 131:7
229:15,17,19,20	205:4 218:13	neither 46:2 61:10	132:2,8 137:8
230:13,22	223:2 283:16	121:13 298:8	171:21 173:3
234:10 235:8		net 30:4 75:4	176:17 177:5,9
239:19	nearest 280:4	76:22 78:20	178:11,22
240:1,2,7,13	nearly 29:21 75:1	264:17	179:3,18,21
242:4,5,6,9,14	152:15 157:1	nets 179:22	180:6,10 181:2
246:8 261:16	necessarily 35:19		191:21
262:5 266:1,3	120:1 126:17	network 61:16,18	192:1,12,13
281:1,6,16	136:5	154:6,7	201:22 205:22
287:3,5		180:3,18,21	206:5 207:19
288:2,17,20	necessary 8:8	196:21	218:9 219:22
290:3 292:1	15:22 64:6 67:12	networking 22:17	230:18 238:14
294:14 296:3	76:16 80:6	networks 56:8	241:15
music/nonmusic	164:14 278:21	197:4 198:8	274:11,22
64:4	needless 171:21	Nevertheless	Noll's 10:15 13:3
musical 31:4 96:11	negative 30:3 75:3	145:19	16:18 37:1 43:6
97:2,16 99:5	148:8,20 152:6		47:10 51:18 60:4
100:8,11,21	231:1	newer 63:15	66:21 68:1
117:3,10 145:14	neglectful 24:13	newfound 69:11	170:22 178:1,8
188:2 205:12	<u> </u>	news 156:2	209:20
223:8,16 241:9	negotiate		nominal 67:6
Muzak 105:5	172:14,16 262:22	Next-to-the-last 75:19	125:4,12
myself 11:8 284:10	negotiated 28:2	nice 20:18	nominally 265:8
	43:11 49:19	nickel 70:10	nominated 46:15
N	53:18 57:11 91:1	michel / U.1 U	
	<u> </u>		

·	0		
non 279:19	nonsound 234:18	novel 89:2	50:3 139:18
noncomparable	nonstatutory 45:2	November 37:3	147:19 148:2,5
94:1 121:11,16	nonsubscription	43:10 130:8	149:6 152:17
122:9,12	30:14	259:14,15	175:21 183:17
124:5,10,12	30:14	,	208:13 210:19
125:5,13,22	noon 7:13 128:19	nowhere 115:19	226:14 240:11
127:20 128:7	129:16	nullifies 125:17	250:11 253:5
Noncooperative	nope 151:20	numerous 43:19	279:22
117:2	nor 30:8 47:8	73:12 185:8	occasional 106:6
	91:21 106:11	188:6 203:21	occasions 188:6
none 99:15 111:17	134:16 160:12	204:5	203:6
125:11 174:2	298:9,13	nut 238:8	
185:11 281:12 291:14	·		occupation 192:13
	normally 91:4	nuts 238:5	occur 96:4 197:20
nonetheless	norms 47:16		occurred 50:5
129:22 291:14	Northwest 3:14	0	101:21 201:8
nonfeatured	4:7	oars 11:5	occurring 280:10
175:12	notably 45:15 75:7	object 20:1 279:1	occurs 251:17
noninteractive	77:15 119:9,20	288:14,16	
15:15 37:6	Notary 1:19	objected 12:8	October 159:9
54:1,18 55:5,18	298:18	93:13 132:5	odd 98:9
57:1 59:1,8,12		objection 17:5	odds 126:2
60:6 61:2 66:3	note 7:1 88:20	134:7 139:5	
99:7 165:5,21	112:17 113:4	140:11,14	OEM 73:6,10
166:19,21	233:19 238:15	207:16 209:9,10	158:2
167:10,14,22	noted 44:11	210:22 211:17	offer 37:9 50:12
168:2,7,14	88:7,13 89:20	212:5,16	58:3 65:7 144:16
178:13 184:22	96:1 107:13	213:8,21 214:16	176:14 195:6
219:6 223:19	110:14 111:13	215:10 216:1	205:22 209:7
230:5 247:22	115:2 120:5	217:12	235:3 261:7
277:1,3	notes 6:22 7:4		276:19
279:10,15,19		objections 133:14	offered 24:16,19
288:9 293:20	nothing 120:21	207:18 217:20	56:12 59:14 70:5
294:4,6,9,13	144:18 162:17	objectives 89:22	80:9 93:6 140:14
nonmusic 28:22	163:6,17 165:5 186:15 228:16	obligation 41:3	144:14,19
56:18 67:12	252:3 253:6	obligations 75:10	162:17
142:7,12			170:12,13
170:7,13,14,17	notice 39:5 271:6	obtain 142:16	173:10 175:2
171:1 180:1,2	noting 115:9	obverse 269:10	176:4 177:4
235:7,16	notion 91:7	obvious 92:2 140:4	180:7,9 228:18
nonrepresentative		288:5	
45:22			262:10
	12:21 32:8	obviously 47:5	offering 30:7
235:7,16 nonrepresentative	noting 113:9 notion 91:7 notwithstanding 12:21 32:8	obvious 92:2 140:4	180:7,9 228:18 244:16 256:3 262:10

	,		
45:14 52:4	ongoing 11:9 72:8	opportunity 80:2	171:3,18 181:2
184:22 241:6	3 0	160:11	227:19 234:13
	on-screen 103:4	100:11	
offerings 37:12	107:21	opposed 37:7 98:5	290:13
56:18 281:17	onto 64:20 150:20	205:8	Ordover's 65:3
offers 140:10		onnogin = 200.16	67:19 123:7,14
	open 48:17	opposing 209:16	165:10 293:4
163:17 176:19	open-ended	opposite 158:7	
244:18 281:22	284:22	226:11	organization 46:8
office 9:5,9,11		annosition 10.7	48:22 153:2
1	opening 5:2 10:14	opposition 10:7	194:11 200:15
officer 29:19 74:16	26:2,7 83:4	130:14	206:1 207:12
79:13	114:11,16 129:8	optimal 237:10	organizations
Oftentimes 103:10	131:6 133:8	optimism 32:15	31:3,11 50:6
oh 138:14 185:9	139:13	i -	97:4 266:16
1	140:4,7,15,17	optimistic 68:22	
285:20	141:1 153:10	69:9 74:18	267:14,18
okay 9:19 23:19	186:21 222:2	105:14	268:17 271:18
122:12 186:17	234:22 237:8	ontions 27.10 56.2	original 15:17
190:18 191:15	234.22 257.8	options 37:10 56:2 230:10	16:5 20:9,12
208:9 209:11,21	270:14 272:14	250:10	21:17 22:3,19,20
211:6,15,18,22	2/0:14 2/2:14	orchestrated 48:7	23:3 95:4
212:20 213:2	openings 276:5	order 7:8 8:5 11:6	101:3,15 104:6
215:22 216:16	operate 57:4 79:6		105:4 106:11,12
232:4 241:12	282:5	13:6 14:6 18:7	132:2
243:19 244:1	202.3	84:19 92:17,22	
l i	operates 278:22	96:7 108:19	originating 41:15
258:12 259:8	operating 30:4	113:22 141:16	ostensibly
274:14 283:4,5	73:6 75:4 78:20	169:18 203:14	64:17,21 71:17
286:20 287:22	118:16 152:12	223:22 233:9,15	·
296:14	179:11 232:16	235:2 263:13	others 58:20 106:8
onboard 11:7		269:2 278:7,19	204:1 227:4
	233:2 236:5,7	orderly 136:20	259:4
on-demand 45:2	264:14 267:7	137:16	otherwise 16:9
58:11 59:14	operation 144:10	1	43:13 47:12 57:1
62:19 64:9 78:6	·	orders 8:2	137:13 163:15
289:9	operational	Ordover 35:6,11	
ones 14:12 110:19	156:20	61:2 62:7,14	232:3 255:7
157:21 240:19	operations 73:3	63:22 65:13	298:13
246:12	75:7 86:11 87:19	66:15 67:7,13	ought 21:8 40:15
279:15,16		1	101:17 132:11
281:19 283:22	opines 171:3	76:8 80:13	214:11 236:4
	opinion 41:22	122:16	253:4 256:16
286:11	121:17 123:8,9	123:8,13,14,19,2	
one's 13:21	145:4 205:14	1 124:4 145:2	ours 98:18
one-sided 130:22	235:11	164:19,22	outcome 43:14
		166:5,14 168:17	49:21 60:17
139:1	opinions 51:10	169:13 170:15	115:5 231:13
<u> </u>			113.5 251.15

263:3,5,7 264:1		panel 6:14	282:13 287:21
272:7,20 273:22	P	8:2,12,17	particularly 58:11
286:16 295:20	p.m 7:14 128:20	Panel's 139:10	89:9 96:10 99:6
298:13	129:2 190:13		117:14
outcomes 117:12	274:7 297:3	paper 167:16 197:11 198:17	parties 8:3,9,19
273:17 287:15	pace 22:14	202:1 214:6	9:21 27:4,16
outlet 230:4,5	package 61:5		28:2 37:21 66:10
·	70:5,6 105:22	paradigm 75:12	119:18 129:11
outlets 230:2	113:21 150:22	paragraph	140:5 173:16,18
250:22	154:10	22:7,8,9 120:22	184:20 247:1
outlier 185:21	170:12,14	121:1 195:10	282:22 285:16
outliers 46:1 52:17	packages 170:16	196:4 211:8	286:8 298:10,12
outset 80:20	•	212:10 213:6	partner 28:17 30:7
142:20 188:14	page 5:2	268:6,12 272:3	•
1	14:15,16,17,20,2	parallel 50:21	partnership 33:11
outside 129:20	1 20:2 22:4,16	51:16	party 76:12
130:7,8 138:17 139:7 277:17	195:5,8,11 210:1,4 211:7	parameters	135:17 209:16
	212:2,7,9,21	132:13 133:5	285:16
outweighed 111:7	213:3 214:14,21	paraphrase	pass 141:12
overall 113:4	266:15 268:7	270:15	passage 85:20 88:5
194:17 281:15	271:14,15		268:9
overestimate	274:22	parent 41:15	•
292:2	pages 1:14 271:19	parity 59:22	passing 50:20
overestimations		parlance 96:14	past 72:1 156:21
71:5	paid 28:10,13	participants	164:19 177:19
	29:11 30:9,16	8:18,21 9:2	178:18 182:1
overhang 276:8	31:13 35:19	·	185:3,4 203:16
overhanging	65:22 127:21 159:3 175:8	participate 201:9	255:11
173:5	183:18 184:1,3,4	participated 174:3	path 43:7
overstate 40:1	239:21 249:2	participating	patience 82:15
overstates 186:19	294:17	184:15	140:1 218:10
		particular 16:22	Paul 3:3 83:7
over-the-air 223:5	painfully 140:3	19:22 54:21	
224:4 277:5	pains 238:22	77:20 118:17	pause 50:14 57:13
overturned 90:15	paint 158:5	196:1 197:16	213:20
overview 73:4	Pandora 12:20	222:17	pay 26:19 31:1,2,9
	55:2 56:7,10	225:15,18	33:15 66:3 72:17
overwhelming 147:2	132:4 137:9	226:2,6,12,13	81:19,21,22
	156:16 285:13	230:8 241:22	85:12 124:20
owner 104:16	287:1,2	242:4 249:20	125:12 128:10
owners 106:17	288:11,21	255:17 261:10	143:17 144:9
163:4 187:19	296:3,7	277:8 280:20	148:16 160:22
	, · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		161:3,4,19

	rag	CII	
167:2,4,7,8,21	21 249:13	8 178:6	100:9,16,22
169:12,14,15,17	255:10 257:21	181:4,5,21	112:22 115:16
170:5 179:10	258:18 261:10	184:16,17,18,19	117:4,5,10,14
188:16,17,22	266:3 276:19,22	186:14 219:4	125:10 128:7
189:6,11,17	277:2 281:5	223:22 224:1	156:20 157:11
232:16	295:15	225:1 233:5,10	160:7 199:15
236:19,21 237:1		234:12,14	205:10,11
238:1 239:20	per 31:18 105:17	244:10,20	246:22 247:14
283:19 284:9	113:13 123:2	245:7,8,12 247:7	
295:14	130:3 165:21,22	257:18	performance-
	233:10	261:12,14	based 97:15
payable 60:1	237:3,14,19	264:7,10,12,13,1	performances
payback 70:7	238:2 291:22	4,22 287:5	44:18 77:1
paying 34:17	293:6,7	294:20	81:4,20 108:1
124:16 170:7	perceived 65:9		performed 228:6
186:5 233:7,8	176:8	percentage	^
240:7	percent 27:9,20,21	64:15,18	performer 189:6
	33:16	65:5,16,21 67:3	performers 189:11
payment 9:22 39:6		122:17 125:4,12	·
264:21	34:14,15,17,18 35:1 36:21	166:1,3 168:15	performing 16:4
payments		179:2,8	31:2,10,11 51:9
31:19,22 32:9	37:3,19	183:7,12,14,19,2	75:13 96:20
183:11	38:4,13,18	2 184:8	97:4,8 248:18
	39:4,13 44:8	186:1,5,9	251:16 271:21
pays 64:2 125:15	49:12 52:18 66:4	236:19,21	performs 67:12
128:3 183:13	69:20	237:1,17 263:14	81:17
187:18 188:13	70:4,7,8,18	264:16 283:22	perhaps 14:8 15:4
239:15 243:5	71:17 81:1	284:1,4,5 293:9	17:10 54:21 90:5
284:17	101:10	percentages	146:22 214:10
PC-based 260:8	115:10,22	292:17,20	219:16
peace 9:18	116:2,11	,	
· 1	118:2,4,6 121:10	PERELMAN 2:11	period 26:21
pecuniary 225:20	122:18 123:1	perfect 253:6	27:17,19
Pelcovitz 166:15	124:17,21 128:3	281:12	29:10,13 33:4
penetration	141:20 142:2,9	perfectly 250:11	38:9,10 39:1,17
113:18	143:1,2		50:5 56:13 70:20
	145:10,20,21,22	perform 26:20	71:13,21 72:12
people 57:19	147:9,10	31:4 85:10 97:7	73:14 74:4,14
102:21 151:20	152:5,10 164:7	143:18	96:4 137:2
158:14 197:13	166:4 168:4,16	performance	138:17 142:21
223:20 225:15	171:19,20	27:14 29:20 42:6	149:5 158:16
228:4 233:9	172:6,9,14,16	43:13 74:22 81:6	permissible 15:6
237:9 239:8	174:10,11	84:9	23:18
242:7	175:8,10,11,12,1	85:5,8,18,22	permission 26:9
247:15,17,19,20,	3,14,17,21	97:2,14 98:4	permission 20:9
	176:1,12,13,15,1	-	

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·	
219:13	piÓce 284:18	player 93:17	pocket 143:6
permissive 135:14	pick 231:15	players 174:2	podium 133:17
permit 216:5	picked 219:18	281:14	point 21:10 22:22
permutations	285:9	playing 177:22	23:5,6 31:17
293:11	picture 242:17	263:6	35:21 50:12
per-play	pie 287:9	playlist 55:5	52:20 68:10
178:15,19,21		250:20	74:21 78:18 87:3 108:12 113:6,7
179:2,6	piece 18:17 167:16	playlists 230:3	114:6 126:5
person 57:18	piecemeal 139:1	plays 77:18 177:22	146:6,16 150:9
124:8 254:18	pieces 227:2	179:5,14,15,18	151:13 157:11
273:21	pie-in-the-sky	251:10,21	160:16 162:3,16
perspective 30:20	153:11	252:1,4,5	163:10,12
152:14 263:8	pike 87:6 280:14	263:12,18	179:20 182:18
persuade 110:4	pioneers 86:9	264:22	183:21 185:13,15
persuaded 87:7	88:15	265:5,9,16 266:5 269:3,13 270:11	187:15 205:21
1 ^	piracy	,	209:5,16
persuasive 76:21	197:16,18,20	playtime 250:22	229:4,16
per-subscriber	places 194:4	please 6:3 7:3	231:7,11,20
114:1 179:3 183:6	_	25:12 26:17 35:13 38:2	239:5 241:2,4
	plague 37:15	39:9,14,19 46:12	244:4 246:9
pertaining 287:10	plan 49:11 152:14	66:7 68:18 129:4	255:8 263:14 264:16 269:11
per-unit-of-use	274:15	140:2 190:14	286:14
237:10	planning 49:9	192:10 193:8	pointed 20:16
perverse 278:4	platform 43:21	194:6 198:15	245:9
Pgs 1:8	45:17 61:15	206:8 213:18 218:12 220:3	pointedly 49:18
Ph.D 193:15	67:15	246:1 247:1	· •
phase 6:6 50:16	platforms 108:7	266:20 268:8	points 42:10,11,16 62:13 76:6 92:15
191:1 203:3	plausible 63:3	271:1,15 274:9	175:6
phenomenon 62:8	67:20	275:5 284:21	policies 91:8
249:11 250:10	play 49:20 191:10	288:14	196:17
251:12 269:5	248:21 249:3	plenitude 244:18	policy 42:4,8 79:8
phone 240:12,16	250:19 263:15	plug 235:9	89:18,22 90:4
241:1	playback 56:2	plugged 56:3,5	91:3,7
phones 281:6	108:2	plugging 38:17	92:9,13,17
phrase 222:2	played 102:12,19	plummeted 71:9	101:20 116:10
physical 18:9 24:3	103:22 104:1 162:8 229:6,15	105:17	117:15 120:21 125:19,21
112:19 113:9	249:1,12,22	plus 172:6,8	125:19,21
234:20	250:2	200:17 240:9	,19 127:2,5
	L		,

	1 45		
192:18,20 193:1,5 194:13	231:14	286:1,9	presented 127:8 273:8,12
195:21 198:22 200:19 203:13	possible 92:8 191:6 231:7 233:21 252:5	precisely 13:19 43:22 93:6 251:12 269:6	presents 94:18 116:22 140:8
221:15 policy-based	255:13 263:7 264:1 269:22 280:4,17	predecessor 41:16 78:17	preserve 108:19,20
86:13,19 87:13 88:18 89:10	possibly 138:12	predicted 70:15	preside 6:14 9:17
108:16	post 131:19	71:2	president 73:3
political 177:12 272:6	postclose 129:20	predictions 70:19 78:10	74:6 77:5 94:21 95:6
politics 199:12	poster 287:1	preexisting 1:6 6:8 30:15 83:11	Presidential
poor 115:16 267:6	post-November 132:22	87:12 88:9	201:15 press 134:5
popular 55:1	pot 163:14	96:16,19,22	pressing 34:9
popularity 262:5	potential 15:11	prefer 263:20	presumably 61:12
population 224:2 portable 56:4	17:5 35:18 49:8 62:18 117:12	preference 139:10 preferred 176:19	82:2
58:13	157:15 158:6	prejudice 13:6	presume 274:11
ported 56:5	197:4 220:15 225:8 295:3,4	preliminary 10:3	pretty 106:22 150:22 159:14
portion 6:22 13:7 14:4 91:12 182:4	potentially 131:15	102:15	284:2 290:10
200:3	278:20	premise 65:11 178:3	prevailing 32:2,7 47:1 185:7
portions 14:11 15:6 19:22 210:5	power 275:13,19 276:2	premises 78:9	prevent 87:18
portrait 69:1	powerful 50:10	prepared 139:9	146:8 273:6
posit 253:3	practice 29:9 136:22	196:8 219:10 preparing 131:15	preview 66:8 75:21 222:10
position 33:8,12	pre-1972 81:7	presence 47:11	previewing 69:5
52:3 64:13 79:12 98:20 100:4	preannouncement	present 18:3,7	previous 30:6 77:12 92:20
105:8 139;15 179:14 243:14	57:9	43:4 77:16 136:21 186:12	281:4 291:7
286:7,10	precarious 105:10	272:1,22	previously 46:22
positions 37:22	precedent 41:2 50:21 89:7,13	presentation 8:5 11:10,14 23:21	116:17
positive 146:15	92:14,18,20	39:20	price 61:22 64:11 65:15,17 70:10
148:8,20 230:22	94:13,16 120:5.6	147:15,21,22	144:11
233:1	122:2 126:20	148:7 150:12	150:15,20
posits 33:14	127:3,11,18 128:5,11 282:8	158:9 160:2	151:3,8,18,21
possibilities	precedential 283:1	161:7	154:9 166:2,17,19
	F. ************************************		100.2,11,17

	rag	·	
167:3,12,13,19,2	principles 89:8	124:11	199:5 201:10
2 168:2,3,16	94:11,16 120:7	nyonodural 7.20	203:14 231:13
169:5,7 170:5	127:17 199:3	procedural 7:20	248:12,14 270:6
171:5 173:8	200:5	procedure 139:16	272:2,15,18
236:3,4,9,21		220:5 285:7	278:11 286:15
237:1,3,9,10,13,	prior 8:2 13:22	proceed 7:7 8:10	295:22
19 238:2	14:4,6 16:7	10:2 122:8	
242:19,20	17:22 20:7 28:1	139:12,17	processes 199:15
243:7,20 252:10	33:4 35:12 38:9	•	231:10 273:17
265:22	39:1 40:11 43:8	proceeding 8:11	produce 180:16
266:11,13 269:2	44:16 45:9 55:20	13:8 26:18	222:14 224:7
270:5 272:7	58:1 69:21 74:11	27:2,12,16,18	268:21
277:7,8,9,19	85:2 99:4	35:12 40:4,12,15	produced
278:5,8 284:12	127:10,11	41:13 43:8,14	-
288:2,8,16	143:15 204:9	44:2 45:11	13:4,16,21 17:7
289:1,16 290:2	prism 34:1	47:14,19 49:21	24:11 41:19
· '	^	53:17 55:21	48:15 130:9
291:21,22	private 49:1 267:2	72:15 74:12	240:19,22 280:1
294:8,9	privately 48:16	77:3,12,16 82:17	produces 162:22
priced 53:16 73:22	49:19	88:1 90:8,11,12	producing 198:5
170:14,16	privatization	93:4,11 95:13	, o
prices 47:3 56:21	203:9,14	97:13 101:16	product 17:18
151:15 166:21	·	104:5,6,11 111:2	61:5 65:15,17
169:9 171:12,16	PRO 97:11	113:17 115:11	84:15 97:21
199:6 272:8	101:6,8 116:7	116:1 121:18	106:18
276:15,16	117:11	128:12 143:14	222:14,15,20
277:11 278:2	probably 57:18	174:6 184:15	224:20 256:18
292:17,20	199:10,17	202:18 204:9,21	276:18 277:13
	203:15 234:22	218:13,17	product-
pricing 117:16	264:1	255:19 267:21	differentiated
primarily 156:15		268:4 269:8,15	255:12
280:5	probative 36:7	281:4 282:9	
primary 38:3	44:1 47:18 50:17	283:2,6 296:9	production 8:15
63:22 65:4 74:3	51:13	, i	107:22 113:3
111:10 115:19	probing 138:19	proceedings 1:15	products 45:15
	problem 113:19	6:15 8:16,19	225:18 250:12
principal 30:21	125:2 158:6	44:17 45:9 55:22	276:20
194:4,7 262:21	159:19 160:13	58:2 89:7 99:4	professes 32:6
263:1	196:16,18	136:15 174:3	^
principally 15:14	237:11 238:17	182:1	profession 207:2
97:10 172:1	278:3 282:13,14	process 12:13 13:5	professor 14:11
194:1	291:21 292:3	16:8,21 17:2	25:15 35:6 42:22
		47:15 59:20	63:22 65:3,13
principle 92:4	problematic 234:2	60:5,16,20 76:19	66:14,15 67:8
221:9,12 256:4,6	problems 123:4	80:11 82:4 95:15	72:1,5,16
285:21		177:10 195:7	

	1 45	·····	
76:8,18 79:22 116:16 132:2 191:21 192:14 194:3 201:22 205:22 206:5 207:19 230:18 234:13 240:15 289:17 Professors 78:15	projected 69:19 73:13 154:13 155:3 projecting 158:9 projection 154:15 projections 38:5,7 70:21 71:18,22 105:12 153:12	28:18 proposal 30:5 34:11 35:6 38:3 39:3,10,13 43:5 53:21 78:10 116:13 118:9 120:15 128:1,13,14 155:9 164:5	provide 23:10 53:20 59:2 62:3 65:8 73:4 77:6 193:8 197:8 203:8 239:22 295:7 provided 61:6,11 119:16 203:22 205:15 235:21
proffer 140:6	155:1	188:8 284:22	provider 157:4
207:11	prominently 12:17	proposals 54:17	282:18
proffering 50:22	promote 103:11 promotes 61:2,4	propose 142:18 144:1 231:2	providers 73:19 245:5
proffers 130:2	•	į	
profitability 74:18	promotion 198:12 228:22 231:17	proposed 11:19 12:7,15,22	provides 45:16 95:20
78:11 113:19 150:8 190:1	228:22 231:17 promotional 43:21 63:16 65:9 70:16	12:7,15,22 13:1,8,10,13,15 14:1,4 15:13	95:20 providing 6:18 59:9 61:8 67:15
profitable 79:2 106:6,7 114:8 189:5,16,19 263:15	76:22 77:7,13 78:4 103:10,18 111:21 112:8,16	34:10 81:13 82:19 93:7 129:14 131:4 132:3 184:18	106:11 114:19,20 222:14 242:8
profits 112:21 153:18	225:7,13 226:9,20 227:15,17	195:8 205:17 proposes 80:22	245:5 provision 44:4
prognostications 72:3 152:21	228:14 229:8 230:8,19,21	127:19 142:22 181:3,9	provisions 26:22 88:21 119:10
program 49:7	249:5 265:1	proposing 121:14	proxies 59:4
192:17 193:4,5	promotions	131:18 132:8	PSS 6:9
programming 28:22 56:18 61:8	112:5,10 prong 225:12	184:17 proposition 146:5	83:12,19,20,21 84:4,6,8,12,20
67:11 75:8,9	•)	^ ^	87:19
77:5 95:7,9	prongs 220:12	propositions 32:12	88:1,3,11,14
104:9,13 105:21	proper 18:15 137:21 221:3	PROs 101:14	89:4 90:7,8,20,22
112:6 185:1 228:19	properly 59:21	prospects 32:16 33:9 69:1,11	91:20 92:7
progress 194:13	60:17 131:2	72:4 74:19 80:17	93:15,17
1	property 9:7 32:1	protect 88:8,14	95:11,22
progressed 226:17 229:13	43:3 195:3 196:1 198:14 204:1	protected 81:10	97:11,12,22 98:6,14 99:19
progresses 283:7	206:3 207:14	85:3	100:3 101:6,7,16
project 154:21	249:10	protections 119:7	104:21 105:4,5 106:17 107:11
228:3	proportionally	proven 71:19	108:10,17 109:7 110:2

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
111:1,6,19,20,22	pure 277:15	156:19 159:1	radar 191:12
112:3,13 113:11	purely 40:22	160:9,14	radical 80:22
114:15	232:22	quarters 156:21	radically 93:18
115:4,9,18 116:21 117:6	purport 266:19	question 51:21	94:1
118:3,13,16	purpose 88:14	53:6,12 123:5,11	radio 1:7 6:10
119:7,8,12	127:4 236:3,13	136:20 143:16	15:15 30:21
120:6,11,17,22	243:4 255:21	184:10 206:7	31:1,6,7,15
121:1,3,9,16,20	purposely 86:18	228:14 230:18	54:2,18,19 56:1
122:3 123:10		231:14 236:14	59:2 66:22 77:8
126:11 127:7,11	purposes 86:6,7 87:21 261:2	257:7 259:1 261:15 264:18	78:5 84:15
184:14 187:8		265:19 275:6	143:19 168:22
277:18	pursuant 26:21	290:3,8	169:7 170:2,5
P-S-S 83:19	27:7 28:10 90:10	·	171:13 214:18 222:22
PSS/Satellite 1:5	100:18	questions 23:21 57:17 123:20	222:22
public 1:19 12:20	pursue 75:11	136:11	,18
49:2 79:8 81:7	puts 100:2 126:22	296:11,15	224:4,9,10,11
84:9 85:5,7,18	296:7	,	226:21 228:15
98:4 102:4,7	putting 17:10	quickly 218:22	229:7,14,15,21,2
106:18 129:22	66:17 267:14	quite 12:5 51:22	2 230:1 233:8
157:19 200:18		105:15 149:3	234:9 258:4,8,22
267:2 271:17	Q	156:12 265:19	275:14 279:17
298:18	quadrupled	quo 39:15	280:5
publication 196:3	104:13	quote 34:12	radios 291:13,16
publications 17:14	QUALIFICATIO	41:1,2,8,18	292:8 295:8,9,10
194:20	NS 5:8 192:5	42:5,9,15	raise 129:6 139:6
195:11,16 197:6	qualified 207:20	49:9,12,14,19	202:16
198:1,7,9	2	50:7,9 58:16	raised 10:10 96:6
publicly 16:9	qualify 57:2	79:16 152:3,13	182:16
26:20 85:10	qualitatively	153:1 156:2,18,19	
97:7,8 143:18	289:2	157:8 160:9,15	ramping 181:8
published 116:19	qualities 198:11	161:6,7 189:3	ran 115:3 122:18
195:3 227:8,22	251:2 252:12	196:19 222:1	RANDI 2:10
publishing 51:8	quality 46:4	quoted 153:19	randi.singer@weil
pull 235:9	289:3,4 292:6	quoting 41:18	.com 2:19
⁻	quantified 231:2	4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	range 31:8 37:18
punk 46:13	quantify 231:7	R	44:7 74:13 102:2
purchase 58:10	-	$\frac{R\&D}{194:13}$	118:3,10
61:13	quantitative 231:19 260:13	232:19 237:22	122:17,20 123:2
purchases 58:21		résistance	124:14 141:20
77:21	quarter 28:7 29:10	284:19	142:8,19,20 171:19 218:20
	147:6 152:3	∠0≒.17	1/1.19 218:20

219:4,9 231:14	116:5,8,11,13	264:12,13,14,17	181:4 182:22
232:1,2,3 244:10	117:9,17	265:2,9 266:8	185:7 205:7,10
259:18 262:6	118:3,9,12	267:20,22	218:20 220:8
287:15 291:21	120:4,6,7,15,17,	268:4,20	242:17 246:13
293:8 294:20	20	269:14,16,19	263:4 273:10
295:2	121:1,9,14,18,22	270:13 271:13	278:16 284:1
wamaaa 117.12	123:1 124:16,20	273:13 277:20	285:10 286:8
ranges 117:12 270:7	125:4,8,13,14	278:11	287:9,11,13
	126:10,11,13,14,	283:10,16,17,22	289:2 294:17
ranks 49:16	22 127:7,11	284:4,5,7,9,13,1	295:2
rapid 291:10	128:10,13,14	7 285:14 286:9	rate-setting 87:8
rapidly 16:12	142:15,21	287:2 295:14	89:7,13 90:7
1 ~ -	143:11,16,20	296:4,6,8	93:4 113:16
rare 236:18	144:5,8,9	ratemaking 59:20	204:21 272:2
rarely 91:1	145:1,7,11,15,16		
rate 27:13	.19	rates 1:6 6:8 26:19	rather 31:20 34:2
1	146:2,8,14,21,22	27:6,8,19,22	42:18 51:8 64:13
34:3,4,13,14,19, 20 36:20	150:8 151:14	28:1 34:10 35:2	86:14 140:16
1	154:21 155:4,9	39:22 41:10,17	145:16 146:22
38:13,18,19 39:3,16 40:15,22	158:16 162:13	42:3,18 49:11	164:5 175:13
41:4 42:5 43:5	164:4,11	53:16 59:3 60:5	208:6 230:21,22
	165:11,14,19	64:16,20 65:1,22	253:11 264:13
49:10,11,15 51:4	166:4,11	67:19 69:20	271:22 276:7
53:21 54:17	168:11,14	79:20 80:2 82:18	rating 71:13
59:22 60:1 61:21	172:20	83:11 88:19	ratio 159:21
64:15,18 67:3,6	173:10,11,15,17,	90:10,21	
70:7 71:21 72:19 75:16 78:10	19,21 174:10,15	91:17,19,21,22	167:9,11
1	176:9,15,16	92:1,14 99:6	168:3,12
82:17 84:2 86:14	177:1,2,3,8,15	100:5,16,18	169:13,16 171:11,12
87:13,14 89:10,11,15	178:5,10,19	101:6,13 107:20	•
	179:2,3,10,21	114:4 121:11	rational 31:21
90:4,16,21,22 91:1,5,9,12	181:5,8	122:18,22	ratios 160:2
92:3,6,7,9,10,11,	182:12,15	124:14	Rdio 58:3
18 93:8,12	183:4,5	126:5,12,18	
95:13,15,16,22	184:15,19	127:20 141:19	reach 218:19
96:2,5 97:12	185:6,11,19	142:2,8,19	227:11 239:5
100:12,13	186:1 189:18	143:1,9 145:4	262:8 275:16,17
100:12,13	190:4 218:16,20	147:3 150:19	reached 35:7
101:10,22 102:1	220:14 231:3,12	155:15 160:12	38:15 261:1
104.14 103.1,11	233:11 240:1,11	163:21 164:2,3	262:10
107:7 108:16,20	243:6,19 244:20	169:22 170:1	reaches 81:16
107.7 108.10,20	245:2 246:15	171:18 174:5,18	
115:2,8,10,11,17	249:1 252:1,5,8	175:1	reaction 270:22
,22	262:17	178:12,14,15,18,	reactions 228:22
,22	263:14,22	19 179:1,6,8	

	1 ag		-
readily 37:14	reason 18:5 21:14	recap 62:12	reconvene 7:14
reading 71:21	24:21 37:16 42:12 50:2 66:2	receipts 38:8	128:19 297:4
reads 271:16	87:17 88:7 92:1	receive 32:20,21	record 6:22
ready 68:19	101:15 108:16	38:21 266:8	8:14,16 10:19
159:12	110:8,17 118:20	269:2	19:11 28:13,16
	143:20 144:15	received 9:20 10:6	29:2 31:22
real 79:6 138:6	145:21 146:13	25:17 38:22	32:2,5,18
161:9 164:9	149:19 161:14	129:16 150:21	33:2,7,10
183:21 236:5,18	178:6 185:21		34:5,12 35:8
270:9	221:11 223:14	receiver 61:16	36:9,19 42:14
realities 64:1	247:16 248:19	receivers 29:1	43:12,20 46:20
reality 40:13 45:20	262:22 269:10	154:4	47:12
47:6 64:14	295:21,22	158:5,11,14	48:1,6,8,12
161:2,18,21	reasonable 18:1	recent 33:8 72:7	51:17 54:1 55:20 57:12 59:19
172:21 178:1	34:1 40:2,7 42:3	74:18 110:19	62:20
186:9 187:16	44:2 51:5 76:7	134:14 157:10	63:2,5,16,21
188:18 258:21	91:22	166:15 204:17	64:10 67:1
realize 172:7	92:3,8,11,17	205:18 261:20	77:8,14 78:3
1	96:1 118:3 123:3	287:13	79:3,19 85:12
realizing 81:14	145:11 197:17		86:1 87:6
really 17:18 18:15	218:16,20	recently 25:18 79:11 106:5	103:14,17,18
28:17 32:11 46:2	231:12 247:12	152:22 162:5	107:4,13 108:8
47:7 63:6 64:1	263:22 277:20	182:12 190:21	111:7,9,15
66:12,13 71:8			112:4,8,11,15,19
89:19 97:20	reasonableness	recess 68:8,13,14	113:2,6 114:4,18
98:21 100:2,3	59:3 220:9 270:8	128:19,21	115:9,13,20
114:19 119:14	286:16	190:9,12 274:6	116:3,5 117:22
120:11 130:20	reasonably 117:17	296:22	130:6,9,13,18
151:19	165:4	recession 149:2	131:17
155:13,18	reasoned 123:1	156:4,9	136:18,19
162:2,12 166:8	reasoning 101:18	recognition 62:17	137:16,18 139:3
170:20 172:22	211:19	80:11 88:15	140:16 142:16
178:2 188:3			143:4 167:2
197:18 202:19	reasons 82:11	recognize 43:21	172:3 176:22
224:6 230:10	84:1,20 100:3	58:14,16 78:1	177:6,10,11
235:2,3 236:18	124:1 125:16	208:9 236:6	178:4 187:3
238:4 257:15	138:10 249:12	recognized 91:6	188:13,16
266:11 270:5	rebuttal 24:1	97:18,19 98:2	192:11 200:8
281:4 287:6	50:16 123:22	111:9 185:3	210:16,17,18
294:11	132:16 136:13	recognizes 99:3	214:10 219:18
realm 67:20	204:8	recollection	224:21 225:5,20
realtime 6:19,20	recall 132:4 135:8	135:13	227:9 228:7
2 3414444 0.17,20	145:9 206:20	133.13	229:5 247:3,16

	ı ag		·
248:16 251:9,17	79:16,19 151:2	271:19	184:6
253:16 259:3	175:20,22	reflected 27:22	regulatory
262:3 266:16,22	recover 151:22	182:5	177:9,13 193:5
267:1 268:10,13	232:17		199:5 203:12
269:1,7 272:16		reflecting 46:1	295:22
298:7	recovering 106:9	55:5 208:10 271:17	reigned 75:9
recorded 77:11	recovery 108:3	†	•
229:15	red 29:5 119:3,4	reflection 156:22	reinvestments 291:13
recording 27:14	redefine 34:22	reflects 166:22	
31:1 41:15 42:6	redlined 11:18,19	Reforming 199:20	reject 82:17 294:1
50:9 75:13 77:13,22	reduce 149:13	refrain 50:8	rejected 42:2 90:19 91:10,16
96:11,13,15,16,2	reduced 149:18	refuse 173:7 178:6	93:5 94:3 132:5
0 97:1,14,22	151:4 182:9	regard 165:6	180:13 188:5
100:9,13,22	298:6	180:5 260:7	relate 27:6 118:13
102:6 103:11,17	reemphasize	292:5,7	134:14 167:5
108:1 111:11	160:16	regarding 8:4	related 97:20
117:5,9 187:10,14	refer 44:4 51:2	regardless 156:3	98:16 108:10
205:11 226:6	235:4	193:3 276:1	116:10 120:21
234:11,17,18	reference 41:11	1	156:6 158:21
248:17 251:16	42:10,11,16	Register 88:2,6,10	159:13 298:9
253:8 271:20	48:19 50:20 76:6		relates 14:5 16:19
recordings 9:22	92:15 120:12	regs 118:17	26:18 136:7
26:20 31:5	132:3 195:10	119:8,12,13	relating 9:21 10:4
43:17,22 44:19	196:3 208:21	regularly 46:18	12:17,18,20
64:9 77:2 81:8	244:8 264:6	regulate 202:10	15:13 116:19
84:10	referenced 55:7	regulated 173:2	120:21 130:1
85:2,5,7,11,19	references 228:17	263:20 272:7	relation 42:19
97:9 103:21		276:16	44:14 228:22
111:12 114:18	referred 55:11	regulating 205:1	
143:18 169:18	180:11,13,14		relationship 89:10 171:15
189:15 229:12 230:7 234:13	referring 22:6	regulation 133:15 134:9,16 194:12	
246:22 247:17	refers 210:10	199:13,21	relative 33:3 45:14
251:10	232:9 235:12	200:17 206:2	76:10 80:3
261:8,9,17,18	246:6,7	207:13 271:22	106:17,20 107:8 110:11 111:3
records 129:21	refinance 160:6,11	272:5,8 276:8,15	114:11 225:7
229:6 249:4	refinancing	277:16	234:5,7 235:11
250:5	160:13	regulations 7:22	245:3 298:11
		82:3 118:22	relatively 243:6
recounted 268:16 271:19	reflect 43:18 47:1 48:14 169:9	119:2,18,22	247:4 261:19
	236:10 251:8	136:2 151:6	
recoup 29:21 75:1	230.10 231.0		released 49:4

	<u> </u>		
249:22 250:1	remotely 248:6	258:9 260:3	271:13
261:22	271:12	261:2 270:18	reserve 159:4
releases 103:12	rendition 96:21	representativenes	residential 114:7
230:13 261:20	repackaging 180:6	s 257:21 271:5	117:20
relevance 24:5	repeal 202:17	represented	resist 49:22
280:8	repeat 207:10	178:10	resources 88:16
relevant 24:22 25:3 37:17 41:1	287:15	representing 83:10 174:9	respect 8:18
137:6 255:8	repeated 137:1	204:11,13	16:14,15 21:10
272:20	repeatedly 92:22	represents 152:4	22:22 23:1,7
reliable 227:7	100:21	request 128:8	52:1 81:19 91:13 98:10 104:15
reliance 35:7	repeater 61:18	226:6	110:10 113:3
129:19	repeaters 150:1	requested 88:2	127:7 136:4
relied 35:11 70:22	repertoire 262:10	147:3	176:11 209:19
97:11 209:2	replace 146:4	requesting 116:11	216:18,22 281:16
227:3	158:22	119:5 154:22	
relies 124:9 125:3	replacements	require 36:10	respective 37:21 45:13 61:6 64:5
172:2 179:1 188:2 271:22	159:1	91:21 114:17	80:7
	reply 10:8	187:8	respectively 70:18
reluctance 268:18	report 70:11	required 24:8	respond 23:22
rely 36:6 122:9 123:6 208:21	195:21 209:20	72:17 107:14 108:6 109:13,16	133:12 136:11
228:3	263:11 283:19	110:15,19 151:5	141:15 151:14
remain 86:8	reported 10:18	187:20 263:13	265:22 268:22
153:21 155:9	31:7	requires 35:19	responding 19:9
187:9	reporter 6:16 8:15	41:9 61:9 64:14	53:9
remaining 9:21	10:17 68:12 190:11 274:5	80:11 89:16	response 10:7
10:10 33:19 34:6	298:1,2	91:19 102:18 110:3	137:5 266:16
remains 30:21	reporting 1:19	rescue 70:5,6	responsibility 41:17
165:7	6:19	<i>'</i>	rest 202:13 211:13
remarkable 149:4	reports 46:8 48:21	research 17:9,18 18:2 20:4,7,13	
Remarkably 32:5	77:17	21:9 58:20	restrict 239:8 271:9 286:14
remarks 234:22	represent 13:7	192:17,18	
237:8	44:12 65:16	193:1,2 194:7,12	restricted 48:15 67:2 209:18
remember 8:12	152:18 172:5,9	199:4,18 227:7 228:1,3 231:8	210:6,15
9:12 160:9	representation	researched 116:18	211:5,9,14
remind 219:17	147:16		212:1,3,7,11,15
reminder 8:7	representative	resembling 248:6	213:1,4,6,10,14 214:2,7,9
	52:5,10,12 53:5		17,7,4,7

	1 46		-
215:1,4,12,14	38:4,5,7,14 44:8	144:12	244:2
216:3 217:15,19	64:19 65:6 66:4	rewarding 79:3	257:1,2,5,8
218:3 238:16	67:3 70:17 71:5		259:9
273:19	80:19,22	Rhapsody 58:2	274:1,10,13,15,1
result 47:14 56:16	81:1,3,13 86:1	240:14 244:11	9,21 296:11
89:22 91:13	101:10 113:13	RIAA 41:7,16,18	297:2
128:8 150:19	115:19 116:12	58:20 90:20	Rich's 21:6
171:17 245:10	118:2,4 122:18	91:16 115:11	
248:11,13 254:8	125:4,12,14	RIAA's 91:18	rigged 177:10
272:20	141:20 142:2		272:15,18
	143:1 145:20	Rich 2:7 5:9	right-hand 244:7
resulted 27:19	147:9,20 148:1,4	11:12,13,16,17,2	rights 31:3,10,11
resulting 295:2	150:7 154:12	1,22 12:3 14:8	35:16
results 152:12	164:7 166:1,4	15:2,7 17:20	36:14,16,18
153:4 154:12	171:19,20	19:5,7 20:16	43:3,13 44:9,14
293:1	179:2,8 180:1,16	23:22 24:2	45:1,3 47:2 51:9
resume 274:10	181:4,18	25:5,19,22	53:16 75:13 85:6
	182:6,15	26:4,5,9,12,15	97:3,4 98:5
Resuming 218:9	183:8,12,15,19	51:21 52:6,11 53:7,11,14	100:9,16,22
retail 61:22	184:1,2,3,8	68:5,10,19,20	204:3 241:10
64:16,20 65:1,6	186:1,2,5,6,10	82:22 129:5,10	246:22 247:15
166:17,18,20	197:15 224:21	133:18 134:10	248:18,20
167:3 171:5	225:5 226:1,3	136:3,13,14	249:10 250:9
244:10,21 245:8	236:19 237:17	139:4,9	251:16
247:19	244:11 293:6,9	140:13,18	260:4,7,19 261:7
Retained 5:17	revenue-based	141:3,16 143:3	271:21 275:22
	28:16	153:9 161:1	276:1,13
retired 192:15	revenues 27:20,21	172:1,18 188:11	rigorous 90:1
200:16	29:3 31:8,15	191:18,20 192:7	95:19
return 25:9 78:8	32:21,22 67:14	201:21 203:1	
79:17 104:16	69:20 115:12	205:21 206:5,8	Ring 142:3
106:12 108:20	116:3 142:9	207:9,11,17,21	rise 9:14 143:2
117:18 230:16	145:10 153:22	208:2 209:5	rising 27:20
232:8,9,11,20	179:22 184:16	210:22	142:20
233:22 286:18	284:10 291:2	211:16,17	risk 112:15 115:3
291:6,16 292:8	reverse 144:4	212:5,13,16	144:12 155:22
295:7		213:8,18,21	
reveal 279:4	review 90:19	214:10,16	risks 89:2
revealed 279:5	revised 13:10 14:3	215:6,10 216:1	111:4,6,10,14,16
	25:16 132:7	217:2,4,9,12,20	,17,20 113:11
revenue 28:18	195:9 208:4	218:7,8	144:18 155:13
29:8 33:16,18	revision 10:5	219:13,20,21	158:1,20 159:12
34:6,15,17 35:1	reward 78:18	230:17 232:5	RMR 298:18
36:22 37:19	16waiu /8:18	239:2 241:13	
		l	

	1 ag		
RMR/CRR/CSR/	34:11 100:12	259:18 262:17	sandbagging
RPR/CCR/RSA	101:9,13 116:1	264:21 265:9,10	135:16,19
1:18	171:2 224:1	266:4,8 268:21	sat 186:21
road 137:20	234:19 262:1,2	269:18 277:9	
158:10,18	294:8	278:12	satellite 1:7 6:9
	round 18:10 200:8	283:10,16	55:22 61:17
roadmap 95:21	route 264:4	284:7,9,17 291:7	72:15 76:20 77:8 78:5 84:17 108:4
roads 291:20		292:18,21	143:18 146:9,10
Roberts 2:3 6:12	routinely 77:22	294:17	158:4,21
10:22 11:1 14:8	row 66:19	RPR 298:18	159:2,11,13
15:3,19 16:15	royalties 29:6	RSA 298:18	165:18,21
17:4 19:3,12,17	30:10 31:1,3,10	l	168:22
20:15 21:18	85:12 115:18	rule 10:11 135:5	169:7,14,19
23:19 26:15	167:4 175:20,21	202:17	170:2,5 171:4,13
139:4 201:20	239:15 265:21	rules 7:20 15:6	222:22
202:4,16,21	271:20	16:11 19:4	223:2,10,12,14,1
207:9	royalty 1:1 2:2 6:7	132:19 137:20	7 226:21 228:15
210:7,11,21	8:2 9:21 32:2,8,9	177:22	229:7 234:9
211:19	34:3,4 35:2	ruling 13:14 40:19	258:4,7,22 260:9
215:18,22 216:9	41:19 42:5 46:21	63:1 88:2 144:16	275:14 279:7,17
230:17 232:4	65:22 72:17,19	run 133:4 138:13	280:4,5
240:15,20	75:16 86:14	161:11 163:2,8	satellites
241:12 257:5,10	89:21 92:21	192:17 193:5	146:3,4,11
258:12 259:8	98:19 99:4		149:22 150:4
296:15,16	100:5,14 115:8	running 60:8	159:6 180:3
robust 69:8 72:10	125:8 127:6	runs 42:12	satisfied 126:17
73:16	142:1,8,10,15		144:8 145:1
Roger 5:8 10:6	150:18 151:4	S	255:7
42:21 191:21	165:11,19,20	SABRINA 2:11	
192:1,12	166:11	sabrina.perelman	satisfy 145:4 220:9
role 49:20 130:16	167:1,8,9,10	@weil.com 2:20	252:18 256:10
192:21 261:3	168:11,13,14		282:16
	169:11,17,18	saddled 71:11	saving 112:12,13
roles 106:17	171:14,15 175:8	sale 77:10	scale 145:16
Rome 291:20	181:17 182:15	sales 43:22 58:18	149:20 153:16
room 47:21 48:17	183:1,18 184:17	62:18 63:16 71:7	scales 164:5
250:19 287:6	185:19 186:6	73:3 77:17 113:5	
rooms 22:18	187:18 231:3	156:6 231:1	scarcely 31:15
i	239:20,21	salient 73:15	scenario 9:13
Rosenblatt 54:11	240:1,11 242:17,21	165:15,17	173:12
57:20 74:5	243:6,21,22	·	scheduling 8:4
rosy 152:21	245:2 249:1,2	sample 46:17 48:12	scheme 81:10
roughly 28:5	-	40.12	Scheme of HU
roughly 28:5	250:6 252:1,5,8		

	1 46		
176:6	298:2,18	135:3 138:4	sensitive 210:19
SCHILLER 2:9	second 22:8 27:15	142:17 156:12	sentence 268:11
	35:13 37:4 54:5	159:16 180:5	269:5 271:16
scholarly 194:21	78:8 81:22	183:16 228:12	
197:22 198:9,10	104:15 107:8	242:13 262:21	separable 254:7
scholarship	104:13 107.8	seen 30:5 71:9	separate 24:3
272:5,12	117:13,15 121:7	115:15,16	61:12 69:17
scope 13:19 36:17	146:13 172:17	181:22	149:10 204:11
74:13 136:5,6,8	181:14 195:10		221:9 254:1,4
139:7 260:4	201:21 205:19	select 102:19	290:6 291:1
261:8,9,15	214:8 219:7	selective 193:10	separated 214:5
1	222:15	self-adjust 186:10	^
scour 33:1	224:15,17 232:6	ľ	separately 50:10
screen 102:10	237:18 238:9	self-evident 52:22	235:21
103:3 112:7	241:15 243:11	self-paid 156:7	September 161:7
191:12	245:14 246:6	self-relying 38:6	sequence 222:12
scrutiny 155:17	252:22 268:11	sell 158:13,18	series 35:19 38:1
SDARS 84:7 93:11	287:8,9	247:20,21,22	48:6 69:6 122:9
99:7,16,20	secondary 219:5	248:20 249:4	287:17 293:16
119:2,12,13	secondly 220:7	250:5	
123:22 124:2	222:20 249:3	seller 40:5,17	seriously 46:5
135:9 143:15	273:8 275:19	86:15 87:10	serve 35:18 59:4
144:1,6,19 145:6		100:19 143:17	served 201:16
148:12 149:10	section 10:1 26:22	144:10 164:11	service 17:12
162:21 163:3	27:3,8,14 42:3	220:7,16 245:19	33:19 36:13
164:21	57:2 76:4 93:3	255:10 277:22	45:18 46:18
165:2,5,6,7,9,16	146:21 228:21		
166:9 168:10	275:1,5 280:8	sellers 36:13 44:13	55:4,6 59:11 61:1,3 62:3
170:10,11 180:8	sections 15:1	246:21 257:12	63:10 64:19
181:19 182:22	secure 36:20 46:9	258:17,18	
204:9 218:16	202:5	seller's 255:16	66:1,3,21 67:10 80:9 84:14,18
271:20 277:18		275:10	85:1,14,15
se 31:18 123:2	seeing 53:7 167:16	selling 250:17	86:21,22 93:2,22
	seek 49:9,11	•	94:7 95:2 97:15
seamlessly 56:11	seeking 14:2	senior 9:4 77:4	98:16 101:1
search 121:22	Ü	sense 58:9 65:14	103:9,15 104:4
searching 240:8	seeks 34:13	98:4 102:8,17	107:2,13,19
	seem 14:12 17:4	108:17 113:17	107:2,13,17
seated 6:3,11,12	106:2 142:11,12	114:20 126:7	110:4 111:22
25:12 68:18	156:3 230:20	138:14 190:2	113:15 117:21
129:4 140:2	seemed 143:3	225:14 234:8	122:19,21
190:14 274:9		235:1 236:6	124:5,15,19
Sebo 1:18 6:17,18	seems 18:8 23:11	274:1	125:5,10,22
	132:10 133:6		120.0,10,22
·			

	1 ag		
128:3 142:11,13	90:9,10 94:7	273:10	121:16 147:22
143:19	95:12 98:7,11,15	settle 93:5	154:14 155:3,5
146:10,11	99:6,8,15,22		shred 120:14
166:12,18,19,22	107:12 111:4	Settlement 282:5	
167:2,8,10,12,14	113:22 121:4	seven 206:13,14	shut 34:3,4
,20,22	122:10	259:20	Sidak 33:14
168:1,7,8,11,13,	125:12,13	several 51:2 60:12	Sidak's 33:21
14	127:20,22	106:19 113:1	
169:6,10,14,16,1	141:22 142:1,17	156:21 168:17	sides 64:6 144:16
9 170:2 171:4,6	156:15	201:3 204:6	258:18 273:4
185:15	165:16,17,18,21	206:17 215:7	275:7
186:3,8,13	169:4,12,17,22	219:10 228:5	sight 237:16
189:22 223:6,22	184:14,21 185:8		sign 233:9 265:4
226:5 227:19	187:9 191:11	shape 19:1	267:4,16
235:14 237:22	214:19 219:6	share 28:18 29:3	_
239:20 240:7,13	223:19 230:6,11	30:9 32:18,20,22	signature
242:8,9,21 243:5	235:5,6 239:18	33:11 70:10	208:18,19
244:16,22	241:2,6,11	172:14,16 248:6	signed 172:8 174:2
249:17 260:8,9	244:9,16,18	shareholder 153:5	253:17 257:22
276:22 277:1,10	246:8 247:21,22	shareholders 70:8	258:5,8
279:8,12,19	277:3 279:14		significant 49:20
281:22 282:18	280:6,19 281:22	sheet 214:6	62:18 93:14
283:16 289:7 294:18	282:4 283:10	shifting 119:10	95:21 110:20
	284:9,11 288:10 292:6 293:19,20	short 152:6	168:21
services 1:7 6:9,10	[163:2,7 274:2	significantly 32:7
15:15 16:17,19	SESAC 97:5 101:8	•	36:2 49:15 53:1
17:11 24:18,19	sets 29:17 60:7	short-circuit 91:7	58:4 61:20
30:14,15 35:9,11	107:17 119:22	short-circuited	
37:7,12 45:7,13	129:17	89:19	signing 49:16
54:2,4,5,6,7,13,1	setting 42:5 43:7	shortcoming 46:3	signs 32:3
8 55:10,12,13,14,1	63:4 67:22 68:1	shorten 83:13,19	similar 51:6 63:9
7,18 56:4,6	84:2 86:13 89:15	•	71:1,4 121:6
57:1,6,11,22	92:7,13 95:21	shorthand 48:21	244:15 282:13
58:2,18	101:22 102:1	shortly 149:11	284:2
59:2,6,9,14,18	104:14 105:1	195:6	similarly 51:5
61:6 62:2	106:14 107:6	short-term 33:9	54:18 91:16
63:9,15,17	108:16 115:2		
64:5,22 65:5,10	120:8 121:18	showed 172:18	simple 30:16
66:5,22 67:4	127:11	showing 68:2	294:11
74:8 76:11 78:7	173:2,13,18	148:7	simpler 43:8
80:10 83:12,22	185:5 199:6	shown 36:4 238:10	simply 18:13,21
87:6,12	200:6 205:8	293:3	20:18 24:15
88:9,16,17 89:5	220:14 251:15		40:4,13,21 41:10
·		shows 65:21	

		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
47:20 51:2 59:8	72:13,17 73:9	290:2 291:1,11	slow 110:5
66:2 67:15 76:15	74:14 76:4,12	292:1 295:9,13	small 52:17,18
79:2,7 80:14	77:6,10,18,19	296:4,5,7	109:8 172:11
91:20 136:14	78:17,22 79:21	SiriusXM's	174:2 176:8
155:17 163:15	81:16 135:1	28:17,18 29:19	196:20 225:4
176:6 180:20	141:15,17,21	30:20 33:8,17	266:11
184:7 187:20	142:7	37:11 64:15,20	
222:1 223:19	146:3,6,9,15	70:10 72:3 73:3	smallest 261:13
224:20 230:1	147:4,8,15,22	74:2,15,19 77:1	smartphones 56:8
234:8 237:17	149:4,13,20	78:11 80:8 143:6	58:13
239:11 252:4	150:14,17,20	148:14 150:12	snapshot 109:12
262:16 284:8,16	152:2,7 153:12	168:15 179:22	-
sing 162:12	155:4,9,11,19		so-called 35:8
SINGER 2:10	156:12,14	sit 124:8	39:20 45:10 51:4
	157:17	site 17:11 24:4	54:5 56:2,15
single 178:9	158:1,8,11,20	224:6 226:4	57:22
199:10,17 233:6	159:10	287:3	social 22:17 108:6
243:4 255:3,5	160:1,5,12,22	sites 16:1	societal 221:15
266:7 268:20	162:1,17 163:17		
sings 189:10	170:11 171:22	sitting 280:12	society 196:12
sir 208:7	172:2 174:9	situation 134:10	software 195:21
1	175:2,5,15	six 259:22 260:2	sold 288:20
Sirius 69:16 149:9	176:13 177:4	sixfold 128:9	İ
151:7 154:7	178:12,20		solely 14:5 20:19
159:11,16	179:10,12,17	size 257:18	252:8
188:22 204:12	180:3,7 181:3	skew 260:17	solve 113:19
256:11,12,17	183:7,11,12	skilled 102:22	somebody 250:16
258:3	188:10,12,18		·
SiriusXM 2:6	189:9,12,17,20	skin 191:7	somebody's 243:1
5:3,13 10:4,8	209:7,13 224:22	skip 50:20	somehow 32:17
11:14 25:14	227:5,12,14		65:1 113:19
26:7,18,19 28:21	230:5,12 232:22 233:5,9,11 235:2	skipping 57:8	124:12 143:4
29:10 30:9	237:20 248:2,20	skips 289:9	238:19 276:8
31:13,14,21	249:14,18,21	sky 71:16	someone 224:20
32:3,9,12	250:18 251:13	Slacker 17:11	280:12
33:11,15 34:6,16	253:17,18 256:5	20:5,9,11,21	somewhat 111:20
35:19	257:13,17	21:2,10 22:1,2	236:8 237:8
36:5,8,20,22	260:5,7 263:4	23:2,14 24:20	260:6 266:8
43:10 44:8,19,22	265:3,13,20	55:11 56:7	292:6
45:8,16 46:18	266:4 269:6	210:10	
54:19 56:16,20	275:13 277:5	i	somewhere 118:5
58:19 59:3,13,17	278:22 279:11	slide 40:9 131:5	song 55:3 58:6
60:1,2 61:14,22	281:7,16 282:22	148:6	96:17,22 97:1
63:14 66:3 70:12	288:17 289:4,12	slightly 30:19	102:11
<u> </u>	200.17.207.1,12		

	8		
songs 55:5 57:9	201:17 229:12	253:19	281:14
97:7 102:19	234:10,13,17	257:14,19 263:2	specifically 12:16
249:22	246:22 247:16	264:3,15,18	86:8 90:19 92:10
250:1,2,20	248:17	267:10	112:9 113:17
songwriter 96:17	251:10,16	268:19,22 272:1	115:2 117:5
	261:8,9 271:20	275:12	126:4 142:22
Sony 172:15	289:3,4	282:11,14	180:12 204:2
sooner 16:10	sounded 186:22	286:4,7 292:5	209:22 226:6
sophisticated	187:1	SoundExchange's	specified 44:8
46:19	SoundExchange	32:11 34:22 35:5	•
sorry 22:7 131:8	4:3 5:5 10:7	38:8 41:14	spectrum 105:2
157:6 171:14	15:12 19:11	47:9,11 50:4,15	106:15 279:14
211:12 217:18	28:13,15 29:6	68:22 69:5 72:3	spell 83:14
238:12	30:6,8,11 31:14	78:21 80:1 82:17	spend 9:10 68:21
	33:2,20 34:8	87:20 94:15	181:10 246:16
sort 22:5 43:22	35:11 37:14	98:13 118:11	
89:19 97:6 103:7	38:21 39:3	120:4 122:16	spent 104:12 224:7
114:8 124:9	40:12,19 42:12	123:1 125:6	245:15
133:4 161:1	45:21 47:6,20	128:9,14 138:1	spirit 13:1,18
169:20 171:11	48:5,10,11	155:4,8 164:4	split 117:21
175:1 183:16	49:2,8,22 54:7	sounds 162:3	-
196:16 200:11	59:15 62:13,14	Soundscan 77:16	spoke 123:13
237:9 262:11	63:1 69:14 70:22		sport 202:12
263:6 270:16	71:15 72:18	source 268:18	sports 201:14
273:13 279:11	75:17 78:9 80:21	273:6	202:2,14
286:3	82:1,4,12 88:1	south 155:22	207:3,4,7
sorts 87:5 103:4	93:13 99:14		• •
105:21 135:9	118:5,16,21	Southeast 1:17	Spotify 58:3
191:7	120:9 121:14	Southern 51:11,12	240:14
sought 34:21	123:21	space 185:2	Sprint 241:6
75:17	127:16,19 137:1	spare 8:14 60:9	squarely 42:2
sound 26:20 27:14	138:7 141:1,18	159:10,12	stable 32:13
31:1,5 42:6	142:16,18,22	·	153:21
43:17,22 44:19	143:10 145:3	speak 8:13 9:17 48:17 60:20	
64:9 69:13 75:13	147:3 153:11	210:3 276:12	stack 296:1
77:2 81:7 84:9	154:22 164:18		staff 102:20
85:2,4,7,10,19	175:10	speaking 132:18	104:10
96:11,13,15,20	176:4,20,22	151:9	123:7,14,16
97:1,8,13	177:11 178:20 181:3,9 182:14	specialized 242:8	stage 68:1
100:9,13,22	184:16 185:3	specific 55:7 57:16	staggering 152:5
102:6 103:20	187:17 188:8	96:21 121:14	20 0
111:12 114:18	190:19	133:15 134:8	stake 70:7
117:5,9 143:18	251:18,20 252:2	139:6 222:6	stand 57:20 58:9
169:17 189:15	201.10,20 202.2		

	· · · · · · · · ·		
69:6,15 131:16	67:3 179:1	268:20 277:10	53:12
134:12	statement 26:7	stay 38:19 244:3	strategic 272:22
standard 34:2	49:3,13,18 83:4	257:8	strategy 58:15
40:16 42:5,13	136:13	steadily 29:7	153:1
51:5 77:17	140:7,15,17	steering 193:6	stratosphere 67:20
86:13,15 87:8,9 88:18 89:14	141:1 179:4,5 239:14 254:19	Ŭ.	î
91:20 100:20	259:14 254:19	stem 107:19 113:22	stream 86:1 102:12 115:8,20
163:18 175:9	1		·
247:12 277:20	statements 5:2 10:14 26:2 69:10	stenotypy 298:5	streamed 56:8
standards 13:14	134:20	step 256:17 286:21	streaming 58:12
126:19	135:1,2,4,20	288:1,14	142:3 164:21
standing 235:1	136:1 140:4	steps 168:9 285:2 286:19	166:17 168:1 169:16,22 170:1
standpoint 63:1	151:16 157:20	·	178:13
136:19	267:2 268:15,16 271:17,18	stereo 56:5	strenuously 93:13
Stanford 42:22		Steven 77:4	stressed 188:14
192:15,18,22	States 1:1 97:3 157:2 204:22	120:17	
194:2,5	229:17,19	stimulate 58:21	stricken 132:6
Stanley 2:4 6:13	stating 139:14	stipulation 9:20	strictly 88:3
38:7 70:21		27:5,7	strictures 131:22
71:5,18	station 297:1	stipulations 8:3	strides 56:15
Stanton 51:12	stations 31:1 229:15,17,18	stock 70:10 162:11	strong 51:13 73:18
stark 112:21	230:1	stockholder	153:2
start 20:2 84:3	statistic 152:17	147:14	stronger 102:1
141:17 159:7		stockholders 79:1	strongly 52:19
219:22 246:9	status 39:15 88:11 161:2	stood 30:2	106:14 145:17
294:11			structure 16:3
started 87:4 153:3	statute 44:3,5	stop 243:10 295:9	28:3,11 29:7
166:16 188:11	91:19 163:16 164:12 175:17	story 84:6,7 238:9	115:1 246:20
193:20 282:6	187:2,6,8	246:19 250:16	253:7
starting 14:17,19	statutes 88:22	266:21	structures 74:1
49:7 149:21		Stowell 72:1,5	struggles 89:2
209:22 210:4	statutory 26:21	76:18 78:15 79:22 220:22	187:17
213:13	30:10,13,22 33:15 38:18 40:8		struggling 104:21
starts 164:20	45:4 49:10,15	Stowell's 71:6 72:16	student 197:2
184:17	57:2 81:4,10,15		
state 140:3 192:10	86:17 144:7,11	straight 12:4	students 196:10
238:22 288:15	173:4,19	124:8	200:1
stated 29:3 66:22	175:1,3,9	straighten 272:16	studies 227:9
	176:6,9 178:10	straightforward	228:6

studio 103:17	105:15,17	287:10	suits 87:20
107:22	113:13 165:22	substitution	summarize 229:2
stuff 167:15	subscribers 69:18	225:13 226:10	259:11 260:21
240:6,9 249:1	70:14 71:3	228:10,16 229:1	266:19 285:2
280:13	147:17,20	231:1 250:8	
	150:3,5,18		summary 50:12
styled 204:18	151:15,20	substitutional	116:7 259:5
stylistic 119:1	153:17 156:4,7	65:9 77:1 78:6 225:8 226:21	summed 152:2
Subchapter 7:21	189:21	227:17 230:20	summing 262:11
subfactor 107:8	subscribing 281:7	subtract 291:1	Superhighway
110:10 111:3	subscription 1:6		198:1
114:10	6:9 30:13 56:4	subtraction	supplemental
subfactors 106:19	83:12 150:20	291:17	18:12
107:6	154:9 165:3	succeeding 272:3	
	166:2	success 28:21	supplementation
subject 7:20 12:12	167:12,13,19,21	32:19 33:9,10	18:14
14:7 24:14 61:12	168:15 169:5,6	48:1	supplemented
132:21 136:6,8	171:13 281:22		18:5 20:12 78:3
138:15,18	288:8 289:7	successful	
139:15 182:17		189:5,16,19	supply 247:2
195:15 296:11	subscriptions	successfully 43:11	248:7
subjects 200:9	70:16	sudden 150:10	support 41:6
submission 201:12	substantial 12:11		53:20 105:1
	14:12 49:9	suddenly 119:11	106:13 121:13
submit 33:5 42:13	110:15 154:12	suffer 46:2	supported 116:14
53:19 59:19	163:1,7,19,21	Suffice 60:15	155:18
62:10 71:20 79:5	164:3	į	gummanta 17.2
164:8,15 176:14	substantially	suggest 31:18	supports 17:2 120:15 181:6
181:6 184:4	72:20 77:11	50:13 69:2	
submits 120:2	102:14 105:16	141:19 143:4	190:6
141:18	106:4 113:2	suggested 82:18	Suppose 256:11
submitted 12:7	124:20 184:4	109:3 127:14	258:3
		132:2 153:10	supposed 209:1
27:5 42:17	substantive	278:16	263:21
149:16 164:18	119:6,17		277:18,19 278:1
183:9 184:6	substitutability	suggesting 52:19	ŕ
201:12	231:18	108:14	supposition 47:10
submitting 128:4	substitute 58:10	suggests 170:16	79:5 221:22
subscribe 61:14	249:21	suitability 117:3	suppress 269:11
226:5 230:10	substituted 226:17	suitable 251:6	surcharge 181:17
266:3		278:20 285:4	182:4
subscribed 227:14	substitutes 280:4		sure 69:6 133:13
	285:9,13 286:22	Suite 4:8	181:15 182:21
subscriber			101.13 102.21

	. 1 48	<u> </u>	
204:4 220:4	280:18 288:22	taste 207:8	telecasts 201:14
221:17 242:1 244:4 263:2	T	taught 193:18	telecommunicatio
surely 15:7 50:15	tab 147:13 148:18	200:9,11,16,18 207:6	ns 203:10 280:18
137:7 187:15	150:11 154:14		
surmount 187:21	155:3,5 158:8	teach 200:12	telephone 196:22 239:17 240:5,9
	160:1 167:17	teaching 193:21	243:3,8
surplus 117:20 118:1,7	171:7 217:16	194:1 200:14	telephones 203:11
,	table 212:13,15	team 141:12 196:9	television 84:17
surprise 130:1	213:4 217:17	207:7	201:8
surprising 62:16	tables 208:20	tease 241:9,19 244:4	
surrogates 44:18	tabs 155:2 217:7	1	temper 42:9,10,15 76:5
surrounding	tacked 150:20	Tech 194:2,5	tended 135:14
15:21	tactical 87:21	technical 110:18	
survey 289:16	tainted 276:7	203:8 276:21 285:16	tendency 47:11
290:8	taking 7:1 13:20	technically 28:6	tends 261:17
surveys 189:20	33:17 38:4	97:19 132:18	tenet 79:15
survival 187:5	166:16 265:2	technique 138:9	tens 188:15
survive 235:2,15	talk 23:9 94:12,14	290:18,20	tenure 198:12
sustained 130:15	96:9 118:11,12	technological 73:8	term 28:5,14
Suzanne 2:3 6:11	159:17 161:17	107:9,15 108:9	38:12,20 39:11
sworn 192:3	238:14,19 239:1 266:15 271:7	110:12 144:17	55:13 56:13 69:21 74:19
SX02 214:15	280:9 288:21	194:13	78:12 91:21,22
SXM 237:11 246:6	talked 21:22 161:1	technologically	145:21 181:5,9
282:11	249:8 275:10	63:7	terminology 57:14
synergies 154:6	talking 123:16	technologies 107:18 187:13	249:15
system 56:10	134:10,22 163:6		terms 1:6 6:8
61:18 108:4	175:6 181:10	technology 9:8	16:20 34:2,3
158:21	191:6 225:3	56:16 57:17 73:16 74:6,7	41:9 80:11,17
177:13,20	240:16 242:3	95:4 107:11	81:16 118:13
235:7,18,21	253:2,15 256:1	108:6,18	137:20,21
240:6,10 245:5	289:1,5	108.0,18	158:10 164:17
264:15 277:11	talks 101:20	164:1 193:14	167:6 194:21
288:19 291:3	158:20 186:7	194:13 195:20	197:14 207:1
294:16	tank 237:2	194:13 193:20	222:6 232:7
systematic 133:3		190.2,11,13,22	249:17 276:20
	target 93:8 108:17	203:11 219:7	282:21 295:13
systems 29:1 56:12 108:2,4 158:22	targets 38:14	223:9	terrestrial 30:21
100.2,7 130.22	task 201:15		31:15 56:1
		L	

224:10,11	138:18 148:12	297:2	258:2,19 262:7
228:15 229:6,13	149:16 151:16	that's 12:1 15:2	265:11,19
tertiary 115:19	153:20	20:6 23:21 37:15	272:19
test 59:2 220:9	154:17,21	38:13 47:2 49:6	273:1,2,3,15,18
1	155:20 165:11	53:6,8,11 62:16	277:12,22 278:9
254:10	170:22 180:6	63:12 64:18	279:1 281:7
testified 35:6	183:10 195:6,8,9	65:17 81:3 86:3	286:13 287:10
77:12 118:15	200:3 203:21,22	92:12,14 100:2	288:7,20
192:3 268:18	205:5,6	103:5 105:18	289:6,13,20
testifies 10:12	208:5,17,22	109:13	290:5,6 292:22
95:10 101:11	221:21 225:6	112:12,13	293:2,13
149:16	226:20 227:4	115:14 116:21	295:15,18,19
	228:17,18 235:4	124:18 126:7	themselves 102:17
testify 37:5 48:3	239:5 246:17,18	127:2 130:16	113:7 164:2
73:9 74:17	259:12 260:22	131:5 133:18,19	227:6
109:22 145:3	266:15,20 268:7	131.5 133.18,19	
164:22 289:18	271:15 275:1	137:4,10	theory 171:14
testifying 289:19	276:10 278:18	139:10,17 146:5	178:2 180:14,15
testimony 10:5,16	280:9 286:2	147:20 148:17	213:7 214:9
11:19	292:13 295:11	152:16 154:13	thereafter 298:6
12:8,12,15,22	298:3,4,8	155:22 159:18	therefore 24:8
12:8,12,15,22	text 44:6 102:11	163:15 167:20	27:11 47:1 56:20
13:2,3,8,11,16,2	210:5 211:1	163:15 167:20	27:11 47:1 56:20 117:11 118:2
14:1,3,5,10,14,1	240:8	173:5,10,20	117:11 118:2
		173:5,10,20	130:19 132:6 138:16 169:11
5,16,19,21 15:9,17	textual 103:6	182:18	138:16 169:11 295:1,8
16:3,5,13,16,18	thank 10:1,19	185:12,17 187:6	ŕ
16:3,5,13,16,18 18:10,17	11:15 15:3	190:4,5 199:1,17	there's 17:7 21:14
18:10,17 20:1,9,12,19	19:6,7,16	200:7 203:19	44:20,22 66:2
20:1,9,12,19 21:12,16,17	25:4,5,19,22	204:10,20 205:3	103:5,10 104:2,9
21:12,16,17 22:3,20,21 23:4	26:1,5,11,14	208:5,19 209:1	109:19 118:20
22:3,20,21 23:4 25:15,16,17 28:8	53:13 68:20	208:5,19 209:1	125:2 135:18
25:15,16,17 28:8 33:13,22 37:1	82:14,20,21	211:21 212:17 216:18 217:21	140:11 144:20
	83:17 128:15,16	218:1 220:5	149:7 155:21
43:4,6 47:10 49:6 60:4 68:1	129:10 134:6	218:1 220:5	156:11 162:17
	136:12 139:22	229:3,15 230:12	163:2 173:4
71:6 72:16,22 78:2 94:19 105:9	140:19,22	234:14 238:3,4	185:20 186:14
78:2 94:19 105:9 107:17 112:3	184:11 190:7,8	239:15,21	202:9 212:11
107:17 112:3	191:15,17	240:22 244:13	214:11 221:11
113:13 116:14 120:12,13,14,20	202:21	240:22 244:13	222:18 224:15
	207:17,21 212:8	251:11,12 253:9	226:10,12
121:1,21 123:12	218:4,9 232:4	251:11,12 253:9	227:2,22
124:6 131:20	234:4 257:2	255:12,18,19	228:1,10,13
132:3 133:14	286:17 296:14	255:12,18,19 256:14 257:4	229:16,18
134:8 137:12		230.14 Z37.4	231:13 232:1
	1		····

	1 46		
233:4 234:11,19	147:6 152:3	todd.larson@weil.	272:1
240:19,20 244:7	156:19 160:8	com 2:17	transcript 7:5
246:10 247:17,18	246:7 290:18,20	tomorrow 131:19	transition 112:18
248:5,19 249:7	third-party 48:12	296:18	translated 165:22
250:19 255:17	Thomas 190:20	tones 142:3	transmission
258:22 260:14	threat 72:13	tool 285:5	204:3
261:18,19,20 262:1 263:8	three-judge 6:14	tools 18:2	transmitted 84:16
267:9,10,11,12	threshold 119:10	top 14:19,22 22:16	85:16 108:5
276:14 277:15,16	throughout 6:15	23:1 63:4 211:10 271:15	treated 209:18
277.13,10 279:12 281:5	72:12 85:17	topic 50:1 75:19	210:6,15 211:9,14 212:1
288:3 289:15,16	thrust 275:11	275:2	213:1,4,6,14
295:21	ticking 222:7	topical 194:11	214:7,8 215:4,14
They'll 154:5	tied 19:20 158:3	topics 200:10	217:19
they're	Tier 17:12	top-line 28:17	treatment 215:16
52:12,16,17,18	Tiers 283:11	total 27:9 33:18	tremendous 63:7
58:5 106:8 110:3 115:22 119:5,14	till 274:15	38:11 58:9 71:7	155:14 158:19
120:1 121:10	timely 12:6	124:14 156:4	trends 74:9
125:18 126:17	tiny 237:11 239:21	224:21 251:22	trial 5:13 70:16
130:10 132:7 135:2 153:13	248:3 258:14	totally 81:3 126:20	133:22 191:1 204:17 209:8,13
153.2 155.15	266:6	225:2 288:13	Tribunal 2:2
157:21 158:9,17	tires 236:22	towards 102:21	16:11 63:2
162:2,12 170:7	Title 7:21	town 98:22	tribunals
173:21 174:15,18 191:6	titles 8:22	Toyota 56:12	100:14,18,20
193:4 221:8	T-Mobile 241:6	track 58:11	Tribunal's 40:19
222:4 233:12	today 7:9	77:20,22	tried 269:11
250:21 252:7 255:20 260:20	10:13,14,16 14:3	tracks 43:17 54:20	trigger 202:17
263:1,3 275:22	69:8 73:17 83:10 86:4 98:12 99:13	55:8,9,15 56:4 58:18	trivia 103:6
276:16 284:1	107:16 112:1	trade 48:6 201:11	Trokenheim 3:4
285:21,22	115:15 129:16	227:10 228:6	83:9
286:10 288:11	131:16 141:12 153:6 157:4	266:22 267:8,9	trokenheim.matth
they've 84:12 106:10 141:11	165:8 166:11	traditional 54:19	ew@arentfox.co
159:4 261:22	172:18 186:22	122:5 198:21	m 3:10
264:3	200:10 202:2	transaction 61:12	trouble 53:9
third 28:7 29:10	281:5	251:7 254:18	true 65:18 84:10
70:15 106:16	TODD 2:8	transactions	98:12 104:4
		248:11 251:8,15	107:16 112:1

			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
115:14 199:1	turning 39:2 101:3	ultimately 183:17	260:3
229:3,11 239:15	102:3 114:21	278:19 287:16	understandings
241:3 264:20	120:4 150:9	UMG 263:12	133:4 137:20
266:9 267:5	214:4 215:2		understands 124:4
276:13 284:8	230:15 236:11	Um-hum 140:20 218:11	244:6
298:7	241:14	i	
truly 138:5 152:16	turnover 233:5,11	unable 232:12	understood 138:7
trusty 8:14	291:10	unacceptable	140:18
truth 160:21	turns 105:12	115:5	undertake 228:2
	121:19 125:19	unanticipated	254:9
try 35:20 40:12 93:19 107:19	170:20 183:11	281:3	undertaking
118:22 171:9	184:2 288:6	unbundle 236:2	295:12
242:6 263:18	290:5	unbundled 235:21	underwrite 187:14
267:3 268:2	turntable 21:3,4,7	288:19	unduly 105:13
269:18 273:1	22:8	•	146:16
trying 103:21	turntable.fm	uncertain 41:8	1
110:2 119:1,14	17:12	72:8	unexpurgated 239:6
235:12 242:11	TV 162:5 185:1	uncertainty 270:7	
249:21 250:4	twice 101:16 116:8	unclear 114:6	unfair 134:16
251:5 270:4		uncomfortable	135:15,19
282:7	two-and-a-half	47:5 139:12	unforeseen 74:11
Tuesday 1:12	34:18	undercompensate	unfortunately
tumultuous 72:7	two-pronged	d 32:7	119:3 202:4
	220:5		213:11
tune 189:10	Two-thirds 145:8	undergraduate 193:13	unique 61:15
tunes 46:14	type 61:1,3 66:1	200:16,18	83:21 98:7,14
turn 8:15 38:1,16	73:19 107:12	i i	100:4 121:4
39:13 42:20	262:5 295:12	underlying 17:3	122:4 124:2
46:11 62:12 66:6	types 172:19 185:8	undermined 65:19	185:2 222:22
74:15 106:6	261:16	undermines 125:1	250:12
112:21 137:11		underneath 156:6	uniquely 45:16
138:1 155:22 173:14 177:3	typewriting 298:6	understand 6:18	uniqueness 84:1
1/3:14 1//:3	typical 283:19	10:12 52:3 54:4	unit 293:7
245:14,22	typically 97:7	107:3 163:9	
259:10 268:6	100:12 126:6	164:12 221:13	united 1:1 97:3 100:15 157:2
271:14 274:22	244:9	242:1,10,11	204:22
278:14 284:20		244:5 253:21	229:17,19 272:2
turned 32:4 69:7	<u> </u>	understandably	ŕ
101:12,14 148:8	U.S 224:1,8	62:22	Universal
176:13	ubiquitously		79:13,15 172:15 179:4 210:13
1,0.13	157:3	understanding	247:9 248:7
		131:21 132:12	241.7 240.1


266:12 University 43:1 116:16 192:15 193:16 university-wide 193:1 unless 130:17 132:10 134:5 178:2,3 179:17 278:9 unlike 63:14 113:16 unlikely 226:16 250:14 unlimited 57:8 unpack 264:5 unquote 41:5,10,21 42:7,9 49:21	16:4 24:17 130:22 135:14,16 137:4 up-front 149:21 upgraded 29:1 upheld 95:18 99:1 uplink 108:4 upon 25:16 89:17 113:9 209:2 227:3 228:3 259:4 284:14 upper 92:8 117:11 145:10 171:19 183:2 292:10 up-to-date 136:19 urge 51:15 69:2 82:9,16 138:22 urging 40:13 USA-ATT 201:6	vacuum 267:7 valid 124:12 257:22 258:7 259:5,7 validate 33:5 valor 9:15 valuable 248:21 valuation 43:3 value 36:16 42:7 44:18 46:2 47:2,18 50:17 51:13 64:8 93:21 101:2 110:3,5,6 142:13,14 166:22 168:6	172:19 176:5 194:4 220:13 223:18 236:2 252:11,12 262:14 266:16 271:18 281:10 293:11 vary 65:22 vehicle 180:19 vehicles 56:19 63:12 verbatim 97:5 226:15 verify 208:16 Verizon 241:5 versa 92:3 version 239:6 versus 41:7 45:3 67:3 78:5 94:10
50:9,11 58:17 79:17 189:8 unreasonable 270:16 unrelated 81:4 unresolved 228:13 unsubstantiated 180:15 unusual 109:8 unwarranted 75:18 unwilling 268:14 upcoming 78:11 update 130:4,12,22 131:10 132:12 137:5 updated 135:10 updating 13:3	USA-ATT 201:6 usable 94:6 USC 10:1 useful 37:20 95:21 148:22 178:11 284:3 useless 121:17 user 37:10 54:20 55:2,6,9 58:6 59:9,10 61:9 103:8 104:17 107:20 196:20 237:14,19 users 35:14 55:14 93:22 237:13 User's 197:9 usual 219:19 usually 206:17 209:16 255:15	169:3,10 170:18 171:2 180:3,19,21,22 189:21 230:8 235:1 242:8 260:11 286:1 295:14 valued 27:9 77:13 100:12 106:2 variable 149:17 Variation 283:10 variety 12:9 54:10 201:1 223:17 242:2 various 40:14 54:13 55:16 64:22 72:6 91:8 92:20 101:20 107:10,17 108:6 116:9 118:22 125:4 135:1,2	152:10 168:7 169:15 183:19 204:19 226:21 230:19 231:17 294:4 vet 198:11 veteran 74:7 viability 35:21 86:20 104:22 198:9 232:22 viable 233:16 vice 77:4 92:3 95:6 video 113:21 114:3,7 280:19 view 32:5 69:3,19 78:21 122:11 229:10 285:19 295:19 viewed 30:19

136:15 137:6	280:22 281:3	139:9 157:18	whole 173:12
views 75:10	wasted 283:5	163:6 189:5,7	177:9 208:14
170:17		190:5 195:5	235:10 240:5,9
	ways 62:6 93:19	200:10 225:3	247:17 273:5,15
virtually 15:8	125:7 137:7	229:16	277:11 288:3
virtues 186:1	146:2 154:5 161:8 166:6,7	237:7,15,16	wholesale 216:5
visiting 194:3	183:17 198:21	254:21 257:8	247:19
vitae 193:17,22	241:8 248:22	284:3 288:13	whom 8:15 70:16
200:20 206:12	288:3 289:15	289:1,4 291:8	
vividly 206:21	291:20	we've 21:2 30:5	who's 19:20
Ĭ ,	Web 16:1 17:11	115:15 143:19	whose 63:9 70:21
VMI 97:5	24:4 224:6	149:3 152:8	74:1 244:17
Volume 1:7		153:19 159:17	298:3
volumes 48:18	webcaster 178:9	171:6 275:9	widely 74:2
	282:5,22	whatever 22:2,11	widely-accepted
voluntarily 121:9	webcasters 178:18	29:2 32:18 35:22	117:2
177:4	webcasting 56:6	132:13 148:16	wildly 68:22
voluntary	81:6 99:7,10,21	187:20 226:1	•
43:18,19 57:11	166:16	238:2 247:16	William 2:3 6:12
59:1	178:10,16,20	259:17	Williams 94:20
	we'd 26:10	whatsoever 31:2	95:6 102:16
W		64:7,14 85:3	112:2
Wagner 141:6	Wednesday 297:5	whenever 55:8	willing 40:5,16
walk 171:9 285:1	week 6:16 7:8,9,11	58:7 135:5	86:14 87:9
walking 286:18	weekends 152:16	whereas 259:2	100:19 143:17
	weeks 191:3	268:13	144:9 164:11
walk-through 60:10,11	205:18	whereby 91:2	167:2,4 169:12
1	weighed 92:16		220:7,15 245:19
waning 9:11		Whereupon 68:14	249:13 255:10
Warner 22:10,19	Weil 2:12 9:4	128:20 190:12 191:22 274:6	277:21
120:17 121:8	11:13	297:3	window 16:12
warranted 51:17	welcome 6:4 19:14		32:10
71:21	26:13	whether 28:21	winds 103:19
Warwick 116:17	we'll 60:13 68:13	61:1 114:7 144:4	189:12
	160:17 175:17	164:14 196:13	wireless 223:5
Washington	176:18 188:16	198:20 206:10	224:2 240:10
1:2,11,17 3:15	191:13 193:10	233:16 237:4	
4:9 9:9	200:2 283:6	238:6 254:2,6 267:1 276:2,16	wish 21:16 23:17
wasn't 18:20,21	we're 25:8	282:21 283:1	55:15 134:13
99:18 104:4	52:11,19 83:9		136:11
135:15 146:6	86:3 131:14	whichever 67:9	wishes 58:7
184:3 254:8,12	137:18 138:3	white 102:11	Wisniewski 2:4
	157.101.50		VI ISIIICW SKI 2.4

withdraw 97:2 100:8 102:7 write 21:15 199:22 9:10 51:11,12 202:8,15 131:9 137:7 writing 199:4 204:18 withheld 85:5,8 167:19 194:10 273:16 you-all 41:2 withess 7:17 60:9 223:21 226:20 23:21 226:20 23:13 49:5 60:4 121:17 267:13 274:15 33:13 49:5 60:4 96:17 120:10 134:11,12,13,18, 19,20 135:22 workable 253:14 131:17,20 133:14 134:8 19,20 135:22 workable 253:14 149:15 170:22 you've 52:13 7 202:3,7,19 204:9 248:8 251:4 200:3 203:20 148:4 149:21 206:15,19,22 256:22 277:21 225:6 246:17 259:11 275:1 200:21 201:1 238:20 workaround 239:9 wrong 41:10 57:18 71:19 91:20 203:4 222:7 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 working 62:9 76:2 wrote 195:21 274:3 293:16		1 46		
26:16 51:20 52:7	1			
131:16 132:22				
108:11,14			188:3 205:12	
109:15 133:16 134:4 181:12,16 182:3,8,18 184:9,11 206:4,9,18,20 207:1,6 219:16 241:16 242:3,10 243:10,13 244:1 252:21 253:9,21 255:1,22 256:14,20 257:4 270:14 296:17,18 97:2 100:8 102:7 withdraw 202:8,15 withstand 155:17 witheld 85:5,8 withstand 155:17 withess 7:17 60:9 120:13,14,16 121:17 233:14;11,12,13,18, 19,20 135:22 136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 220:24,15 238:20 220:24;15,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 worked 95:3 working 62:9 76:2 worked 95:3 working 62:9 76:2 worde 195:21 225:63:272:11 256:11,12,166 256:3 277:18 225:13 253:16 worde 195:21 225:13 253:16 worde 195:21 226:3 273:16 226:3 273:16 worde 195:21 226:3 273:16 226:3 273:16 worde 195:21 226:3 273:16 226:3 273:16 worde 195:21 226:3 273:16 226:3 27			world 19:15 110:1	
134:4 181:12,16		,	203:4,7 236:18	
182:3,8,18 184:9,11 206:4,9,18,20 207:1,6 219:16 243:10,13 244:1 252:21 253:9,21 254:4,15 255:1,22 256:14,20 257:4 270:14 296:17,18 97:2 100:8 102:7 202:8,15 131:9 137:7 withdraw 202:8,15 139:33.14 273:16 273:18 273		190:20	265:21	256:11,12,16
182-3,16	1	woe 157:17	worse 106:1 263:3	
184-3-11 206-4-9,18,20 207-16,6 219:16 241:16 242:3,10 243:10,13 244:1 252:21 253:9,21 254:4,15 255:1,22 256:14,20 257:4 270:14 296:17,18 97:2 100:8 102:7 withdraw 202:8,15 131:9 137:7 withstand 155:17 203:4,14 208:10 223:21 226:20 120:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 121:17 239:10:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:13,14,16 226:20 223:21 226:20 120:13,14,16 226:20 223:21 226:20 226:11 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 265:15,515 working 62:9 76:2 worked 95:3 working 62:9 76:2 worked 195:21 worked 95:3 worked 95:21 274:3 293:16 worked 195:21 274:3 293:16 274:3 293:16 274:3 293:16 274:3 293:16 274:	, ,	wonderful 87:5		
207:1,6 219:16 241:16 242:3,10 243:10,13 244:1 252:21 253:9,21 254:4,15 256:14,20 257:4 270:14 296:17,18 97:2 100:8 102:7 104:17 123:9 202:8,15 131:9 137:7 withheld 85:5,8 withstand 155:17 withseas 7:17 60:9 120:13,14,16 121:17 134:11,12,13,18, 19,20 135:22 136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 242:13,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 worked 95:3 242:13 242:13 260:16,20 worthy 276:5 wienth 70:13 97:15 242:13 260:16,20 worthy 276:5 worthy 276:5 wwithy 276:5 wwip 68:19 wienth 26:3 yield 245:9 271 yielded 166:3 yields 37:18 York 2:14 3:7 9:10 51:11,12 204:18 you-all 41:2 wrap-up 293:17 write 21:15 199:22 wrap-up 293:17 write 21:15 199:22 writing 199:4 273:16 writen 12:7 13:10 21:16 25:17 33:13 49:5 60:4 96:17 120:10 131:17,20 244:3 39:5,18 45:11 242:13,18 149:15 170:22 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 244:3 242:13,16 244:14,14 239:9 workand 239:9 worked 95:3 working 62:9 76:2 wrote 195:21 wrote 195:21 274:3 293:16 wrote 195:21 274:3 293:16 274:3 293:16 274:3 293:16 274:3 293:16 wrote 195:21 274:3 293:16 2	•			yearly 29:11
241:16 242:3,10 243:10,13 244:1 252:21 253:9,21 250:16,20 260:16,20 260:16,20 250:14,415 255:1,22 256:14,20 257:4 270:14 296:17,18 97:2 100:8 102:7 202:8,15 131:9 137:7 203:4,14 208:10 223:21 226:20 120:13,14,16 121:17 236:19 202:3,114,16 121:17 236:19 202:3,114,16 121:17 236:19 266:9 266:2 266:13,14,16 121:17 236:19 202:21 226:20 120:13,14,16 121:17 256:9 266:2 266:13 274:15 134:11,12,13,18, 19,20 135:22 136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 200:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 239:9 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 255:3:5,15 256:15,15 256:11,15,16 243:12,17 255:3:5,15 256:11,15,16 256:15,15,15 256:11,15,16 256:15,15,15 256:11,15,16 256:15,15,15 256:11,15,16 256:15,15,15 256:11,15,16 256:15,15,15 256:11,15,16 256:15,15,15 256:11,15,16 256:15,15,15 256:11,15,16 256:15,15,15 256:11,15,16 256:11			· ·	yellow 69:4
243:10,13 244:1 252:21 253:9,21 254:4,15 255:1,22 256:14,20 257:4 270:14 296:17,18 202:8,15 202:8,15 203:4,14 208:10 203:4,14 208:10 21:17 134:11,12,13,18, 19,20 135:22 136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 202:3,15 256:22 277:21 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 256:22 276:24 270:14 296:11,16,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 296:11,14,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 296:11,14,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 296:11,14,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 296:11,14,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 296:11,14,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 296:11,14,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 296:11,14,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 296:11,14,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 296:11,14,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 296:11,14,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 296:11,14,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 296:11,14,16,19 97:2 100:8 102:7 200:8 102:7 200:8 102:7 200:11,14,16,19 200:11,15,19 200:11,15,19 200:11 200:16,20 200:16,20 200:16,20 200:16,20 200:16,20 200:16,20 200:16,20 200:16,20 200:19:11 200:16,20 200:19:12 200:16,20 200:19:12 200:16,20 200:16,20 200:19:12 200:16,20 200:16,20 200:19:11 200:16,20 200:16,20 200:19:11 200:16,20 200:10:11 200:11 200:11 200:11 200:11 200:12 200:10:11 200:11 200:12 200:12 200:11 200:12 200:12 200:11 200:12 200:12 200:12 200:11 200:12 200:12 200:12 200:11 200:12 200:12 200:11 200:12 200:12 200:12 200:12 200:12 200:13 200:12 200:12 200:11 200:13 200:12 200:12 200:12 200:12 200:13 200:12 200:11 200:12 200:	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	_		vet 76:14 154:7 8
252:21 253:9,21 Woodbury's 180:13,14 worthy 276:5 yielde 245:9 271 255:1,22 wording 87:16 wrap 68:19 yielded 166:3 yielde 37:18 270:14 296:17,18 97:2 100:8 102:7 write 21:15 199:22 wrap-up 293:17 9:10 51:11,12 202:8,15 131:9 137:7 write 21:15 199:22 writing 199:4 273:16 writess 7:17 60:9 120:13,14,16 256:9 266:2 121:17 267:13 274:15 134:11,12,13,18, 19,20 135:22 136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 238:20 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 (51:115.11) 256:3 276:1 256:3 272:11 256:		180:7,8,11		•
254:4,15		Woodbury's	260:16,20	
255:1,22	· ·	180:13,14	worthy 276:5	yield 245:9 271:12
270:14 296:17,18 withdraw 202:8,15 withstand 155:17 witness 7:17 60:9 120:13,14,16 121:17 134:11,12,13,18, 19,20 135:22 136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 223:15 worka 69:22 york 2:14 3:7 york 2:14 3:7 writing 199:22 writing 199:4 273:16 written 12:7 13:10 21:16 25:17 33:13 49:5 60:4 96:17 120:10 131:17,20 133:14 134:8 149:15 170:22 136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 wrap-up 293:17 writing 199:2 writing 199:4 273:16 written 12:7 13:10 21:16 25:17 33:13 49:5 60:4 96:17 120:10 131:17,20 133:14 134:8 149:15 170:22 194:14 197:2 200:3 203:20 248:8 251:4 256:22 277:21 259:11 275:1 200:21 201:1 203:4 222:7 259:11 275:1 200:21 201:1 203:4 222:7 256:3 272:11 256:3 272:11 256:3 272:11 256:3 272:11 256:3 272:11 256:3 272:11	255:1,22	wording 87:16	wrap 68:19	yielded 166:3
296:17,18 96:11,14,16,19 wrap-up 293:17 York 2:14 3:74 withdraw 104:17 123:9 write 21:15 199:22 you-all 41:2 202:8,15 131:9 137:7 writing 199:4 you-all 41:2 withheld 85:5,8 167:19 194:10 198:3 199:5,8,11 writting 199:4 you-all 41:2 witness 7:17 60:9 223:21 226:20 33:13 49:5 60:4 you'll 29:5,18 you'll 29:5,18 120:13,14,16 256:9 266:2 266:17 120:10 33:13 49:5 60:4 80:4 148:18 80:4 148:18 19,20 135:22 workable 253:14 workable 253:14 149:15 170:22 you've 52:13 7 191:19,21 192:2 workably 40:6 248:8 251:4 200:3 203:20 148:4 149:21 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 255:22 277:21 workaround 239:9 wrong 41:10 57:18 71:19 91:20 200:21 201:1 203:4 22:7 256:3 272:11 274:3 293:16 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 worked 95:3 worke 195:21 wrote 195:21	[·	work 69:22	wrapped 96:22	yields 37:18
withdraw 97:2 100:8 102:7 write 21:15 199:22 9:10 51:11,12 202:8,15 131:9 137:7 writing 199:4 204:18 withheld 85:5,8 167:19 194:10 273:16 you-all 41:2 withstand 155:17 203:4,14 208:10 273:16 you'll 29:5,18 witness 7:17 60:9 223:21 226:20 33:13 49:5 60:4 46:7 52:12 54 120:13,14,16 256:9 266:2 96:17 120:10 131:17,20 80:4 148:18 19,20 135:22 267:13 274:15 131:17,20 244:3 160:2 176:1 19:19,21 192:2 248:8 251:4 149:15 170:22 you've 52:13 7 200:3 2,7,19 204:9 248:8 251:4 200:3 203:20 148:4 149:21 207:4,8 231:4 256:22 277:21 225:6 246:17 200:21 201:1 238:20 workaround 239:9 wrong 41:10 57:18 203:4 222:7 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 wrote 195:21 274:3 293:16	1		7.7	York 2:14 3:7 4:7
104.17 123.18 131:9 137:7 167:19 194:10 198:3 199:5,8,11 203:4,14 208:10 21:16 25:17 33:13 49:5 60:4 46:7 52:12 50:13 14:11,12,13,18 19,20 135:22 136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 205:11 53:1 53:1 253:5,15 205:11 53:1 253:5,15 205:11 53:1 205:21 205:3 14:15 15:11 205:10 131:17,20 131:1	· ·		î î l	9:10 51:11,12
withheld 85:5,8 167:19 194:10 273:16 you'll 29:5,18 withstand 155:17 198:3 199:5,8,11 written 12:7 13:10 39:5,18 45:11 203:4,14 208:10 223:21 226:20 21:16 25:17 39:5,18 45:11 46:7 52:12 54	l i		write 21:15 199:22	204:18
withstand 155:17 198:3 199:5,8,11 written 12:7 13:10 you'll 29:5,18 witness 7:17 60:9 223:21 226:20 xitness 7:17 60:9 223:21 226:20 xitness 7:17 60:9 xitness 7:17 60:4 xitness 7:18 20:10 xitness 7:17 120:10 xitness 7:17 60:4 xitness 7:18 20:10 xitness	, i		_	you-all 41:2
withstand 155:17 203:4,14 208:10 written 12:7 13:10 39:5,18 45:1 witness 7:17 60:9 120:13,14,16 223:21 226:20 33:13 49:5 60:4 46:7 52:12 54 121:17 267:13 274:15 33:13 49:5 60:4 80:4 148:18 160:2 176:1 134:11,12,13,18, 281:20 282:19 131:17,20 133:14 134:8 160:2 176:1 199:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 248:8 251:4 200:3 203:20 yourself 206:12 207:4,8 231:4 256:22 277:21 253:2 254:16 225:6 246:17 200:21 201:1 238:20 workaround 239:9 wrong 41:10 57:18 200:21 201:1 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 284:16 274:3 293:16 255:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 wrote 195:21 274:3 293:16	withheld 85:5,8		2/3:16	vou'll 29:5.18
witness 7:17 60:9 223:21 226:20 23:16 25:17 46:7 52:12 54 120:13,14,16 256:9 266:2 33:13 49:5 60:4 80:4 148:18 121:17 267:13 274:15 131:17,20 160:2 176:1 134:11,12,13,18, 281:20 282:19 133:14 134:8 yourself 206:12 19:19,20 135:22 workable 253:14 149:15 170:22 yourself 206:12 191:19,21 192:2 workably 40:6 248:8 251:4 200:3 203:20 148:4 149:21 206:15,19,22 253:2 254:16 256:22 277:21 225:6 246:17 200:21 201:1 238:20 workaround 239:9 wrong 41:10 57:18 203:4 222:7 242:1,5,16 worked 95:3 284:16 256:3 272:11 243:12,17 working 62:9 76:2 wrote 195:21 274:3 293:16	withstand 155:17	, ,	l l	,
120:13,14,16 121:17 134:11,12,13,18, 19,20 135:22 136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 120:13,14,16 256:9 266:2 267:13 274:15 281:20 282:19 workable 253:14 workable 253:14 vorkably 40:6 248:8 251:4 256:22 277:21 256:22 277:21 workaround 239:9 worked 95:3 working 62:9 76:2 256:9 266:2 267:13 274:15 267:13 274:15 281:20 282:19 133:14 134:8 149:15 170:22 194:14 197:2 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 208:5,22 221:21 208:5,22 221:21 209:3 203:20 200:21 201:1 200:21 201:1 203:4 222:7 251:3 253:11 256:3 272:11 274:3 293:16	witness 7:17 60:0			46:7 52:12 54:10
121:17 134:11,12,13,18, 19,20 135:22 136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 131:17,20 133:14 134:8 149:15 170:22 194:14 197:2 200:3 203:20 200:3 200:3 20 20		ì		80:4 148:18
134:11,12,13,18, 19,20 135:22 136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 131:17,20 133:14 134:8 149:15 170:22 194:14 197:2 200:3 203:20 200:3 200:3 20 20				160:2 176:1
19,20 135:22 136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 workable 253:14 workably 40:6 248:8 251:4 253:2 254:16 256:22 277:21 256:22 277:21 256:22 277:21 257:1 275:1 259:11 275:1 200:21 201:1 200:21 201:1 200:21 201:1 200:21 201:1 203:4 222:7 251:3 253:11 256:3 272:11 274:3 293:16				244:3
136:1 190:17 191:19,21 192:2 202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 workably 40:6 248:8 251:4 253:14 253:14 253:14 253:14 253:14 253:2 254:16 253:2 277:21 253:17 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 workably 40:6 240:18,21 250:3 203:20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3				yourself 206:12
202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 200:3 203:20 200:4 148:4 149:21 200:21 201:1 200:21 201:1 200:21 201:1 200:21 201:1 200:21 201:1 200:21 201:1 200:21 201:1 200:21 201:1 200:3 203:20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:3 20 200:3 200:				-
202:3,7,19 204:9 206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 208:5,22 221:21 208:5,22 221:21 225:6 246:17 259:11 275:1 200:21 201:1 203:4 222:7 251:3 253:11 256:3 272:11 274:3 293:16	•			-
206:15,19,22 207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 253:5,15 253:2,234:10 256:22 277:21 256:22 277:21 259:11 275:1 200:21 201:1 203:4 222:7 251:3 253:11 256:3 272:11 274:3 293:16	• •			•
207:4,8 231:4 238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 worked 95:3 working 62:9 76:2 259:11 275:1 200:21 201:1 203:4 222:7 251:3 253:11 256:3 272:11 274:3 293:16		3	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
238:20 240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 worked 95:3 working 62:9 76:2 239:9 worked 95:3 working 62:9 76:2 203:4 222:7 251:3 253:11 256:3 272:11 274:3 293:16			1	
240:18,21 242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 Wroting 41:10 37:18 71:19 91:20 284:16 274:3 293:16		· ·		
242:1,5,16 243:12,17 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 wrote 195:21 256:3 272:11 274:3 293:16	-	239:9	_	
243:12,17 253:5,15 working 62:9 76:2 wrote 195:21 274:3 293:16		worked 95:3		
253:5,15 working 02.9 70.2 wrote 195:21	i '			274:3 293:16
/>4· 6 //>5·4		9	i i	
7	254:1,6,17 255:4		197:11 198:17	7
250.4,15 257.20 Works 31:4 207:5	-		207:5	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
40.10,18 81.7 WSA 285:14	258:15 298:3,5,8	•	WSA 285:14	^
witnesses 5:7 97:16 99:5 zero 279:10				zero 279:10
8:6,19 54:11 100:12,21	8:6,19 54:11	100:12,21		



Attached is your MiniCD, containing your ASCII, .PDF and .VDF files, which are complimentary with every Capital Reporting Company transcript.



(Works in regular CD drive.)

Instructions for using your Visionary .VDF Transcript Viewer:

- I) Insert the MiniCD in your disk drive:
- 2) Open the disk on your computer and you will see a folder with the deponent's name and the deposition date. Open this folder:
- 3) Click on the "Viewer Start" file to begin installation of the Visionary

 Miewer to your computer. It will take less than two minutes.
- 4) Once installation is complete, open the "data" folder to find your VDF, .TXT and .PDF files. You can now open the .VDF file in the Visionary Viewer.

Please call us if you have any questions!